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ADDENDA! ERRATA
p84 After para 2 add: "The National Code of Local Government Conduct (DoE
1975) has been superceded by the 1990 Code (see DoE Circular 8/90). The
code has statutory status, and new councillors must declare that they are
to be guided by it. The Local Ombudsman can find a breach of the code
incompatible with good administration, and if maladministration is found,
and a member is in breach of the code, the Local Ombudsman must name the
member, unless it is considered unjust to do so."
p106 line 3 should read: "During its existence, the Representative Body,
supported by the Department of the Environment, was largely hostile to any
extension."
p123 line 8 should read: "1990" not "1971"
line 10 should read: "(section 217)" not "(section 105)"
line 29 should read: "Section 78 ...1990" not "Section 36 ...1971"
line 33 should read: "(Planning [Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas]
Act 1990)" not "(Schedule 11, pars 8)"
p124 line 1 should read: "(section 174)" not "(section 97)"
line 3 should read: "(sections 289,290)" not "(sections 242, 245)"
p138 At end of pare 1 add: "Sunkin (1987) also found few cases of judicial
review against local authorities, with 75, 69 and 120 cases each year in
the mid-1980s (p439)".
p262 After pare 1 add: "There is now statutory protection for such clients. The
Access to Personal Files Act 1987, which came into force on the 1 April
1989 enables an individual to know what is recorded about him/her in the
manually maintained records held by a local authority for the performance
of its social services functions. Regulations (Access to Personal Files
[Social Services] Regulations 1989) set out, inter alia, how access is to
be given, how the local authority's decision is to be reviewed, and what
exemptions there are."
- 2 -
pp272-274, 277, 308 References to "County" should read "Country"
p272 At the end of paragraph 2 should be added: "and consolidated into the Town
and Country Planning Act 1990".
p275 last line should read: "1990 Act" not "1971 Act"
p276 line 3 should read: "(section 55)" not "(section 22)"
line 6 should read: "1990, section 57" not "1971, section 23[1]"
line 9 should read: "Part VII of the 1990 Act" not "Part V of the 1971
Act"
line 12 should read: "(section 172[1])" not "(section 87(1])"
p284 lines 16-17 should read: "section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act
1990" not "section 245 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971"
p308 line 16 should read: "Section 66 of the 1990" not "Section 27 of the 1971"
line 20 should read: "section 66(7]" not "section 27(77"
line 23 should read: "(section 71)" not "(section 29[3116])"
line 24 should read: "Section 65 of the 1990 Act" not "Section 26 of the
1971 Act"
line 29 should read "(section 71)" not "(section 29[2])"
p309 After pare 2 add: "Circular 22/88 (DoE 1988b) also recognised that there
are occasions when publicity may be desirable, even though not required by
statute, in particular where there would be a significant change in a
homogeneous area, and where there could be adverse effects on the general
character of an area (Appendix B, pare 4)".
p336 Add: DoE (1988b) Department of the Environment Circular 22/88 General 
Development Order Consolidation: The Town and Country Planning General 
Development Order 1988 The Town and Country Planning (Applications] 
Regulations 1988 (London: DoE)
p347 Add: "Sunkin, M (1987) "What is Happening to Applications for Judicial
Review" (1987) 50 Modern Law Review 432
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Winifred Mary Seneviratne
SUMMARY
This study examines the ways in which local authorities in England
handle complaints from consumers of their services, and, in
particular, looks at the extent of and use of internal complaints
procedures. It is argued that complaints procedures are important
because they are a part of a citizen's democratic entitlement, and
that, as they are concerned with the resolution of the individual
trouble case, they are a fit study for lawyers. Justifications are
given for locating the study within local government, and the impact
of organisational theory in this area is explored.
Other methods of dealing with consumer complaints are examined, and it
is concluded that, although councillors, the courts and the Local
Ombudsman all have a role to play in this area, there is still a need
for authorities to have internal complaints procedures.
The major part of the study explores in detail the extent of
authority-wide internal complaints procedures in local government in
England. It justifies the use of these procedures, and compares the
experiences of various departments within local government in relation
to the use of departmental complaints procedures. In addition, there
is more detailed study of social services departments and planning
departments, not only in relation to complaints procedures, but also
in relation to other practices which may reduce complaints.
Authorities, in general, did not have well developed complaints
procedures, and there was little evidence of their use as part of the
managerial process. There were, however, some authorities with good
practices, and there is evidence of change within local government,
which is now recognising the necessity of taking complaints seriously.
ACKNOWLEDGEMNTS
I would like to express my thanks to a number of people for their
contribution to this study. I am especially grateful to Professor
Norman Lewis, not only for acting as my supervisor, but also for
giving me the opportunity to become involved in the research project
from which this study arose, and for his encouragement throughout the
research. / would also like to thank a number of the staff at the
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, in particular, Diane Longley and Ian
Harden for their help and support, and Lilian Bloodworth, Sue Turner
and Julie Prescott, for preparing the drafts. I am also grateful to
Ian Brownlee for his help in the final preparation of the text.
Although not named individually, I would like to express my thanks to
all those officers and members of local authorities who took part in
the research, together with the staff in central government
departments and the Local Ombudsman's office for their valuable
assistance.
Finally, special mention must be made of my two daughters, Anna and
Sarah, for their patience and understanding during the course of the
research, and I would like to thank them for not making too many
demands on my time during the final stages of the project. Of course,
any errors are entirely my own.
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION
	
1
PART ONE	 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Chapter /	 Grievances, Law-Jobs and Democracy 	 7
Chapter 2 Local Government-Its Autonomy and its Study 	 30
Chapter 3 Grievance Redress and the Managerial Enterprise	 52
PART TWO	 ALTERNATIVE/ADDITIONAL METHODS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Chapter 4 Elected Members	 72
Chapter 5 The Local Ombudsman	 89
Chapter 6 The Courts
	
122
PART THREE LOCAL AUTHORITY PROCEDURES
Chapter 7 Authority-Wide Complaints Procedures 	 146
Chapter 8 Social Services Departments and Complaints Procedures 203
Chapter 9 Planning Departments and Complaints Procedures 	 271
CONCLUSIONS
	
323
BIBLIOGRAPHY
	
331
- 1 -
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis arose out of a major study into complaints procedures in
local government, jointly funded by the Department of the Environment,
the Commission for Local Administration and the Economic and Social
Research Council. Norman Lewis was the instigator of the study, for
which I was the senior research officer, and it was conducted over a
period of 18 months from January 1985.
The study itself (which will be referred to in the thesis as "the
Sheffield Study") was to investigate the ways in which local
authorities handle complaints from consumers of their services.
Despite the fact that there had been calls for local authorities to
adopt complaints procedures by the Local Ombudsman (see CLA 1978) and
Radcliffe Maud (1974), there was little information about their
operation, or indeed, as to the numbers which existed at all. The
Sheffield Study was designed to discover how many authorities had
complaints procedures, and how such procedures were interpreted and
incorporated into the work of the authority and the various
departments.
Throughout my work on the Sheffield project, I began to examine
complaints procedures from the point of view of Justice and due
process. Complaints, or grievances, are unresolved problems where
redress is needed, and grievance procedures provide an important
mechanism for resolving these individual trouble cases. As a lawyer I
am concerned with the study of the process of dispute resolution. Most
lawyers tend to focus on the courts, the "formal" arena for settling
disputes, and have paid little attention to less formal methods.
Although some of the areas of conflict dealt with in this study could
be processed by the courts, courts are not always appropriate or
satisfactory for a number of reasons, which will be discussed fully in
Chapter 6. The less formal and informal mechanisms of dispute
resolution are fit subjects for study, and they ought to be studied,
as it is at this level that vast numbers of disputes are processed.
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Within local government the elected member has traditionally performed
an informal method of dispute solving. Valuable though they be in this
role, local councillors cannot provide a systematic method of
complaint handling, a view which will be expanded upon in Chapter 4.
The introduction of the Local Ombudman system has also provided an
additional avenue of redress where the complaint is one of injustice
arising from maladministration. Its role will be discussed in Chapter
5, but it is worth noting at this stage that the Commission actively
encourages authorities to develop and publicise their own complaints
procedures, and encourages the use of local settlements.
As in the Sheffield Study, therefore, my main focus is on the use of
formal complaints procedures within local government, and a central
theme throughout the work is that the lack of procedures for the
redress of grievances can be an injustice in itself, by denying an
accessible avenue of complaint.
Another aspect of the theme of Justice is a concern that rules are
applied properly, and discretion is not exercised in an arbitrary
fashion. Complaints procedures can be of use in this respect, as they
are a mechanism for challenging the application of the rules, and thus
a means of ensuring their proper application. They can be used to
ensure that discretion is properly exercised, as all decisions, even
those involving a high degree of discretion, are an exercise of
judgement, arrived at for certain reasons. By allowing these reasons
to be challenged, a complaints procedure would reduce the opportunity
for arbitrary decisions.
Alongside the concern for Justice is the belief that complaints
procedures can be viewed as part of a citizen's democratic
entitlement, a particular aspect of the democratic promise being
openness and accountability. Accountability, the idea that
democratically elected bodies are answerable for their actions, should
not be confined to the process of elections. It should have a more
immediate, and sometimes personal, impact, and one way of achieving
this is for there to be a process by which decisions can be challenged
3as they occur. Complaints procedures are thus one method of
accountability; by allowing an opportunity for challenge, the whole
administrative process will have to become more open and accessible.
Related to accountability is the concept of participation, and,
indeed, these two words are sometimes used synonymously. However,
participation and accountability are different in the sense that
participation means involvement in the decision-making process, giving
those concerned a chance to influence decisions and participate in the
process of policy formation, whereas accountability is about a
challenge to a decision which has already been taken. In this sense,
complaints procedures are not directly concerned with participation,
but their use may result in more consumer involvement in policy
formation and implementation, as, if complaints are monitored, they
can be used to provide a greater base of information on which to make
decisions. The use of complaints procedures as an information system
for management will be explored in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, which examine
three separate areas of local government work. There is also some
evidence to show that effective grievance procedures will indicate
where resource responsibilities lie, and that this will compel some
consultation about resource allocation.
Before leaving the issue of participation, it is worth noting the
concern which has been expressed about the progressive rationalisation
of public decisions, which has reached a point where social
organisation and decision making might be delegated to computers and
taken out of the arena of public debate altogether. The increasingly
powerful bureaucratic state also undermines the possibility of
participating usefully in decision making processes through the usual
democratic channels such as political parties and elections.
Complaints procedures may help to weaken this trend, by allowing
decisions to be challenged, and in turn provide information for the
decision making process. It might be thought that there is a
contradiction between administrative efficiency and representative
administration, but present developments indicate that there may be
another side to this coin. It is not suggested that complaints
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procedures will correct all wrongs, but they can assist in the search
for efficiency; they can highlight sites of responsibility for
decision taking and bring to light gaps in management systems. These
themes will be explored more fully in Chapter 1.
The focus of the thesis is local government, the major reason being
that the Sheffield Study, on which it is based, was set up
specifically to look at complaints procedures in local authorities. In
addition to this, as local government is democratically elected, it
provides a useful focus upon which to explore the issue of democratic
entitlement. As well as being a democratic body, local government is a
major provider of services to the citizen, and it is important that
the citizen has some opportunity, between elections, to express
dissatisfaction with the services received, particularly as many of
these services are delivered through the medium of discretionary
powers.
This is discussed more fully in Chapter 2, but it should be noted that
the Department of the Environment, which partly funded the Sheffield
research, is particularly keen that local authorities establish
complaints procedures. It may be cynical to suggest that their
interest is more to do with enabling citizens to act as watchdogs over
local authorities, rather than empowering citizens in a general sense.
Indeed, it could be argued that complaints procedures are unhelpful in
this sense, because they individualise and channel grievances into an
acceptable forum, rather than confront what may be the real issue of
the grievance, for example, a reduction in resources. They thereby
divert attention away from policies about resource allocation, and
concentrate upon issues of maladministration. I do not believe that
this need necessarily be so, and this argument is not an argument
against procedures; just a caveat about their use. Grievance
procedures are not an alternative to other political processes; they
should supplement them. It may indeed be that procedures can highlight
the problem of scarce resources and bring the issue into the political
arena. This raises the issue of the relationship between central and
local government, and throughout the Sheffield Study the tension in
5this relationship was manifested in a number of ways. This issue will
be directly addressed in Chapter 2.
Those not concerned with the use of complaints procedures to empower
citizens, may nevertheless be persuaded of their usefulness for
another reason; namely, management information, as it is argued that
complaints procedures can be used as a way of monitoring the
performance of the organisation. This is another theme of the thesis,
and Chapter 3 offers some theoretical basis for explaining the
relationship between grievance redress and the managerial enterprise.
The fact that an organisation has complaints procedures does not
necessarily mean that they work, as it may be that insofar as the
public are sympathetically treated, it is the result of a benign
culture and a web of informal grievance handling. There may be a
submerged body of complaints which administrative cultures help to
suppress. When procedures are introduced there may, or may not, be
resistance by members of the organisation; procedures may be
highlighted or submerged. Attention must be paid to correcting this
tendency where it happens and attention must be paid to the creation
of a positive culture of rights, alongside well-publicised and
accessible complaints procedures.
The major part of the thesis is devoted to the study of complaints
procedures in local authorities in England. It draws to a large extent
on material obtained during the course of the Sheffield Study, where
the methodology adopted was postal questionnaires for the quantitative
information, and interviews with local government personnel, and
perusal of local authority documents for the qualitative information.
This was supplemented by studies of consumer experiences of local
authority procedures and of the local ombudsman systems. As the Senior
Research Officer for the project, I was largely responsible for the
direction of the research, and, although this thesis is based on the
empirical work of the Sheffield Study, for which I was largely
responsible, it explores developments which have taken place since the
published report (Sheffield Report 1986), and places the whole issue
of complaints procedures in a broader theoretical framework. It also
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attends to the broader policy implications of complaints procedures,
which the Sheffield Study, being essentially empirical and
commissioned, largely avoided.
I also decided to restrict the thesis to a part only of the local
authority business covered in the Sheffield Study, so, although that
study examined five local authority areas in detail, this thesis
concentrates primarily on two; social services and planning. During
the course of the Sheffield research, I developed an interest in the
area of social services, and as well as contributing to a large extent
to the Sheffield Report (1986) as a whole, the chapter on the social
services was my responsibility. It therefore seemed appropriate to
pursue this service area in greater detail in the thesis, rather than
presenting what would be comparatively superficial accounts of five
service areas. In order to give a more balanced picture of local
authority developments, planning departments were also chosen for
further study. Both social services and planning departments are
heavily legislated and regulated and have a number of appeal
mechanisms, and both have a significant impact on the lives of
consumers. However, in relation to complaints, the Local Ombudsman's
published figures have repeatedly revealed large numbers of planning
complaints, but relatively small numbers of complaints about social
services. These two areas therefore represent contrasting areas for
study, and present a more complete picture of the role of complaints
procedures within departments.
Where necessary, throughout the thesis, I acknowledge the Sheffield
Study in general as a source of information, and in particular, I
occasionally refer to the Sheffield Report (1986) which was the
published report arising from the research project.
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PART I THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
CHAPTER 1 GRIEVANCES. LAW-SOBS AND DEMOCRACY 
Grievance Procedures 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the ways in which local
authorities handle complaints from consumers of their services. It is
accepted that complaint can be a difficult concept to define, and that
it is necessarily elusive and context dependant. A grievance can
evolve according to both the circumstances and the individual actors'
perception; for example, a statement that vermin are present in a
council flat, is more likely to be interpreted as a complaint by a
housing officer than is the same statement made to an officer in an
environmental health department. I did not want to use a narrow,
legalistic definition, and for the empirical research the definition
used by the Commission for Local Administration in their 1978 Code of
Practice (CLA 1978) seemed adequate:
"'Complaint ... should not be too narrowly defined. The
definition should certainly cover the small minority of matters
which are clearly complaints and may end as allegations of
injustice caused by maladministration and be referred to a Local
Commissioner. It should also, however, cover those other
approaches to Authorities, whether for advice, information or to
raise an issue which, if not handled properly could turn into
complaints." ( p3).
I am using "complaint" interchangeably with the word "grievance", and
referring to an unresolved problem where redress is needed. There is
a distinction to be made between grievance procedures, complaints
procedures and appeal procedures (see Leak 1986, p86). Grievance
procedures and complaints procedures are synonymous, with appeal
procedures as a sub-group of these. What they all have in common is
some formal provision for an aggrieved party to go to a higher level
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or external body. The difference with an appeal procedure is that the
body to whom the appeal is made has power to impose its decision in
the disputed area. This study is looking primarily at
grievance/complaints procedures, although reference is made to
particular appeal mechanisms where appropriate.
Until recently there was little theoretical or empirical work in this
area, but interest in grievance redress has increased over the last
few years.	 (See Rawlings 1986 for a review).	 The emergence of a
"complaints industry" (see Crawford 1988, p246) has been strongly
influenced by consumer movements, especially in the USA, where there
are highly developed complaints procedures within and outside of
government agencies.
The American attitude to such procedures can be illustrated by the
following quotation;
"No set of guidelines, rules or principles can assure individual
gratification over policy decisions; but the allocation of
adequate skills, resources, and procedures to the handling of
citizen complaints and grievances can assure accountable,
responsive government sensitive to the needs and concerns of the
ordinary American and entitled to his confidence and support"
(Rosenblum 1974, p5).
Indeed, enshrined in the American constitution, in the First
Amendment's restriction on the power of congress, is the statement
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress o grievances" (emphasis added).
So far as this country is concerned, and specifically local
government, there were recommendations in the 1970s that authorities
should develop their own internal arrangements for receiving and
investigating complaints.
	 One came from Redcliffe-Maud (1974), and
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one from the Commission for Local Administration (CLA 1978), which
even issued a code of practice.
Although there has been an upsurge of interest in grievance mechanisms
over the last few years, there has, until now, been little empirical
evidence about local government. There is a dearth of knowledge about
the extent to which mechanisms exist, and the operation of those which
do exist. We have scant knowledge of the way procedures are
interpreted and incorporated into the work of personnel within
authorities; whether there are different approaches and practices
across authorities or between departments when they respond to
consumer complaints. It may be that the existence of complaints
procedures result in organisations using other methods to prevent
disputes arising, by allowing, for example, consultation or in-built
appeal mechanisms, or other "good practice" measures.
Although previous research in this area is sparse, what there is
suggests that the response to the recommendations from Redcliffe-Maud
(1974) and the CLA (1978) was negligible. Justice (1980) found that
less than 20% of local authorities interviewed had taken significant
steps to improve complaint handling in response to the CLA's code of
practice. Others found that complaints procedures only existed in
somewhat erratic and fortuitous circumstances (Lewis and Birkinshaw
1979a). And, for example, in education departments the "practices of
grievance disposal were more or less arbitrary and operated
independently of coherent notions of justiciability" 	 (Lewis 1981,
p99). Justice (1980) found such procedures "thin on the ground".
There is even less information on complaining behaviour. Friedman
(1974) observed that the better educated and higher socio-economic
classes tend to complain "more often and more successfully."
Experience in the USA has led to the observation of the "squeaky
wheel" syndrome, where the persistent complainers are the ones who
obtain redress. It would be interesting to see if one can make
general comments about complaining and complaints, and discover
whether there are different types of complaining behaviour, and what
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effect grievance procedures have on such behaviour. Thynne and
Goldring (1987), writing about the "new" administrative law in
Australia, believe that there has been a change in the climate and
culture of complaining. As well as the Australian reforms increasing
the number of mechanisms available for reviewing administrative
action, they have also reduced the effect of some of the psychological
and cultural barriers which have, in the past, acted as a significant
deterrent to many of those who believed they were victims of the
system.
I would sound a word of caution here. It is not inevitable that an
appeal procedure leads to a culture of justice. Leak (1986) found, in
his study of an appeal procedure in a local authority housing
department that rather than producing any distinctive shift in
attitudes or values, or importing a "culture of Justice" into the
department, the appeal procedure was largely assimilated to other
modes of working already present. What was evident was the use of
informal methods of resolving problems, and he concluded that the
values of formal Justice may be "just one set of competing values and
remain marginal where they lack widespread support" (Leak 1986,
p511). Therefore, in implementing such procedures, attention must be
paid to this factor, and an attempt made to create a positive culture
of rights.
It would also be interesting to see what role other agencies play, for
example, the courts, the local ombudsman, and elected members, in the
process of grievance resolution. Certainly, within local government,
the councillor has always been seen traditionally as a method of
dispute solving. Valuable though the member might be, increasing
specialisation and complexity has meant that not all issues can be
addressed by local councillors, who are busy people by definition.
Indeed Widdicombe (1986) found that on average councillors spent 74
hours on council duties in a typical month, with 13 of these being
spent on "electors' problems, surgeries, pressure groups" (Research
Volume II p42). By its nature, this method is unsystematic, which
militates against any claim that it ensures access to justice.
The concern for procedures can be set in the context of a general
concern about the shift away from the democratic basis of local
government (see McAuslan 1980) towards the corporate management style
espoused by Bains (1972). Within this approach, the role of elected
members has been curtailed by the concentration of power in a central
policy committee, consisting of a few key councillors, and by the
establishment of management teams of chief officers who decide what is
to be put before the committee (Bains 1972, pars 4.14).
Before developing these issues, this is perhaps an opportune time to
justify the role of law in this area, and my interest as a lawyer. I
approach complaints procedures from the viewpoint of a lawyer
recognising the importance of law as a political resource (see Lewis
1981, p104), with potential for influencing political change. Thus, I
agree with Cotterell and Bercusson (1988) that in modern societies
"law is a primary means by which institutions are defined and
protected, established policies are turned into state structures of
guiding principle, and strategies are implemented through the
elaboration of rules and regulations" (p2).
Others have recognised that lawmakers is a term which not only applies
to Judges and parliament, but that it also includes "the officialdom
of municipal governement ... of social agencies ... of schools, of
governmental health and welfare programmes" (Cahn and Cahn 1964,
p1333). In the past, lawyers have attempted to distinguish between
courts and tribunals, and Justice and administration, but "that
distinction, while never theoretically coherent, has become observably
untenable" (Lewis 1981, p91).
Local administration, along with other state activity, ought to be the
concern of lawyers, as administrative bodies constitute a major
mechanism for decision-making in society, and disputes will inevitably
arise.	 The lack of any procedure to deal with such disputes is an
injustice.	 The argument for a formal complaints procedure in this
context is a recognition that "High Rules of Lase administered by the
courts, are not always appropriate or satisfactory
	 (Lewis 1981).
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Friedman's classic study on the sociology of complaining , in which he
made a comparative analysis of Britain and Canada, found that the
"courts of the land apparently are not the place where the citizen ...
looks for administrative Justice" (Friedman 1974, pp9-10). The vast
majority of citizens in his survey were more likely to appeal up the
administrative hierarchy or turn to their elected representatives.
According to Kamenka and Tay (1975) the central problem for advanced
industrial societies in the twentieth century is no longer that of
private property; it is that of administration and social control.
More recently, Cotterell and Bercusson (1988) have been concerned to
examine the role of law in relation to democracy and social justice,
and in particular the forms of regulation and institutional forms
which are "available, feasible, and appropriate to secure as fully as
possible the capacity of each citizen to act autonomously ... in
determining the conditions which shape her or his life" (p2).
Lawyers may therefore, and law must, have an important role to play in
examining the operation of administrative bodies, and lawyers ought
also to be concerned with grievance resolution in general, which is a
perennial problem in any society. As a theoretical basis, Llewellyn's
law-Jobs theory provides a valuable yardstick for looking at
complaints mechanisms in society, and I will now briefly elaborate on
this theory.
Llewellyn and Law-Sobs 
For Llewellyn, if society was to remain effective:
"you must manage to deal with centrifugal tendencies, when they
break out, and you must manage, preventively, to keep them from
breaking out.	 And that you must effect organisation, and that
you must keep it effective. And that you must do all this by
means which do not choke off, but elicit, your necessary flow of
human energy" (Llewellyn 1940, p1373).
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Basically, then, Llewellyn's theory is that in every group or society,
certain Jobs have to be performed if the group is to remain cohesive
and stable. These needs are fulfilled by the Law-job, and "law-Jobs"
are the means of meeting these needs. Thus, law can be seen as "a
series of socially necessary tasks to be performed in any given
organisational framework" 	 (Harden and Lewis 1984, p2). 	 The main
concern of the "law-Jobs" is the fundamental one of survival:
"the Job must get done enough to keep the group going."
(Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941, p292)
Beyond this main concern, Llewellyn identified five law-jobs (see
Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941, p293), although Lewis (1981) has
categorised them into four main idea/ types: disposition of the
trouble case; preventive channelling; the constitution of groups; goal
orientation, that is, a concern with the policy, goals and objectives
of the group at large (p92). The law-Jobs can also be categorised as
procedures "for the resolution of grievances, for planning and
monitoring, for describing the legitimate anatomy of groups", these
being the necessary conditions of social intercourse (Harden and
Lewis 1984, p2).
For the purposes of this study, it is the first law-Job, "the
disposition of trouble cases", as identified by Llewellyn, which is
important, as grievance procedures are primarily mechanisms for
handling individual trouble cases. This particular law-job was seen
as "garage-repair work" (Llewellyn 1940, p1375).	 The trouble case
itself involves some grievance or dispute, the trouble being
"Individual" trouble.	 Individually the grievance may not pose any
threat to the group, but collectively and cumulatively they might.
Thus, individual trouble cases can present trouble for the whole
group, as they threaten to disrupt the established order.
The courts, of course, are one example of this particular law-Job.
However, they are only a more formal method than others. Informal
methods of dispute resolution, those which are "administered outside
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courts by such officers as prosecutors, welfare administrators,
immigration officers, economic regulators, and officers who award
subsidies" (Davis 1975, pl) should also be encompassed by this
particular law-Job, and, as mentioned previously, this is an area
which has tended to be ignored by lawyers.
Complaints procedures then are concerned primarily with handling the
individual trouble case. They are necessarily reactive, in that
people will use the procedure only if they have a particular
grievance.	 A secondary function, that of "preventive channelling",
"producing and maintaining a going order instead of a disordered
series of collisions" (Llewellyn 1940, p1376), may be to produce
generalistic rules of conduct, but this is very much secondary, as
rules will often only be made after a particular grievance has
progressed through the procedure. Rules will then be made about a
perceived problem after an aggrieved person has had his/her particular
problem adjudicated upon. This relies upon an individually aggrieved
person coming forward, It may be worth noting here that one problem
experienced by the Local Ombudsman is that the system relies upon an
aggrieved individual coming forward, and they are unable to
investigate on their own initiative, although recently there have been
attempts to encourage voluntary bodies to sponsor complaints from the
less articulate members of society. Thus, the secondary function of a
complaints procedure, the production of generalisable rules, is
restricted by the rationale of the individual trouble case.
Another problem with this particular law-Job is that it appears to
offer no alternative to the status quo. Because of this, it could be
argued that complaints procedures could be used as a sop to consumers,
in that they individualise and channel grievances into an acceptable
form, rather than confront what may be the real issue of the
grievance, for example, a reduction in resources. Wynne (1982)
recognises the ritualistic role of this particular law-Job, in his
work on the use of the Judicial inquiry, to handle the "trouble" of
the issue of nuclear power. He sees the process as a form of ritual
secrecy, but yet believes it is necessary in public life.
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"The rituals encasing such artificial frameworks tacitly mediate
otherwise conflicting forces, leading to the chronic postponement
of open confrontation. To the extent that they succeed in
moulding human behaviour to avoid violent confrontation, rituals
... may possess their own truth" (p viii).
While there must be some value in avoiding open conflict in society,
complaints procdures, being based on an individualistic ideology,
"bourgeois individualism" (Kamenka and Tay 1975), or the "ideology of
private property" (McAuslan 1980) may mask the real problem.
Complaints procedures could make better citizens, but they could also
feed individual greed; in other words, furthering the aims of
individualism rather than collectivism. As examples, an individual's
pursuit of the right to buy a council house may override an elected
authority's policy; the parents' right to express a preference for a
particular school for their child could override the local education
authority's aims and objectives. Lynes (1976), looking at the work of
the Unemployment Assistance Tribunals in the 1930s, concluded that,
although they looked at the individual trouble case, they were set up
as a deliberate act of the government seeking to provide a safety
valve, to divert criticism from the cuts it was introducing in the
rates of benefit. Consequently, trouble for the government was
averted through a device set up to handle the trouble of individuals.
Birkinshaw (1985) also notes this method of using grievance procedures
to "transmute conflicts of political, economic and social movement
into disputes between individuals based upon individual entitlement
and duty" (p187 original emphaisis).
A further concern is that complaints procedures are an attempt to move
even more power from the local level to the centre, with individual
citizens acting as watchdogs over local government's-activities by
being able to pursue individual complaints. This tendency has been
noted by Gamble (1989) who believes that the present government is
intent on weakening "the autonomy and legitimacy of all intermediate
institutions", thus "removing the institutional basis for any
opposition to policies determined at the centre" (07). Every organ
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of government (including local government) has been reduced "with the
exception of the power of the central government itself" (p18), thus
bringing about a change in the "autonomy and legitimacy of most
intermediate institutions" (p19).
Alarming though such scenarios appear to be they are not arguments
against procedures as such. Grievance procedures are not an
alternative to other political processes; they should supplement them.
Empowering citizens in such a way is a double-edged sword. Despite
the emphasis in some circles on individualism, such procedures could
result in better citizens; procedures can strengthen the capacity of
individuals to challenge and the challenge may.not stop at the local
authority. They may result in citizens forming interest groups, and
alerting some to the notion that collective action is the way forward.
To conclude this section, the disposal of trouble cases in local
government, as elsewhere, is a fit subject for study by lawyers. As
well as fulfilling the "trouble case" function, complaints
procedures can be seen as an aspect of the democratic promise, part of
that promise being accountability, openness and participation. They
can be used as form of citizen enfranchisement, making government
agencies more responsive by allowing some input in the processes which
determine modes of official behaviour (Cahn and Cahn 1964, p1333).
I would concur with Rosenblum (1974), who concludes that "complaint
handling, as a dimension of meritorious performance of services to the
people, can reduce alienation of individuals from their government,
enhance their awareness of opportunities for redress and heighten
their participation in the subtle and complex processes of democracy"
(p43). Some of these themes will be explored in the next section.
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Democracy 
It is worth restating that this is a study of local government, and
that, as such, it prompts a discussion of the nature of democracy.
The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London spoke of
local government being "an instance of democracy at work", and that
"no amount of potential administrative efficiency can make up for the
loss of active participation in the work by capable, public-spirited
people, elected by, responsible to, and in touch with those who
elected them" (Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London
1960, p59).
This local aspect is often emphasised, and indeed, it sometimes takes
on paramount importance:
"Above all else, a genuine local democracy implies that decisions
should be taken - and should be seen to be taken - as locally as
possible" (Government White Paper 1971, pare 8).
This point has, in turn, been emphasised by the Council of Europe,
which was convinced that m municipal autonomy is one of the cornerstones
of democracy in European countries", and judged it necessary to:
"strengthen representative democracy at the local level by
bringing decision-making as close as possible to the citizens and
involving citizens more directly in the management of the affairs
of their community while safeguarding efficiency in the conduct
of local affairs" (Council of Europe 1981, Recommendation No
R(81)18).
In this country, it is seen as important to "return power to those
people who should exercise decisions locally" (Government White Paper
1971, para 8). Indeed, as Buxton (1973) points out, the concept of
local democracy seems to rest more on the need for government to be
local, than upon any precise analysis of what is required for a system
of local government to count as truly democratic (p260).
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Democracy itself is a rather elusive concept, but at its basis is the
idea of legitimate government. Participatory government, where
everyone participates in the decision-making process, would be seen as
a legitimate form of democracy, although such a form is impossible in
a complex modern governmental organisation. Representative democracy
is therefore seen as a necessary form, because it is clearly
impossible to involve all the interested parties in the decision-
making process. This form demands that the final decision making
power should be in the hands of elected representatives, who can, at
certain specific times, be judged on their record by the electors, and
be dismissed by those electors, if the record is not satisfactory. In
addition to this, there is a form of democracy that demands that
individuals should be able to obtain information about the
government's actions, and have the power of bringing their views and
requirements on specific issues to the attention of those who govern,
with an expectation that they will be listened to.
Many are coming to believe that "the traditional representative model
of local government is no longer adequate to meet the demands which
are increasingly made by its electorate for policy-making that
responds to felt needs" ( Lewis and Harden 1982, p82), because "no
elected body can be expected to represent the sole legitimate forum
for resolving conflicting social and economic interests" (p66).
Representative government is an incomplete basis for fulfilling
citizenship, and there may be a need to involve the public more
actively in the political process. Ranson and Stewart (1989) raise
the issue of whether democracy in its basic form is "an adequate basis
for our society" (p16), because the views of the electorate can be
expressed only occasionally and in general terms. There is no
adequate opportunity for participation and expression of public views,
which are necessary to strengthen democracy during a period of social
change.
In a representative democracy, therefore, there are the twin ideals of
accountability (where the electors receive an account of what has been
done, and make decisions on the basis of it), and participation, which
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is "vital to the successful development of services which are
sensitive to local needs" (Seebohm 1968, para 127). These two
concepts will be examined in turn.
Accountability, that "assumed feature of the British way of public
life" (Lewis and Harden 1986, p239) is central to our idea of
democracy. At its most basic level, it means that governments, or any
other elected body, will be answerable to their electorates
periodically, through the process of elections, when not only their
future conduct, but also their past behaviour will be the subject of
scrutiny. In other words, although the citizen may not be able to
participate in the original decision-making process, s/he can demand
an account of it.
However, accountability and "answerability" cannot be confined to the
process of elections, because the "logic of choice .... assumes that
freely accessible information must characterize the political process"
(Harden and Lewis 1986, p42). The ideal of accountability, even in its
narrower sense, implies an openness in decision-making. The reason
for this assertion is that where there is representative government,
it is implicit that "choice of representative is paramount" (Lewis and
Harden 1986, p9) and choice can only be meaningful if there is a full
record of the candidates behaviour in the decision making process.
One aspect of this openness in decision-making is to have procedures
for challenging decisions as they occur, as such a procedure would
presuppose that reasons are given, and thus that there is some
Justification for them. Thus Robson (1988), in his research into the
housing department of a London Borough concludes that it is "crucial
for a decision-making body to have credibility and this, it is
suggested, can only be established by showing that it approaches cases
honestly and with integrity and comes to its conclusions uninfluenced
by outside pressures" (p21). This is also arguably the basis for
judicial review. A procedure to challenge decisions would therefore
help to open up the process of decision-making, and thus, increase the
level of accountability.
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Openness is also important because the power of bureaucrats lies not
in their formal position, but in their control of information, and
thus in their ability to distort and conceal it (see Breton and
Wintrobe 1982, p91). Openness is not only necessary to control the
bureaucrats in this sense, but it is necessary so that the electorate
have more information upon which to make a decision about their
representative when it comes to the process of election.
Allied to openness is a duty to state reasons. Indeed, Justice (1971)
has claimed that no single factor "has inhibited the development of
English administrative law as seriously as the absense of any general
obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their
decisions" (p23, para51). The advantage of such a duty is that it is
likely to ensure that when a decision is made in an individual case,
some record will be made of the factors taken into account in making
that decision. This will give some assurance that the decision will
be reached after proper consideration of the relevant facts. When
reasons are given, the person affected is in a far better position to
decide whether or not to seek a review of the decision, than a person
who is totally ignorant of the grounds on which the decision was made.
Thynne and Goldring (1987) conclude that the public right to
information may actually reduce the need for review, because
officials, knowing the decision can be scrutinised, will act better.
Justice (1971) too recognised the beneficial effect that the existence
of a duty to state reasons has "both on the quality of the decision
and upon public confidence in the whole process" (p23, para51), and
believes that this duty should be recognised as an "inherent element
in the concept of natural justice" (p23, para51).
Ranson and Stewart (1989) conclude that the condition for "democratic
and accountable government is open government"; that a condition of
active citizenship and public choice is the right to know and the
publication of information; and that secrecy "undermines citizenship
and accountable government" (p18). A similar conclusion is reached by
Harden and Lewis (1984):
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"in Britain the underlying expectations of openness and
accountability mean that the activities of all public actors and
their agents are the proper subject of public scrutiny unless a
strong case to the contrary can be made out, that case in turn
having to run the gauntlet of public and reasoned scrutiny"
(p20).
The Franks Committee, when looking at tribunal proceedings, also
recognised the importance of reasons:
"A decision is apt to be better if the reasons for it have to be
set out in writing because the reasons are then more likely to
have been properly thought out" (Franks 1957, pare 98).
And the Council of Europe has also recommended that the reasons on
which administrative acts are based should be available to the public.
(Council of Europe 1987, Recommendation No R(87)16 Section VI).
Galligan (1982) too emphasises the importance of reasons, his
standpoint being the inadequacy of traditional views of
administrative law in this area. In order to have accountability, the
power-holder must explain and justify his use of power, and in order
for there to be effective participation, the power holder must have
before him a full view of the public interests bearing upon the
exercise of his power (pp270-271). Thus, the concept of
accountability "can be developed in terms of the constraints that the
requirements of reasoned decision-making impose on the administrative
authority" (p271), and a commitment to reasons "generates a basis for
criticism and facilitates judicial review"	 (pp272-3).	 In short,
account cannot be fully meaningful in the absence of reasons.
As with most systems of accountability, this is a challenge to a
decision once it has been taken, and it does not allow for
participation in the decision-making process. In his study of an
appeal procedure in the Housing Department of Sheffield City Council,
Leak (1986) concluded that the accountability produced by the appeal
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system was upwards, in the sense that it allowed senior management and
members to monitor the decisions made by the "street level
bureaucrats", rather than downwards, towards the client (p28). This
is particularly so when the body determining the appeal is simply a
higher level in the same institution as the original decision-makers.
Where the appeal is to an external body this, "in theory at least",
seems to "portray figuratively accountability of decision-maker to a
wider audience" (Leak 1986, p109).
Just as there is a basic assumption that government agencies should be
accountable, so there is a similar assumption that there should be
some measure of participation in the process of decision-making.
Indeed,	 accountability is sometimes	 used synonymously with
participation.	 However, these are different concepts, in that
participation means involvement in the decision-making process,
whereas accountability is about a challenge to a decision which has
been taken.	 As an ideal, participation is about the involvement of
the relevant parties in decision-making, so that they can affect the
future course of action. 	 In practice, it is not just a matter of
discovering who are the "relevant parties", but what kind of
"involvement" is envisaged. Participation means more than knowledge
which is fed to decision-makers for them to examine, use or ignore as
they feel fit. It must involve control of the decision-makers, "to
ensure that the values which are incorporated in any schemes are those
of the people affected by it" (Hill 1976, p98).
Participation is seen as "vital to the successful development of
services which are sensitive to local needs" (Seebohm 1968, pare
137), but this too is double-edged, as, besides being a form of
legitimation it can also produce "an understanding and co-operative
public", as objections may be "anticipated or eliminated at the formal
stage of public enquiry", making the process "smoother, less
contentious and speedier" (Skeffington 1969). Despite this view, I
would concur with Cotterell (1988) that the "commitment and moral
involvement of the regulated population is necessary in order to
legitimise modern administration"	 (p20),	 and that "collective
- 23 -
participation of citizens in public decisions ... appears as the only
means by which ... citizens - insofar as they are necessarily objects 
of regulation, can also become subiects in the creation of regulation"
(p20 original emphasis).
Of course, this leaves open the question of how participation can be
achieved, and it has to be admitted that the taking of the decision is
only one aspect of participation. Setting the agenda for discussion
could also be included, as could procedures where views are taken into
account, even though those providing the information do not take part
in the final decision. Insofar as participation is used in the sense
of giving those concerned a chance to influence decisions and
participate in the process of policy formation, complaints procedures
are not about participation. However, if participation is seen in the
wider context of information gathering, complaints procedures can be
used to provide a greater base of information on which to make
decisions, as they can provide feedback for the decision makers in
making policy. Experience in Chicago and the work of the National
Consumer Council indicate that the monitoring of complaints can help
shape policies with the consumer interest in mind. To use complaints
procedures in this way may bring about more consumer involvement in
policy implementation. This will be discussed more fully in ensuing
chapters.
Participation is thus seen not only as a means of reducing the
relative power of the executive elite, but also as a way towards a
more general democratisation of society. Pateman (1970) believes that
for a democratic polity to exist, it is necessary for a participatory
society to exist, which means a society where all political systems
have been democratised, and socialisation through participation can
take place in all areas (p43).
There is also an educative function, in that participation in local
decision-making trains individuals for assuming responsibility in the
wider societal decision processes. It may educate those who
participate, thereby making them permanently able to defend their own
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interests (see Abrahamsson 1977, p199). In fact, some would go as far
as to argue (see Bachrach 1969) that democracy is realised to the
extent that the citizens participate in decision-making, and thus,
participation becomes a goal in itself. However, Bachrach (1969)
admits that democracy has to be seen in terms of both results and
process (p3). The public interest is measured by both the soundness
of decisions reached in the light of the needs of the community, and
also by the scope of public participation in reaching them. It is
only if all citizens participate in the political decision-making
process that political decisions can be guaranteed to reflect the
interests of the mass of the people. It also develops the
individuals' personality, making the citizen aware that s/he is part
of the total society, so that s/he feels not only responsible for
him/herself, but to society at large.
Complaints procedures can be used, therefore, as a way of legitimising
bureaucratic conduct, in the sense that the provision of mechanisms
for complaints and grievances contributes to a reputation for fair
dealing. As Lipsky (1980) expresses it:
"The development of standards for client treatment, rights to
appeal and procedures for administrative regularity seems to
develop in proportion to client allegations of artbitrariness and
unfair treatment. By developing procedural rules, agencies may
in fact protect the rights of some clients, but they also gain
legitimacy in continuing to act with most clients as they did
before" (p43).
The idea of legitimation is perhaps best expressed in terms of
Habermas' ideal speech situation, and it is to this that I now wish to
turn.
- 25 -
Habermas and the Ideal Speech Situation 
For Habermas (1976), the idea of rational discourse was envisaged as a
full and open discourse among all, on an equal footing, without
distortion in communication. In this way there would be a triumph of
reason and truth. The ability to reason and make decisions should be
based on the facts known about the situation; distortion occurs when
the facts of the situation are hidden from some or all of the
participants, and when rules prohibit people from participating fully
in the decision-making process. The goal is the equal participation
of all concerned in the decision-making process. This is a universal
rationality in which everybody participates equally, a situation in
which communication is not distorted, in other words, an "ideal speech
situation".
Habermas (1970) expressed concern about the progressive
rationalisation of public decision-making which has reached a point
where social organisation and decision-making might be taken out of
the arena of public debate altogether. The increasingly powerful
bureaucratic state also undermines the possibility of participating
usefully in decision-making processes through the usual democratic
channels, such as political parties and elections. There is a growing
contradiction between administrative efficiencey and representative
administration. As an example of this, Grace and Wilkinson (1978), in
their study of the operation of social services departments, as an
aspect of the provision and use of legal services, found that
according to social work ideology, clients do not need legal services,
as the social worker provides the service based on a professional
evaluation of the clients's problem and needs (p3). The authors,
however, do not see social work agencies as social structures in
pursuit of an objectively defined and corporate goal in a highly
rational and co-ordinated way (p4), and therefore some input by the
client is necessary. A valuable feature, therefore, of a grievance
procedure is its use as a form of citizenship. Complaints procedures
may act as a form of legitimation, by allowing a challenge to
decisions, which in turn may feed into the decision making process.
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Habermas has been criticised (see Craib 1984, p210) for reducing
politics to a matter of communication, and making it appear that if
only there was more understanding, that would solve many problems.
However, despite these criticisms, his theory can be used to define
the conditions of democracy, and evaluate a particular institution in
these terms, and allow that they are democratic to the extent that
they conform to the ideal.
What is central to Habermas' theory, then, is the value of reason in
public discourse (see Ranson and Stewart 1989). Diverse interests are
encouraged to reason with each other in order to reach mutual
understanding and agreement, and through this process, "the public
domain secures the authority and legitimacy of public choice in
society" (Ransom and Stewart 1989, p12). So, in attempting to come to
a "rational" decision, it must be supposed that the outcome of
discussion will be the result of the force of better argument, and not
of accidental or systematic constraints on discussion.
Prosser (1982) emphasises the importance of participation and
accountability in this context (p11). The concept of participation is
centred around the development of institutions for the expression of
the ideal of discussion free from domination; that is, there is equal
power to affect decisions given to all affected. Accountability is
about the development of means to ensure that justifications, in the
forms of reasons, must be given for all actions. Accountability is
thus dependant on the ideal of participation. Participation is about
involvement in the decision-making process; and accountability is the
reasserting of the legitimate expectation of participation, an
expression now common in other contexts too.
Coupled with the arguments about grievance procedures being a part of
the democratic entitlement is the belief that the lack of any
procedure for the redress of grievances is an injustice. Davis (1975)
maintains that the "largest clusters of injustice ... lie in the
administrative application of governmental power in the absence of
systematic fact-finding and beyond the reach of previously existing
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law that controls the result" (1975, p3). Others have spoken about
filing cabinets being "filled with examples of systematic maltreatment
and abuse and denial of rights for which there is no straightforward
legal redress" (Community Development Project 1977, p3). Local
government, as well as being a democratic body, is a major provider of
services to the citizen, many of which occur through the medium of
discretionary powers.	 It is a denial of justice if citizens have no
opportunity to challenge decisions taken in relation to them.
One aspect of justice is the elimination of arbitrary decision-making,
and an insistence that rules are properly applied, and that discretion
is exercised fairly. Bureaucrats, according to Weber's ideal type,
are subject to strict systematic control and discipline, and enforce
the law "without hatred or passion and hence without affection or
enthusiasm" (Weber	 1947, p340).	 However in reality the power of
officials and the nature and the work they have to do allow to
officials a high degree of discretion. The rules versus discretion
debate has occupied legislators and administrators for some time (see
Towell 1976), and there is no doubt that the "relationship between
discretion and policy has always been the subject of heated debate in
the administrative process" (Lewis 1973, p275).
A public officer has discretion "whenever the effective limits of his
power leave him to make a choice among possible courses of action or
inaction" (Davis 1969, p4). Discretion is seen to be preferable to
rules in some situations because individualised Justice is thought to
produce better results than precise rules. However, the problem is
that many civil servants have little training for exercising
discretionary tasks and whereas rules confine the scope of discretion
"appeals and complaints secure the maximum scrutiny of decisions, and
the presence of explicit 'professional' standards, even if they are
not always adhered to, provides some basis either for checking deviant
officials, or, if the standards are unacceptable, attacking the whole
system" (Hill 1972, p85).
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Davis (1969) admits that discretion is necessary, but that the
relationship between discretion and rules is seriously out of balance
and in need of rectification through various strategies of confining,
structuring, and checking discretion. Interest in discretion became
heightened during the 1970s, especially with Reich's (1964) concept of
"new property" rights in, for example, welfare benefits. These formal
rights were seen to be fit subjects for adjudication. Without wishing
to discuss in any detail the relative merits of rules and discretion,
it could be argued that one way to ensure that rules are properly
applied is to allow challenges to the application of the rules.
Administrative bodies constitute a major mechanism for decision-making
in society, and the officials within them have a high degree of
discretion. However, even highly discretionary decisions are an
exercise of judgement, arrived at for certain reasons. A complaints
procedure may allow a challenge to these reasons.
It could be argued that complaints procedures may result in a
reduction in discretionary decision-making to the detriment of the
consumer, because the organisation, in an attempt to defend itself,
may formalise systems and have standardised rules, and that this would
make matters worse for consumers. Such claims will have to be
supported by empirical data, but it is not inevitable that procedures
result in a reduction in discretionary decisions, to the detriment of
the consumer. It can be accepted that the allocation of scarce
resources will necessarily involve a high degree of discretion, but
the checking of this need not involve a highly rule-based system. A
decision need not be rigid and rule based. As I have said, decisions
are an exercise of Judgement based on reasons. Because complaints
procedures may allow a challenge to these reasons, it does not
necessarily mean that there is no room for discretion. This is a call
for reasoned decision-making and for discretion to be properly
applied. The ensuing empirical data support this contention.
Adjudication provides an opportunity for scrutiny and for
accountability of the decision makers to their clientele and to the
public, and is a method of checking the arbitrary exercise of
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discretion without the imposition of inflexible rules. The concern
therefore is to improve the quality of Justice which is administered
outside the courts, by those in charge of scarce resources, and one
way of doing this is to allow for a mechanism of review or complaint,
(see Davis 1975, pl), which may "promote consistency of decision-
making within the law" (Lewis 1973, p283). Thus, the introduction of
administrative review will help to improve the quality of primary
decision-making.
To conclude, this chapter has sought to Justify the concern of lawyers
in the area of grievance redress outside the courts. It has also
examined the use of complaints procedures as an aspect of Justice, in
the sense that there should be mechanisms for the redress of
grievances, and also as an aspect of a citizen's democratic
entitlement, with one aspect of the democratic promise being openness
and accountability. The focus of the research was local government,
which, being a democratically elected body, provides a useful area in
which to explore the issues of democratic entitlement. The following
chapter will discuss the study of local government in more detail.
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CHAPTER 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT-ITS AUTONOMY AND ITS STUDY 
Introduction 
The focus of this study is local government, the reasons for this
being practical as well as theoretical. Local government is more
accessible than central government, both to the researcher and to the
citizen. Its work is not covered by the Official Secrets Act 1911,
and the recent Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985
ensures that in theory at least, there is freedom of information for
local government activities. Although the full effects of this
legislation were still being thought through at the time the empirical
research for the Sheffield Study was being carried out, there was
certainly no reluctance on the part of local authorities to co-operate
with the research.
Local government is a major mechanism for decision-making in society
and it constitutes an enormous bureaucratic structure. For example,
the large urban authorities administer services to populations of over
half a million people (population estimates for mid-1983 were
1,012,900 for Birmingham, 714,000 for Leeds, 542,700 for Sheffield,
457,500 for Manchester, 502,500 for Liverpool and 463,900 for
Bradford), and even the smallest rural authority (Teesdale) has a
population of 24,700. 	 (Figures from the Municipal Year Book 1985).
However, unlike other administrative bodies like government
departments and health authorities, it is directly elected. When we
study local government, therefore, we are not only studying an
administrative body, but also a democratic institution, with
democratically elected councillors responsible for the delivery of
services, and whose citizens have an opportunity to influence
decisions in a much more direct way than in central government.
Although all local authorities are the statutory creations of
Parliament and have no independent status or right to exist, there is
that element of local choice, and it is argued (see Widdicombe 1986,
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p50) that it is an effective means of delivering services, because it
has the ability, unlike non-elected systems of local administration,
to be responsive to local needs. Local government now concentrates
more on services where responsiveness to the public is most important
(eg social services) and less on those where the main requirement is
simple efficiency of output (eg public utilities). Local government
is thus different from local administration, but, as Widdicombe (1986)
warns, it "needs to be able to demonstrate that it is a more effective
means of government than local administration" (p55).
The study of local government also highlights the tension between
democracy and efficiency: the problem of striking a balance between
efficiency and the interests of individuals in matters of public
administration. This tension is represented in an acute form in local
government: it is big business, but touches the lives of individuals
at key points. Local government is not, however, concerned solely
with efficiency; indeed, the Audit Commission's function in relation
to local authorities is to make recommendations for improving the
"economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of local
authority services" (Local Government Finance Act 1982, s20).
Widdicombe (1986) emphasised the important distinction between
efficiency and effectiveness, which may resolve some of the apparent
tension. Efficiency is concerned solely with output, but
"effectiveness is concerned also with the meeting of needs" (p50).
Local government should therefore allow the local view to be
expressed, because if it does not provide for sufficient local
democratic self-expression "it ceases to be sufficiently distinct from
local administration" (Widdicombe 1986, p56).
The Structure of Local Government 
Ever since the reorganisation of local government in the 1960s and
1970s, which was responsible for its present structure, (subject to
the recent alterations made by the abolition of the GLC and
metropolitan counties) local government has been newsworthy. The
impetus for reorganisation came in the 1960s, this being partly a
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result of the recognition of the importance of education and the
social services, resulting in increased public expenditure in these
areas, and also an awareness by national politicians of the
difficulties of administering national policy through small and
inefficient units of local government (see Buxton 1973, p229). In
1966 the Royal Commission on Local Government was appointed, presided
over by Lord Redcliffe-Maud (Redcliffe-Maud 1969). Its terms of
reference were wide: it had to take into account the structure of
local government, and to make recommendations for authorities,
boundaries and functions, bearing in mind the need to sustain a viable
system of local democracy (Redcliffe-Maud 1969, pill). Much of the
Commission's report was incorporated into the Local Government Act
1972, although the recommendation for a unitary model was rejected in
favour of a two-tier model of counties and districts.
After 1974 the new metropolitan counties (South Yorkshire, West
Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, West Midlands and Tyne and
Wear) had the following functions: highways, refuse disposal,
traffic, transport planning, weights and measures, some town and
country planning (structure plans and some local plans), fire and
police. The metropolitan districts were to have education, housing,
social services, cemeteries, markets, refuse collection, town and
country planning (most local plans and development control),
recreation and environmental health.
	 The metropolitan counties have
now been abolished, although they were still in existence at the time
of the research. The 44 non-metropolitan counties have the same
functions as the metropolitan counties, with the addition of education
and social services, leaving non-metropolitan districts without these
functions.
Although it achieved a major reorganisation of local government, the
1972 Act had little effect on the internal organisation of the
authorities. This aspect was explored by a working group set up by
the Department of the Environment and local authority associations,
and chaired by Bains. In its report (Bains 1972), Bains suggested
that although the ultimate decision-making body of the local authority
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is the council, each authority should have a central policy committee,
which would act as a steering committee for the full council (Bains
1972, pare 4.14). These committees, usually called Policy and
Resources, or General Purposes, are now important features of local
authority internal organisation, and, as their name often suggests,
they perform a policy-making role, rather than acting as a watchdog
and review body for the general performance of the authority.
Bains also supported the concept of a chief executive to act as a co-
ordinator and leader of a management team, consisting of chief
officers of the various service departments. The role of such an
officer was not fully elaborated upon by Bains, but rather it was
suggested that there was "a great deal of room for discussion and
argument about Just what powers and authority he should have and many
authorities have avoided the issue by not spelling them out" (Bains
1972, pare: 5.10). The ambiguity of the role can be seen from a
cursory look at the list of officers in the various authorities.
Although most authorities have a chief executive, the role is
sometimes combined with that of the town clerk, or occasionally with
that of the director of finance/treasurer.
Widdicombe (1986) noted the "almost universal practice since local
government reorganisation for local authorities to appoint a chief
executive as their most senior officer" (p142). The great majority of
these are solicitors by background, and it is unusual for them to have
any departmental role. Their extra-departmental role is seen as
having the important function of welding local authorites "into a
corporate whole rather than a loose federation of service departments"
(p142). Widdicombe admitted that their role had never been totally
clear and noted the "considerable variety" in their roles, with some
having clear management authority over all staff, while others were
more "primus inter pares", with a role not dissimilar to that of the
former town and county clerks (13143). During the course of the
Sheffield Study this diversity was noted: one chief executive saw his
role as "keeping the council solvent and legal", and leaving the chief
officers to "get on with their job".
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Widdicombe (1986) recommended however that there should be a statutory
requirement that local authorities appoint one of their officers as
the chief executive, who should be the head of the paid staff, with
clear authority over other officers, and having "ultimate managerial
responsibility for the way in which officers discharge the functions
of the Council" (p144). One reason for this is that public
expenditure constraints necessitate the taking of decisions more on
the basis of a balance between services and expediency "rather than
simply on professionally judged merits" (p143). Local authorities
need to be organised corporately, which will be assisted by vesting
clearer responsibilities in the chief executive. The chief executive
can also take on a mediator role between chief officers and elected
members. The role of chief executives in relation to complaints
procedures is explored in Chapter 7, but it should be noted here that
their value as arbiters and mediators was highlighted during the
course of the Sheffield Study.
Local Government and Central Government 
In the 1980s, national attention was focused on local government once
more, this time in relation to such issues as spending restrictions,
rate-capping, abolition of the metropolitan counties and the GLC, and
the privatisation of services and, more recently, the poll tax. Much
of this is about the relationship, if not struggle, between the
central and local state, and it is to this issue which I will now
turn.
Jackson (1967) suggests that local government is "an entirely
different kind of institution from the national government, where the
elected body and the executive are separate" (p17). Local government
is nearer to the consumer, and the citizen can influence decision
making in a way unlike central government. Councillors perform a
different function to MPs, as the committee system allows councillors
to become involved in administration in a way totally unlike the
relationship of Parliament to the Civil Service. Councillors are an
integral part of the "government", unlike the majority of MPs, whose
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role is far more one of scrutiny. The different attitudes of
professional administrators and amateur elected representatives is
more acutely felt in local than in central government, where MPs do
not have regular contact with the Civil Service.
It could also be argued that the kinds of services provided by local
authorites are very different to those provided by central government.
These include, housing, education, environmental health, transport and
the personal social services. These services touch the lives of
citizens in a more personal and direct way than central government.
Indeed, central government in Britain has few service responsibilities
outside of social security and defence, with local government being
responsible for most welfare services.
A central question to be addressed is whether local government is
autonomous. Can it be seen as a discrete area of study, distinct from
central government. The Layfield report (1976) put forward two models
of local government. The centralist model was a system in which local
authorities were virtually the agents of central government, with
their primary Justification for existing being that they could
mitigate the dangers of remoteness and bureaucratic administration
resulting from a wholly centralised form of government. The localist
model, on the other hand, was a system where real political authority
and power are decentralised to local authorities in respect of those
functions which could appropriately be performed at the local level.
(see Widdicombe 1986, p53).
Although Dearlove (1973) states that the conventional theory views
local authorities as the agents of central government, which exercises
control by financial means (p14), this view has not been universally
accepted. Despite the fact that local authorities may only act within
the specific powers set by Parliament, and despite the limitations
placed by central government on the amount of discretion which could
be exercised, there has always been enormous variation in the level of
services. Thus Holman (1970) found "vast differences 	 between the
same services in different areas" (064).	 A similar conclusion was
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reached by Boaden and Alford (1969), who found "examples of the
variations of service over the whole range of local authority
activity" (p204). Slack (1960) and Townsend (1962) found differences
in the services provided for old people.
	 Erratic provision of day
nurseries was found by Packman (1968), Ryan (1964) and the Central
Advisory Council for Education (1967).
	 Such differences seem to
indicate a lack of central control; nor do they necessarily reflect
differences in local need (See Dearlove 1973, p14). Widdicombe
(1986), too, speaks of British local government being "diverse" (p29)
and that there are a "host of differences in the practices and
approach of different councils which derive from different local
traditions" (p24).
This, then, is recognition that there is some autonomy. Britain is
not a totally central state: there are expenditure targets and set
limits for raising taxes, but "British local authorities still retain
considerable discretion over the way in which they run their services
and the level of service they provide" (Goldsmith 1986, p xiv).
Before exploring this proposition, it may be useful at this point to
explore some of the theoretical assumptions about research into local
government, focussing on what has become known as the "urban"
question, or the concept of urban sociology, which has concerned
itself with the study of the city.
The Urban Question 
The development of interest in local government can be traced to the
late 1960s and early 1970s (see Harloe 1975) and in Britain took the
form of studies into state involvement at a local level, especially in
the areas of planning and housing. There have been attempts since
then to ground urban sociology in some theoretical framework. This
section will explore these developments, and attempt to justify the
focus of this research, which is local government as a discrete if not
autonomous entity,
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Before this, during the 1950s, urban sociology was little more than
the study of everything that happened in urban areas, including
educational deprivation among the working class and social isolation
in council tower blocks. In other words, it was no different from the
sociological analysis of advanced industrial capitalist societies (see
Saunders 1986, p114).
The development of urban sociology in Britain, or more specifically,
urban managerialism can be traced to a book published in 1967, which
was actually a contribution to the sociology of race relations, but
which also developed a new approach to the analysis of the city. The
book, Race. Community and Conflict (Rex and Moore 1967) was a study of
housing and race relations in the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham. Its
importance was the recognition that a city, during its development
historically, becomes differentiated into distinct sub-communities
which are partially separated. •Three groups become segregated during
the inital settlement of a city: the upper middle class live in large
houses near the cultural and business centre of the city, but away
from the factories; the working class live in small rented terraced
cottages, where there is a strong sense of collective identity; the
lower middle class also rent homes, but they aspire to be like the
bourgeois home-owners. As the city increases in size, the population
migrates from the centre to the outlying areas, with the result that
inner city areas like Sparkbrook, become transformed into twilight
areas.
Of crucial importance to their theory is the notion that "suburban
housing is a scarce and desired resource" (Rex 1968, p214), which is
unequally distributed among the population. The means by which it is
allocated to sections of the population is crucial to our
understanding of life chances, in the city. Housing allocation
presents a situation of potential conflict by the different groups
demanding access to the same resource. There are two types of access
to housing: in the private sector access is dictated by the credit
institutions which lend money according to the size and security of
the income of the borrowers; in the public sector access to housing is
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determined by local authority policies, based as a rule on residence
qualifications, the applicant's need, and the suitability of the
particular type of housing for the applicant: the bureaucratic mode of
allocation, as opposed to the market mode. The selection by the local
authority is identified as one of the determining factors of
residential patterns in the city. The approach is Weberian in tone,
with the authors looking at typical actors in the social system.
The study was useful because it suggested that the struggle over
housing can be analysed in terms of the class struggle over the
distribution of life chances in the city, which connects urban
sociology with questions of inequality and class conflict. Rex and
Moore (1967) also made the connection between spatial organisation and
the social organisation of the city. As Haddon (1970) puts it: "The
housing market represents, analytically, a point at which the social
organisation and the spatial structure of the city intersect" (p118).
It was Pahl (1970) who drew out some of the important themes raised by
Rex and Moore, and made the initial formulation of the urban
managerialist position (which he later revised). He argues that a
person's life chances are affected by indirect as well as direct
income. A high income enables people to purchase privileged access to
urban resources, but the state is also involved in the process through
its role as allocator of public resources. Urban sociology,
therefore, must study the distributional patterns of urban resources,
looking at both market and bureaucratic processes (Pahl 1970, p53).
In his later work (Pahl 1975), he emphasises the importance of the
spatial element. Urban sociology is not concerned with the study of
all allocation systems, only the resources that are inherently unequal
because of their connection in a spatial context. Thus, he includes
housing and transportation as fit subjects for urban sociology, but
not family allowances and pension schemes (p10).
Although he recognises that the city cannot be studied independently
of wider society ("the city should be seen as an arena, an
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understanding of which helps in the understanding of the overall
society which creates it" (Pahl 1975, p234-57) he maintains that there
are important processes in the city that can be analysed in their own
right, one such process being the distribution of scarce urban
resources. He maintains that it is inevitable that there will be
inequalities in distribution, and that similar constraints will
operate "to a greater or lesser degree independently of the economic
and political order" (Pahl 1975, p249). That is, there will be
problems of distribution of urban resources whatever the type of
society, capitalist or socialist.
The urban managerialist thesis is developed on the basis that the
allocation of resources is largely a function of the actions of those
individuals who occupy strategic positions in the social system. The
urban system has various "gatekeepers" whose decisions determine how
much access different sections of the population will have to
different types of urban resources. Urban sociology's function is to
study the goals and values of these gatekeepers to explain the various
patterns of distributions. Pahl (1975) says, "... given that certain
managers are in a position to determine goals, what are these goals,
and on what values are they based" (p208).
The populations which differed in their access to scarce urban
resources . are, according to Pahl (1975), the "dependent variables",
whereas those controlling access, "the managers of the system" are the
independent variable" (p201). The task for research, therefore, was
to discover the extent to which the different "gatekeepers" had common
ideologies and acted consistently with each other. It was also
important to recognise the social and spatial constraints upon access
to scarce resources in the city.
One problem of Pahl's approach was identifying the urban manager.
Should it include only public sector employees, both at central and
local levels, or should it also include those in the private sector
who also act as controllers of resources sought by the urban
population, for example, estate agents and building society managers.
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Pahl originally included a wide range of individuals in the private
and public sector, including "housing managers, estate agents, local
government officers, property developers, representatives of building
societies and insurance companies, youth employment officers, social
workers, magistrates, councillors ..." (Pahl 1975, p206). However, he
later distinguished between public and private sector managers and
restricted his definition to the public sector only, distinguishing
"private managers" from what he called "managers of the urban system"
(Pahl 1977, p54-55) and emphasising the importance of "the role of
state bureaucrats and technical experts" as central to an
understanding of urban outcomes and regional development (Pahl 1977,
p56-57). Although he does not make it entirely clear why public
sector employees only are included in his definition, it appears that
it is in relation to the role they play in mediating between the
central state and the private sector, and between the central state
and the local population.
Another problem, apart from the significance of public and private
sector gatekeepers is what level of manager within the system should
be researched. Should we be looking at the values and goals of those
in top positions within the organization, or those lower level
employees who work at the interface with the client? There seems to
be no criteria for identifying who the urban managers are or for
assessing the relative significance of the different types of
managers.
Another problem relates to the issue of autonomy. Within the public
sector, managers are restrained both by the operation of market forces
(eg. land prices, the interest rate) and by higher-level government
agencies or policies. Given this, it is difficult to describe urban
managers as independent variables. Pahl himself recognised the
problem, and in Whose City (1975) he suggested that the thesis gave
too much power to the managers, although he argues against the
deterministic view which sees them as having no freedom of action at
all. His position now seems to be that managers are intervening
variables, mediating between the demands of profitability and social
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needs and between central government and the local population. Rather
than being the independent variables described before, they are
significant as allocators of resources, resources which depend on
decisions made by central government and the private sector. Williams
(1978) points out that "however narrow the limits, managers might well
have sufficient choice and discretion to materially affect the outcome
of a particular situation", and that "this is something for research
to reveal" (p239).
Pahl (1975) maintains that urban managers, because of their key
allocation role, are "central to the urban problematic" (p285), and
that research should begin with a study of the goals and values of
these managers, and their attempt to identify the constraints of their
action.
Pahl's work is useful in that it has focussed attention away from the
preoccupation with the significance of occupational class and the
labour market situation in shaping people's lives, but he has been
criticised, notably by Saunders (1986) who says that his approach
"gives no indication of where the power of state managers to shape
resource distribution ends and the logic of the capitalist market
system takes over" (p137). The problem is that everything is found to
be contingent, and Pahl fails to theorise how far and in what
situations the autonomy of the managers may be exercised.
Marxist approaches 
During the 1960s Marxist theory was beginning to broaden its scope
beyond explanations of the class struggle between bourgeoisie and
proletariat, and within this context the urban question was
reformulated by Marxists. One approach in this reformulation was the
humanist one, which took as its concern the quality of everyday life,
and the limitations and potentials for urban life for liberation and
self-realization. The other, the deterministic, sees the urban crisis
as secondary to the basic class struggle which takes place in the
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workplace, and seeks to incorporate urban struggles within the
existing workers movement.
One important Marxist theorist is Lefebvre, who maintains that space
is political and strategic, and not "a scientific object removed from
ideology or politics" (1977, p341). Space is a social product, like
any other, and his view is that we do not require a science of space
per se but a theory of how space is produced in capitalist societies,
and of the contradictions inherent in this process. The basic
contradiction in capitalist society is between profit and need; that
is the necessity to produce space to make a profit, and the needs of
those who have to use it.
For Lefebvre, the study of space is not the study of the city, as we
live in an urban society and the separation of city and countryside is
of little significance. According to Lefebvre, space "becomes the
seat of power" (1976, p83). Through the organisation of space, social
relations are reproduced in everyday life, and under the capitalist
system the effect of the production of space is to concentrate
decision-making at the centre, with the periphery occupied by
"subjugated, exploited and dependent spaces, new-colonial spaces".
(Lefebvre 1976, p85). This has the effect of destroying social
cohesion, as everyday life becomes dispersed at the periphery while
decisions are made at the centre.
He sees the trend towards regional devolution as an attempt by the
ruling class not to devolve power, but "to offload some of their
responsibilitiles on to local and regional organising while preserving
the mechanisms of power, intact" (Lefebvre 1970, p87). He sees the
urban crisis as a fundamental crisis of advanced capitalism, as the
struggle over the use of space is central to the conflict between the
requirements of capital and social need.
It might be useful to look at the work of Castells here, both because
he criticises Lefebvre, and also because he writes from a
structuralist perspective while addressing himself explicitly to the
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urban question. During the 1970s Castell's work was important in
reshaping urban sociology. He identified "space" as an object of
urban sociology which constitutes a legitimate focus for scientific
concern (1976, p70). He disagrees with Lefebvre's assumption that
space is produced by the conscious activity of human subjects, because
it fails to recognise, he maintains, the determinate conditions of
social life.
For Castells, spatial units have to coincide with social units, and it
is only then that "a sociology could be defined as urban from the
point of view of its scientific object" (1976, p57). This
coincidence only occurs in what Castells calls "collective consumption
units", for example housing and social services. These units of
consumption are socially organised and provided with a spatially bound
system. The real object of study for urban sociology, therefore, is a
spatial unit of collective consumption. Castells argued that the
urban system is one aspect of the total system. Its function lies in
the process of consumption, that is, the reproduction of labour power
(housing, education, etc). Unlike production, these units of
consumption are specific to urban spatial units (Castells 1977, p236-
237).
Castell's analysis ignores the fact that collective consumption can be
organised aspatially, or spatially in an area different to the city.
Collective consumption is organised in two ways: firstly there is that
provided in kind, for example, housing, education, old people's homes,
which has a spatial element. But there is also provision in cash for
example, student grants, housing benefits, child benefit, which has no
spatial element.
Castells, like Pahl, believed that the urban question had an
essentially spatial component. Thus, for example, Pahl could write:
"I tend to use the word 'city' as shorthand for 'a given context
of configuration of reward-distributing systems which have space
as a significant component'. Thus housing and transportation are
- 44 -
elements in my view of a city, family allowances and pension
schemes are not. 	 An urban resource or facility must have a
special spatial component".	 (1975, p10).
The problem with such a definition is that resources can change from
spatial to non-spatial in different countries and at different times,
and, as Mingione argues it is "impossible to isolate 'urban' needs
from 'non urban' ones. The consumption process itself is not
definable in a purely territorial context, it does not correspond to
any 'urban question' but is rather an important part of the general
social question" (Mingione 1981, p67).
The value of Castell's work is in recognising the issue of consumption
as an object for research. Saunders (1986) suggests that it is
legitimate to identify consumption as a specific area of study,
(p232), but that one cannot conceptualise the city as a unit of
consumption, and therefore the spatial orientation of urban studies
must be abandoned (p238).
Sociological Analysis of Consumption 
By the end of the 1970s, researchers in the area of urban sociology
turned their attention to issues about consumption, for example,
inequalities in the welfare state, analyses of local government
services, and conflict between central and local government. Saunders
(1986) argues that to focus on the processes of consumption in
advanced capitalist societies "provides a distinctive object of
analysis for urban studies" (p289). All aspects of consumption are of
central importance to our understanding of the present system and the
way it is changing, because the capacity to consume is not entirely
dependant upon a person's position in the production process. A
household's consumption is not just a function of what is earned, but
of how much use is made of state provision.
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This distinction between the politics of production and the politics
of consumption owes much to German "critical theory", notably the work
of Habermas and Offe. Habermas (1976) has argued that Marx's political
economy is inadequate for understanding late capitalism. This is
because science and technology has revolutionised production and thus
undermined the labour theory of value, and partly because of the role
of the state in managing the economy <see Legitimation Crisis 1976).
The state has undermined traditional laissez-faire ideologies and
created "rationality problems" with regard to securing and directing
economic growth. The failure to resolve these problems threatens the
legitimacy of the system (which depends on the ability of the state to
deliver on its promises) and the motivation of individuals to
participate in the system. Offe (1984) makes a distinction between the
State's two roles: the state has traditional "allocative" functions,
for example, controlling the money supply or regulating working
conditions; and more recently its "productive" functions, where the
state directly provides resources, for example by providing welfare
support for the labour force.
In the 1970s, the concept which replaced urban managerialism was "the
local state". This was first used by Cockburn (1977) in her study of
the London Borough of Lambeth. She argued against the idea of local
autonomy, saying that the local state, or local government, can only
be understood as part of a unified capitalist state, and thus the
provision of services at a local level reflect the requirements of
capital as a whole. Whereas Pahl had over emphasised local discretion
and political autonomy, Cockburn denied them. This can be contrasted
with Loikine's (1977) view, which specifically envisaged the
possibility of capture of local authorities by labour representatives.
It also fails to explain the increasingly apparent tension between
central and local government, which does not readily fit with the view
of either partnership or lack of autonomy.
Another approach is that of Jessop (1979, 1982), whose analysis is
that the state operates in two different ways. Firstly there are the
traditional institutions of representative democracy, for example
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elections, lobbying etc, which are used by consumers, welfare clients
etc. On the other hand, there is the corporatist sector for example
industry, the professions, which operate to develop policies which are
consistent with their own interests. Jessop maintains that there is a
tension between these two modes of interest mediation: between
democratic accountability on the one hand and rational planning on the
other. The problem is how to reconcile corporate economic strategies
with electoral pressures on social spending.
The local state is regarded as "structurally accessible, the point of
daily contact between citizen and state" (Friedland et al 1977, p451).
Its very accessibility makes it more susceptible to popular pressure
than other levels of the state. One response to this has been to
remove key services relating to production to higher levels of the
state system, leaving "consumer interests" to be managed at a local
level (see Saunders 1986, p301). The state, therefore, operates at
two levels: production is organised at a regional or national level,
but in the area of consumption, the state operates at the local level,
and the ideology is that of citizenship rights and public service.
We seem now to come to the conclusion that the state in the modern
period cannot be analysed as a single cohesive entity, and that
different bits of the system have different problems, are accountable
to different bodies and operate within different frameworks. Local
government may thus be a discrete enough area of study. The services
it delivers are qualitatively different to those of central
government, and it is "an entirely different kind of institution from
national government, where elected body and executive are separate"
(Jackson 1967, p17). Nevertheless, it is not a single homogeneous
entity, and there are structural and operational differences between
the various parts of local government. Widdicombe (1986) recognised
that "diversity remains in spite of the greater rationalisation
achieved by the 1974 and 1975 reorganisation". (p29)
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The Autonomy of Local Government 
Much of the continued interest in local government in recent years has
focussed on the relationship between it and central government, a
relationship marked by conflict which has been "a prominent feature of
British politics for most of the last decade" (Goldsmith 1986, p
xiii). The "increasingly strained relationship between central and
local government" was noted by Harden and Lewis (1982, p66), and
Widdicombe (1986) too speaks of the "growing political polarisation of
central and local government" (p24).
Some writers have concluded that the logical conclusion to this
conflict is "a complete breakdown of central-local relations in the
UK" (Meadows and Jackson 1986, p87), and although it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to explore the reasons for this in any depth,
some discussion of this state of affairs is necessary. It is worth
noting that at the time of the research local government officers did
feel the tension between themselves and central government. There is
no doubt that part of the reasons for this tension is the increasing
centralising tendency of the state which appears to be threatening the
autonomy of local government (see Harden and Lewis 1982, p66).
Gamble (1989), too, speaks of the increased central power of the
state, citing as examples the imposition of the national curriculum
and the setting up of new national bodies to replace government
bodies, concluding that the government is attempting to "weaken the
autonomy and legitimacy of all intermediate institutions, so removing
the institutional basis for any opposition to policies determined at
the centre" (p17). 	 Loughlin (1986) has noted the increasing use of
legislation which imposes rules on local government, which has
"generally been accompanied by discretionary powers vested in the
Secretary of State" <p200). Widdicombe (1986), too, drew attention to
the evidence from the Association of District Councils, and individual
conservative authorities, which criticised the greater control from
the centre where they perceived it to be excessive (p35), and
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questioned whether the cumulative effects of centralism is "eroding
local government" (p54).
Part of the reason for this centralism is that the sheer scale of
local government determines that it cannot be insulated from the
"macro-economic policies of central government" (Widdicombe 1986,
p53), and also, because it provides services that are central to
peoples lives, it becomes unrealistic to suppose that there can be
autonomy in the provision of those services. Citizens want there to
be a right to services throughout the country which are "reasonably
consistent, although not necessarily uniform" (Widdicombe 1986, p54).
Widdicombe does recognise, however, that part of local government's
strength is its diversity and that national uniformity would not be
desirable (p64).
Not only is local government's relationship with central government
changing, but its approach is changing at the local level. In the
1970s Cockburn (1977) identified two trends in local government:
corporate management and participation (p2). The development of
corporate planning was heralded by Maud (1967), before which local
authorities had been traditionally organised into semi-autonomous
departments, each dominated by a particular profession (see Cockburn
1977, p17). There can be no doubt of the move towards a corporate
management style, a factor recognised by Widdicombe (1986), who admits
that local government's internal management has become "more corporate
and less based on the old service professions" (p61).
Its role has also changed in relation to the consumers of its
services, who have different expectations. This new approach is
reflected by the Audit Commission, which, in a Management Paper
entitled "The Competitive Council", included a section headed: "People
no longer accept that the council knows best", where it was
acknowledged that "council's customers are more demanding and less
grateful.	 They are also better informed, and better able to
articulate their demands". It goes on to say that the only value of
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services "is the extent to which they satisfy popular needs" (Audit
Commission 1988, p3).
The disenchantment with the professional bureaucratic approach was
recognised by Harden and Lewis (1982), particularly in relation to the
way such values have tended to stifle political choice (p70). This
point was taken up by Widdicombe (1986), who observed that local
communities are "less prepared to accept professional approaches to
service delivery, and want instead more participation through
consultation (p61). Part of these raised expectations is that
grievances will be redressed, and that the consumer will have some
opportunity to express dissatisfaction with decisions. The Commission
for Local Administration has been available since 1974 to redress
grievances and to supplement the role of councilors, but increasingly
more formal mechanisms are being used for this purpose.
However, despite the corporate management approach, and the increased
demand for consultation and participation from consumers, the role of
the professions within authorities is still important, and it also
raises important questions about autonomy. It has been argued that
the autonomy of local authorites may be being eroded by professionals,
who because of their shared ideology, expertise and career structure,
form "policy communities which span the boundaries of government
institutions" (see Rhodes 1986, p18).
Dunleavy (1984) also argues that the initiation of policy in local
government is heavily influenced "by professionally promoted
'fashions' which are nationally produced" (p77), and he suggests that
these professionalised policy systems can be seen as a decision-making
strategy. Professionals within local government may form part of the
national professional community which pursues its own professional
interests, and is influenced by professional bodies, rather than any
ethos within individual authorities.
Laffin (1986) argues that professional groupings in government cut
across central-local relationships because the professions, whether in
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local government or not, form a professional community with shared
values and understandings and a high degree of value consensus (p109).
Such professionalism can lead to the erosion of local autonomy. The
West Midland Study Group (1986) found that there was a developed
professionalism among officers, which was divorced from the old idea
of local government service. There were strong links with central
government departments and with other officers in similar departments
of different local authorities, rather than with members and officers
within their own authority but within different departments (p244).
We now seem to have come full circle, and are back with the autonomy
of urban managers. So, what conclusions can be drawn from this? All
the various approaches to the urban question examined in this chapter
have some value in explaining the processes at work in a study of
local government. None offer a total explanation, nor a simple model
for conducting research, but what they amount to is the fact that
local government does have a degree of autonomy. Although central and
local government have a symbiotic relationship, at the time of the
research there was some autonomy in what was administered, even if
financial and other constraints tended to circumscribe the arena for
choice.
In addition, these approaches indicate that for research purposes, the
relationship between consumers and the local state is a discrete
enough area of study. Administrative organisations have considerable
involvement in the urban process, and their actions are not
predictable in that they respond to a variety of interests and
constraints. Therefore the analysis of administrative actions is
important, and the influences and constraints on these organisations
"can only be seen by examination of the administrative operation in
practice" (Batley 1980, p26).
However, in seeking to explain the administrative organisation in
practice "we have to proceed beyond that structure and those within
it" (Williams 1978, p239). The role of professionals within local
government cannot therefore be ignored, and the study of urban
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managers is an important area for research. Bureaucrats do not
operate in a political vacuum but they are not totally insignificant
in determining what the state does and how it does it. To an extent,
the way they operate will depend upon their own values and interests.
In order, therefore, to understand the role of the urban manager, it
is necessary to look at how they are located within the organisation.
Some discussion of the managerial enterprise is therefore needed, and
this will be the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 GRIEVANCE REDRESS AND THE MANAGERIAL ENTERPRISE 
Introduction 
At the end of the last chapter it was concluded that local government
constitutes a discrete area which is worthy of study. The Sheffield
Study, on which this thesis is based, was conducted by means of
questionnaires sent to local authorities to be completed by senior
council officers, supplemented by interviews of senior officers and
councillors. The position taken in that study and this thesis is that
the individual actors' views and interpretations are important. There
was therefore an emphasis on what may be called the official view of
the situation. Officers are the ones who will interpret and implement
procedures, and it was therefore considered that the officers'
perceptions of the situation were of prime importance. If the
perceptions of members, as policy makers, are also taken into account,
this may give an accurate picture of the local authority viewpoint.
Consumer opinion was also sought, in the Sheffield Study, to test
whether the organisational view was mirrored by its customers, and to
this end some limited studies were carried out of consumers'
experiences, both of local authority procedures and the local
ombudsman system. Although these consumer studies were limited they
nevertheless provided some valuable information of consumer behaviour,
and there is no reason to suppose that more detailed work among
consumers would have led to different overall conclusions. In fact,
although these studies were limited, the information obtained
positively reinforced the data collected from the official
perspective. A more systematic consumer view was also obtained by
reading complaints files kept by local authorites and the Local
Ombudsman. These too reinforced the official data.
While accepting that the views of the individual actors, the "urban
managers" are important in any study of local government (see Pahl
1970), it is important to recognise that they do not operate as
- 53 -
isolated individuals: they are located within organisations, and the
decisions they make, and the way their decisions are translated into
action take place within an organisational framework. I would agree
with Rex (1973), that the principal focus of urban sociology should be
"the study of factors affecting the decisions of decision-makers"
(p66), and therefore some understanding of the organisational
framework becomes important. This is the approach adopted by much
British research in the 1970s, which "began to question how the
implementation of planning and housing policy was influenced by
organisational requirements and by the personal and professional
values of officials" (Batley 1980, p19). Indeed later writing in the
area of urban managerialism has begun to emphasise the organisational
constraints involved (see Williams 1978, for a review), and Williams
(1982) himself argues for a "political economy of organisations"
(p104).
Batley (1980) has argued for the importance of organisational analysis
to be recognised when studying urban managers: "The limits on policy
initiatives can ... only be observed by examination of organisations
in practice - that is, as their structures (and the constraints they
contain) are operationalised through administrative action" (p18).
The study of organisations is important because "without
organisations, the response of the 'authorities' to demands emerges
from a vacuum: with organisations, responses are seen to be not those
of simple interest but the product of processes which are structured 
to include some interests and to exclude others" (p26).
When looking at decision-making in local authorities it should be
remembered that there has been a move towards a management style
approach in local government, which was discussed in the previous
chapter. Value for money is becoming increasingly important. This is
emphasised by the fact that the Audit Commission's remit goes beyond
issues of financial probity and is concerned with undertaking value
for money audits. Indeed, there is an explicit statutory duty to have
regard to value for money in relation to all their functions (DoE
1985, pare 8).	 Any study of local government decision-making must
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take this emphasis on efficiency into account, and try to establish
how complaints procedures in particular would fit within this
framework.
Local authorities are complex entities, and organisational theory may
help us to understand how local government works, and the actors'
roles within it. It may also be useful insofar as it may help to
identify problems that may be associated with introducing or using
complaints procedures within organisations. Leak (1986) has pointed
out that appeal procedures by themselves do not necessarily import a
culture of justice into the organisation. Other methods, for example
codes of practice and retraining programmes, may be required to
facilitate implementation. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is
to examine the use that can be made of organisational theory to
explain the conduct of urban managers, and how systems for grievance
redress might fit into the managerial enterprise.
What is an organisation ? 
Before looking at organisational theory, it may be useful to explain
briefly what is meant by an organisation, and how local government
fits in with the definition. Hall (1977) speaks of organisations as a
vital and central component of the social order (p17). March and
Simon (1958) stress the importance of the study of organisations to
social scientists, because they are interested "in explaining social
behaviour" (p2), organisations forming part of the environment which
influences human behaviour. So what is an organisation, and how is it
distinguished from other social formations?
The textbooks on organisational theory usually contain a definition,
or a number of definitions, of organisations. Weber (1947) for
example, says an organisation is a "system of continuous purposive
activity of a specified kind" (p151), adding that organisations
transcend the lives of their members and have goals. Etzioni (1964)
emphasises the importance of goals when he speaks of organisations as
"social units (or human groupings) deliberately constructed and
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reconstructed to seek specific goals" (p3). Scott (1964) emphasises
the importance of "specific objectives" for organisations, although he
points out that they have "distinctive features other than goal
specificity and continuity", including, for example, "relatively fixed
boundaries, a normative order, authority ranks, a communication system
and an incentive system" (p488).
Hall's (1977) definition includes "a relatively identifiable boundary,
a normative order, ranks of authority, communications systems, and
membership-co-ordinating systems" (1)23). The organisation itself is
relatively continuous, and "engages in activities that are usually
related to a goal or set of goals" (p23). Silverman's (1970)
definition describes a conventional ideal type of formal organisation;
that is, it arises at an ascertainable point in time, is consciously
established to serve certain purposes, and is characterised by a
"patterning of relationships which is more or less taken-for-granted
by participants who seek to co-ordinate and control" (1314).
How do these definitions help to define the organisation or
organisations which is/are the subject of this study? Do we define
local government as one organisation, or is each local authority to be
defined as a separate organisation? Within local authorities, it may
be that different departments can be viewed as individual
organisations. It may be that particular local authorities have a
definite corporate image, but might the fact that the actor is an
official in the housing department be more relevant than the fact that
s/he is an employee of a particular local authority?
Dun/eavy (1981) has argued that there is a common shared ideology
among many professionals, especially in the local government system,
and that the networks making up this system are able to impose
standards of efficiency based on technical/rational approaches to
policy which are intended to be applied regardless of local
circumstances or demands. Such professionalism, as well as leading to
the erosion of local autonomy raises questions about the goals of the
organisation.	 One study found that there was a developed
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professionalism among officers, divorced from the old idea of local
government service, and having strong links with central government
departments and with other officers in similar departments of
different local authorities, rather than with members and officers
within their own authority but within different departments (Dunleavy
1981, p244).
These issues about professionalism are raised here to illustrate that
local government may consist of a number of separate, clearly defined
organisations. Each local authority may have its own corporate
identity and geographical location, but within it there may be
competing and conflicting goals. For example an officer in an
environmental health department in one authority may have more in
common with environmental health officers in other authorities, than
with an officer in the planning department of his/her own local
authority. If we want to define the organisations in this study, it
may therefore be more useful to speak of the operating norms of
planning departments, rather than of a particular local authority, for
some purposes.
Having accepted this, there is still the question of who is to be
included as part of these organisations. Few would argue that the
employees of the organisation should be included, from chief officers
to "street-level bureaucrats". 	 But should elected members	 be
included too? Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) speak of political
administrators which crosses the officer/member divide, which may be a
more appropriate way of studying the actors in local government. What
is more problematic is whether the consumer, the "lower level
participants" (see Mechanic 1962) also come within the definition.
While it seems appropriate to identify elected members as part of the
organisation, it would appear that neither officers nor members would
include consumers within the definition. This would seem to accord
with how consumers themselves see the situation, and indeed,
traditional management theory does not include consumers.
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What is Organisational Theory ?
Although recognising that organisational theory is important, it would
be indulgent in a study of this kind to give a detailed analysis of
management and organisational theory. 	 Only a brief sketch is
therefore presented here.	 Writers on organisations have adopted
various approaches to their study, although most of the work on
organisations is functionalist (see Burrell and Morgan 1979), with its
concern for providing explanations of social order, consensus, and
social integration.
A number of writers have attepted to unravel the complexities of the
subject by classifying organisations according to type. For example,
Etzioni (1961) identifies three types of organisation, based on their
power structure: coercive, normative, and remunerative. Blau and
Scott (1963) speak of goals, classifying organisations according to
who benefits from the organisation. Parsons (1960) classifies
organisations according to their overall purpose in society as a
whole, identifying four such functions which they could fulfil:
production, political, integrative, and pattern maintenance.
Weber (1947), who carried out some of the earliest work on
organisational structure, was interested in the different types of
authority which exist in industrial society.	 He classified
organisations according to authority, 	 identifying three types.
Traditional authority is found in organisations where a command might
be obeyed out of reverence for old-established patterns of order.
Charismatic authority is based on a devotion to a particular person,
obedience being justified because the person giving the order has some
sacred or outstanding characteristic. Legal-rational authority is
based on the view that a particular official who gives an order, is
acting in accordance with particular rules and regulations, and has a
right to instruct those lower down in the hierarchy, and he believed
that modern industrial society was moving towards a situation in which
rational legal authority would be the dominant form.
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) are more concerned to classify theories of
organisations, rather than classify organisations themselves. Their
approach to the study of organisations is different to most authors,
in that they put forward the proposition that social theory can be
conceived in terms of four key paradigms, based upon different sets of
metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of social science and the
nature of society. This has relevance for the study of organisations
as "each paradigm generates theories and perspectives which are in
fundamental opposition to those generated in other paradigms" (p vii).
There are even those (Clegg and Dunkerley 1977) who question whether
it can be called organisational "theory", and who would rather speak
about "a body of knowledge that, for pragmatic reasons, has developed
both unevenly and &theoretically" (pl). The reason for this is that
the study of organisations has developed in a number of specific ways
to settle different ends, ranging from improving organisational
effectiveness to providing theoretical direction for those claiming a
purely academic interest.
Studies of Organisations 
Most approaches to the study of organisations fall into two broad
camps. Firstly orthodox approaches, which are management orientated,
include the work of Taylor (1911, 1947), the Human Relations School
(Mayo 1933, Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939), and the socio-technical
systems approach (Trist and Bamforth 1951, Woodward 1958). The work
of Taylor (1911, 1947) forms the basis of the classical approach to
organisational theory. His scientific management approach combined a
study of the physical capabilities of workers, with his own theory of
motivation, and he sought to convert the process of management to "a
true science, resting upon clearly defined laws, rules and principles,
as a foundation" (1947, p7). This approach has been criticised
because the employee is viewed as an inert instrument performing an
allotted task. It ignored factors concerned with individual behaviour
and motivation, and concentrated on the formal aspects of the
organisation at the expense of informal groupings, with the individual
- 59-
in a passive role, whose behaviour was determined by the work
environment.
In contrast to scientific management, the Human Relations School saw
motivation as more complicated and emphasised the importance of the
formal work group, which resulted in a rejection of Taylor's "economic
man" approach (see Mayo 1933; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). It
was found that non-economic rewards play a central role in determining
motivation, and therefore the workplace has to be regarded as a social
system, with informal organisations which could work either for or
against the formal system. The Human Relations approach in turn has
been criticised, for ignoring the role of conflict in the work place,
and concentrating purely on the social aspects of the work
environment.
The socio-technical systems approach was an attempt to combine social
factors with other external factors, namely technology. This approach
derived from a study by Trist and Bamforth (1951), which focused on
the importance of group relationships, with the work situation viewed
in terms of the interrelations between social and technological
factors. It was develped by Woodward (1958) who set out to discover
whether the principles of organisation laid down by classical
management theorists correlated with business success when put into
practice. The results of the study showed an empirical relationship
between technology and patterns of organisation and business success.
This approach has given rise to research based on the objectivist
assumption that organisations are hard, concrete, empirical phenomena,
which can be measured, research which has "over the last ten years
consumed the intellectual energy of an increasing proportion of
organisation theorists " (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p163).
The approaches discussed so far can probably be termed "orthodox
approaches" in the sense that they are oriented towards managerial
problems of the organisation and managerial concerns for practical
outcomes. They are also the approaches that have "fixed their
interests on the structural aspects of the organisation" (Etzioni
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1964, p4). This is the dominant approach, and its dominance has led
Clegg and Dunkerley (1977) to conclude that the "interests of
management and the interests of organisation theory have all too often
been in harmony" (p2).
The alternative, radical, approach is based on a sociological approach
to organisations, and it owes much to the work of Weber (1947), who
discusses organisations in the context of his work on bureaucracies.
For Weber, bureaucracy was the expression of rational and efficient
administration, and he emphasised the technical competence and
monopoly knowledge of bureaucrats:
"bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of
control on the basis of knowledge" (1947, p311).
In this "ideal type" of bureaucracy, there is a high degree of
specialisation of function, and authority derives from skill and
expertise. The initial selection and subsequent promotion of
personnel is dependant upon technical qualifications and experience,
and there is a pyramid shaped hierarchy and a formal set of rules
governing procedures. The various Jobs and duties are allocated to
various positions or roles, duties which are not given directly to an
individual to perform, but the job that the individual is doing. As a
result, if an individual leaves, the continuity of duties is assured
(p329-330).	 His theory of bureaucracy emphasises the positive
attainment and functions of the organisation.
Valuable though Weber's work on bureaucracies was, it did concentrate
on the formal organisation, and on the off ical stance an organisation
might take.	 It is now broadly accepted that non-rational or
dysfunctional conduct does occur within organisations. At a
theoretical level this was explored by Selznick (1948) who recognised
that organisations, although formally rational, are influenced in
practice by the informal and social aspects of the organisation, and
that they "never succeed in conquering the non-rational dimension of
organisational behaviour" (p25).	 He focused on the dysfunctional
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consequences of bureaucracy, maintaining that sub-units within the
organisation set up goals of their own, which may conflict with the
purposes of the organisation as a whole,
Gouldner (1954), too, addresses certain "obscurities" and "tensions"
in Weber's theory (pp19-20) particularly the notion that the
effectiveness of bureaucratic functioning depends upon the
organisational members accepting the legitimacy of rules or legal
norms. The manner in which the rules are initiated may have influence
upon the dynamics and effectiveness of the bureaucratic operations.
When looking at the rules of the organisation it is important to know
for whose benefit the rules are made, as this can affect the outcome.
Blau (1955) was interested in the influence of the informal
organisation on the formal structure. In a constantly changing
environment, the organisation has to rely on unofficial practices and
communication channels if it is to remain effective, because official
modifications of the rules and procedures takes too long.
Bureaucracies are not, therefore, the static structures of Weber's
ideal type, but the scenes of an ongoing process of interpersonal
relationships which generate new elements of organisation, as
individual employees modify the rules unofficially in advance of the
organisation doing so officially. Indeed it is not only a question of
modification of the rules, but the fact that there may be multi-
layered and heterogeneous goals within an organisation.
At an empirical level, within local government these kinds of patterns
emerge, and aspects of non-rational conduct become evident. Leak
(1986), in his detailed study of the operation of an appeal procedure
illustrates the way that sub-goals can defeat the objectives which the
organisation is trying to achieve. This became apparent when
undertaking the empirical research for the Sheffield Study. It has to
be admitted that whatever is achieved in terms of the introduction of
complaints procedures must take account of the fact that it has to be
operated and implemented by individual actors within the system.
Leak's (1986) work testifies to the fact that if there is an attempt
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to introduce a complaints procedure where there was none before, the
old routines of the office are not going to change, and it will not
necessarily lead to a culture of justice, producing a distinctive
shift in attitudes or values. Even where there are visible structures
for such appeal mechanisms, they are not as dominant as the
enterprise's own operating norms and assumptions, and officers are not
generally appointed whose task it is to look after the consumer
interest.
This tendency has been observed by Etzioni (1964), who recognised that
"many lower-level clerks and sales workers who come into contact with
consumers are organization-oriented and not consumer-oriented" (p99).
He concluded that to be client oriented "is a relatively unrewarding
experience in many organisations" (000). Blau and Scott (1963)
observed the same phenomenon among social workers, who were more
oriented to their social work team, and seemed to treat their relief
clients in a more impersonal manner (p108). 	 Training of staff thus
becomes a very important aspect of the process.
This tendency has been recognised by those who have moved away from
the structuralist approach of Weber and turned their attention to
decision-making and the human element in organisation. Simon (1957),
for example, introduced the model of "administrative man", as opposed
to the economic man characteristic of classical theory, and he used
the notion of "bounded rationality", as opposed to optimum decision-
making, saying that the central concern of administrative theory is
"with the boundary between the rational and non-rational aspects of
human social behaviour" (p xxiv). Solutions to problems are adopted
which "satisfice" rather than "maximise".
March and Simon (1958) also use this model, recognising that the
members of the organisation are the decision makers and problem
solvers, whose perceptions and thought processes are central to
explanations of behaviour in organisations. In practice, a satisfying
solution is sought rather than an optimum rational one, and the human
element of the process is emphasised. 	 This model was further
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developed by Cyert and March (1963) who saw the organisation as an
"adaptively rational" system, coping with a variety of internal and
external constraints in arriving at decisions. The organisation is
seen as an information-processing and decision-making system which has
to cope with various conflicts from both within and outside its
boundaries.
Silverman (1970) also emphasised the importance of the person as the
social actor at the centre of the stage. Social life is an ongoing
process, and social action is seen as deriving from the meaning which
is attributed to the social world by individual actors. He suggests
that the systems approach to organisations has "severe logical
difficulties" especially in the assumption that organisations as
systems have needs or are self-regulating. The systems view of
organisations does not take into account, or provide explanations in
terms of, the actions of the individual human beings who are its
constituent members. For Silverman, a person is the social actor at
the centre of the stage, and thus he says that "while society defines
man, man in turn defines society", and "men also modify, change and
transform social meanings" (1970, p126).
So, having started with the individual "worker" in classical theory,
and the emphasis on the individual as a cog-in-a-machine, we have now
come around to the individual again, but this time, seeing individuals
as essential actors, in the sense that their definition of the
situation is important. Although the objective structuring of the
organisation is important, the actions of the individuals within the
organisations must be important because it is their actions which are
the actions of the organisations, and are a result of their definition
of the situation. The emphasis has thus moved towards the individuals
who comprise the organisation.
This in turn presents its own problems. There may be different
definitions of the situation, and the actors may have different goals.
How does an organisation resolve potential and actual conflicts of
aims and interests? These particular concerns have been marked by
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what have become known as "implementation studies" in organisational
analysis, the main concern being that of an implementation deficit, a
gap between policy as created at the top and the different version of
this which is applied in practice. Before discussing the problem of
implementation, it should be pointed out that the role of discretion
cannot be ignored in this process, because, as Young (1981) argues, it
allows the policy system to take account of the values, perceptions
and motivations of the "peripheral actor" in the system (p32). A
brief look at the problem of discretion will therefore be necessary.
Discretion 
The role of complaints procedures as a method of controlling the
arbitrary exercise of discretion has already been discussed in Chapter
1. Without wishing to repeat that discussion, it has to be said that
discretion is inevitable because of the complexity of a social world
that cannot be planned for, and that it is recognised that all
organisations produce discretion, even if this is sometimes at the
margins. The rules versus discretion debate is not new. Indeed
Bendix (1949) summarised the problem by saying:
"Too great a compliance with statutory rules is popularly
denounced as bureaucratic. Too great a reliance on initiative in
order to realise the spirit, if not the letter, of the law is
popularly denounced as an abuse of power, as interfering with
legislative prerogative" (p12).
Few would argue these days that rules can only ever be an incomplete
guide to action, and Hill (1972) recognises that there are several
limits to the extent to which discretion can be eliminated by rule
formulation (p85), but he also points out that many civil servants
have scanty training for exercising discretionary tasks" (p84).
This is not without problems as these actors may make choices
"incongruent with those of formal policy-makers" (Young 1981, p34).
Lipskey (1980) also speaks about the street-level bureaucrats, those
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"public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the
course of their jobs" having substantial discretion in the execution
of their work (p3). This is notoriously the case in social services
departments, as shall be seen from the empirical work in this study,
but even in housing departments, the empirical work points to a great
deal of discretion within the system. Policy is rarely applied
directly to the external world, but is "mediated through other
institutions or actors" (Young 1981, p35), and the impact of the
policy is affected as much by these key actors, as by the merits of
the policy itself.
Given the inevitability of discretionary decision-making, there is a
need for checks on this use of power, so that individuals who are
subjected to these decisions are safeguarded. For consumers, appeals
and complaints mechanisms can secure that there is the maximum
scrutiny of decisions. But, when looking at the problem of
implementation, even though central policy makers may attach great
significance for rules and guidelines, the peripheral agents "place
their own construction upon central advice or directives" (Young 1981,
p35) and thus policies may be assimilated, ignored, or inverted.
Young believes that it is important to study the actors at the edges
of policy implementation, as the outcome of the policy system is
determined not only by the amount of control exercised over these
implementers, but also by the extent to which these actors share the
policy makers definition of the situation, that is, the extent to
which they inhabit a common assumptive world. This then leads us back
to a discussion of the problem of implementation.
Implementation 
The conventional approach to implementation distinguishes "policy"
from "implementation" as quite distinct processes, policy being the
decision, and implementation being the practice of it. The problem of
implementation deficit can be seen to be a result of organisational
complexity, with organisations distorting and misinterpreting policy.
Dunsire (1978) suggests that sections within a bureaucracy will adapt
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policy to suit its own interests, and he focuses on ways in which the
objectives and interests of particular sections can be incorporated,
to make the policy acceptable within the bureaucracy. However, this
conventional "top down" approach to the conceptualisation of the
implementation process has come under attack in recent years (see
Barrett and Hill 1986). It is now recognised that policy does not
necessarily originate from the "top", but can be a response to
pressures or problems on the ground. Not all action relates to
specific policy and where policy stops and implementation starts may
be extremely difficult to determine.
The problem of implementation is as much a problem for local
government, as it is for any organisation. The managerial problem is
complicated because of the democratic nature of local government, and
the situation is different to that of central government because of
the constitutional position of the elected member. The difference
between councillors and MPs is well recognised, in that councillors
are not just constituency representatives, but they are simultaneously
a representative of the local community, and also responsible in law
for the delivery of services (See Widdicombe 1986, p103).
Within local government the problem is complicated by the fact that
elected members decide policy,	 but managers decide on the
implementation of that policy.
	 These managers, unlike councillors,
have little formal legal responsibility for delivering services, but
in practice are responsible for day-to-day management. However,
Cockburn (1977) noted the tendency of the corporate management
approach 'in local government to "exclude the ordinary elected
councillor from effective decision making" (1)39) and she pointed to a
blurring of the distinction between senior officers and members,
maintaining that "it is far from evident that all elected members are
politically distinct from senior officers in the bureaucracy" (p168).
This blurring of roles was also noted by Maud (1967), who was
concerned about the undue involvement of councillors in detailed day-
to-day administration, so that they were unable to devote time to
issues of policy.	 Maud (1967) also rejected the distinction between
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policy and administration in the functions of officers and members,
recognising that officers are involved in policy interpretation and
formulation, whilst elected members will not be satisfied with leaving
the implementation of policy wholly in the hands of the officers.
More recently (see Widdicombe 1986) the role of the professional chief
officer is increasingly being questioned by councillors, who are often
reluctant to accept the professional approach to service delivery, and
appear to want to intervene more in the day-to-day management of the
authority. Councillors often see the style of implementation of
policy as part of the policy itself rather than as a separate process
(Widdicombe 1986, p104). Thus, at a senior level their boundaries
become blurred, and Widdicombe (1986) concludes that the "current
local government model .... is not one which lends itself to total
clarity in roles and relationships" (p103). The old assumptions that
detailed decisions and actions should be left to officers, is being
challenged, and members are recognising that shortcomings in the
detailed implementation of policy can often affect its credibility and
success (Widdicombe 1986, Research Vol 1 p124).
However, despite the increased desire of some members to intervene,
the overwhelming number of decisions are taken by officers.
Widdicombe (1986) speaks of the "complementary relationship" between
councillors, who are part-time and drawn from representatives of the
general public, and full-time officers with professional expertise,
although it is admitted that "there has sometimes been too great a
stress on officer professionalism" (p66). Although councillors have
the right to ensure that their decisions are implemented by officers,
a merging of the two roles is not seen as desirable, and "councillors
should leave the day to day implementation of council policies .... as
far as possible to officers", and officers should "demonstrate that
they are sensitive to the political aspirations underlying those
policies" (p66). In one area of decision-making in particular, that
of appointments below senior officer level, Widdicombe (1986)
recommends that councillors should not be routinely involved as "line
management responsibilities can be disrupted if appointments of junior
-68 -
staff are made by councillors rather than senior officers" (1)168).
The reality of the organisational structure will necessarily mean that
in day-to-day matters, the councillor's role is limited.
All this adds weight to Young's (1981) argument that it is important
to study the actors at the edges of policy implementation, as the
outcome of the policy system is determined not only by the amount of
control exercised over these implementers, but also by the extent to
which these actors share the policy makers' definition of the
situation, that is, the extent to which they inhabit a common
assumptive world. The aims and objectives of the organisation are
thus mediated through individuals.
This could make the introduction of complaints procedures problematic.
Until recently, these sorts of systems have not flourished in this
country, and there has traditionally been no culture of Justice in
administration. This can be compared, for example, to the USA where
organisational culture is more in tune with the idea that consumer
complaints should be taken seriously, and can be used in the policy
making process.
Abrahamsson (1977) has noted the tendency for organisations to
concentrate on activities which have easily and directly measurable
results, which means that there is a risk that concrete goals will be
concentrated upon, at the expense of goals which are more abstract
(p143). This is especially true for public service organisations
which increasingly emphasise economic efficiency criteria rather than
a more general measure for goal achievement.
As well as the emphasis on economic efficiency, which may work to
squeeze out justice,	 the role of professionalism in public
organisations may also militate against it. Although Widdicombe
(1986) believes that local government's internal management has become
more corporate and less based on the old service professions (p61),
Hill (1972) notes the attempt by professionals within public
administration to preserve their integrity from the power of the
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organisation (p83). Etzioni (1964) noted that there was an ideology
in public organisations that those who administer the service are in a
better position to Judge what is good for the consumer than consumers
themselves (p97). Thus the administrator or expert takes control
because of "his . superior knowledge", and this results in the
consumers' freedom of choice being restricted in the name of other
values such as health, education, or increased possibilities of choice.
in the future (pp97-98).
Thus, as we shall see, commitment to Justice seems to weigh less
heavily on the minds of managers than the policy initiatives may have
us believe. This has been observed at a theoretical level by
Habermas, for example, who was concerned about the progressive
rationalisation of public decisions, with the growing contradiction
between administrative efficiency and representative administration,
so that technical factors seemed to be more important than values.
There is thus the danger that technical control and efficiency may
become the only way of examining goals, and that ultimately there
could be a system where decision-making could be delegated to
computers and removed from the control of the people (see Habermas
1971 1 1976). Peters (1978) takes up this theme by asking whether we
have come to the point where "a new elite structure based on
information, technical expertise, position and policy ideas has come
to determine who gets what, when, and why?" (073).
So, how can this danger be averted? How can "values" be reclaimed, as
opposed to purely technical decision-making? One method would be to
utilise legal training. Thus Lewis (1981) argues that the wider
employment of legal skills in modern government would "contribute to
our democratic ideals and to the optimisation of resource allocation"
(p105).
In Britain, few senior officials in local government have legal
training. Indeed there are few lawyers in any high administrative
posts in Britain, which is in marked contrast to the other countries
in the European Community, the USA and Australia (Whitmore 1970,
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p483). This can affect the way complaints are seen and dealt with.
Apart from specialist legal sections, the only policy making areas
headed by lawyers have been chief executive departments, but as we
shall see, few complaints ever get this far. If there is an attempt
to introduce a procedure where there was none before, the old routines
of the office are not going to change. Officers have the ability of
redefining a problem, so that a consumer may come with a complaint,
and leave the office feeling that it was not a complaint at all.
Training, as well as policy initiatives, is needed, otherwise the
implementation gap widens.
Leak's (1986) detailed study indicates that even where visible
structures do exist for complaints or appeals procedures, they are not
as dominant as other operational norms. Officers are generally not
appointed whose task it is to look at consumer complaints, and in
organisational theory consumers are not even seen as part of the
structure.	 Fairness and justice should be part of the training
process of managers in local government, so that these Ideals do not
become submerged by the organisational structure itself.
Even where authorities have complaints officers, indicating an
institutional commitment to a culture of justice, they often have a
low profile, and complaints are submerged. Whitmore (1970) believes
that having lawyers in administration is the "best guarantee of
fairness", and points out that many administrative decisions are more
important socially, and often monetarily, than the decisions of the
lower courts (p492). The use of lawyers may go some way to ensuring
that when procedures do exist they are utilised, and do not fall into
disuse.
This chapter began by asserting, once more, that the study of local
government was valid, and that in order to conduct such a study the
views of the actors in local government would be sought. It is
however important to recognise that these actors do not act in
isolation, but that they operate within an organisational environment.
In order to understand this process,	 a brief overview of
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organisational theory was presented, which brought us back to the
importance of the individual actor, and which in turn highlighted the
problem of implementation.
This is a problem insofar as, even if organisations have complaints
procedures, it does not mean that they will necessarily work; the
administrative culture may suppress complaints; and there may, or may
not, be resistance by members of the organisation to operate the
procedures. Implementation thus becomes important, which means that
there must be a commitment throughout the organisation to the creation
of a positive culture of rights, and in this respect the quality and
training of officers becomes important.
Complaints procedures are but one aspect of redress for aggrieved
citizens. Other avenues of redress are the courts, elected members
and the Local Ombudsman. These will be discussed in the next part of
the thesis.
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PART II ALTERNATIVE/ADDITIONAL METHODS OF DISPUTE SETTLINENT
CHAPTER 4 ELECTED MEMBERS 
Introduction 
We saw in the last chapter that a strong managerialist element is
developing in local government, and that this has implications for the
role of the elected member, whose traditional role is that of
decision-maker. In this chapter I want to explore the role of the
elected member in dispute resolution.
Elected member, in this context, can be used to include Members of
Parliament as well as councillors, as both are approached by
constituents for help in settling grievances relating to local
government, and in some cases holding surgeries to seek out problems.
In the quantitative part of the Sheffield Study there was no
examination in any detail of the role of the MP, although references
were often made by officers, in the fieldwork, to the fact that
complaints taken up by MPs, along with member complaints, were treated
with great care. However, the survey of consumers in a London Borough
in the Sheffield Study indicated that few (2%) had approached an MP
with their complaint at first instance, which is not out of line with
Leak's study (1986), which found very little MP involvement in housing
cases, with MP inquiries making up only about 1% of the total (p270).
However, 40% of those surveyed in the Sheffield Study consumer survey,
said they would go to their MP if they had a complaint, and the local
authority did not resolve it satisfactorily. The Sheffield Study
fieldwork also indicated a much greater involvement of the MP, with
officers' attesting to the fact that MP involvement often brought a
swift response. Hill (1976) also noted that when complaints are
referred to local offices by MPs the cases will be "investigated at
managerial level in order to provide a speedy reply" (p153).
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Others have recognised that MPs will pursue problems brought to them
by their constituents, which are not the responsibility of central
government (see Beith 1976). Hill (1976) noted that problems take up
a considerable amount of the members time, and that while the
"electoral pay-off ... is often doubtful", most MPs "express a sense
of obligation to try to redress grievances" (052). Other research
has shown that MP's constituency workloads involve a good deal of
local authority problems, especially housing (see Cohen 1973; Gould
1978; Norton 1982). This may be because the MP is seen to carry more
weight and be unbiased, but, as Hampton (1970) observed in his study
of Sheffield, this places MPs in an ambiguous position. If they are
too attentive to local issues, they are seen as interfering with local
government; if they concentrate on national or international issues
they are accused of neglecting their constituencies. There can be no
doubt that MPs do have a role to play in dispute settlement, but it
can be in an ad hoc and unsystematic way. However, if complainants do
manage to persuade an MP of the worthiness of their cause, the
authority will respond.
In some recent research on MPs and complaints (Rawlings 1990), it was
seen that a large proportion of complaints dealt with by MPs concerned
local authority matters, mainly in the field of public housing, but
also including social services, planning permission, education and
public transport (p31). This study confirmed some of the findings of
the Sheffield Study that MPs were not Just postboxes, but can play a
very active role in dispute resolution (1337), their role being
particularly valuable in "non-routine cases with no obvious haven"
(1)40).
Councillors 
Although councillors have a grievance resolution function in common
with MPs, constitutionally their role is different. Unlike MPs they
have executive authority, and they have a much closer relationship
with the services for which they are responsible. As Hill (1976)
expresses it:
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"in local government there is not the clear-cut division which
exists in Parliament between members of the Government and the
rest of the MPs" (p154).
And, although chairs of committees become closely involved with chief
officers in decision-making, they are not "ministers", and are obliged
to bring important matters to the full committee. As they are not
just constituency representatives, they may be asked to complain about
a decision, in which they played an active role. Despite the fact
that this can make their position more ambiguous than that of an MP,
there is no doubt that the councillor has traditionally played a major
role in dealing with complaints from constituents, and nothing in this
research casts any doubt on the fact that this role will continue.
Before examining the role of councillors in complaint resolution, it
may be useful to discuss briefly their constitutional position. In
fact, there is little in statute or common law regarding the position
of individual members of local authorities (see Cross and Bailey 1986,
p54). It is the corporation, rather than the individuals who comprise
it, which has legal significance, so that a member in an individual
capacity has no executive powers and can exercise no lawful authority.
There are a number of conventions and commonly accepted practices
which govern the rights and powers of members in their individual
capacities, and in this respect the standing orders of individual
local authorites are important. Members' principal legal rights
relate to the inspection of documents and the payment of allowances.
Their principal legal duty is an obligation to disclose any pecuniary
interest they may have in a matter before the council, a duty recently
strengthened by the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.
The Local Government Act 1972 gave a general power to local
authorities to discharge any of their functions through officers (see
generally Cross and Bailey 1986, p73). Previous statutes enabled
certain officers to take decisions on behalf of a local authority, and
before the 1972 Act it was a widely accepted practice that whatever
action an officer took which was within the scope, general authority
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or of a policy settled by the council would be taken as the act of the
council itself. 	 Now, the practice is for authorities to specify the
areas of decision making which fall to specified officers. Under
section 100G(2)(4) of the Local Government Act 1972, councils are
obliged to maintain a list, open to public inspection, of the powers
delegated to officers.
These wide powers of delegation mean that "councillor involvement in
the minutiae of decision making on individual cases is declining" but
"it is by no means dead" (Hill 1976, p154). Despite the fact that
there is evidence that the corporate approach has reduced the
effective role of many councillors (see Cockburn 1977; McAuslan 1980),
and that the decision making function is mechanistic "depoliticised
policy-making" (see Birkinshaw 1986, p55) there is still evidence of
councillor involvement in routine decision-making. For example, Hill
(1976) found in some housing authorities that allocation of council
houses by the housing committee still occurs (p154). In one recent
Local Ombudsman report (88/A/2329), an authority was criticised for
having too much councillor involvement in allocations, the ombudsman
saying that in the long term he could see "no role for such detailed
member involvement in normal housing allocations". There were no
written rules for the housing allocation sub-committee, a clear breach
of section 106 of the Housing Act 1985, which requires councils to
publish their allocation rules, and one councillor admitted that he
was not too happy with the operation of the sub-committee, feeling
that a lot of decisions were "made on whims" or on "how members feel
at the time". Such detailed involvement is not common, and in the
larger authorities it is usually only special cases of allocatio;n,
and eviction, which are dealt with by committee. This is also true in
social services departments, where sub-committees make decisions in
exceptional cases of child-care and grants.
Councillors are involved in a wide range of activities, their role
encompassing that of "committee member, constituency representative,
and party activist" (Heclo 1969, p187). Their different role
orientations were identified by Newton (1976) and Gyford (1984) who
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identified two main types of councillors, the "tribune", who was
orientated towards individual cases and focused on the ward, and the
"Statesman", who was more concerned about policy issues and the
community.
However, Heclo (1969) found that many councillors preferred to be
involved in detailed decision-making rather than devoting themselves
to large-scale policy matters, which require intensive study and an
understanding of complex financial issues. The implication of this in
respect of councillors as resolvers of grievances is considerable. On
the face of it, councillors appear to be excellent representatives of
individual interests, and would be better at this job than at
articulating wider political demands. But are those who are so close
to the decisions the best people to question them? This dilemma is
clearly expressed by Hill (1976):
"Indeed, inasmuch as councillors make themselves responsible for
discretionary decisions, they undermine the contribution they can
make as either pursuers of grievances or as members of a "court
of appeal". And if they adopt an appeal role they cannot, at the
same time, also be satisfactory "counsels" for the aggrieved"
(p155).
There is the further problem that if councillors do become involved in
the large scale issues and concentrate on policy, they will have
little time to devote to individual cases. When they become involved
in policy issues, they have to work closely with officials, and thus
they can become absorbed into the organisation, which makes it
difficult for them to be sufficiently disinterested when taking up
complaints.
Widdicombe (1986), too, recognised that councillors, unlike MPs, have
dual roles, being "simultaneously a representative of the local
community and responsible in law for the delivery of services" (p103).
Councillors are also traditionally representatives of, and servants
of, the local community (13104). 	 The representative role of the
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councillor is called into question with the increasing signs that the
community is not homogeneous, but is an aggregate of sectional
interests (p103), some of which bring pressure to bear through
councillors (p105).
There is the additional problem that they are responsible for the
delivery of services, but how far they should be involved is
problematic. On the one hand, Widdicombe (1986) does not believe that
it is "practicable or desirable to exclude Councillors from management
issues", and that "it is reasonable that Councillors should be able to
ensure that (policies) are implemented" (p127). But a distinction
must be drawn between the direction of general management policy and
day-to-day management intervention. The danger with too much
involvement in day-to-day administration is that this will alter the
character of councillors "so that they become full-time administrators
rather than people who are representative of the local community which
they serve" (p127).
Members' Role in Complaint Handling 
In view of the problems inherent in the various roles of councillors,
I would agree with Birkinshaw (1985) that the "role of the member in
representing citizens has serious shortcomings" (p68). Nevertheless
their role in grievance resolution should not be under-estimated.
Widdicombe (1986) found that on average a councillor spent 74 hours
each month on council duties, 13 hours of which were spent dealing
with electors' problems, surgeries, and pressure group activity
(Research Volume II, p42). This amount of time did not vary much by
the type of authority, with metropolitan districts averaging 11 hours,
which suggests that the councillors' constituency role is much the
same across the country. Labour and Liberal councillors on average
spent more time (16 hours and 17 hours respectively) on electors'
problems than did conservative councillors (10 hours).
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These figures represent a sizeable proportion of time spent dealing
with constituents, and it is therefore of interest to see how
effective they can be in this role. While not wishing to devalue the
work of councillors in any way, it seems obvious that they cannot be
expected to deal satisfactorily with every complaint, because of the
time involved and the complexity of some of the problems.
This difficulty is not helped by the attitude of some officers to
complaints sponsored by members. Although most authorities treat
member complaints with particular care, and in some cases have special
systems for dealing with such complaints (eg members' correspondence
to the chief executive having special headed paper and arriving via a
members' secretariat), giving them special weight, this does not of
itself guarantee sympathetic treatment. Some officers have complained
that member complaints are little more than councillors trying to get
around their own policies, and they resent the fact that applicants
may receive an earlier response, for example, just because s/he has
involved a councillor. Leak (1986) found "antagonistic attitudes
towards councillor enquiries" (p260) and in particular there were
criticisms of councillors pleading individual cases with officers,
when it was as a result of council policy that funds were severely
restricted (p259).
The fieldwork in the Sheffield Study supports this finding, with
officers feeling that they were more concerned with equity and fair-
treatment, whereas councillors were interested in vote-catching. Leak
(1986) noted "a very heavy volume of enquiries in the months
immediately preceding the election", which was strikingly high when
compared to the following year, when there was no election (p265).
There were even instances of councillors going from door to door
asking if tenants had any repairs or other problems and promising to
report them and have them sorted out" (p260).
During the fieldwork on the Sheffield Study, officers gave the
impression that councillors did not know enough about the situation,
with one social services director saying: "What does the councillor
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know about schizophrenia?", a view which was implicitly endorsed by
other officers who considered their decisions to be a matter of
professional Judgement. As such they should not be challenged by
members, whose role was to "establish the policies and procedure and
leave the rest to the officers." This attitude was by no means
confined to social services departments. In housing matters, an area
where there has always been much member involvement, some senior
officers regarded it as an infringement of their professional status
if a member did more than refer a complaint and then accept the
reconsidered outcome. Indeed one senior housing officer interviewed
said that he would regard it as a resignation issue if he were
overruled by a group of members in relation to a decision he had
taken. On the other hand, some officers recognised the advantages of
having difficult cases decided by members, especially in situations
involving the allocation of scarce resources.
The tension that can exist between officers and members was
highlighted by Widdicombe (1986), who found that, irrespective of
political allegiance, 59% of councillors thought that officers had too
much influence over decision-making (Research Volume I, p35).
Officers, on the other hand, complained of interference, and were
finding that the new generation of councillors were more assertive
than their predecessors (Research Volume I, p67). There was
particular friction between committee chairs and chief officers. This
was noted particularly by the evidence from the Federated Union of
Managerial and Professional Officers (FUMPO) to Widdicombe, where
there were strong complaints of recent interference in the detailed
administration of councils. 	 As an example, one committee chair
insisted on reading the chief officers morning mail with him
(Widdicombe 1986, p33). There was evidence of such tension in the
Sheffield Study, where officers complained that in some London
Boroughs, the members wanted to appoint the cleaners.
Such tension does not ensure the best service for complainants, nor
does the fact that complaints appear to be taken up more vigorously by
opposition members (see Birkinshaw 1985, p68). The vast majority of
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councils are organised on party lines, with only 15% of councillors
classified as "independent". This could therefore cause problems if
members of the ruling party are reluctant to take up complaints (see
Widdicombe 1986, Research Volume I, p59). Evidence suggests that this
is not just confined to this country. For example, most of the
complaints brought to the Alberta State Ombudsman originate from
elected members who sit on the opposite side of the Assembly (see 17th
Annual Report of the Ombudsman for Alberta for 1983, p55). This seems
to indicate that the members' commitment to complaint handling may be
more to do with political point-scoring, rather than a sense of
justice, a point noted by Leak (1986) who concluded that the
"resolution of the individual trouble case was by no means necessarily
disinterested" (p271).
Whatever the views about the motives of councillors in taking up
complaints, their effectiveness depends on their ability to obtain the
necessary information. The councillor may be further hindered in
his/her duties by the fact that, although they have a rigbt to inspect
documents wherever this is necessary for the performance of their
duties (see R v Barnes B.C. ex parte Conlon (1983) 3 All ER 226), they
do not have a roving commission to go through council documents. They
are only entitled to see such documents as are reasonably necessary to
perform their duties. Improper or indirect motives can disbar, and
the decision to disclose documents to the councillor is for the
council itself to decide, or the committee if there has been
delegation.	 Thus the councillor is entitled to have access to all
written material in the possession of the local authority as long as
s/he has good reason. 	 In the case of a committee of which the
councillor was a member, there would normally be good reason for
access to all the committee's written material. In other cases a
"need to know" would have to be demonstrated. In the last resort it
would be for the council to determine, subject to Judicial review
under the Wednesbury principles. (See R v Lancashire C C Police 
Committee ex parte Hook (1980) QB 603 HL; R v Birmingham City D C ex 
parts 0 (1983) AC 578).
The Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 gives a
statutory right of access to documents for members. Any document in
the possession or under the control of the council, containing
material relating to any business to be transacted at a meeting of the
council, committee, or sub-committee, is to be open to inspection by
any council member. There is no right to inspect where it appears to
the proper officer (a function usually designated to the chief
executive) that a document discloses certain classes of exempt
information. This right of inspection is expressly stated to be in
addition to any other rights that a member may have (Local Government
Act 1972 section 100F, added by Local Government (Access to
Information) Act 1985 section 1). At the time of the Sheffield Study
the impact of this was not yet known, although such legislation can
only improve the ability of a councillor to pursue a complaint for a
constituent.
Previous research has revealed serious shortcomings in the role of the
member in representing citizens with complaints. Maud (1967)
concluded that councillors needed to "understand sympathetically the
problems .... of constituents", and had to be able to convey them to
the authority (Volume 2, p143).	 Cockburn (1977) and McAuslan (1980)
believed that the role of councillor in grievance resolution, was
diminished in local government. Justice (1980) also had misgivings
about councillors' effectiveness in taking up complaints which may
involve the Local Ombudsman, because on the one hand "they could make
political capital out of a reference to the CLA" or, on the other hand
"they were alarmed at the prospect of becoming involved in a complaint
against the authority", or "they had simply forgotten what the correct
procedures were" (pare 254).
There is also evidence that members of the public do not trust
councillors to take up their complaints, many feeling that they are
not independent of the council. Watchman's research (1985) in
Scotland found that there was distrust of members by the general
public.	 Widdicombe (1986) had a mixed response: some 20% of the
electorate had had some contact with a councillor, and 26% had made a
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complaint at some time.	 Most were dissatisfied with the response
(Research Volume 1, p41). Even though there was a lower level of
dissatisfaction if the complaint was made to a councillor (48%) than
if the complaint was made to a council officer (60%), such a high
dissatisfaction rate calls into question the role of the elected
member in this area. In the Sheffield Study, discussions with tenants
associations and community groups in some of the larger authorities
visited produced a mixed response to local councillors, especially
when dealing with persistent or resistant complaints. This confirmed
that, whatever the role of the councillor, and while in no way
undermining their value, formal grievance procedures are needed, as
the good offices of councillors alone are not adequate to deal with
the range of grievances encountered.
The limited role of the councillor as a citizen's champion is also
emphasised by Widdicombe's research, which found that of the 301
consumers who had complained, only 33% complained to a councillor,
compared with 61% who complained to council officers, and only 4%
complained to their MP (Widdicombe 1986 Research Volume III, p54).
The Sheffield Study survey of complainants whose complaints resulted
in a referral to the ombudsman indicated results consistent with
Widdicombe. Over 63% of the sample in the Sheffield Study took their
complaint to an officer of the authority in the first instance; 27%
approached a councillor, and less than 2% approached their MP.
In the Sheffield Survey, a hypothetical question was asked to see to
whom consumers would complain, if a council department failed to give
a satisfactory result. Only 15% mentioned the local councillor, but
40% of consumers said that they would refer the matter to their MP.
There is some consistency here with Widdicombe's findings, as when
asked a hypothetical question about the most effective course of
action to challenge the council's decision, the highest score was
accorded to the MP -(22%), followed by the councillor (18%) (Research
Volume III, p55). The Sheffield Study fieldwork experience confirmed
that many members of the public regarded the member as part of the
organisation being complained against, and would be reluctant to
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approach them. This is even more the case in ombudsman matters, where
a large number of ombudsmen referrals come from opposition members.
Councillors are considered to be too bound up with the decision making
process to be distanced from the offending decision.
There is the additional problem that the members' conduct itself may
be the reason for the complaint. Under the Local Government Act 1972
sections 94-98, if a member has any pecuniary interest, direct or
indirect, in any contract, proposed contract or other matter, and is
present at a meeting when it is discussed, s/he must disclose that
fact and refrain from the discussion and voting. Breach of this duty
is a criminal offence. In addition to this, the standing orders of
the authority may provide for the exclusion of such members from the
meeting, with the proviso that the member may remain if the majority
of those present at the meeting so decide (see Cross and Bailey 1986,
p58).A member is not treated as having an interest, if it is so remote
or insignificant that it could not reasonably be regarded as likely to
influence him/her in discussion and voting, and an interest which a
member has merely as a ratepayer, inhabitant of the area, or person
entitled to participate in any service offered to the public is also
excluded (Local Government Act 1972, section 97).
In addition to this statutory obligation, the National Code of Local
Government Conduct (DoE 1975) gives guidance to councillors on their
conduct. The code states that:
"It is not enough to avoid actual impropriety and you should at
all times avoid any occasion for suspicion or the appearance of
improper conduct. The law makes specific provision requiring you
to disclose pecuniary interests, direct and indirect. But
interests which are not pecuniary can be Just as important.
Kinship, friendship, membership of an association, society or
trade union, trusteeship and many other kinds of relationship can
sometimes influence your Judgement and give the impression that
you might be acting for personal motives. A good test is to ask
yourself whether others would think that the interest is of a
- 84 -
kind to make this possible. If you think they would, or if you
are in doubt, disclose the interest and withdraw from the meeting
unless under Standing Orders you are specifically invited to
stay".
Where a councillor's business or personal interests are closely
related to the work of one of the council's committees or sub-
committees, s/he should not seek or accept the chair of that committee
or sub-committee, and s/he should seriously consider whether
membership would involve him/her disclosing an interest so often, s/he
would be of little value to it or would weaken public confidence in
its impartiality.	 The National Code is often incorporated into the
standing orders of individual authorities. Widdicombe (1986) found
that 82% of authorities had formally adopted it, and it was made use
of without formal adoption by a further 12% (p107).
Failure to comply with the present code will be regarded by the Local
Ombudsman as maladministration, even if the code is not incorporated
in the standing orders (see Local Ombudsman Reports 89/C/0826;
89/C/0037; 89/C/0212; 89/C10334). Some recent reports of the Local
Ombudsman reveal some serious breaches of the Code (see 88/C/472;
88/C/1538) and sometimes of the Act. For example, in one case
(88/B/517) the councillor, who was also vice-chair of the planning
committee, was involved as an applicant in a number of planning
applications. Another case (88/A/0006) caused the ombudsman to remark
that the councillor's actions "amount to one of the most blatant
breaches of the Code I have seen, and can only have done great harm to
the reputation of the council and to local government in general".
Although these cases are exceptional, they do little to uphold public
confidence in councillors, and they illustrate the problems with
relying too heavily on councillors as champions of complainants.
Although the Local Ombudsman must be applauded for making it clear
that they normally regard breach of the Code as maladministration, it
is disturbing that Widdicombe (1986) found that councillors are not as
conscious of the Code "as should be the case" (p107).	 This is one
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area where there is a need for induction training of new councillors,
but Widdicombe found that "arrangements were patchy" (p163).
The situation may also be improved as a result of the Local Government
and Housing Act 1989. Section 19 empowers the Secretary of State to
make regulations, which would require members to notify the proper
officer of any direct or indirect pecuniary interests they may have.
The register of members' interests would be open to public inspection.
There is also provision for the Secretary of State to issue a National
Code of Local Government Conduct, after consultation with
representatives of local government (section 31) and the form of
declaration of acceptance of office by the member may include an
undertaking to be guided by the code in the performance of council
duties. The Local Ombudsman's powers in relation to members will also
be strengthened by the Act. Section 32 provides that if the Local
Ombudsman issues an adverse report, and that a member was involved in
the maladministration and that the member's conduct constituted a
breach of the statutory code, then (unless the Local Ombudsman
considers it unjust) the report shall name the member and give
particulars of the breach. In addition, when a councillor is
criticised in an Ombudsman's report, the councillor will not be
permitted to vote on matters relating to the report (see CLA Annual
Report 1989/90, p8).
The effect of these changes is yet to be seen, and despite the
limitations of councillors as a method of dispute resolution, there is
no doubt that within local government this is seen as a vital and
important aspect of their work. Members who were interviewed during
the Sheffield Study fieldwork were at pains to emphasise that the
member is an effective complaints device. Indeed one councillor went
so far as to say that the local ombudsman was not really necessary as
his authority had 50 local ombudsmen - the members. The particular
value of the member appears to be that their special status will often
ensure the triggering of any complaints procedure which does exist
within the authority.
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One of the concerns of the Sheffield study was to see what part
members played in any complaints procedure which existed. As members
ultimately are responsible for actions of the authority, it could be
thought that they would have an active role in handling resistant
disputes which were not satisfactorily resolved at officer level. As
shall be seen (Chapter 7) only a minority of authories claim to have a
formal procedure for handling complaints, and within this minority,
only one-third use a committee or sub-committee of members as a final
link in the grievance chain.
This is surprising, given that many decisions taken by officers are
not purely managerial, relating to the mechanical application of pre-
existing rules or policy.	 Officers have a great deal of discretion,
where there is room for genuine differences of opinion. One would
have thought that councillors had a role to play in this area, but
although some senior officers saw the advantages of difficult cases
being decided by members, this was not the norm.
One area where member involvement was found to be useful, during the
Sheffield Study fieldwork, was as negotiators or conciliators, and in
this respect the role of committee chairs is important. For example,
in one metropolitan district, the chair of the planning committee
would discuss contentious planning applications with the planners and
applicants before the appeal stage. In housing departments in
particular, lettings officers would often discuss matters with
committee chairs as a way of trying to avoid disputes. These informal
attempts to avoid disputes were noted by Birkinshaw (1985, p71),
especially in cases where there are statutory protections for
consumers. Thus, he says, that "some statutory obligations have a
tendency to produce additional administrative practices which result
in increased procedural protection", in particular by authorities
displaying "a willingness to conduct informal meetings with applicants
or licensees" (1)71). The Sheffield Study found that such informal
negotiation was common practice, and that these negotiations involved
the members as well as officers.
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To conclude, then, elected members play an important role in dispute
resolution which should not be underestimated, a role which can have
two distinct aspects. Firstly, they can be used as a trigger, to
alert the authority to the complaint, and despite the problems
outlined, this can be seen as a major aspect of their dispute
resolution role. At the other end of the grievance chain, elected
members could be involved in settling resistant disputes which had not
been satisfactorily handled at officer level. This would be a valid
role for them, as they ultimately have responsibility for the way the
authority conducts its affairs, although, as shall be seen in later
chapters, few authorities have procedures with this level of member
involvement.
However, their role in dispute resolution is limited by a number of
factors. Firstly, they cannot deal satisfactorily with every
complaint, because of constraints of time and the complexity of many
of the problems. Added to this is the ambivalent feelings of officers
towards members exercising this role, which may restrict their
effectiveness. There is also some evidence of member distrust by the
general public, and certainly a feeling among officers that members
use complaints for political motives, a view supported by the fact
that complaints seem to be more actively pursued by oppostion members
than by members of the ruling party. Complaints also seem, at times,
to be used for electioneering purposes.
There are also situations where it is the conduct of the councillors
themselves which gives rise to the complaint, as evidenced by some
Local Ombudsman cases involving conflict of interest. Even where
councillors' conduct is not in question, they can be too close to the
decision to be disinterested in the outcome of the complaint. This is
why a formal- complaints procedure, which does not depend on a
sympathetic councillor is essential, so that all complainants will be
able to have their grievance discussed. This will not undermine the
councillors' role, as there will always be those constituents who
need, or desire, help from their representative. There is little
evidence to support the councillor who believed that the members were
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in effect local ombudsmen. As the decision makers, they are not
appropriate to handle complaints about that decision. In essence, an
ombudsman has to be outside the organisation which is the subject of
the complaint, but councillors, unlike MPs, have executive authority
within the organisation. It is for this reason that the introduction
of the Local Ombudsmen system is important and its role in grievance
handling will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 THE LOCAL OMBUDSMAN 
Introduction 
The last chapter concluded that, valuable though local members may be
in complaint handling, there were shortcomings, and therefore some
examination of the impact of the Commission for Local Administration
(the Local Ombudsman) would be useful. This is the concern of this
chapter. The investigation of the operation of the Local Ombudsman
system is worthwhile for two important reasons. Firstly, the Local
Ombudsman is a method used by members of the public to resolve
individual grievances, and it is therefore of interest to see how well
it performs this function. Secondly, although in the Sheffield Study
no clear correlation was established between the existence of
published grievance produces and the numbers of complaints accepted by
the Local Ombudsman for investigation for individual authorities, the
existence of the Local Ombudsman does affect the way local authorities
respond to complaints, so it is of interest to see the extent of the
Local Ombudsman's impact on local authority procedures.
The Commission for Local Administration was set up by the Local
Government Act 1974, which established three commissioners for England
(north, south east and south west regions) and one commissioner for
Wales. The Scottish equivalent was set up in 1975. For the purpose
of the Sheffield Study the focus was the English Commission, although
some pilot work was done in Wales, and the work of Watchman (1985) is
used to give a Scottish perspective as appropriate.
The method employed in the Sheffield Study was designed to give as
full a picture as possible of the system, and was approached from a
number of perspectives. All past and present ombudsmen were
interviewed about their work, together with the directors of the three
area offices, and files were examined at the CLA office in London.
The local authority view of the system was gained from a series of
questions in questionnaires addressed to chief officers asking about
the impact of the Local Ombudsman on the running of particular
departments. During the Sheffield Study fieldwork the method of
handling Local Ombudsman complaints was examined, by interviewing
those with responsibility for Local Ombudsman liaison, and by
examining complaints files, some of which became the subject of formal
investigation. The consumer view was obtained by a questionnaire
which was sent to 300 people ( 1 in 10 ) who had complained to the
Local Ombudsman in a six month period during the course of the
Sheffield Study, chosen at random, and from information obtained from
the Sheffield Study consumer survey, which contained questions about
perceptions of the Local Ombudsman.
The Role of the Local Ombudsman 
The official objectives of the Local Ombudsman as set out in each
Annual Report, are as follows:-
"The Commission's main objective is the investigation of
complaints of injustice arising from maladministration by (local
authorities etc) with a view to securing where appropriate both
satisfactory	 redress	 for	 the	 complainant	 and	 better
administration for the authorities 	
The supporting objectives of the commission are:
To encourage authorities to develop and publicise their own
procedures for the fair local settlement of complaints and to
settle as many as possible;
To encourage the local settlement of complaints made to the Local
Ombudsman;
To make the Local Ombudsman system known as widely as possible
and to advise people how to make their complaints;
To secure remedies quickly for those whose complaints are
Justified;
To issue guidance on good administrative practice to local
government and to relevant bodies;
To guide those with complaints outside the Jurisdiction of the
Local Ombudsman;
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To support the work of other Ombudsmen"
(CLA Annual Report 1989/90, p3)
It was thus set up primarily as a method of handling individual
grievances involving local authorities, although the work is not
confined to individual issues, and it is important to note that as
well as "satisfactory redress" the aim is to achieve "better
administration". However, the great bulk of their work does centre
around individual grievance handling, and, from the Sheffield Study
interviews with past and present ombudsmen, this is certainly how they
see their role. For example, one said that the Local Ombudsman tries
to find an acceptable solution to grievances. Another said that the
primary concern was to secure a remedy for an individual's grievance,
secondly to help the particular local authority to administer better,
and lastly to try to encourage better practices generally. This was
the commonly held view. Indeed, only one Local Ombudsman said that
the primary role was to ensure good local administration, insisting
that the ombudsman was not there to ensure that the complainant won,
but that the correct solution to the problem was reached, and that the
Local Ombudsman is not on anyone's side, other than that of "good"
administration.
Although these two aims need not be mutually exclusive, there is some
tension between the two roles, and they can result in a different
relationship with local government, which may be happy to co-operate
with individual grievance redress, but not so happy to see the CLA
having a roving commission to comment upon their procedures. One
director though that too much emphasis on the second role meant that
the Commission became too much like management consultants, and a past
ombudsman emphasised that the CLA was not an "efficienty unit".
The British model is basically one of compromise, with some attempt to
improve procedures were possible. There is also much emphasis on
informal settlement, but in these areas there could be a danger that
an individual complainant is satisfied at the expense of a thorough
investigation of an authority's procedures. 	 Although most of those
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interviewed were at pains to stress that the Local Ombudsman would not
be compromised in this way, when pressed some were prepared to admit
that an informal, speedy, local settlement could be better for an
individual complainant than a printed report in six months time. When
pressed about the other potential complainants who may be affected by
poor procedures, the response was that it was up to them to make their
own complaint. Baroness Serota has said that the procedures are
designed to support the "traditional process of remedying grievances
wherever possible within the democratic local government framework"
(Annual Report 1981/82).	 And Yardley (1983) has emphasised the view
of the primary responsibility to the complainant as follows:
If a local settlement is reached which is agreeable to both the
council and the complainant, and acceptable to the Local
Ombudsman, there is nothing further which needs to be done on the
issue in point, and it is unnecessary to draw further attention
to the defect which has been discovered" (p526).
The government <see Government Response to Widdicombe 1988) has
recognised that there is scope for extending the Local Ombudsman's
role to improve "the quality of administration generally", so that the
Local Ombudsman would have "a developing role in the prevention of
future, as well as a cure for past injustice and maladministration"
(p30). It was suggested that the Local Ombudsman should take greater
advantage of the opportunity in their reports to comment on "the
adequacy or otherwise of the procedures in individual authorities"
(p30) and to "advise and comment on local authority procedures
generally, on the basis of the wealth of experience they have gained
through investigations" (p31).
In order to do this there have been legislative changes, so that the
Local Ombudsman can take a wider and more assertive role. The Local
Government and Housing Act 1989 makes provisions for widening the role
of the Local Ombudsman by extending their powers to enable them to
issue advice on good administrative practice (section 23). This is
statutory recognition of the valuable function already performed in
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this area, and it seems that the Commission hope that additional
resources would be made available to assist them (CLA Annual Report
1988/89, p55). It is also proposed to give the Commission power to
enable them to appoint additional "non-investigate", or advisory,
commissioners, who could provide general advice to the Commissions on
efficiency and good practice (section 22).
	 There is also a
requirement that local authorities notify the Local Ombudsman of the
steps taken, or to be taken,	 to rectify any administrative
shortcomings identified in an adverse report (section 26).
Maladministration and Injustice 
The main objective of the Commission is the investigation of
complaints of injustice alleging maladministration, and the tension in
the two roles of the CLA can be seen in the concept of
maladministration. This has developed in a pragmatic way, and it is
not based upon a systematic attempt to settle principles of good
administration which are then applied as appropriate. The three
commissioners do not sit as a commission, which has resulted in a
marked lack of development of settled principles and some
inconsistency.
Watchman (1985) did develop categories of maladministration, but
maladministration is not defined by statute, and although one could
probably suggest that certain actions (or inactions) would give rise
to such a finding (eg failure to follow own procedures, failure to
fulfil statutory duties, failure to keep proper records, unreasonable
delay) it is by no means certain that lapses here will result in
findings of maladminsitration (eg Reports 397/C/84; 297/1784).
Although Watchman believes that situations where there is no standard
procedure for responding to complaints should amount to
maladministration, the Sheffield Study found that in general Local
Ombudsmen had been reluctant to describe scant procedures or lack of
them as maladministration per se, without particular evidence of
injustice being caused. This is another illustration of the tension
between the role of the Local Ombudsman as a resolver of the
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individual trouble case, 	 and as an instrument for improved
adminst ration.
There were some cases where the Local Ombudsman did appear to be
taking a strong stand against poor procedures (eg 689/Y/84; 269/Y/84;
238/S/82; 247/Y/85; 706/Y183), but all too many where there was a
general reluctance to suggest that minimum standards should be
adopted. However, recent reports seem to be revealing a trend towards
insisting on certain minimum standards. For example, incomplete
record keeping has been criticised (88/A/0015), as has poor liaison
between departments (88/A/1067), lack of records of an inspection in
building work (87/13/1245) and a case where files had gone missing
(88/C/1727).	 In that case the ombudsman criticised the council's
handling of the complaint as being "less than ideal".
During the Sheffield Study there was little evidence that the Local
Ombudsman regarded the giving of reasons as a basic requirement in
administration, breach of which will give rise to maladministration,
but in a recent case (881Al2329) the ombudsman declared that good
administration "requires that reasons are given for administrative
decisions, and a proper note should be made of such decisions". This
was referred to as a "breach of elementary administrative procedure",
which gave "the impression that decisions are arbitrarily made". The
ombudsman insisted that the council should "immediately minute and
disclose reasons". This indicates a move away from some of the cases
examined during the Sheffield Study when there was criticism on
occasion of the absence of minutes, but it had not been declared to be
maladministration.
Further developments in the area are encouraging, notably the
expectation that all local authorities have internal complaints
procedures, and that "a failure to have one or to rely on one which is
incomplete or inadequate may lead to a finding of maladministration"
(CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p6). This is borne out by recent reports.
For example, in one case (87/A/453) the ombudsman declared that "good
administration requires that authorities should have effective and
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clear internal complaints procedures", and that a "failure to have
arrangements whereby legitimate complaints may be dealt with speedily
and fairly may well in itself amount to maladministration". In
another case (88/A10763) the authority was criticised because there
was no evidence to suggest that complaints had been properly
investigated: "In fact it seems that little attention was paid to them
at all".	 One authority, which did have a complaints procedure, was
criticised because it was not adhered to (88/C/1083).
A particular problem which appears to be confronting local authorities
at the present time is staffing and resource problems. The ombudsmen
recognise this, but nevertheless find maladministration. For example
in one case (88/A/0709), which concerned delay in finding a place in a
new school for a child who had been expelled the ombudsman knew that
the authority had "severe staffing and resource difficulties", but
neverthless the delay constituted maladministration. 	 In some "right
to buy" cases (88/C/1692; 88/A/833: 88/A/1341; 88/A/1412) the
ombudsmen "sympathise" and "do not underestimate the difficulties"
which councils have to face when their scarce resources are
inadequate, or they fail to recruit staff, particularly in legal
departments. Nevertheless, it was found that the failure to meet the
timescale imposed by statute constituted maladministration. In a case
involving delay in processing an improvement grant (88/A/1054) due to
acute staff shortages and financial difficulties, the ombudsman would
not allow this to "serve as an excuse for a failure to undertake a
duty imposed by an Act of Parliament". It is difficult for the Local
Ombudsman to find otherwise when there is a clear statutory duty and
statutory timescale, but equally, if the councils are employing their
resources and staff in the best way, one wonders whether such findings
can solve the problem.
Section 31 of the Local Government Act 1974 provides that the
authority concerned only has to consider a report where there has been
a finding of inlustice caused as a result of maladministration. Thus
maladministration without individual injustice will not require any
action from the authority concerned, emphasising once more the Local
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Ombudsman's primary role as being concerned with the individual
trouble case. There may be poor procedures and maladministration
revealed during the course of the investigation, but without
injustice, the authority need do nothing.
However, in recent reports there does seem to be an attempt to find
injustice where there has been a clear case of maladministration. For
example, in one case (87/B/1350) the injustice was the fact that the
complainant had had to correspond with the council and pursue the
matter over an unnecessarily long period. This approach is reflected
in some of the remedies suggested. For example in one case
(88/B/0774) where the injustice was found to be the loss of a business
opportunity, this was to be remedied by a payment "to reflect the time
and trouble involved in pursuing the complaint", and in another case
(88/B/110) the council were asked to apologise and pay £100 to the
complainant for his "time and trouble".
The Sheffield Study found a lack of consistency in following up on
procedures which were found to be unsatisfactory. Although sometimes
Commissioners did follow up the authorities concerned (in some cases
even issuing second reports) this was by no means the general
practice, and eventually it was admitted by senior officials that the
Local Ombudsman exercised "discretion" over the closing of a file when
procedures were found to be defective.
Again this situation may be improving, as there are references in the
reports to actual improvements in procedures as a result of the
investigation. For example, in one case (88/A/878) the ombudsman was
pleased to note "that the allocation system had been reorganised", so
that "such mistakes should not recur". And again, in a case where
there was a finding of poor judgement, but not maladministration
(88/A/2144) the ombudsman said:
"I am nevertheless pleased to see that new procedures have now
been adopted which may help to avoid this happening in future"
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In another case (88/A/647) the council had recognised that their
system for administering grants was cumbersome, and had improved it.
Alongside this are the cases where councils were called upon to
improve their procedures (88/A/0763; 88/C11083; 87/B/1350) but how far
this was monitored by the Commission is not known. This situation may
be improved by section 26 of the Local Government and Housing Act
1989, which requires authorities to notify the Local Ombudsman of the
steps taken to rectify administrative shortcomings. What procedures
the Commission will introduce to monitor this is yet to be seen.
This provision certainly lends force to the argument that the Local
Ombudsman ought to be playing a more effective role in overseeing
administrative practice. This was the view of a number of local
authority officers interviewed, during the Sheffield Study, who
thought the role of the Local Ombudsman was to criticise and help to
improve procedures. In New Zealand, for example, the ombudsman can
recommend that practices which are unreasonable or unjust should be
altered or that the law should be changed (see Lundvik 1981), and the
same is true for Denmark (see Nielson 1983).
Baroness Serota, the first chair of the Commission in England, has
said that there should be a Code of Good Administrative Practice
(Serota 1983, p39), a suggestion which was also made by Justice
(1971). Australia (Administrative Decisions [Judicial Review] Act
1977), and Sweden (Administrative Procedures Act 1971), have such
practices, and indeed it has become a common feature of ombudsmen
systems that they do make recommendations for reforms and improvements
(see International Ombudsmen Conference, 1980). The newly introduced
statutory duty of notification of steps taken to rectify procedures by
a local authority following the investigation of a complaint,
reinforces the idea that the ombudsman is an overseer of good
administration as well as being concerned with the individual trouble
case.
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Public Awareness of the Ombudsman 
One of the reasons for looking in detail at the Local Ombudsman was
that it is a method used to resolve individual trouble cases. How
well it performs this role must depend to some extent on the public
knowing it is there to be used. However, studies have shown that the
level of awareness by members of the public is low.
The Sheffield Study consumer survey, which was conducted in a borough
with a good complaints handling record, and where there were strenuous
efforts to afford publicity for the Local Ombudsman revealed that only
38% of respondents were aware of the Local Ombudsman's existence, the
levels of awareness, not surprisingly, being higher among private
sector residents than council house tenants. When asked to whom they
would complain if the local authority did not resolve a complaint
satisfactorily, only 13% said the Local Ombudsman, compared to 40% who
mentioned their Member of Parliament. About half of those who had
heard of the Local Ombudsman mentioned media coverage as their source
of knowledge. There was little evidence that the local authority had
made any successful attempt to educate people on the matter. Almost
one-third of those who had heard of the Local Ombudsman system were
unaware of, or unable to articulate, the nature of its role, and again
this lack of knowledge was more common among council house tenants.
In a recent Annual Report (1988/89) the ombudsmen indicate their
awareness of this problem, and concern is expressed that the service
is not widely enough known (p8). A revised booklet has now been
published, which is available for local authorities, citizen's advice
bureaux, consumer advice centres and other voluntary organisations.
Even though aware of the Local Ombudsman the fact that a complaint has
to be in writing (section 26[1][a]Local Government Act 1974), may be a
serious impediment to some complainants. The ombudsman receives many
hundreds of telephone calls and some personal visits, and it may be
that some complaints are not coming through because of this
requirement. The Justice (1980) research supports this view, as does
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the Sheffield Study with 25% of the Local Ombudsmen complainants
saying that they found it difficult to put their complaint in writing.
This is a worrying enough figure in itself, but especially so when the
sample consists of those who are sufficiently motivated to answer a
postal questionnaire. The Sheffield Study fieldwork reinforced this
view, that people do not find it easy to formulate their complaints.
This requirement is not out of line with most ombudsman systems,
although there are notable exceptions. For example, the Commonwealth
Ombudsman of Australia, allows such complaints, which have now become
more common than written ones. They also, incidentally, appear to be
resolved more often in the complainant's favour, than do those
received in writing. There is also a system where the ombudsman visits
areas, advertising this fact in the press, so that people can come
with their complaints. The ombudsman can be contacted by phone, and if
the problem does concern the ombudsman, the complainant is informed of
the next visit of the ombudsman to the vicinity, and invited to come
along and talk about it (see Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual Report
1983-84). Although no-one seems to be pressing for a change in this
area, some thought may need to be given to it, especially in the light
of changes relating to direct access.
Access to the Ombudsman 
One recent improvement in the system is the removal of the member
filter for ombudsman complaints, introduced by the Local Government
Act 1988. Before this, submission of complaints to the ombudsman had
to be made through a local member (section 25(2) Local Government Act
1974). Such a requirement presented an obstacle to those wishing to
bring a complaint, and it was criticised (see, for example, Justice
1980). The Sheffield Report itself lent support to the criticisms,
the research finding that the majority of officers and members
interviewed felt that the requirement could no longer be Justified.
Indeed,	 in some authorities officers would, 	 after detailed
investigation, actually encourage members to submit complaints,
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especially in the case of tiresome complainants or resistant
complaints.
The justification for the "filter" principle (which existed only in
Britain and France) appeared to be that the local authority should
have an opportunity of investigating the complaint itself. However,
as there is a statutory obligation (Local Government Act 1974, section
26[5]) on the Local Ombudsman to ensure that this has been done, the
member filter appeared superfluous. Apart from this, the Sheffield
Study indicated that many members of the public often regard the
member as part of the organisation complained against (a not
unreasonable assumption, given the extent to which local councillors
are bound up in the decision making-process) and are thus reluctant to
seek their help in submitting a complaint.
Widdicombe (1986), also recommended change in this area, and before
the law was changed the CLA devised its own method of overcoming the
problem. Since 1984 all complaints received directly were referred to
the civic leader with a request that they be settled locally, or
formally referred by a member (see 3rd Report from the Select
Committee on the PCA 1986, p46). In the Sheffield Study, most local
authorities visited had adopted practices to deal with such direct
complaints, so that members (sometimes the Leader of the Council or
Lord Mayor), sponsored them as a matter of routine. In Scotland, the
Scottish Local Ombudsman developed a practice of following up directly
referred complaints after one month to see if satisfaction had been
achieved (see Bretton 1984, p13).
Such practices are now no longer necessary, as, since May 1988,
members of the public can complain directly to the Local Ombudsman.
In the first year of the changed procedure, the number of complaints
rose by 44% (CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p4). This increase is partly
attributed to the growing public awareness of the Commission's
services, but it also illustrates the disincentive imposed by the
member filter in discouraging what may have been valid complaints.
Indeed, a comparison of the figures for the year ending March 1989
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(where 72% of complaints were sent directly to the ombudsman, and 28%
were referred by members) with those from 1988 (42% sent direct, 58%
referred by members) demonstrates that the removal of the member
filter has had a significant effect on the method by which people send
their complaints to the Local Ombudsman (CLA Annual Report 1988/89,
p10). In 1989/90 there was a further increase, to 83%, of complaints
sent directly to the ombudsman, and indeed there was a record number
of complaints altogether, the total being 8,733 (CLA Annual Report
1989/90, 01). Such an increase also indicates that complainants are
not having their problems resolved at a local level, due, presumably,
to a lack of decent procedures within the authority.
Satisfaction with the Ombudsman System 
Evidence from the Sheffield Study suggests that local authorities are
learning to handle the Local Ombudsman and see it a less of a threat
than it was before. Some authorities do look to the Local Ombudsman
for advice and guidance, but the general impression gained was that
local government had learnt to accommodate it.
Over 80% of the Sheffield Study questionnaire responses from local
authorities expressed satisfaction with the thoroughness, fairness and
impartiality of the Local Ombudsman. The only major criticism, such
that it was, concerned delay, especially at the informal process
stage. Other criticisms were that the system was expensive; that
there was not enough opportunity to contest findings of fact; and that
there should be a right of appeal from investigation findings, but
only a small minority mentioned these. The general feeling was that
local government looked favourably on the Local Ombudsman, a fact
commented upon by the ombudsmen themselves:
"For the most part local authorities respect and value the Local
Ombudsman system, realizing that they and we both have our part
to play in ensuring that the most reasonable standard of local
administration is maintained within the limits of human frailty".
(CLA Annual Report 1989/90, p18).
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The respondents to the Sheffield Survey were satisfied with the
general process of investigation, especially the taking of oral
evidence. It may be worth noting that most of the world's ombudsmen
appear to regard this feature of the British practice as the best in
the world (see, for example, Gwyn 1983).
On the other hand, consumers of the system appear to be not so
satisfied. 70% of the respondents to the Sheffield Study of CLA
complainants questionnaire expressed dissatisfaction with the way
their case had been dealt with. Over half were critical of the
conduct of the investigation, but there is the problem of not being
able to please everyone as almost the same number were critical
because they thought the inquiry was conducted too slowly, as were
critical because they thought it had been too quick.
In only 12 of the 148 responses had there been a finding of
maladministration and injustice and it may therefore have been that
the major objection and cause of dissatisfaction was in losing the
case. Of the 148, 53 had their cases accepted for full investigation,
and, besides the 12 mentioned above, in 4 more cases maladministration
was found, but without injustice. Only 8 of the 53 respondents, where
there had been full investigation, expressed satisfaction with the way
the case was dealt with, 7 where maladministration and injustice was
found, and one where the case was discontinued, presumably because
some satisfactory local settlement was reached. As the Sheffield
Study research produced evidence of the high standard of work,
courtesy and concern by ombudsman office staff and investigators, the
major complaint seemed to be failure to accept that the case had been
lost. It may be that expectations are too high, or that the
jurisdictional limits, especially that of proving maladministration,
are not fully grasped by complainants. The Scottish Local Ombudsman
has commented that these limitations do produce these effects. (see
CLA Annual Report 1983/84).
What was perhaps more disturbing was that 44% of the sample said that
they would not use the Local Ombudsman again if they had further cause
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to complain.
	
Part of the problem may result from some of the
ombudsman's office procedures.	 For example, some of the letters to
complainants examined on files during the Sheffield Study were
unnecessarily curt and peremptory. Also, although the aim of the
Local Ombudsman is to encourage local settlements, complainants may
have felt that nothing had in fact been done to resolve their case.
There may have been a decision not to investigate, based on an
assurance by the local authority that they would go some way to
meeting the complainant's wishes, but all that the complainant had
received was a letter saying simply that there had been a decision not
to investigate. In some circumstances there was no follow-up by the
Local Ombudsman to see that the local authority had honoured its
promise.
Justice (1980) also found evidence of dissatisfaction from consumers.
However, whereas they found that 47% of those bringing planning cases
were dissatisfied with the role the Commission had played, 68% of
those involved in housing cases were very satisfied. It is suggested
that the reason for this difference is that it is easier to devise a
remedy that would satisfy a complainant in housing cases (p83).
Limits of the Ombudsman's Jurisdiction 
The Local Ombudsman is empowered to investigate complaints of
injustice arising from maladministration, but is not allowed to look
at the merits of decisions, nor question policy (Local Government Act
1974, section 34[3]). The distinction between the merits of a
decision, and how that decision was reached is not always clear, and,
indeed in R.v.Local Commissioner for Administration ex part Bradford 
Metropolitan City Council (1979) QBD 278; (1979) 2 All ER 881, the
court said that section 34(3) does not preclude the investigation of
acts on the grounds that they were decisions taken by a local
authority on the merits of a case, as taking a decision is an action
taken in the exercise of an administrative function. In this case, a
mother was complaining to the Local Ombudsman about the local
authority's actions in respect of her children, who had been taken
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into care by the authority and placed with different foster parents.
The court said that the actions of the authority could be
investigated.
But in a recent case (R.v.Local Commissioner for Administration ex 
parte Eastleigh Borough Council(1988) 1 QBD 855; (1988) 3 All ER 151)
it was held that there had been a breach of section 34(3), because the
ombudsman's report had gone beyond a criticism of the council's
failure to follow its own policy, but had questioned the merits of the
policy decision, in relation to the inspection of drains. This case
raised "issues of some importance concerning the relationship between
courts and the local ombudsman" (per Lord Donaldson p152), as it had
been decided in the lower court that, despite the fact that
jurisdiction had been exceeded, there could be no relief to the
council, as to do so would in effect provide a right of appeal against
the ombudsman's findings. The court of appeal, however, decided that
the ombudsman's report was subject to judicial review when it was
decided that jurisdiction had been exceeded. This was because of the
public law character of the Local Ombudsman's office, and the fact
that Parliament had not created a right of appeal against the findings
in a report.
The limitation imposed by section 34(3) can therefore be problematic
and cause confusion for complainants. On the other hand, there has
been judicial recognition of the appropriateness of the Local
Ombudsman where the courts have no role to play. For example, in
Gaskin.v.Liverpool City Council 1 WLR 1549, the plaintiff, who had
been in care since he was six months old, claimed to be suffering from
severe psychological injuries and anxiety neurosis because of the
authority's negligence or breach of duty while in their care. He
applied for the disclosure of the authority's records to assist in the
preparation of his case, but his application was refused on the
grounds of confidentiality. The Judge advised that "if there were
anything in the complaints
	
the right way to ventilate them would
be - not by action at law - but by complaint to the local government
onbudsman" (per Lord Denning p1553).
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It also appears that the courts will be very reluctant to interfere
with a decision by the Local Ombudsman in deciding not to investigate
a complaint. In R.v.Commissioner for Local Administration in England 
ex parte Newman and another (1987 Court of Appeal. Unreported), the
court said that section 26 of the Local Government Act 1974 gave the
commissioner a discretion whether or not to investigate a complaint.
While not precluding the possibility of judicial review in some
(extreme) cases, the 1974 Act specifically states that "any question
whether a complaint is duly made 	 shall be determined by the Local
Commissioner" (section26[10]), and therefore, in this case, they were
not in a position to substitute their own views for that of the
commissioner.
Apart from the limitations imposed by section 34(3) of the Local
Government Act 1974, there are administrative actions which are
outside the jurisdictional limits of the ombudsman, which can be a
source of dissatisfaction and confusion for complainants. These
limits are set out in section 26 and Schedule 6 of the 1974 Act, which
expressly exclude from the Local Ombudsman jurisdiction matters
concerned with the internal running of schools, personnel matters,
action taken in connection with the commencement and investigation of
legal proceedings, and commercial and contractual matters.
A number of senior local government officials interviewed during the
course of the Sheffield Study research could see no justification for
the majority of these exclusions, although councillors were more
reluctant to extend the Local Ombudsman's jurisdiction. The officers'
views in general were that the Local Ombudsman should be able to
investigate any activity engaged in by local government and while few
actively recommended early review, there was no fierce opposition to
extending jurisdiction.
The ombudsmen themselves (past and present) agreed that their role was
unnecessarily and sometimes illogically restricted. The general view
was that the Local Ombudsman should be able to investigate all local
authority matters, except where there were positive justifications for
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not doing so, for example, defence matters, and that the present
exclusions confuse complainants.
The Representative Body, supported by the Department of the
Environment, has been largely hostile to any extension. However,
Widdicombe (1986) has recommended extension in some areas, and there
have been instances where the Local Ombudsman stretched their
jurisdiction somewhat, without challenge. 	 Each of these exclusions
will be explored in turn.
Internal school and college matters (curriculum, conduct, discipline 
etc).
The exclusion of internal school matters is a matter of some debate,
and this exclusion does produce anomolies. For example, there can be
an investigation into the treatment by a child in a local authority
home, but not in a local authority school.
Education departments themselves do come within the Local Ombudsman's
jurisdiction, but they do generate comparatively few complaints. In
the 1980s education complaints have made up between 4% and 6% of all
Local Ombudsman complaints for each year, with about the same
percentage of formal investigations (see Annual Reports). The
exception to this was 1984/85 when there was an increase making
education complaints 7% of all complaints and 97. of all formal
investigations. This increase was due to complaints about school
admission appeal committees, and they simply reflected the teething
problems of a relatively new system. There were fewer complaints of
this sort in the following year, and the pattern followed previous
years.
The Schedule 5 exclusion may explain this low number of complaints, so
that problems do not become articulated at this level. Only a handful
of complaints are rejected by the Local Ombudsman each year because of
this exclusion, but there is no way of knowing how many more
complaints there would be if the exclusion were abandoned.
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As well as producing anomolies, the exclusion has also resulted in
some strained interpretations. For example, in one case, a child was
suspended from school in circumstances where the Local Ombudsman said
that he felt the child should have received help from an educational
psychologist. In the report there was criticism of the local
authority and the school, although it seems that the Local Ombudsman
has no Jurisdiction to examine the conduct of the school (82/3/5509).
And in a recent report (871A/961) there was a finding of
maladministration because of the poor treatment of a pupil after an
incident at a school. The report also criticised the authority's
failure to have a proper complaints procedure to deal with complaints
made about the handling of the incident.
Justice (1980) criticised the exclusion and recommended that internal
school matters should be brought within jurisdiction "though
implementation of this may not be feasible in the immediate future for
reasons of cost and limited resources" (parag 43).
In their 1980/81 Annual Report the Local Ombudsman endorsed the view
that internal school matters should be within their jurisdiction:
"Just as are complaints about matters internal to any other
local authority establishment. If it is right that a complaint
can be made about the internal running of a children's home, then
In principle it must be right also that a complaint can be made
about the internal running of a children's school" (p43).
This has been the consistently held view of the ombudsman, and not one
of the past and present ombudsmen interviewed disagreed with it or had
reservations about it. Their view is restated in the 1988/89 Annual
Report, where they said that they see no logical reason why any action
of a local authority in the exercise of their administrative functions
should be outside the Local Ombudsman's jurisdiction" (p54).
This is in contrast to education department officers who were asked in
the Sheffield Study survey whether the Jurisdiction of the Local
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Ombudsman should be extended to include internal school matters.
Overwhelmingly 88% (29 respondents) answered in the negative, the
majority (18) giving as their reason for this that the existing system
was adequate because of the numerous regulations covering internal
school matters, and because of the important role played by school
governors in grievance resolution. Two officers raised the
"floodgates" argument to explain why the suggestion was not practical.
Even so, during the Sheffield Study fieldwork, a few officers spoke
positively about the extension of Jurisdiction, welcoming the
opportunity for a problem to be dealt with by an independent body.
They could see no justification for the present exclusion and regarded
schools as an extension of the education department. One town clerk
commented wryly that the chief education officer would like to be able
to look into the internal affairs of schools. Some officers
interviewed thought that the Local Ombudsman should be able to
investigate internal administrative matters, for example, failure to
teach the correct set book, or failure to enter a pupil for an
examination. There is no question that the Local Ombudsman would only
be able to investigate "administrative" actions as in other local
authority areas. Indeed, if the Local Ombudsman could investigate
internal school matters it seems unlikely that there would be a huge
increase in workload, as the limits of maladministration would itself
exclude many complaints. It is interesting that under the Education
Reform Act 1988 section 23, local authorities are to set up complaints
procedures to receive complaints in respect of the curriculum and
related matters. It will be interesting to see if the Local Ombudsman
will receive any complaints in this area.
A number of education department officials emphasised the role of
school governors in dealing with complaints, a view shared by the
Representative Body which felt that it would be "both impracticable
and undesirable for an outside body such as the commission to be able
to investigate complaints about the internal arrangements of schools",
and that "there are other ways of examining complaints eg by school
governors" (CLA Annual Report 1980181, p61). However, the Sheffield
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Study fieldwork highlighted the general conviction that governors are
ill-equipped to perform this role. It was said that governors do not,
and cannot, act as ombudsmen. They could not guarantee impartiality,
and the group pressures within governing bodies made them less
objective than education departments. As one officer remarked: "Too
many governors are unwilling to override the wishes of head teachers".
Two chairpersons of education committees also stated that governors
rarely became involved in internal school complaints.
The Education Reform Act 1988 has altered the functions and roles of
governing bodies, and only time will tell whether the changes will
prove effective in improving the handling of complaints, although it
does seem that governors will be less able to act as ombudsmen
independent of the schools, particularly as schools themselves are now
being given increased autonomy from the local authority.
Despite the criticisms, the government have come out strongly against
the extension of jurisdiction. They recognise that some matters, for
example, allocations, catchment areas, grants, and school buses are
within jurisdiction, but do not consider it desirable to extend
jurisdiction to "the control and instruction of children within
school", as this is a "professional rather than an administrative
function" (Government Response to Widdicombe 1988, p29). It is felt
that this is a serious drawback to the Local Ombudsman's role of
resolving individual trouble cases, but not one which the Commission
propose to pursue at the present time (see CLA Annual Report 1988/89,
p54).
Personnel matters 
The clear impression gained from fieldwork during the Sheffield Study
is that this is an area where the general public feel confused, and
where many people expect the Local Ombudsman to have jurisdiction.
The reasoning behind the exclusion is that labour laws should be
uniform in the public and private sectors, and that personnel matters
are really to do with collective bargaining and industrial relations.
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However, if one is referring to administrative practices in local
authorities, it seems curious that, for example, a delay in paying
housing benefit can be investigated, but a delay in paying a local
authority pension to an ex-employee or his/her family cannot. It also
creates the anomoly that, for example, maladministration could be
found if an application for council property was lost, but not if it
were an application for a job with a local authority which was lost.
Those interviewed in the Local Ombudsman's office found this exclusion
irritating, especially in relation to potential and ex-employees.
Other countries do have such Jurisdiction. For example, in Australia
the Commonwealth Ombudsman investigates complaints relating to
recruitment, compensation, and retirement benefits (see Commonwealth
Ombudsman and Defence Force Ombudsman Annual Reports 1984). Since
1976 the French Mediateur has been empowered to receive complaints
from former or retired public servants (See Clark 1984, p171).
Although Widdicombe (1986) saw that the primary function of the Local
Ombudsman was "to provide support for the consumers of local
government services rather than those who are employed to provide
thee, concern was expressed about potential staff, and a code of
practice was recommended governing officer appointment procedures,
breach of which would constitute prima facie maladministration, which
would allow an applicant to complain to the Local Ombudsman (p221).
It appears that the main concern here is with the so-called "political
appointees" (p/56), and it is interesting that, while the government
do not want to extend the ombudsman's jurisdiction in this area, they
have taken steps to prevent "politically biased or prejudiced
selection and appointment procedures" (Government Response to
Widdicombe 1988, p30). In general, however, they consider that
personnel matters are essentially concerned with relations between
employer and employee, and not with the relations between a public
authority and the public, and that therefore they should not be
subject to Local Ombudsman scrutiny (Government Response to Widdicombe
1988, p30). Again, while not agreeing with the government's view on
this, the Commission do not intend to pursue it at the present time
(see CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p55).
Commercial and Contractual Matters 
This exclusion prevents the Local Ombudsman from investigating actions
taken by a local authority relating to contractual matters or
commercial transactions and its inclusion in Schedule 5 appears to be
because there is a similar exclusion in the 1967 Act for the
Parliamentary Commissioner. 	 However, the situation of central
government is not the same as for local government.	 Firstly, it
appears that the exclusion for the PCA was really to do with the
Ministry of Defence and concern with national security. In local
government, there have been many scandals over the years associated
with commercial matters, especially in connection with the tendering
process, and with the need for members to declare their interests
where contracts are being negotiated.
The Local Ombudsman and their staff want to see an end to this
exclusion, and there is evidence that they are accepting complaints in
this area. For example, in a recent case involving Waltham Forest,
they investigated the allocations of market stalls at Walthamstow
market, at the request of the chief executive. Although the Act
precludes the investigation of complaints about markets, they called
it "a complaint about the operation of a public act".
Recent reports contain further examples of investigations in this
area. There have been some (88/C/1377; 88/C/0776) concerning delays
about registration of private residential homes for the elderly, which
are commercial enterprises. One case (88/B/0774) involved a loss of a
business opportunity, and another (87/B/295) was concerned with the
assignment of a lease. In another case (88/C/1136), which concerned a
shop tenancy, the fact that this may have been a commercial matter was
not alluded to at all in the report. Nor did the exclusion prevent
the investigation of two cases (37/C/205; 87/C/706) which involved the
use of an unreasonable and misleading method to select firma of
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undertakers with a view to advertising their services, and which
resulted in certain firms being given an unfair advantage.
Widdicombe (1986) was not convinced that commercial and contractual
matters "with members of the public are different in kind from cases
involving other local authority dealings with the public", and they
wanted a review of the exclusion (p221). The government does not take
this view, arguing that ombudsmen are concerned with "the interaction
between the executive arm of Government and the general public", and
that actions "taken by public bodies in buying and selling goods and
services are fundamentally different" 	 (Government Response to
Widdicombe 1988, p29). 	 They maintain that there is no case for
providing protection through the Local Ombudsman, as there are legal
safeguards and remedies. They do, however, mention areas which will
be kept under review, where the commercial aspect is almost a
secondary function, for example, allocation of market stalls and where
councils are using non-commercial considerations in tendering
procedures.
The Local Ombudsman makes the point that some traders may be highly
dependent on business from their local authority and that if that
business is unfairly denied them, then their livelihood may be
threatened. The Commission are seeking alteration of the law "to
allow investigation of complaints about the way proposed contacts are
allocated or withheld" (CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p54). In this
respect, it is interesting to see that the courts are becoming
involved in such matters. The Local Government Act 1988 places a duty
on public authorities to give reasons for certain decisions relating
to contracts. The Act imposes a duty on local authorities to exclude
from contracts any consideration of matters which are non-commercial,
and there is therefore a duty not to discriminate against a contractor
by the intoduction of political or irrelevant considerations (section
17). Where this section applies, the authority must give written
reasons for a decision to exclude a contractor from an approved list;
a decision not to invite tenders, or not to accept them; or a decision
to terminate a contract (section 20).
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In R.v.The London Borough of Enfield ex parte
T.F.Unwin(Roydon)Ltd(1989) 46 Build LR 1, the contractor was suspended
from Enfield's list of approved contractors, the only reasons being
that there were "inquiries into the conduct" of the borough's staff.
Unwin started proceedings for Judicial review seeking orders of
mandamus requiring reasons for the decision to suspend it from the
lists of contractors, and an order of certiorari to quash the
decision, arguing that there was a statutory duty to give reasons by
virtue of the Local Government Act 1988. Enfield did not deny that it
had failed to comply with the duty imposed by section 20, but said
that there were "substantial and serious allegations of offences or
irregularities in the relationship" between Enfield and Unwin, and
that while the allegations were being investigated by the police it
was not possible to provide further details to him.
The court accepted the dilemma of local authorities in cases such as
these, and decided that the standard of fairness which a contractor
was entitled to expect depended on all the circumstances. In this
case, the fact that an investigation was underway did not deprive
Unwin of the right to be told of the accusations and to be given a
chance to answer before a decision was made. In the circumstances,
Enfield were not Justified in failing to give reasons for its
decisions, and because of the prior relationship with the council,
Unwin was entitled to a legitimate expectation of fair treatment. The
courts are thus becoming involved in these areas whereas the Local
Ombudsman is excluded, and cases such as this strengthens the need for
an extension of Jurisdiction to complaints about the method of
awarding or withholding contracts.
Actions in connection with the investigation or prevention of crime or 
of civil or criminal proceedings in court 
This particular exclusion is confusing, as local authorities have many
powers where there is a criminal sanction attached, and thus a
decision on whether to commence proceedings in such cases, or a
failure to do so, could be construed as connected with crime. During
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the Sheffield Study numerous files were examined where it was clear
that the Local Ombudsman had been restrained from investigating
complaints by this provision.	 To cite one example, there was a
complaint about the unauthorised cutting of trees. The Local
Ombudsman decided not to investigate on the basis that it was a
criminal office to lop trees in a conservation area unless the local
authority was notified of the intention to do so. The letter to the
complainant, rejecting the complaint, ran as follows:
"I cannot therefore investigate your complaint that the council
failed to take action following unauthorised tree works by your
neighbour since this would have involved a criminal prosecution".
This seems to be a strange interpretation, since it would lead to the
exclusion of many, if not most, enforcement complaints. As apparently
the Local Ombudsman can investigate the local authorities actions when
they are deciding whether to serve an enforcement notice, but cannot
investigate the decision not to take action in the magistrates' court
the position is even more confusing. Indeed, it was admitted that
this exclusion is not rigidly adhered to, because if it were very
little would be within jurisdiction because criminal proceedings are
often possible, even if remotely.
The government view concerning the commencement or conduct of criminal
or civil proceedings before any court, is that administrative actions
taken before court proceedings are within jurisdiction already, and
there is no case for extending jurisdiction beyond this (Government
Response to Widdicombe 1988, p29). In relation to actions taken in
connection with the investigation or prevention of crime, the
government accepts that this should be within the Local Ombudsman's
jurisdiction, except in relation to police authorities (1)29). This
has been effected by Order in Council (the Local Government
Administration (Matters Subject to Investigation) Order 1988, S. I.
1988 No.242), which amends Schedule 5 of the Local Government Act
1974. It enables the Local Ombudsman to investigate actions taken by
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an authority (other than a police authority) in connection with the
investigation or prevention of crime.
Investigation on the Local Ombudsman's initiative 
The primary role of the Local Ombudsman, as responding to complaints
from individuals, is emphasised by the fact that the ombudsmen are
precluded from investigating complaints on their own initiative, where
they have not received a complaint from an individual. Thus, for
example, if they see a report in the media of child cruelty, or the
abuse of the elderly, where a local authority is involved, in the
absence of a complaint, they cannot investigate. Even if the
"complainant" is deceased, or too inadequate to complain, no matter
how much the Local Ombudsman may wish to investigate, and even if the
local authority request an investigation, without an aggrieved member
of the public bringing the complaint, there can be no investigation.
Despite the fact that most ombudsmen worldwide enjoy such a power (eg
New Zealand, Australia, Denmark and Sweden all empower their ombudsmen
to investigate on their own initiative) the local authority
associations, the Representative Body and the Department of the
Environment have always strongly opposed allowing such investigations.
Some feel that such a change would alter the nature of the system from
being a citizens' defender, to being a general overseer of
maladministration in local authorities. Against this, it could be
argued that in New Zealand and Australia this power has been exercised
sparingly, and one could probably expect the same patterns to emerge
here, if there were such a power, especially given resource
constraints.	 The Local Ombudsman believe that own-initiative
investigations would only be done very rarely. 	 (see Sheffield Report
1986, p34).
Where a local authority request an investigation, it is difficult to
see the objection, provided the Local Ombudsman is willing and has the
available resources.	 As was found during the Sheffield Study
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fieldwork, local authorities often see the Local Ombudsman as a highly
desirable way of resolving complaints which are found to be difficult
or resistant.
Such a power could also be used to conduct ad hoc inquiries where the
local authority agrees. Local authorities and interest groups report
that they would value such an initiative and it would be in line with
developments elsewhere. For example, since 1976 the French
mediateur's jurisdiction has been extended to include complaints from
small businesses and associations such as amenity and environmental
groups (see Clark 1984, p.172). Sir Guy Fowles has called for
ombudsmen to be "general investigating authorities", a role which has
become increasingly recognised by governments worldwide (Fowles 1979).
The ombudsmen themselves have argued for the power to initiate
investigations, arguing that, as the service exists to investigate
possible injustice caused by maladministration, "it should not be
hindered by the fact that a complainant is not readily forthcoming,
perhaps because he or she is dead". They believe that there are
cases, observed in the media, which appear "more significant and
serious than some complaints properly referred to the ombudsmen by
individuals" (CLA Annual Report 1985, Appendix 4, parag 20). Such a
power may go some way to redressing the middle class bias among
complainants. Justice (1980) for example found over 70% of complaints
to the Local Ombudsman were made by non-manual households (p60). The
Sheffield Study's limited survey revealed that 77% of complainants
were owner occupiers.
Widdicombe (1986) recommended that the Local Ombudsman should have
power to initiate investigations, provided that there was "good ground
for concern", and that it was not used to conduct an investigation
into the general procedures of an authority rather than an individual
case "where there was reason to suppose that injustice had occurred"
(p02)
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The government view is that such a power would be a departure from the
principle of redressing personal injustices on the complaint of
aggrieved persons, and as such, the Local Ombudsman could "lose
goodwill and co-operation by acting, or appearing to act, as a general
purpose watchdog". They therefore refused to support it (Government
Response to Widdicombe 1988, p30)
The Commission itself has attempted some improvement here, to assist
those who may be unable to bring, or intimidated at the thought of
bringing a complaint. Under the Local Government Act 1974, section
27(2), the Local Ombudsman has power to investigate complaints made on
behalf of a person who is uanble or has difficulty in making a
complaint. The Commission has, therefore, written to voluntary
organisations asking them to refer complaints to them on behalf of
aggrieved persons, where an issue has not been resolved satisfactorily
within the local authority (see CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p58).
Although this initiative is specifically designed to make social
services departments more responsible to their clients, it does
represent some attempt to alleviate the problems caused by the
prohibition on investigation on the ombudsman's own initiative. The
number of complaints received in this way has not been great, but the
Local Ombudsman believes that the letter may have had the effect of
encouraging voluntary organisations to recommend the service to
clients, who have then complained direct (CLA Annual Report 1989/90,
p12).
Remedies 
In order to judge the effectiveness of a system of dispute resolution,
some thought must be given to the remedies afforded by the system.
This brings up the vexed question of the enforcement of the Local
Ombudsman's recommendations. It does happen that not every local
authority is prepared to accept the decision of the Local Ombudsman as
binding on them. The Select Committee on the Parliamentary
Commissioner noted that 6% of recommendations have been without
effect, and 19% of local authorities which have had an adverse report
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at one time or another have been prepared to ignore the Local
Ombudsman's recommendations (Select Committee 1986, pars 8). There
have been 150 cases in total since the Local Ombudsman was set up
where the local authority has not provided a satisfactory remedy after
a finding of maladministration and injustice, which represents about
5% of all cases of maladministration and injustice (Government
Response to Widdicombe 1988, p28 pare 6.21). There is no parallel in
this respect with other ombudsman systems, none of which, except
Northern Ireland, has a statutory power of enforcement.
The majority of local authorities have a good record, and examples
were encountered on fieldwork during the Sheffield Study of local
authorities seeing an adverse report as a warning that something was
wrong, and doing their best to sort out the problem. The following
extract from a letter, sent by the chief executive of an authority to
a successful complainant, exemplifies the correct attitude of a good
authority to a finding of maladministration and injustice.
"I send the Council's apologies for the maladmimistration
involved in this case, and I add my own apologies for the fact
that we .... have given you service which fell short of that to
which you are entitled."
But, of course, not all authorities are so accommodating, and indeed,
some are positively obstructive. Indeed the figures alone, serious
though they are, play down the seriousness of the problem. During the
course of the Sheffield Study research it became evident that a number
of the Local Ombudsman's findings are in fact negotiated with the
local authority, and it was felt that there was a tendency to dilute
the finding when the local authority was likely to prove hostile. The
ombudsman showed a tendency to reach a finding that was acceptable to
the authority and there were instances where a draft second report was
sent to the local authority, only for it to be withdrawn when it
became clear that it would find a poor reception. Indeed, some Local
Ombudsmen have avoided making second reports at all on a matter of
- 11.9-
principle, indicating that some local authorities have learnt how to
handle the ombudsman which is seen as less of a threat than formerly.
Non-compliance is therefore a serious problem. The only sanction for
the Local Ombudsman if a report is not accepted is to issue a second
report, which in turn can be ignored. This is in contrast to the vast
number of complainants who are obliged to accept findings which go
against them.
Is the solution to the problem therefore, to adopt the Northern
Ireland system of enforcement in the county courts? The Select
Committee (1986) decided not to recommend this (para 24, 25), but
recommended that offending authorities be brought before them to
explain their position. Widdicombe (1986) came closer to recommending
enforcement on the Northern Ireland model, recommending that
"consideration be given to the application of similar rules" for the
Local Ombudsman here (p220)
The conclusion from the Sheffield Study was that there should be no
enforcement through the courts. As has been said before, many
recommendations are negotiated, and much is achieved on this basis of
voluntary co-operation.	 It was felt that enforcement would imperil
this relationship and make local authorities defensive. The current
Local Ombudsmen believe that the present working practice gives them
an opportunity to see what the local authority will offer, sometimes
telephoning the chief executive to ask what kind of recommendation is
likely to be acceptable to the authority. Watchman (1985) too found
occasions where a refusal to follow the Local Ombudsman's
recommendation was the result of a breakdown in the working
relationship between authorities and the Local Ombudsman's office. If
there were judicial enforcement many local authorities may want
procedures to become more judicial, which would destroy the value of
the system.
The government rightly pointed out that the "failures", although small
in number, undermine the credibility of the Local Ombudsman system as
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a whole (Government Response to Widdicombe 1988, pare 6.21), and that
steps should be taken to improve this (pare 6.24). However, they
concluded, as did the Sheffield Report, that the "independent,
informal, flexible investigation of individual complaints without
powers of compulsion .... remain appropriate" (pare 6.20), because
local authorities may
	
be less willing to co-operate,	 and
investigations may become "increasingly formalised, lengthy,
legalistic and costly" (pare 6.22). The government has decided against
enforcement, nor do they like the Select Committee (1986) proposal
that the Select Committee have a role in calling recalcitrant councils
into account, because "local government .... do not see themselves as
accountable to Parliament - though recognising that they operate
within a statutory framework" (pare 6.23). The remedy proposed is
"more local pressure" (pare 6.25) and some method of ensuring that
adverse reports are fully and properly considered by councils, which
should give a "full and public explanation" if they decide not to
comply with the recommendation.
In order to ensure this the Local Government and Housing Act 1989
provides that decisions not to comply with further reports should be
taken by the council as a whole (section 28); that there should be a
set response time of 3 months for adverse reports; that local
authorities be under a duty to inform the Local Ombudsman of the steps
taken to prevent similar injustice recurring; that authorities should
be required to publish in local newspapers a statement from the Local
Ombudsman and their reasons for not remedying the injustice, in cases
of non-compliance (section 26). All this puts councils under a
greater obligation to state publicly why they do not intend to
implement a remedy required by the Local Ombudsman. This is an
attempt to make the fact of non-compliance a matter of public debate,
and it may have the effect of making the system more vigorous, while
at the same time ensuring that proceedings remain voluntary and
informal. If this proves ineffective, alternative methods may have to
be considered, and the Commission are urging that if voluntary
compliance continues to be unsuccessful, judicial enforcement of
remedies should be introduced (CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p54).
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Sheffield Report and this study endorses
wholeheartedly the Government's Response to Widdicombe (1988), that
the Local Ombudsman service "has in practice proved a positive force
for good, both by redressing individual grievances and by providing a
spur to more responsive, efficient and fairer local administration"
(pmra 6.18).
Any problems or drawbacks to the Local Ombudsman as a method of
handling the individual trouble case (eg lack of awareness,
jurisdictional limits, lack of enforcement) have been discussed
throughout the chapter. However, no matter how good the system is, or
may become, it should be seen as a last resort method, with the
emphasis on local authorities settling grievances within authorities
themselves. Before looking at the extent to which they do so, I want
to look more generally at the role the courts can play in resolving
such grievances.
- 122 -
CHAPTER 6 THE COURTS
Introduction 
The use of the courts as a method for solving individual trouble cases
seems obvious. Our legal system is based on such cases, and indeed, as
Birkinshaw (1985) has pointed out, at one time grievance resolution
would have been thought of by lawyers purely in terms of resolution by
the courts (p2). The fact that this is an unduly restrictive way of
looking at grievance redress, especially when looking at the state's
involvement in remedying grievances has been discussed in Chapter 1
(See also Ganz 1972).
However, despite these arguments, there are a number of areas of
dispute where the courts provide an appropriate remedy. It is proposed
in this chapter to outline the legal remedies which are available for
members of the public to challenge a local authority's decision or
action and to look at the limitations of these remedies. It is also
the intention to examine whether the possibility of an external
appeal, either to the courts, tribunals, or a minister, affects the
way a decision is made within the authority.
Legal remedies which are available include ordinary actions in
contract and tort, which can be brought in the County Court or High
Court, and in that respect local authorities are subject to the
control of the courts in much the same way as any other kind of
corporate body or natural person. In addition to this, there are
provisions in various statutes for an appeal to those aggrieved by
local authority decisions to the County Court, High Court, Magistrates
Court, Crown Court, a tribunal or a minister. Moreover, the decisions
of local authorities are subject to judicial review.
Statutory Appeal Mechanisms 
So far as statutory appeals are concerned, these, of course, have
limited application, specific to certain areas. They include such
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matters as appeals to the Secretary of State on the merits of planning
decisions, and appeals to the County Courts on various housing
matters. Some statutes provide for a review of the merits of a
decision, and others for an appeal against their legality. For
example, there is a right of appeal to the Magistrates Court when a
local authority serves an enforcement notice for breach of the
building regulations (Building Act 1984, section 40). The Town and
Country Planning Act 1971 provides a right of appeal against a notice
served by the local planning authority ordering a landowner to remedy
the condition of any waste land (section 105), and the Public Health
Act 1961 provides a right of appeal to the Magistrates Court where
plans are rejected because of building regulations.
Magistrates Courts also hear appeals under the Foster Children Act
1980, sections 8-10, in relation to decisions by local authorities to
prohibit the taking of a child if the authority is of the opinion that
the person or premises are unsuitable or that the arrangement would be
detrimental to the child. A person aggrieved by this prohibition, or
by any requirement which an authority may make, may appeal to the
juvenile court, which, if it allows the appeal, may vary a
requirement, or substitute a requirement for a prohibition.
There are statutory provisions for appeals to the Secretary of State
for the Environment in the case of the making up of private streets or
apportioning the cost (Highways Act 1980 sections 205-218). Appeals
can also be made to the minister in respect of an authority's decision
regarding an application for a disposal licence for depositing waste
under the Control of Pollution Act 1974.
The Secretary of State also plays an important role in reviewing
decisions of planning authorities in relation to development control.
Under Section 36 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, an
applicant for planning permission who receives an adverse decision
(that is, a refusal, or permission subject to unwelcome conditions)
can appeal to the Secretary of State. There are similar rights of
appeal against refusals for listed building consents (Schedule 11,
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pare 8) and against enforcement notices (section 97). The decision of
the Secretary of State on appeal may, in certain circumstances, be
challenged in the High Court (sections 242, 245)
In the sphere of education, in relation to special educational needs,
there is provision in the Education Act 1981 for parents to appeal to
the Secretary of State if the LEA does not make a "statement" in
relation to a child's special educational needs. The Minister can then
compel the LEA to reconsider the decision. There is a right of appeal
against the statement itself, to a special committee of the local
authority, and then a further appeal to the Secretary of State.
These are just some examples of the statutory appeal mechanisms which
are available, and during the course of the Sheffield Study their use
and popularity were explored. The Sheffield Study survey asked a
number of questions about these mechanisms. The majority of
respondents to the survey considered that it was always preferable to
try to resolve complaints by members of the public within the
authority, rather than rely on the statutory appeal procedures (social
services 92%, education 94% and environmental health 98%). Despite
this the advantages of having statutory procedures were also
recognised. Thus, 68% of social services departments, 58% of education
departments and 70% of housing departments thought that there
advantages in having statutory procedures for resolving complaints,
rather than having the complaint settled within the authority. The
main advantages noted by respondents for statutory procedures were
that justice could be seen to be done, or that it accorded more with
ideas of natural Justice.
Planning departments did not show this enthusiasm for statutory
procedures, with only 17% thinking that there were advantages,
compared to 77% who thought that there were not, the main reasons
being that the Local Ombudsman was a better procedure, being cheaper
and quicker, and that statutory procedures tended to harden attitudes.
It may be that the majority of respondents in planning departments
misinterpreted this question, and did not appreciate that the survey
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was asking about the advantages of, for example, appeals to the
Secretary of State in development control matters. Indeed, during the
Sheffield Study fieldwork, planning officers in some authorities spoke
of the particular use of such appeal mechanisms when a new council was
elected. When new members were elected, initially, a large number of
planning applications were rejected, as members knew they could be
challenged on appeal,
independent assessment
experienced they were
decisions, rather than,
State.
and in this way members could obtain an
on their decision. When members became more
prepared to take responsibility for their
in effect, entrusting it to the Secretary of
In the survey the majority of planning officers (70%) thought that the
statutory appeal procedures were adequate, and few (23%) thought that
there was any need to improve these procedures in order to reduce the
number of appeals to the Secretary of State. The "improvements"
suggested by this minority were either the removal or restriction of
the right of appeal in certain circumstances, and the introduction of
fees for those who exercised their right of appeal.
More respondents in social services departments found statutory
procedures useful (54%), than those from the other departments. The
use of the Magistrates Court in care orders was seen as particularly
useful and valuable by officers interviewed during the Sheffield Study
fieldwork. Although court procedures were seen as time-consuming and
costly, officers recognised that they allowed for another judgement in
a case, and to some extent let the authority "off the hook". The
possibility of independent review was often mentioned by those
interviewed.
In the Sheffield Study survey, 75% (28) of the respondents saw the
courts as the preferred body of appeal in statutory matters, the
reasons being their independence and impartiality. One respondent
spoke of "a need for appeal to a body not directly involved in
decision making" in matters of such a sensitive nature, and another
thought that "an appeal to an impartial body and the involvement of
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people outside the department reduces the likelihood of mistakes being
covered up". Despite the fact that few (24%) respondents to the survey
wanted statutory appeal procedures extended to other areas of work in
social services departments, a number of officers interviewed
expressed concern about the procedure which allowed an authority to
assume parental rights over children in voluntary care by resolution,
rather than court order. This practice will no longer be allowed by
virtue of the Children Act 1989, and, from the Sheffield Study
fieldwork, it appeared that it was not used routinely.
In housing departments, only 22% of respondents to the Sheffield Study
survey found particular statutory procedures useful, and even less
(7%) wanted an extension of such procedures. When asked about a
particular statutory procedure, that of housing benefit review panels,
the majority (64%) were satisfied with its operation, although again,
few (24%) wanted it extending to other areas of housing management.
The reason for the satisfaction with the scheme appeared to be that it
was little used and little known, and therefore had not proved to be
too much of a burden to the departments. Indeed, many authorities
visited during the fieldwork period of the Sheffield Study had adopted
informal methods of handling housing benefit cases.
Similarly, with education departments only 3 (9%) respondents wanted
an extension of statutory appeal procedures to other areas of work
within their department. Furthermore, although in general 55% were
satisfied with the procedures for appeals concerning the allocation of
pupils to schools, and special needs (Education Acts 1980, 1981), only
6 (18%) thought that such mechanisms could be usefully extended to
other areas of work in education departments. The reasons given were
that the procedures were bureaucratic and time consuming; that such a
procedure could circumvent the authority's declared policy, and that
the system worked unfairly because decisions were inconsistent, and
that schools could be overcrowded as a result of the appeal
cmaittee's decision.
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Hill (1976) points out the problems of using tribunals to adjudicate
in areas where the problem is one of allocation in situations of
demand exceeding supply. In order to adjudicate, any individual claim
would have to be weighed against all competing claims, in order for a
fair decision to be reached (p159). This, in essence, appeared to be
the reason for the ambivalent attitude towards these appeal panels,
expressed by officers in education departments, during the Sheffield
Study fieldwork. Despite this, the use of tribunals in this area may
limit some abuses, such as the allocation decision not being taken
fairly.
Another problem noted with the appeal mechanisms was that the
statutory machinery was too adverserial, and that a more conciliatory
approach was desirable. As in housing, some education departments had
introduced an informal system, in which attempts were made to settle
the matter without the need for the statutory procedure. These were
much more conciliatory in their operation and involved discussions
with parents of the reasons why it was not possible to accommodate
their wishes. Only if parents were not satisfied would the case go to
the appeals committee. The success of such schemes was illustrated by
the fact that in one authority, about 100 parents each year expressed
dissatisfaction with the school allocation, but after negotiation only
about 30 pursued the case to the appeal tribunal.
Authorities emphasised that appeal arrangements would only be
implemented when all other means of settlement had been exhausted, and
it did seem that the statutory procedure was viewed as a last resort.
If this is so, this adds weight to the argument for such statutory
mechanisms, as it encourages informal avenues of appeal where none
before existed, and gives more opportunity for a negotiated
settlement.
A similar practice was found by Birkinshaw (1985) in relation to
licensing matters. Where there were statutory appeal mechanisms, he
found that informal meetings with the applicants were used as a matter
of course. Even quite detailed statutory procedures were often
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supplemented by informal negotiation, and his conclusion was that
where statutory provisions are introduced, this tends to bring in its
wake supplementary safeguards and devices (p71). Nothing in the
Sheffield Study would detract from this view. Again, in relation to
special education needs, some authorities used case conferences, in an
attempt to settle disputes informally, rather than risk an appeal by
the parents to the Secretary of State.
The questions in the Sheffield Study questionnaires referring to
statutory appeal mechanisms did not differentiate between those with a
right of appeal to the courts and those where the appeal was to the
Minister. When asked specifically about these
appeal, most departmental responses favoured
ministers. In social services departments, for
that there were advantages in having statutory
appeal was to the courts, whereas only 27% saw
appeal to the minister. In housing departments
different avenues of
courts rather than
example, 75% thought
procedures where the
the advantages of an
the figures were 53%
and 25% respectively, and in environmental health departments, while
40% were prepared to say that there were advantages in appealing to a
minister, where the courts were concerned, 71% saw advantages in the
use of the magistrates court and 63% the county court. Education
departments were out of line with this general trend, with a minority
(32%) agreeing that there were particular advantages in appeals to the
courts, compared to the minister (54%).
Mine complainants may not be reticent about using statutory
procedures where the appeal is to a minister, or other tribunal
(especially in planning cases) evidence shows that people are more
reluctant to use the courts. In his detailed study of the housing
department in Sheffield, Leak (1986) found that legal remedies were
rarely sought against the council, but were rather used by. the council
(p13). The few housing cases there had been were heard in the County
Courts. Leak believes that this is a function of the lack of readily
available legal facilities, as, until 1985, Sheffield had no law
centre. In this respect, Sheffield is compared to an inner London
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borough where there were numerous cases against the council under
section 99 of the Public Health Act 1936.
Another reason for the reluctance to pursue legal redress was that in
Sheffield the ideology of public interest had restricted the growth of
individual rights, and hampered the perception of any rights at all.
Councillors admitted that they wanted to discourage legal action in
repairs cases (Leak 1986' p318) because this would disguise genuine
and urgent cases, or may lead to leapfrogging the queue. A campaign by
the Liberals in 1978 to encourage tenants to take legal action where
repairs had been delayed had been very much resented by Labour
councillors. This belief, that enforceable individual rights should be
subordinated to an administratve queue, was often encountered during
fieldwork in the Sheffield Study, in particular from councillors and
officers in housing departments.
Although there are obligations on local authorities which can be
enforced in the County Court, these are usually in relation to the
authority's obligations as landlord. One exception to this is the
specific remedy given by the Housing Act 1985 in right-to-buy cases.
In such cases, once an offer has been accepted, and details of a
mortgage agreed, the property should be conveyed as soon as reasonably
practicable, and if it is not, an injunction can be obtained from the
County Court, requiring the council to complete the transaction. This
was an attempt to prevent local authorities deliberately delaying in
these matters, but it can, of course, be used where lack of resources
is the cause of the problem.
This remedy does not prevent delay in the pre-offer stage, nor give an
effective remedy where delay occurs before the offer is accepted. In
such cases, those aggrieved would make a complaint to the Local
Ombudsman on the grounds of maladministration, such cases making up
22% of housing complaints to the ombusman last year (CLA Annual Report
1988/89, p11). Even where maladministration was found, however, it was
difficult to quantify the injustice in terms of financial loss. The
Housing Act 1988 introduces a procedure to deal with such delays, so
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that the purchase price will be offset by rent paid during the delay
period, and the discount period (within which a person cannot sell
without repaying the council) will be amended accordingly. The Local
Ombusman believes that this should reduce the number of complaints
(CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p19), and this provision indicates one of
the ways a legal remedy results in an improvement in administration
much more effectively than the intervention of the Local Ombusman.
Authorities' obligations in relation to the homeless are more
difficult to enforce. Because of the lack of a statutory right to
redress, most cases in this area are decided by way of Judicial
review, a procedure which will be dealt with later in the chapter. It
is worth noting here, however, that such cases often concern the
definitions of words used in the act. For example, two recent cases
were concerned with the definition of "intentionally homeless".
(SeeR.v. Mole Valley District Council ex parte Burton(1988);R.v.
Hillingdon Borough Council ex parte Time (1988) 20 H.L.R. 305). In
these cases, a different interpretation by the court would have been
the only method of obtaining redress.
This lack of an effective method of challenging a decision on
homelessness is a drawback of the legislation (see Civil Justice
Review 1988, para750), and as the government are reluctant to see
homelessness decisions appealed to the county courts on the merits, a
new code of guidance is expected to call for local authorities to
establish internal appeals proceures culminating in a hearing by
councillors (See Legal Action, June 1990, p16). Such appeal panels
mnad be subject to review by the courts. (See R.v.Sheffield City 
Council ex parte Burgar (1990) QBD). This would be an improvement, and
there can be little doubt that such an appeal mechanism, or even
better, a challenge in the county court, would be a more effective way
of dealing with the problem than Judicial review.
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Damages for Failure to Perform Statutory Duties 
Local authorities have a number of duties imposed by statute, and a
power to perform a number of functions. If they do not perform these
duties or exercise these functions, citizens may have some redress
through the courts. However, it is not possible to state concisely the
principles on which an action for damages can be sustained against a
local authority for a breach of a statutory duty or a failure to
exercise a statutory power. It is often claimed that an action for
damages will not lie against an authority for failure to do an act
which ought to have been done, and case law in this area tends to
indicate the circumstances in which an action will not lie (see Cross
and Bailey 1986, p195).
In order to establish an authority's liability, it is necessary to
know whether the statute confers a power or imposes a duty on the
authority. Then the statute as a whole has to be examined to see
whether a remedy for the injury complained of is prescribed. The
general rule is that the provision of a specific remedy excludes a
common law action in tort (Hesketh.v.Birmingham Corporation (1924) 1
K.B. 260). If there is a duty and no special remedy is provided, then
it must be ascertained whether the duty is owed to the community at
large or to persons of whom the plaintiff is one. Only if the duty is
owed to individuals, of whom the plaintiff is one, can the action lie
(Read.v.Croydon Corporation (1938) 4 All ER 631). Only in these
restricted circumstances can the aggrieved person sue for damages.
For this reason, a failure of a highway authority to perform the
duties of repair and maintenance has been held not to give rise to
liability to pay damages to persons injured as a result. However,
section 1 of the Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961 changed
this, and an action can lie subject to the defence that the authority
has taken such care as is reasonable in the circumstances to secure
that the part of the highway to which the action relates was not
dangerous for traffic.
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There is no liability in general for failure to exercise discretionary
powers (see Cross and Bailey 1986, p200), although where a power to
confer a fresh benefit is incompetently exercised, an authority will
be liable for "fresh damage" which would not have occured had the
power not been exercised at all. There is no liability for merely
failing to confer the benefit in question. The authority's
intervention must, in some respect, make the situation worse (Fast 
Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board. v. Kent (1941) A. C. 74). Local
authorities have been held to owe a duty to protect owners and
occupiers of buildings from losses inflicted on them by builders as a
result of defective building work (see Dutton.v.Bognor Regis U.D.0 
(1972) 1 All ER. 462;Anns.v.Merton L.B.C. (1977) 2 All ER. 492).
However, Murphy.v.Brentwood District Council (1990) 3 WLR 414 has
overruled Dutton and departed from Anns and established that purely
economic losses caused by failure to take reasonable care in carrying
out a statutory power or duty, are not recoverable. No opinion was
expressed in relation to personal injury caused by such failure.
This does not necessarily mean that actions against local authorities
are unproblematic. In Dear.v.Newham L.B.C. (1988) 20 H.L.R. 348, the
authority was sued under the Public Health Act 1936 section 72(2) for
failing to remove rubbish, as a result of which a child was injured.
Although there is a statutory duty to remove "house refuse", the
rubbish in question was held to be not capable of falling within the
definition of "house refuse", and accordingly the authority was under
no duty to remove it, even on notice.
The courts have also placed some limitation on using breach of
statutory duty where they consider another remedy more appropriate.
So, in G.v.Hounslow Borough Council (1986) 86 LGR 186, a minor,
subject to a care and protection order, was transferred from a
community home to a guest house. Action was brought against the
authority for damages in the county court on the grounds that they
were in breach of their statutory duty by making a minor homeless. The
court said that this was an improper remedy, the proper remedy being
judicial review.
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The courts are not prepared to inquire too closely into how an
authority performs its duty. For example, in one case, the complaint
was that the authority had failed in its duty to consider a report
before a school was closed, as required by the act. The court said
that the fact that the education committee members had a copy of the
report was sufficient to discharge this duty (Nichol and 
Others.v.Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council (1987) LGR 435).
Judicial Review 
Although, generally, the courts are reluctant to intervene in the
exercise of discretionary powers by administrative bodies, such bodies
are obliged to keep within the framework of their enabling
legislation, and to act in accordance with the principles of natural
justice. The actions of local authorities are thus subject to review
by the courts, and this procedure has a much wider application than
statutory appeal mechanisms. The application under Order 53 of the
Mee of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court Act 1981, section 31) is
made to review a decision or action of the local authority, and it is
therefore used to challenge an authority's application of the rules.
Judicial review can be used where other remedies are available, and an
applicant can seek review of any decision or action on the grounds
that it is illegal. It is discretionary, both in the decision to
consider a case or not, and in relation to the remedies granted.
It can be used where a local authority has acted outside its statutory
powers; where it has acted illegally in that irrelevant matters have
been taken into account; relevant matters have not been taken into
account; the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority
would ever have made it; the authority acted in bad faith, or was
influenced by malice or an improper motive (Associated Provincial 
Picture House Limited.v.Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K. B. 223).
Judicial review can also be used for procedural impropriety, or .where
an authority has failed to comply with its statutory duty. It cannot
however, be used to question the merits of a decision, nor can it be
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used as a court of appeal, as was clearly set out in the case of
Luby.v.Newcastle-under-Lyme Corporation (1964) 2 Q.B.D. 64:
"The court's control over the exercise by a local authority of a
discretion conferred upon it by Parliament is limited to ensuring
that the local authority has acted within the powers conferred.
It is not for the court to substitute its own view of what is a
desirable policy in relation to the subject-matter of the
discretion so conferred. It is only if it is exercised in a
manner which no reasonable man could consider justifiable that
the court is entitled to interfere" (per Diplock L.I. at p72)
In the GCHQ case (Council of Civil Service Unions.v.Minister for the 
Civil Service (1984) 3 All ER 935), the heads of review were confirmed
to be illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Thus
administrative action is subject to control by judicial review where
the decision-making authority has been guilty of an error of law;
where it has acted so unreasonably that no reasonable authority would
have made the decision; and where the authority has failed in its duty
to act fairly. Under this third head is included a decision concerning
a benefit or advantage which a person "has in the past been permitted
by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to
be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to
him some rational ground for withdrawing it on which he has been given
an opportunity to comment" (per Diplock L.J. at p949). So, although
the courts are not concerned about the fairness of particular
policies, they are concerned that legitimate expectations are
All the discretionary decision making of local authorities is
potentially reviewable in accordance with these principles. Thus, for
example, in a case concerning child care, the court held that in
deciding whether or not to allow a child home on trial where there
were unsubstantiated allegations against the parents, the local
authority had to have a fair procedure which gave the parents the
chance to make representations and call evidence (R.v.Hertfordshire 
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County Council, ex parte B [1987] 1 FLR 239). Similarly, in R.v.Bolton 
PLB.C. ex parte B ([1985l FLR 342), the court insisted that the local
authority complied with the objectives of the Child Care Act 1980,
section 12(a)-(e) in allowing parental challenge to the termination of
access.
The High Court was also prepared to intervene in the case of a local
authority's entry of names of alleged child abusers in the Child Abuse
Register, dismissing the authority's claim that this was a purely
clerical act internal to the council's administrative procedures. It
was decided that local authorities are not free to exercise arbitrary
control over the entry of names of alleged abusers with total immunity
from supervision by the courts. Such immunity would erode citizens'
rights, and there can be intervention by the courts if there is a risk
of injustice to an adult through the unquestioning acceptance of a
child's accusation (R.v. Norfolk County Council. ex parte M (1989) 2
All ER 359).
However this decision may be a result of the particular facts of that
case, where the alleged abuser was blacklisted as a result of his name
being entered on the register, which meant that he could no longer do
contract work for the local authority. Other applications in this area
have not received such a favourable response. Thus, in a case where a
parent was not permitted to attend a case conference, following which
the children of that parent were entered on the "At risk" register,
the court held that the parent had not lost a right nor been denied a
legitimate expectation thereby, and the barring from the meeting was
not reviewable. The decision was not unfair or contrary to natural
justice and judicial review did not lie (R.v.Harrow London Borough 
Council ex parte P (1988) LGR 41).
Mua is of concern in this case is that the court also said that
recourse to judicial review in respect of a decision to place the name
of a child on a child abuse register ought to be rare, as all
concerned in "this difficult and delicate area" should be allowed to
perform their task without looking over their shoulder all the time
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for the possible intervention of the court. The court concluded that
entry of the name of an abuser is not a finding of fact, even less one
of guilt. The problems concerning attendance at case conferences will
be taken up in Chapter 8, but it is of concern that the courts are
reluctant to intervene in this area, particularly as there is no
statutory right of appeal.
Judicial review has been used in the case of foster parents whose
mmms have been removed from the local authority's list of approved
foster parents. Although there is no statutory provision for the
authority maintaining a list of approved foster parents, the court
decided that people whose names are removed from the list are entitled
to know why and to answer any allegations known about them, and that
this right can be enforced by Judicial review (R.v.Wandsworth London 
Borough Council ex parte P (1988) LGR 371). This case involved an
allegation of sexual abuse against the foster parents, and although
the court said that the authority must act fairly, provided the rules
of fairness are complied with, the decision as to whether there is a
risk or not is to be taken by the local authority. The foster parents
have no redress in the absence of a breach of natural justice, as the
court considered that because it is important that the local authority
should have confidence in foster parents, their interests are
subordinated to the interests of the children.
These are some examples of the problems faced by those aggrieved by a
local authority's decision in what is admitted to be a problematic
area of local authority work. Some of these issues will be taken up in
the chapter on social services departments (Chapter 8), but the cases
illustrate the reluctance of the courts to intervene, and thus the
limitations of this form of redress.
/mother problem with Judicial review is that the applicant must first
Wain leave to bring the application, and this will only be granted
if the applicant can show a prima facie case, and has "sufficient
interest" in the matter. The case can only proceed if leave is
obtained. What is meant by "sufficient interest" is not laid down in
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the legislation or Order 53, but it is clear that a ratepayer will
have sufficient interest to challenge decisions about expenditure (see
R.v.GLC, ex parte Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 559; IRC.v.National 
Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Limited (1980) QBD
407). It is not clear however whether an elector would have sufficient
interest in these cases, nor whether a ratepayer or an elector would
have sufficient interest in a case which not involve expenditure.
It is with good reason, therefore, that it has been said that the
courts in general are "fraught with technical danger and uncertainty",
and that Judicial review in particular is a "notoriously opaque area
of the law" (Birkinshaw 1985, p2). In order to remove some of this
uncertainty Widdicombe (1986) recommended that any elector or
ratepayer should be deemed to have sufficient interest to seek
judicial review of an action taken by his/her local authority (p224).
The government's response, however, was that the present law is not
defective, and that the present rules ought to be able to ensure that
anyone who legitimately wants to question a local authority's decision
would be able to do so. To remove the "sufficient interest"
requirement would be to institute a "busybody's charter" (Government
Response to Widdicombe 1988, p371).
Another problem with judicial review, as with legal actions in
general, is that legal costs can be very expensive. The courts have
discretion in awarding costs, but they are normally awarded to the
successful litigant. Since a short High Court action can cost more
than £50,000 (Widdicombe 1986, p212), and since the legal aid limits
mean that, in effect, only the poor will be aided in this way, the
expense can act as a powerful deterrent against those wishing to
challenge a local authority. As Birkinshaw (1985) expresses it: "The
state is its own financier, at our expense" (p175). The state has both
resources and expertise, in contrast to the ordinary citizen, to whom
litigation, besides being expensive, can be a daunting experience.
Hill (1975), too, points out that just about the last thing that would
occur to an isolated aggrieved citizen is to try to take a case to the
high court (p169).
- 138 -
In view of these problems, Widdicombe (1986) recommended that the
Local Ombudsman should have the power to assist individuals wishing to
challenge a decision by a local authority, where there were
implications for an authority's services at large or, on procedural
issues, for its conduct of business generally; where there were
important issues of principle where clarification of the law would be
desirable; or where there was evidence of persistent breaches of the
law (p228). The government's response to this suggestion was that, as
there is provision for legal aid, it would not be appropriate to
provide special assistance over and above that which was available
through legal aid for those bringing proceedings against local
authorities (Government Response to Widdicombe 1988, p37). However,
the evidence does not show that the procedure is widely used.
Widdicombe (1986) found that in 1985, only 217 cases for judicial
review were brought against local authorities, 80% of which were
brought by private individuals. Leak (1986) found that in Sheffield
there had not been a single judicial review case in the 10 years
preceding his research (p317).
Collective Actions 
There have been attempts to overcome these problems in order to use
the law as a device for protecting rights or interests, by use of the
Test Case stategy (see Prosser 1983). However, a drawback of this
strategy is that legal aid is not usually granted for collective
actions, because such actions often fail the test for granting legal
aid; that is, that a reasonable person, given sufficient means, would
finance the litigation. Given the small amount of money which is
usually at stake in such cases, it would not be considered appropriate
to grant legal aid (See Royal Commission on Legal Services 1979,
pp106, 140). The government response to the Royal Commission
emphasised the inappropriateness of using legal aid for collective
action: "legal aid from public funds should be available in
appropriate cases for individuals who have inadequate resources"
(Government Response to the Royal Commission 1983, p3 pars 3).
- 139-
Another drawback to this strategy is that Judges tend to respond to
the interests of those owning private property, or to the claims of
"public interest" as identified by public officials. They do not show
themselves as being particularly sympathetic to community claims or
group interests, which cannot be easily attached to a "legal right"
(McAuslan 1980, chapter 9).
This can be contrasted to the US experience where the law is used much
more as a method of mobilising political resources. Here the rules on
locus standi are much more liberal, and the use of class actions have
developed, where litigants can pursue a claim on behalf of others with
similar claims. If the claim is successful, damages (or other
remedies) can be awarded to all the members. If the litigant is not
successful, and loses his/her individual claim, the court can deal
with the class issue independently (see Chayes 1976). Indeed, it has
been said that "Lawsuits involving the validity of governmental action
or inaction, rather than asserting private rights, have come to
dominate Federal Civil Dockets" (Chayes 1982, p9).
However, this liberalisation of locus standi has suffered setbacks in
recent years, with more restrictive interpretations of "standing".
(see Sterna Cub.v.Mlorton 405 US 727 (1972]; Valley Forge Christian 
College.v.Americans United for Separation of Church and State 102 S Ct
752 [1982]), and class actions have been restricted in school
segregation cases, civil rights cases and cases involving rights of a
political or social nature (see Chayes 1982).
There has also been some retrenchment by the Judges in respect of
judicial intervention in the provision of remedies against public
bodies (see Lewis and Harden 1982). Despite this retrenchment, the US
courts are much further ahead of the English courts, because of the
individualistic nature of the English law system, and its philosophy
of the protection of property interests.
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The Courts as Quality Controllers 
hglicial review has been used to control public expenditure by local
authorities on the basis that they are acting ultra vires if they are
in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to ratepayers. This was the basis
of the Fares Fair case (Bromley.v.GLC(1982)1 All ER 129), where
Bromley challenged the GLC's policy of reducing London Transport's
fares by 25%. The House of Lords decided that such a policy would only
be intra vires if it aimed, as far as practicable, at ensuring that
the fare revenue covered costs. This was based on an earlier case when
it was held that the common law fiduciary duty required local
authorities to run transport undertakings on business lines
(Prescott.v,Birmingham Corporation(1955) Ch 210), rather than using
the usual policy review test; that is, that the authority had acted in
away no reasonable authority could have acted.
The House of Lords rejected the GLC defence that it was elected on a
mandate to introduce a 25% fares cut, the fact of democratic election
itself not being sufficient to legitimate its actions. Some degree of
rationality is required, and authorities are not to fetter their
exercise of discretion by self-imposed policy rules (see British 
Oxygen Corporation.v.Board of Trade (1972) AC 610).
Harden and Lewis(1988) point out the implications of this proposition
(pm. If the courts are to insist on the rationality of policy-
making, and if the courts are to adequately supervise this,
"administrative law needs to be considerably developed in a procedural
direction" (p208). This must involve some change in the area of giving
reasons for decisions, as there is at present no general duty to do
so. It has been suggested that, if a prima facie case of abuse of
discretion can be made out, then, in the absence of a statement of
reasons for a decision by a minister, a court would be entitled to
assume that no good reason existed. (Radfield.v, Minister of 
Agriculture. Fisheries and Food (1968) AC 997). But the problem with
this is that "the burden of demonstrating a wrongful exercise of
discretion must rest on him who asserts it" (Lord Justice Oliver in
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the Bromley case p143), and if there are no reasons given, it is
difficult ever to establish a prima facie case.
If there were a change in this direction there would have to be some
tightening up of procedures within local government. If the decisions
of authorities are to be scrutinised by the courts to see if they are
rational, then reasons for decisions will have to be given as a matter
of course. Local government has a long way to go in this respect. For
example, the Sheffield Study found that the giving of written reasons
was by no means universal. Housing departments proved to be the best
in this respect, with 62% of respondents claiming to give written
reasons for decisions routinely, and a further 30% giving them if
requested, where there was no statutory requirement to do so. In
education departments, 547. gave written reasons routinely, and 39% if
requested. But only 35% of social services departments gave reasons
for decisions routinely with a further 57% giving reasons if
requested. It is interesting to see the way the Local Ombudsman is
thinking in this area. In one case (88/Al2329) it was declared that
good administration "requires that reasons are given" for decisions,
and that a proper note should be made of them. It will be interesting
to see if the courts develop on the same lines.
The British system can be contrasted with "hybrid rule-making"
decisions in the American federal courts, where there is a general
duty on the federal agencies to demonstrate to the courts that a
rational process of decision-making took place with adequate
opportunities for participation. The agency is responsible for
designing the procedures, with the courts acting as quality control
uchanisms to test the adequacy of the procedures adopted rather than
the substantive rationality of the decision (see Harden and Lewis
1988, p209).
In this country, Judicial review is a device which can be used by the
courts "as a quality control mechanism over politicians, bureaucrats"
(Birkinshaw 1986, p3), but it is in reality "a largely ex post facto
one" (p4) with no significant impact before decisions are made. The
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courts have little impact on ideals such as fairness, impartiality or
legitimacy, and have been slow to move towards overseeing the adequacy
of procedures. Apart from enforcing express statutory consultation
requirements as mandatory, breach of which will make the decision
ultra vires, the courts in general have refused to impose a duty to
consult, Exceptionally they are prepared to enforce such a duty, based
on a principle of natural justice, where specific assurances have been
given, and where legitimate expectations are thus being disappointed.
(see Craig 1983, chapter 7). Such an expectation may arise "either
from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from
the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably
expect to continue" (Council of Civil Service Unions.v. Minister for 
the Civil Service (1984) 3 All ER 935, at 944 per Lord Fraser).
Loughlin (1986) however has warned of the dangers of using judicial
review as an external check on local authority action through
ratepayer and consumer influence (p170). If they are to be effective
in their supervisory role, they would be required to adjudicate on
"complex polycentric issues in which fact-finding processes...and the
fashioning of relief...raise sensitive political issues" (p198). The
danger is that "unless they can define a precise constitutional role,
the courts would be required to play a mediating role which might
challenge their independence and hence legitimacy" (p198).
This danger, of the courts being used as a process of subordinating
politics to the courtroom, has also been recognised by Harden and
Lewis (1988), who say that it can only be prevented if ways can be
found "to limit the role of the courts to the protection of certain
specific rights and to acting as a final quality control mechanism for
owl and participative policy-making processes" (p206).
The Limitations of the Courts 
On a more general level, one of the problems of using the courts as a
dispute solving mechanism is that those with grievances do not
automatically think in terms of legal remedies, and it is thought that
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it is those with the least resources who have failed to make use of
legal remedies (see Capelletti 1981). One solution to this problem of
womt legal need was to make the legal system more accessible, by the
extension of legal aid and the establishment of, for example,
neighbourhood law centres. However, there is now a movement towards
the idea of using alternative dispute solving mechanisms, such as
internal complaints procedures and ombudsmen, as an alternative to the
courts.
Courts are thus being seen as one of many different forms of dispute
resolution mechanisms, and there is a growing recognition that
adversarial forms of procedure may be suited to some sorts of
disputes, but not others. In this context, Sir Guy Powles, New
Zealand's first ombudsman, has expressed the view that issues
involving obdurate disputes of fact are not ideally suited to the
ombudsman's procedures, and are best resolved through the courts or
tribunals (Fowles 1982).
The Barclay Report (1982), too, highlights the limits of the Local
Ombudsman system and recommends an independent tribunal for those
issues where they feel that local authority members cannot, for one
reason or another, produce satisfactory outcomes. It may be that the
courts, or tribunals, are more useful in the area of social services
than in some other areas of local authority work. The ombudsman system
on the other hand, is more like that of a "conscience". Ombusmen can
go further than the courts, and they do not seek to fulfil the same
need. Powles (1982) is also convinced that the quieter, more
inquisitorial methods of investigation of the ombusman can succeed
where other forms might fail.
lathe Sheffield Study it was interesting to see whether the courts or
the Local Ombudsman had had the most influence on departmental
internal procedures and complaints procedures. Almost without
exception, it was the Local Ombudsman who had had the most influence.
nnm in planning departments 67% said that their internal procedures
had been affected by the Local Ombudman's decisions, compared to 29%
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who claimed that court cases had had some effect; education
departments claimed the same level of influence, with both court cases
(33%) and ombusman reports (33%) causing procedures to be amended.
Housing and social services departments claimed low levels of
influence for both the courts and the ombudsman. In social services
departments 14% claimed that procedures had been amended as a result
of the Local Ombudsman, compared to 3% (2 respondents) as a result of
court cases. The figures for housing departments were 9% for the
ombudsman and 6% for the courts.
Furthermore, few respondents in the Sheffield Survey wanted any
legislative reform which would introduce an independent element into
the complaint handling process, either by extending the powers of the
courts, or by establishing independent tribunals. In fact, 92% of
planning, 92% of education and 81% of housing departments were opposed
to extending the powers of the courts in this way. Social services,
with 22% in favour of such an extension, were out of line with the
other departments, and 76% approved of the establishment of a family
court as a method of reforming the complaint handling process.
Independent tribunals did not prove to be popular, with the majority
of planning (93%), education (85%) and housing (81%) departments
opposed to their being established as part of the complaint handling
process. This method was not quite as unpopular for social services
departments, with 65% opposed to their establishment. Despite this,
evidence during the Sheffield Study revealed that external appeal
mechanisms acted as a strong incentive to tightening up procedures,
and to resolving grievances informally within the authority.
Conclusion 
Despite the problems associated with using the courts to resolve
disputes, and despite the apparent hostility felt towards external
weal mechanisms by local authority personnel, the courts do have an
important role to play in this area. I would agree with Birkinshaw
(1985), when he says that he cannot see "the role of the courts
changing dramatically in assisting in the resolution of grievances
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against the state" (p172), in relation to individual consumers acting
as plaintiffs against local authorities. In this respect, the courts
are a poor substitute for resolving disputes internally. But, where
the courts can be useful is that the possibility of an external
challenge can encourage the use of informal mechanisms for the redress
of grievances within authorities, in attempts to avoid appeals.
In these cases, therefore, courts would be used as the last resort,
but the possibility of their use could lead to authorities tightening
up their own internal procedures. We are some way behind the
Australian courts, where there are general appeal tribunals which can
review cases on their merits, but nevertheless there are some useful
statutory appeal mechanisms where such reviews can take place.
However, even in situations where there are these local administrative
courts, there is still a need for ombudsmen, and for improvements in
internal procedures. One such improvement would be for authorities to
have their own complaints procedures to resolve disputes. The extent
to which they do so is the subject of the next chapter.
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PART III LOCAL AUTHORITY PROCEDURES 
CHAPTER 7 AUTHORITY-WIDE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES 
Introduction 
The previous section explored some of the methods available for
resolving grievances: elected members, the Local Ombudsman and the
courts. This chapter is concerned with an examination of the extent
to which local authorities have procedures to effect settlement of
grievances internally, that is, the systems used for receiving and
dealing with complaints made by individuals or small groups. As such,
It draws to a large extent on the findings of the Sheffield Study,
although, of course, it incorporates more recent developments in this
arm
Before examining local government's record in this area, it is
probably worth noting here that the Sheffield Study agreed with the
general impression formed by Watchman (1985), who conducted a survey
of complaints procedures in local government in Scotland, that "as
complaint-solving bodies, local authorities have a record of
achievement over many years which bears favourable comparison with
that of other corporate bodies of the same size and significance."
(See Sheffield Report 1986, p3).
This point was emphasised by a number of local government officers
during the course of the Sheffield Study fieldwork, who challenged the
need for such procedures in local government, pointing out that there
are a large number of bureaucratic organisations which are far less
responsive to the consumer interest than local government. 	 It was
argued that local government is democratically elected, and it does
have geographical proximity to the clients it serves.	 As was
discussed in Chapter 1, the fact of democratic election is not, of
itself, sufficient to legitimate conduct.
	 It was, nevertheless,
argued that the numerous forms of legal and political control over
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local government activities, for example judicial review; statutory
rights of appeal; the Local Ombudsman; fiduciary control by the Audit
Commission; and ministerial control by the Secretary of State for the
Environment, made internal complaints procedures, if not unnecessary,
then fairly insignificant.
Some of these alternative methods of dispute resolution have already
been discussed, and despite their advantages, it was concluded that
there are advantages in resolving disputes internally, in accordance
with a formal complaints procedure. This conclusion is in accord with
the Local Ombudsman system, one of its objectives being to "encourage
the local settlement of complaints" (CLA Annual Reports), and few
would disagree that the Local Ombudsman and the courts should be used
as a last resort.
The justification for complaints procedures has already been discussed
in the introductory chapters, and although the emphasis in those
chapters was in relation to their use in terms of justice and
democratic entitlement, issues of efficiency were also mentioned.
There is now an understanding that large scale organisations, like
local government, are being monitored for efficiency. "Efficiency" is
not a simple concept, and it cannot be divorced from the concept of
"effectiveness", which in turn depends on evaluating the extent to
which the goals of the organisation are being fulfilled. There has to
be some means of monitoring, and it may be that complaints procedures
can help in performing a monitoring role.
The chapter is concerned with the use of authority-wide procedures for
handling complaints, and the question to be addressed is why such
procedures are necessary, and what advantages they have over and above
specific departmental procedures. The move towards the local
authority being seen as a corporate entity rather than a group of
service providers has already been noted in previous chapters. The
consequence of this is that the proper institutional response to a
problem is, in the end, a corporate response, and this may at some
stage entail a response from the top of the pyramid. So, despite the
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fact that departments may have their own procedures, in the end, it is
the authority which has to find a solution, and the role of the chief
executive in this context is seen as being particularly important.
This role will be discussed in the chapter.
During the course of the Sheffield Study the procedures themselves
were examined from a public satisfaction viewpoint, and also from the
point of view of managerial efficiency, that is, to the extent to
which they could be used as a form of quality control of services.
There was a methodological bias towards the views of the officers in
local government, and although some canvassing of the consumer
viewpoint was sought, the Sheffield Study concentrated on the formal
end of the process. This was inevitable, given that the day-to-day
handling of complaints occurs at officer level, and this is why the
focus of the research was here. However, to supplement this
information, councillors were interviewed, files were examined, and
the views of consumers were obtained by interviews with
representatives of consumer organisations in some of the local
authority areas where fieldwork was conducted, and by a consumer
survey. Further work has also been done to update the information,
beyond the work conducted by the Sheffield Study team.
The Consumer and Public Services 
One question to be addressed is whether there are distinctive
qualities in the provision of public services, which may make
complaints procedures more appropriate in this sector. According to
the Audit Commission (1988) a local authority exists to provide
services for the public, and the only value of these services is "the
extent to which they satisfy popular needs" (1988, p5). This
sentiment is echoed by the government in the "next-steps initiative",
in the following terms:
"...the performance of any operation will be measured not by how
much money it spends or how many staff it employs, but how well
it delivers the goods and the extent to which it meets the needs 
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of the consumers for whom its services are provided" (Next Steps
Initiatve 1990, p ix, para23. Emphasis added).
Unlike the private sector, where making a profit, or at least avoiding
a loss is a convenient method of Judging the effectiveness of the
services offered, local government has, as a rule, no such indicator
as "local authority clients are rarely called upon to pay the economic
price for services they receive, and there is usually no alternative
supplier" (Audit Commission 1986c).
Local authorities therefore have to find some other method of
evaluating performance, and one way of doing this is for "Clients'
to be treated as 'customers'; services need to be provided for the
public rather than simply to it" (Audit Commission 1988, p5. Original
emphasis). Indeed, not only is there a need for this, but the Audit
Commission claims that clients have become customers "and quality is
replacing quantity as the main target for local authorities" (1988,
p3).
However, there should be some caution in extending the notion of
customer too readily to consumers of local authority services.
Indeed, running through the whole next-steps programme is the
difficulty of identifying who the customers are. For example, who is
the customer in the prison service? (see Next Steps Initiative 1990,
p100). One important difference is that in the public sector the
consumer does not necessarily buy the service. The service does not
therefore profit by his/her custom, and does not wish to expand its
share of the market. There may be situations where consumers may want
the service and be willing to pay for it, but may be refused on the
grounds that they do not meet the criteria for need of the service,
criteria which are determined by a mixture of political and
professional Judgement. Unlike the private sector, consumers in some
circumstances may have a right to receive the service, or may even be
compelled to receive it. How can one speak realistically about
customers being compelled to receive a service? In these cases, the
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consumer is not a customer at all, but a citizen with certain rights
and entitlements.
Another difference is that, unlike the private sector, the consumer
usually has some other major relationship with the service provider,
apart from being a consumer, for example an employee, a taxpayer, a
citizen (see Pollit 1988, p9). Also, those who pay for public
services and those who benefit are not necessarily the same people, so
that deciding who shall have access to what, is a political decision
(see Potter 1988, p151).
Another distinctive feature of local government is that its consumers
may have a lack of choice in some of the services it provides. Being
a monopoly supplier in some situations, consumers cannot use "exit"
actions as an alternative to complaining. This particular aspect of
the public services is discussed by McAuslan (1988) who argues that
those who advocate public choice claim that if you increase "exit",
you need less "voice" (p694), "voice" being, for example, judicial
review of decisions. For example, there is no provision for judicial
review of decisions by building societies on whether to grant or
refuse a mortgage, because customers can go elsewhere, whereas
judicial review of housing decisions by local authorities has
developed because clients cannot go elsewhere. The Housing Act 1988
is designed to increase consumer choice, and will facilitate "exit"
from the system of council housing. Thus, the "public choicists"
argue that there is less need for judicial review, or a voice in the 
system.
Although there is some force in this argument, all organisations have
a duty to act within the law, and although no-one can claim a right to
a mortgage as such, an arbitrary refusal to someone who fits the
criteria of entitlement may be grounds for complaint to the Building
Society Ombudsman. Indeed, the establishment of such ombudsmen
schemes by building societies, and other institutions is a recognition
of consumer rights in situations where there may not be a formal legal
remedy.
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This is not the place to discuss the relative merits of the public
interest ideology, as opposed to the public choice ideology (see
McAuslan 1988), but the example serves to illustrate the point that
consumers of local authority services, as in all monopoly supply
situations, do need mechanisms for challenging decisions, as the lack
of choice means that they cannot obtain the services elsewhere. Such
mechanisms are also needed to regulate monopoly suppliers in the
private sector, and the problem posed seems to be more one of
containing power, rather than differentiating between the public and
private. Confronting power goes beyond any such distinction. Indeed,
E. P. Thompson (1975) has noted that for effective legitimation, the
law must correspond to people's claims of justice and popular
conception of it, which means that the law must provide restraints on
power - whether in terms of formalised structures of participation and
accountability or individual remedy.
However, there may be special responsibilities in the state sector as
this sector does not, as a rule, provide the opportunity which may be
available in other consumer situations, for example, by the consumers
changing their supplier, changing shopping patterns, or changing brand
or product (See Hirschman 1970). Where there may not be these
opportunities in the in the private sector, for example in situations
where public utilities have been privatised, mechanisms have been
created to monitor performance and obtain redress for aggrieved
consumers.
Another difference between the supply of services by the public sector
rather than the private sector is that there is usually no contractual
relationship between the "customer" and the supplier of the service so
that very often a disappointed consumer, or one who thinks the service
has done harm, has little or no opportunity to sue the provider, an
opportunity which may be available in the private sector (See
Winkler's (1987) study of NHS complaints, pl). There may be an
argument for a quasi-contractual relationship in these situations, and
the development of public law remedies in this area, on the basis that
- 152 -
legitimate expectations have been raised, could go some way to
overcoming the problem.
Although a number of services formerly provided by local authorities
are now being performed by private companies, due to the introduction
of competitive tendering, there will still not be a contractual
relationship between the consumer and the private service
organisation.	 The contract will be with the local authority, or the
particular service department. 	 This in itself calls for special
attention to be paid to the consumer interest as "in the end the
authority cannot decide what is, and is not, good service. 	 Only
those who receive the service can do so" (LGTB 1988, p5).
The Local Government Training Board (LGTB 1988) believes that the
client viewpoint assumes prime importance in the competitive tendering
situation, as "the public's perception of service needs to be measured
and used to manage contracts", pointing out that the extent to which a
service matches up to standards is a matter of Judgement and that this
Judgement is not always a purely professional one. One method of
involving the "ultimate service recipient, the public" in managing and
monitoring contracts is to set up complaints procedures and use
complaints as measures of performance (p8). This view is endorsed by
the Audit Commission (1989), which supports competition, believing
that it offers the potential for both lower costs and better services,
but recognising that competition calls for "robust monitoring systems"
(p1) so that levels of public satisfaction can be monitored "both
reactively, by monitoring complaints, and proactively, by public
opinion surveys" (p19).
From the findings of the Sheffield Study it seems that local
authorities have a long way to go in this respect. Despite a Code of
Practice issued by the Commission for Local Administration in 1978
(CLA 1978) which recommended that arrangements be made to monitor
inquiries and complaints to see if "collectively they indicate trends
which require changes of policy, or procedure", and that there should
be "simple systems for recording complaints and queries other than
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those which can be fully and successfully dealt with on the spot,"
(p6), a number of service areas were deficient in this respect.
For example, in housing departments, 59% (68) claimed that they
recorded complaints, but only 10% (11) produced a statistical analysis
of them; in planning departments 58% (76) recorded complaints, but
only 14% (18) analysed them; and for education departments the figures
were 39% (13) and 9% (3) respectively. Social services departments
proved to be better than the other service areas with 70% (26)
claiming to log the numbers of complaints, but, again, only 19% (7)
produced any statistical analysis of the complaints. Even these
figures are probably an over estimate. Although seven social services
departments claimed to produce a statistical analysis of complaints,
on further investigation, only two departments were able to present
the statistical information.	 The other authorities admitted that
their systems were not operating very well and that such analysis was
"not high priority". A study by the Audit Commission and Local
Government Training Board (INLOGOV 1985) drew similar conclusions to
the Sheffield Study, finding that many authorities lacked "the
systems, procedures and organisational machinery which allow
information about operational activities to be drawn together so that
service performance can be assessed" (p59).
Others have seen the value of complaints procedures as a method of
quality control, to raise standards and performance, which has obvious
managerial advantages, being valuable for identifying responsibility
for making difficult judgements (see Harlow and Rawlings 1984, pp207-
210). However few officers responding to the Sheffield Study
questionnaire saw complaints procedures in this way, and indeed, it
was only in social services departments that the majority considered
that formal complaints procedures had advantages for managerial
efficiency, with 24 authorities believing this (65% of the sample).
Only 45% (52) of housing departments, 39% (13) of education
departments, and 37% (48) of planning departments viewed complaints
procedures in this way.
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This important function of complaints procedures is not just
overlooked in the public sector. For example, in their study of the
work of the Financial Services Ombudsmen, Birds and Graham (1988)
found that the "motivation for setting up these institutions had been
primarily defensive" (p318), with the result that the grievance
redress function was uppermost in the ombudsmen's mind and quality
control and the raising of standards was secondary. The conclusion
was that "grievance handling rather than quality control would seem to
be the major function envisaged for the 'free standing' ombudsmen"
(p318).
This positive role for complaints is much more readily accepted in the
United States. A more detailed investigation of the U.S. attitude to
complaining will be discussed later in the chapter, but it is worth
noting here that in the U.S. complaints are seen as feeding into the
administrative process, especially through elected members. Indeed,
the Study on Federal Regulation (1977) recommended that "there should
be a systematic means of processing complaints so that they can be one
of the factors that guide agency priorities and proceedings" (p133).
Clearly, in local government, any claim that complaints are used as a
method of reviewing administrative procedures cannot be done in a
systematic way, as only a minority of departments actually provided a
statistical analysis of complaints. In response to the questionnaire
during the Sheffield Study, a number of departments did claim to use
complaints as a method of reviewing their administrative procedures,
but fieldwork revealed that procedures are only reviewed when
particular issues come to the notice of senior officers. This kind of
performance review is becoming a crucial area for the newly privatised
utilities, and the Gas Consumers Council, for example, keeps detailed
statistics on complaints, with monthly reviews and detailed analysis
of the data every four months. It follows up "unusual or worrying
trends" (Gas Consumers Council 1989, pp18-21).
So, even leaving aside any notion of justice (and, incidentally, the
Social Security Advisory Committee (1984) considers that an "effective
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appeals procedure is an essential part of any benefit structure" (p51,
emphasis added), the managerial benefits of complaints procedures
cannot be over emphasised. For those officers who, during the course
of the Sheffield Study fieldwork, complained about the resource
implications of such procedures, the Audit Commission (1986c),
believes that management information "should provide benefits which
exceed the cost of providing it" (p7). Given that authorities are
concerned to discover how far people's needs are being met, one method
of doing this is to examine the level of complaints which they receive
about their services.	 This is especially true in relation to
involuntary consumers, for example, children, old-people, and third
parties to planning decisions. Procedures providing an effective
means of registering dissatisfaction can help authorities to keep in
touch with consumers and avoid becoming isolated and unresponsive
bureaucracies. There are signs that authorities are becoming more
conscious of the use of complaints for performance review. The Local
Ombudsman notes that authorities "are beginning to look at complaints
and consumer satisfaction from the angle of performance review rather
than as a series of embarrassing hiccoughs" (CLA Annual Report
1989/90, p30), and also that there are an increasing number of
enquiries from authorities about good practice "which are not prompted
by particular complaints or by advedrse findings" (p30).
This section began by asking whether there are differences in the
provision of services by the public, as opposed to the private,
sector. While this very much depends on the level of service provided
(for example, sports and leisure facilities have much in common with
private sector provision; child-care provisions have no obvious
parallel in the private sector), and while all organisations, in
particular monopoly suppliers, need to have restraints on their power,
the fact that local authorities are to a large extent the only
supplier in a number of important areas of a person's life, makes the
use of complaints procedures of special importance here.
This chapter is concerned with authority-wide procedures for handling
complaints, and, although the various departments should have their
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own internal procedures, the value of an authority-wide system must be
emphasised. In this respect I agree with Berry (1988a) that, no matter
how good a departmental procedure may be, ultimately such procedures
"should be available to every user of any local authority service"
(p19). Where departments have good procedures, there can still be "a
more active, authority-wide, supervisory role for the Chief
Executive's office (NCC 1988, p32). BASW (1989), too, sees the
advantage of the involvement of the chief executive in the
investigation of complaints, "particularly those of a serious nature",
as this would mean that there would be involvement by someone who was
not concerned with the provision of the service" (p10). To have
authority-wide procedures indicates a corporate commitment to
grievance redress, and "would reinforce a coherent change of attitude
within the whole authority" (Berry 1988a, p19).
The use of complaints procedures as management information systems has
also been raised in this section, and, although not specifically
addressed, the concept of efficiency was hinted at. Before looking at
the extent of authority-wide procedures, I want to elaborate on the
idea of efficiency, and its relationship to complaints procedures.
Efficiency. Economy and Effectiveness 
Efficiency has become increasingly important in government in recent
years (see Birkinshaw, Harden and Lewis 1990, Ch.5), and this is
particularly so in local government where financial constraints have
forced local authorities to examine how well they use their resources.
The establishment of the Audit Commission for local government in
England and Wales by the Local Government Finance Act 1982 is a
recognition of the importance of efficiency. This independent body
has a duty to appoint auditors to local authorities, and to help the
authorities to bring about improvements in economy, efficiency and
effectiveness directly through the auditing process and through the
value for money studies which the commission carries out.
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Although "efficiency" is the concept which seems to assume importance,
it is important to recognise the other aspects of the Audit
Commission's functions. In their handbook (Audit Commission 1986c)
what is emphasised is that performance in local government includes
both service efficiency and service effectiveness (p8). 	 These
concepts are defined as follows:
"Effectiveness means providing the right services to enable the
local authority to implement its policies and objectives.
Efficiency means providing a specified volume and quality of
service with lowest level of resources capable of meeting that
specification.
...economy ... means ensuring that the assets of the authority
and services purchased, are procured and maintained at the lowest
possible cost consistent with a specified quality and quantity"
(Audit Commission 1986c, p8)
There are dangers with a narrow "value for money" approach. Loughlin
(1981) argues that "it provides no realistic indication of relative
effectiveness of service provision" and that "effective management is
determined by the size of the rate demands" (p446). This danger has
been recognised by the Audit Commission itself, which emphasises that
"efficiency alone is not enough; it is essential to be committing
resources to the right things" (Audit Commission 1986c, p4), and that
authorities need to be defining policy objectives and effectiveness,
and checking that these are being achieved. The Audit Commission also
claims that it is "unwise to assume that value for money and cheapness
are synonymous" (Audit Commission Annual Report and Accounts 31/3/85,
01).
This point is taken up by the Local Government Training Board (INLOGOV
1985), which considers that it is necessary to look at "the
effectiveness of services as well as their efficiency" (p59).
Effectiveness in this context means providing the right services to
enable the local authority to implement its policies and objectives.
Efficiency means providing a specified volume and quality of service
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with the lowest level of resources capable of meeting that
specification (INLOGOV 1985, p59).
These ideas are explored at a theoretical level by Birkinshaw, Harden
and Lewis (1990, Chapter 5), where they maintain that efficiency is
not a simple concept, not even when it is coupled with economy and
effectiveness, and that the conceptual differences between these are
often obscured rather than explored (p146). These three concepts are
often competing goals, and therefore there will have to be trade-offs
between them (pp158-160). They also make the point that this is not a
particular problem of the public sector, as even within the private
sector, managerial discretion cannot be evaluated by any simple
criteria of profit-maximisation.
There is, therefore, a tension between efficiency and effectiveness,
and it is of little consequence to have economy and efficiency if the
authority's objectives are not being met. Therefore, in order to
assess whether there is value for money, the effectiveness of the
programmes has to be examined. The question is then raised as to how
conflicts between efficiency and effectiveness are to be resolved.
One way is to rely on managerial discretion, but it must be borne in
mind that the role of management is not only to apply technical
knowledge, nor merely to fulfil a defined organisational role, but
also to design and operate systems to acquire and use information in
the decision-making process (p165). There is therefore a need for
quality control and monitoring. This is especially true of the public
sector, because, unlike the private sector which has, as its main
goal, profitability, and money as a common yardstick by which to
measure this, much of the public sector output is not priced. It is
therefore impossible to use cash as a universal measure of value, so
the effectiveness of the service has to be measured in other ways.
Birkinshaw, Harden and Lewis (1990) conclude that there is no escape
from the logical necessity to specify goals before issues of
efficiency can be raised, and hence no way to avoid the logical
priority of effectiveness as a criterion for evaluation of public
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policies. Effectiveness presupposes a set of objectives and
priorities, and for public policy the concept of efficiency is
logically subordinate to that of effectiveness.
What relevance has all this for complaints procedures? As was
mentioned in the last section, complaints procedures can be used for
management information, as a way of reviewing performance. They are
one method of discovering whether people's needs are being met, and
therefore how effective the service is. It is a method of quality
control to ensure that the service is up to the required standard. At
this point it might be appropriate to look at the United States
experience of complaint handling, as in the U. S., complaints have a
high profile and are seen as a method of feeding information into the
policy process.
Complaint Handing in the United States 
Senator Henry Jackson, in 1965, when referring to congressional
auditing and inquiry of executive and administrative programmes, spoke
of "the duty of the legislature to cross-examine the powerful" which
is "at the very heart of the American system of government" (Senate
Committee on Government Operations 1965). Consumer complaints were
seen as a method of informing this process. This view is endorsed by
Rosenblum (1974), who in his study of citizen initiated complaints,
asserts that "federal agency responses to citizen initiated complaints
is at the core of our conception of government of, by and for the
people" (p2). Rosenblum's study sought information from several
government agencies about the procedures they used to follow up
complaints; whether they resulted in changes in agency practice; what
publicity was given to the procedure; whether there was any
statistical recording and monitoring. It was based on the premise
that "a democratic system must provide its people with the instruments
for holding government accountable to them and for making effective
choices from among meaningful alternatives" (1)4). If federal agencies
respond to citizen needs they can "help otherwise alienated
individuals to feel that they are participating in their government's
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decision making even when the substance of a particular grievance or
complaint cannot be resolved to their satisfaction" (p5).
Despite these ideals, the results of Rosenblum's (1974) survey were
disappointing, revealing that 51 out of 64 respondents had no special
office or organisational unit specifically responsible for handling
complaints.	 Those without special complaint offices had, not
surprisingly, not established explicit routes for processing
complaints. Less than one-fifth of the agencies said that changes in
agency practice had resulted from complaints. The TARP report (1975)
a study commissioned by the office of Consumer Affairs, Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, had similar disappointing results.
This study was to provide a comprehensive and systematic review of
federal agency complaint handling. It found serious deficiencies,
including a lack of clarity, order and consistency between agencies
with regard to the classification of complaints, statistical reporting
and evaluation of complaints. There was little formal policy analysis
and no systematic method for transmitting analysis to the senior
policy-makers,
Nevertheless Rosenblaum (1974) was optimistic that the ability of
these agencies to point to changes instituted as a result of
complaints provided "a distinct basis for optimism about the capacity
to utilize complaints constructively in evaluating and
formulating agency programs, procedures and policies" (p12). As
examples of this, the Social Security Administration maintained that
citizen-initiated complaints had produced "concrete beneficial changes
in policies and practices" (p17). The Veteran's Administration said
that "complaints from veterans had been "useful in improving its
operation or procedures" (p20). And the Food and Drug Administration
had made changes in its procedures as a result of complaints,
including "a revision of the control system to speed responses and the
establishment of an Emergency Response Officer" who would answer
"critical consumer complaints" (p31).
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The use of citizen complaints to federal agencies can be seen as an
alternative means whereby citizens at large can directly make their
views known. The aggregate of citizen complaints usually constitutes
"the agency's only direct source of information about problems from
the perspective of the public" (Study on Federal Regulation 1977,
p131). Regulatory agencies are exhorted to make more active efforts
to solicit the views of the public, but, in the absence of this, the
complaint handling systems of agencies "can be a surrogate for direct
public participation" (031). The study found that most agencies do
not have procedures for spotting patterns of complaints as a method of
Judging the frequency and severity of problems (033), with consumer
complaints appearing to play "a minor role in rule makings, and 	
in the overall establishment of agency priorities" (p183). 	 However,
it did find some cases where consumer complaints appeared to have been
part of the impetus for agency rule making. For example, the Civil
Aeronautics Board complaint summaries highlighted problems encountered
by consumers in processing claims with airlines for lost or damaged
luggage (033).	 On the basis of this complaint information the
C.A,B. office of Consumer Advocate petitioned for rule making on
baggage liability rules. The point is emphasised that complaint
handling by regulatory agencies is an important area for consideration
and reform because "complaint from the public can constitute a direct
form of public participation in regulatory policy making" (p137).
As in this country, the use of complaints procedures where services
are contracted out is of special importance. Marlin (1984) speaks
about complaint handling systems as "an important aspect of the
contract monitoring component", as complaints, particularly when
analysed by type and change of pattern "can be highly useful tools to
the contract manager" (p95). Complaints are therefore a major gauge
of quality, because if a serious deterioration of service occurs,
elected local officials will hear from their constituents, and he
notes that "the incidence of complaints serves as a pulse measuring
day-to-day service quality" (05). It has to be accepted that there
will be a certain level of complaints, as standards can never be fully
met by authorities will limited budgets, but what is important is any
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unexplained deviation in patterns "such as a sudden jump in the
frequency of complaints or a change in the type of complaint" (p95).
This is an indicator that a change in service quality has occurred and
should be investigated.
As in England, complaints procedures are also increasingly being seen
as appropriate for the private sector, not just government and quasi-
government agencies. For example, The Interstate Commerce Commission,
Office of Compliance and Consumer Assistance (ICC 1982) has issued
regulations to cover removal firms, to protect consumers on interstate
moves and define the rights and responsibilities of consumers and
movers. Removal firms are obliged to "establish and maintain a
procedure for responding to complaints and inquiries" from consumers
and to keep a written record of all complaints and inquiries from
consumers (ICC 1982, Section 1056 13). This procedure is publicised
by means of a booklet prepared by the ICC ("When you move, Your Rights
and Responsibilities"), which removal firms have to give to consumers.
Before leaving this discussion of the American experience, some
mention must be made of complaint handling in the city of Chicago,
which was observed by a member of the research team during the course
of the Sheffield Study (see Sheffield Report 1986, pp 6-17, 76-77).
Complaints are handled by the Mayor's office of Inquiry and
Information, which has the role of executive ombudsman for the city of
Chicago, a city with 3 million inhabitants. Most complaints are
received by telephone, and the telephone number is not only widely
disseminated, but probably one of the best known numbers in the city.
The Sheffield Report (1986) concluded that in terms of publicity, the
system was "difficult to better" (p16).
All queries and complaints are logged on the computer and processed
and pursued in a systematic fashion. Copies of the entry are printed
out and sent both to the appropriate department or organisation, and
to the complainant. There is a rigorous system of progress chasing,
and a response and explanation is expected and normally received
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within 10 working days.	 The success rate, in terms of complainant
satisfaction is nearly 100%.
The unit whose job it is to resolve the problems is part of a larger
community liaison unit, which has a city-wide function of consultation
with citizen groups throughout the whole of Chicago. There are only 7
officers working on complaints, and they function on a territorial
basis rather than specialising in particular service areas. They stay
with the cases until the end, and are, in effect, operating as
personal ombudsmen for the complainant. Their duties are to follow up
the complaints and to keep in touch until a satisfactory solution to
the problem is achieved.
As far as monitoring is concerned, a statistical analysis is performed
daily, monthly and annually. The computer system also assesses the
waiting time for each telephone caller before being passed on to an
investigator. Each day the computer is programmed to cross tabulate
automatically in the respective service areas and the 50 electoral
districts.
	 Such analysis has proved invaluable in highlighting
structural defects in sewerage, and street lighting.
Complaints forms are divided into the 50 wards of the city and into 41
separate heads of complaint, and analyses are done in order to
identify trends for the purpose of quality and systems control. In
this respect the city is following the recommendation of the Study of
Federal Regulation (1977) that "there should be a systematic means of
processing complaints so that they can be one of the factors that
guide agency priorities and proceedings" (p133).
The complaints office also deals with complaints in relation to the
police, fire and ambulance services, and even Federal agencies. The
cost of the service is about El million per year and this includes the
cost of the neighbourhood forum, which is an active city-wide
consultation device.
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There is no doubt of the value of the system as a management tool.
The regular cross tabulations on the computer relates complaints in
particular services to individual wards or districts and thereby
alerts the city to system defects. This system was far in advance of
any systems found in the local authorities visited during the
Sheffield Study, in terms of analysis and monitoring. I will now
direct my attention to an examination of complaints procedures in
England.
Complaints Procedures in England 
We are still some way behind the United States in the approach to
consumer complaints, despite strong recommendations that local
authorities should develop complaints procedures, that is, develop
their own internal arrangements for receiving and investigating
complaints. In 1974, Redcliffe-Maud recommended the adoption by local
authorities of clearly established, well publicised procedures for the
reception and investigation of complaints by members of the public
(Redcliffe-Maud 1974). In 1978 the Commission for Local
Administration, in consultation with the Local Authority Associations,
issued a Code of Practice for local authorities in relation to
complaints (CLA 1978).	 Calls for such procedures have also come in
the international sphere:
"There have to be grievance procedures - the public demands them
- and if the orthodox Judicial system does not supply them, the
public will turn to the Ombudsman to fill the gap" (Ferns,
Goodman and Mayor 1980, p9).
Previous research into the effect of these calls for procedures is
sparse, although local government has received more attention than
central government in this respect. Rawlings (1986) sees this as a
function of the Local Ombudsman system, as the Commission for Local
Administration "places much greater emphasis than the PCA on
encouraging authorities within its Jurisdiction to improve and
publicise their own grievance procedures" (1392).
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Research that has been done (see Rawlings 1986 for a review of current
research) indicates that the recommendations of Redcliffe-Maud and the
CLA have not been heeded. Justice (1980) found that less than 20% of
the local authorities interviewed had taken significant steps to
improve complaints handling in response to the CLA's code of practice,
and that good procedures were "thin on the ground". The majority of
authorities had developed procedures for dealing with complaints
referred to the CLA, but not for those in the pre-referral process.
Even when procedures did exist, the publcity for them was sparse. The
intervening years have not seen a remarkable improvement in this area.
The Sheffield Study found that only 35% of local authorities had
formally adopted the code. There were even some officers who
telephoned asking what code was being referred to, when they were
trying to complete this part of the questionnaire during the Sheffield
Study.
The issuing of the 1978 Code also stimulated research by Lewis and
Birkinshaw (1979a) and Evans (1979) into the allocation of decision
making functions in local authorities. Lewis and Birkinshaw's
research (1979a) involved a study in which 300 authorities replied,
and a field study in one authority. It found that about half of the
authorities surveyed had no recognisable procedure; about a quarter
referred resistant disputes to committee, with others using senior
officers (or executive ombudsmen) to conduct a review of the decision.
(For work on the executive ombudsman see Wyner 1973 ; Mohaptra 1976).
Watchman (1985), too, found variations between authorities, but
procedures in Scotland generally are not as advanced as in England
with formal machinery for complaints about administrative performance
scarce. Lewis and Birkinshaw (1978, 1979b) also did some general
survey work on local authority grievance mechanisms in the late 1970's
in which they found that the statutory provisions which gave
procedural protection were haphazard, owing as much to chance and
political pressures as to any analytical design. In respect of non-
statutory procedures, most areas were poorly provided for, with school
allocation and personnel matters being the only areas with developed
procedures.	 They also found considerable differences between
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authorities, a finding supported by the Personal Social Services
Council (1976) in their survey.
Other studies have looked at particular areas of local government
activity, most of these being in housing. For example, Lewis (1976)
and Lewis and Livock (1979) have looked at decision-making chains in
council house allocation. The Advisory Centre for Education (1981,
1982) surveyed local authorities on their practice and procedures in
the area of suspension of children from schools and Pratt and Grimshaw
(1985) looked at Sheffield LEA's procedures for determining whether or
not to refer school attendance cases to the courts. There have also
been studies of the personal social services, which will be discussed
in the next chapter.
Besides the lack of empirical study, the haphazard intervention of the
law in this area has led Lewis and Harden (1982) to criticise the lack
of theory in this area. They bemoan the fact that the Local Ombudsman
has not yet produced "an all-purpose, inclusive grievance procedure
requirement across the face of local government" (p67) but what has
existed instead "for more than a century" are "various legal
requirements which afford piecemeal procedural protection to members
of the public, especially in the field of 	  grievance procedures
(p67).
The purpose of the Sheffield Study, therefore, was to try to rectify
this dearth of knowledge about the existence of complaints procedures
in local authorities, and to discover details of those that do exist.
In particular it was concerned to discover the impact of the Local
Ombudsman on the way local authorities process complaints and whether
any changes had occurred since the issuing of the 1978 Code of
Practice; whether complaints and complaints procedures have any
bearing on the efficiency of local government performance, and whether
they are seen in a managerial way as a form of quality control;
whether there are different types of mechanisms which are more
suitable for different types of complaints; whether the different
- 167-
service areas reveal different types of complaints which will require
different responses.
Some more knowledge of the way procedures are interpreted and
incorporated into the work of the personnel within the authorities,
and whether there are different approaches and practices across
authorities was another area of concern and whether there are
different departmental responses within the same authority. It may be
that some organisations, or some departments, lend themselves to
grievances because they have to make negative decisions, and no matter
how good the institution, there will still be complaints.
Before embarking on a discussion of these procedures, it may be useful
to examine the role of the chief executive, in this area, as s/he is
often central to the implementation of the corporate process.
The Role of the Chief Executive 
There is no doubt that chief executives have a special status and
authority in local government. In 1985, INLOGOV (1985) could claim
that despite "a few well-publicised examples, the post of chief
executive has become firmly established in local government" (p77),
and in 1982 there were only 7 authorities which specifically stated
that they did not have a chief executive or someone with similar
duties, Their functions include public relations; corporate planning,
personnel; management services; administration; project co-ordination;
research and intelligence. Virtually all local authorities have a
chief officer management team, which is invariably co-ordinated by the
chief executive's department.
With the move towards a corporate management approach in local
government, the role of the chief executive becomes of crucial
importance. The Audit Commission (1988) believes that the chief
executive is "central to the implementation of these corporate
processes" (p11) and that his/her role must be more clearly defined,
as current practice varies greatly. Some chief executives have few or
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no staff; others manage large departments; some are very much in
control of the running of the council; others seem remote from
operational management. The Audit Commission sees the need for a
strong chief executive in every authority "responsible and accountable
for translating the council's corporate policy into action" (1988,
p11) believing that s/he "has a pivotal role in managing the inter-
relationship between the political and the management processes".
(p11). Whatever the views of the Audit Commission, the Local
Government Training Board found that, although many chief executives
saw themselves as able to act as brokers or facilitators in respect of
difficult decisions or relationships, "few want to act as arbiters,
particularly where issues arise between the parties on a council"
(1,C7B 1987, p8).
There was some discussion of the role of the chief executive in
Chapter 4. In this section I want to look at the role they (or some
senior officers in their department) play in complaint handling in
general, and in relation to Local Ombudsman complaints. This is based
on the questionnaire returns of the Sheffield Study, supplemented by
Interviews.
There are differences in the roles chief executives adopt, classified
at each extreme as post box or investigator. Most, of course, expect
chief officers to run their own departments, stressing that the chief
executive should act as a final court of appeal only. However, a more
extreme view was expressed by the town clerk of one authority who felt
that any complaint procedure which had a fail safe to the chief
executive was bad in principle. He maintained that chief officers are
responsible for running their services, and if the complaint chain led
to him "the system has failed". He saw his major role as keeping the
council financed and legal, and that he was "not a letterbox".
Another example of this kind of approach was the suggestion by another
chief executive that it would be "quite an affront to a chief officer
to have his Judgement questioned" by a member of the Local Ombudsman
investigating staff, who may be young and inexperienced.
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This view was out of line with the views of most other chief
executives, who, although allowing for the autonomy of chief officers,
nevertheless have taken on the role of the final court of appeal. So,
for example, when there are serious complaints, many chief executives
request specific information, prepare their own report, and ask for
further information if necessary, although it should be stressed that
for the most part serious complaints are handled by chief executives
as a defence against the Local Ombudsman. Sometimes chief executives
play a co-ordinating role in complaints handling, particularly if it
is a sensitive issue, or one that involves several departments. Some
chief executives would call for the file and interview officers if
they found the departmental response unsatisfactory in some way.
On the whole the impression gained from the Sheffield Study was that
chief executives liked to see themselves as neutral arbiters, and,
though obviously not wishing to impinge on departmental territory,
this view has much to commend it, as they can take a more detached
view. Leak (1986) in his study noted the advantages of this detached,
mediating role, observing that private solicitors dealing with housing
cases were happier dealing with the Administration and Legal
Department rather than the housing department because there was "no
core of accrued hostility, but rather they're looking for a solution
as quickly as possible to cause minimum disruption and minimum bad
publicity" (p319). Their neutrality was evidenced by one case where
an action was brought against the council for statutory nuisance in
respect of two damp houses. Following an environmental health report,
the council's solicitors had taken the view that the action could not
be defended, and had entered a plea of guilty, much to the displeasure
of the director of housing. Housing department staff were found to be
defensive, but the solicitors, removed from direct involvement, found
it easier to accept liability (Leak 1986, p319).
An interesting aspect of the neutrality of the chief executive's
department was noted when reading some complaints files of one
authority during the course of the Sheffield Study. Here, a
complainant saw the officer in charge of complaints not only as a
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neutral party, but almost as a 'people's friend', as evidenced by a
memorandum from the complaints officer to the housing office.
"Meanwhile, Mrs. P. (Complainant) refuses to meet Mrs. A (Housing
Officer) on Friday 14 June unless I accompany her. I do not
propose to do this if Mrs. A can sort something out before then".
(emphasis added)
This role of the chief executive in complaint handling seems to be a
natural progression from the part played by many chief executives in
dealing with Local Ombudsman complaints. The Sheffield Study found
that 78 (56%) authorities had formal procedures for handling such
complaints, some chief executives remarking that it was not necessary
to have formal procedures, as there were too few complaints at this
level to justify them.
Those that did have procedures used them mainly for internal purposes,
for officers and members, and in particular to inform members of the
procedures to be followed if they were asked to refer a complaint to
the Local Ombudsman. Only 29 authorities made their procedures
available to the general public. It was noted that, whatever the type
of procedure, all emphasised the central role of the chief executive
in this area. Indeed, the main purpose of some of the procedures
appeared to be a method for making sure that the chief executive was
both made aware of the complaint, and allowed to oversee its
investigation. Some procedures specifically mentioned that
investigations "will be monitored and recorded by the chief
executive's department". Even in those authorities where there was no
formal procedure, the practice had evolved of the chief executive co-
ordinating responses, and being kept informed of the progress of such
complaints.
Although playing a central role in co-ordination of the complaint,
this role can take different forms. In one authority the procedure
document noted that the role of the chief executive was one of
"seeking to avoid findings of maladministration against the Council,
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not by attempting to hide evidence of maladministration, but by
seeking a local settlement where the chief executive is satisfied that
there has been maladministration". The chief executive, when
interviewed, admitted that he found this a difficult role, as the
Local Ombudsman's office expected him to adopt an independent stance
and use his influence to make sure that "all the facts are produced
and presented accordingly".
This was, however, an unusual attitude, and in the main, chief
executives saw themselves as adopting a neutral role. In these
circumstances, complaints officers would perform a useful role, but,
as shall be seen, little attention has been paid to the possibility of
such officers. In one authority the senior assistant solicitor saw his
job as defending the council against complainants, but the influence
of the chief executive and the introduction of a complaints procedure
had encouraged officers to see complaints positively and to take a
less litigious stance. Thus, the procedure, and the chief executive
had affected staff attitudes and there was a greater willingness to
accept fault by officers and members. The standard pattern for
authorities with formalised procedures was that chief executives would
send a copy of the complaint to chief officers for comment, and on the
basis of this submit a report to the Local Ombudsman. Even
authorities without formalised procedures had well established
practices, with the chief executive seeking information in the same
way.
In some authorities chief executives had a more investigative role,
these being mainly the larger urban authorities. For example, in some
London boroughs, rather than asking for comments from chief officers
about a complaint, chief executives asked specific detailed questions
to elicit the information thought to be relevant, and of interest to
the Local Ombudsman. In these authorities there was no indication of
defensive attitudes, and the chief executives saw themselves very much
as neutral arbitrators.
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Alongside these various roles adopted by chief executives, there were
varying levels of involvement by officers and members in Local
Ombudsman complaint handling. Some authorities were very officer
oriented, and had member involvement only to the extent that when
there was notification that there was going to be an investigation the
chief executive would notify the chair and deputy chair of the
relevant committees "so that they are aware that an investigation is
taking place". Other authorities involved members at a much earlier
stage, although this is not necessarily advantageous. For example,
one authority had recently reviewed its procedures to reduce member
involvement, after it was criticised by the Local Ombudsman for being
too inflexible, and thus missing opportunities of finding quick and
readily acceptable solutions to complainants' problems. The old
system, involving full reports being prepared for the relevant
committees, was seen as no longer necessary, except where policy
issues were involved, and the chairperson of the committee concerned
directed that a full report be prepared. The new system involved an
informal discussion based on a short report, with the chief executive,
chair and vice-chair of the committee, and the referring councillor.
Some authorities did report in full to committee before taking action,
but these tended to be small authorities with few complaints. Most
procedures involved chairs and sometimes vice-chairs of committees,
together with the leader of the council, with the option of referral
to committee for discussion. Members were also encouraged to inform
chief executives immediately they were asked to refer a complaint to
the Local Ombudsman so that the authority could begin its own internal
investigation in advance of the notification.
Although playing a central, co-ordinating role in Local Ombudsman
complaints, some of the systems used by the chief executives' officers
left much to be desired in terms of record keeping. One of the
striking features of this part of the Sheffield Study reseach was the
poor filing systems employed by authorities for Local Ombudsman
complaints.	 In some cases "chaotic" would be an apt description.
Some authorities kept all cases on one file; some could not produce a
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full set of Local Ombudsman complaints files, as some files were kept
in the relevant service departments; many files ended abruptly with no
record of the actual result. This certainly is one area where proper
files should be kept if there is going to be an attempt to use
complaints managerially, and indeed, it is an area where the ombudsman
has commented (see Chapter 5). This is also highlighted in the health
service, where the Health Service Commissioner has commented upon
"inadequate keeping of records" (pare 11) and "reports of a lax record
keeping" (pare 17) which in some cases had led to inadequate
supervision of patients and even death" (Health Service Commissioner
1989, pare 8).
One advantage of the chief executives' involvement with Local
Ombudsman complaints, from the point of view of the Sheffield Study,
was that they were able to act as co-ordinators for the questionnaires
which needed to be completed by chief officers in some of the service
departments. Indeed, chief executives seemed to see this as part of
their function in eliciting a corporate response to the request for
information. Some of the findings from the Sheffield Study will now
be examined.
Existence of Complaints Procedures 
In order to avoid any confusion, for the purpose of the research, the
definition of complaints found in the 1978 Code of Practice was used:
"Complaint 	  should not be too narrowly defined.	 The
definition should certainly cover the small minority of matters
which are clearly complaints and may end as allegations of
injustice caused by maladministration and be referred to a local
commissioner. It should also, however, cover those other
approaches to Authorities, whether for advice, information or to
raise an issue, which, if not handled properly could turn into a
complaint" (CLA 1978, pare 1.2).
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The fact that this definition was being used was made clear on each of
the questionnaires used for the Sheffield Study. Despite this, some
respondents wanted to quibble with the use of this definition and
wanted a more narrow, legalistic definition. For example, the officer
of one authority who co-ordinated Local Ombudsman complaints, made a
point about the difficulty of the definition of complaints, adding
that this made it difficult to actually quantify the numbers of
complaints received, because "a complaint may develop from what was
initially a request for information". 	 Other officers would simply
begin the interview by saying "anyway, what is a complaint?".
Rawlings (1986) notes the practical difficulty of defining when a
grievance crystallises, but takes "a relaxed view" of "wrong-righting"
activity, to the extent that he is prepared to include planning
inquiries in his review of research into grievance mechanisms (1)3).
Like Rawlings, this study takes a relaxed view, and follows the
ombudsman view that complaints procedures are devices for channelling
information, to enable local authorities to handle complaints better
and provide them with some form of quality control.
Those authorities which do have a definition in their procedural
documents recognise that the definition should not be too restrictive:
"A complaint can be widely defined. It may take many forms from
a complaint on repairs work to an allegation against an
individual.	 It may be in the form of a telephone, personal,
written or other form of communication. There are routine
complaints which can be dealt with at the front reception level,
or more serious ones which need investigation by senior staff
members" (procedure document).
A number of others work on the assumption that the definition is
obvious:
"The system is designed to deal with serious complaints where
normal procedures have not had the desired result"
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Some authorities' publicity about complaints against the council make
it clear that a complaint is seen somehow as a notification of
inujustice:
"A person who thinks he has suffered injustice at the hands of
the Council should: FIRSTLY go the the Council department
concerned and complete a blue complaint form"
Some councils adopt a more flexible approach with the emphasis on
dissatisfaction.
"UNHAPPY about the way in which the Council has handled something
for you? DISSATISFIED enough to want to complain and pursue the
matter further?"
Other authorities take a different view and talk in terms of
"complaints/suggestions" in their publicity material.
It may be that a more vigorous approach to the problem is called for,
and that there should be a consistent set of definitions in this area.
The Study on Federal Regulation (1977) recommended that "a consistent
set of definitions for the term complain, complaint-handling system,
jurisdiction and authority etc., should be developed and applied in
all Federal Central Office complaint handling systems" (p137). The
Interstate Commerce Commission uses a definition which is narrower
than that of the Local Ombudsman, specifically excluding "requests or
Inquiries concerning interpretation ... (and) other informational
matters", and includes within its definition "any written or oral
communication received from any person alleging violations or improper
practices by any carrier" (ICC 1982).
While such consistency may be an advantage in some circumstances, in
practice it is often necessary to accept the consumers' and officers'
interpretation of events. "Complaint" is an elusive and context
dependent concept, and a grievance can evolve according to both the
circumstances and the individual actors perception of the event. As
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en example, the statement that vermin is present in a council flat
would be a complaint to a housing officer, but not to an environmental
health officer. Complaint therefore, is seen as referring to the area
of unresolved grievances, and despite its elusive nature, and the fact
that the definition could pose ambiguities, it was found, like Lewis
(1979), that, on the ground, it is relatively easy to distinguish
complaints from mere requests for information.
The Sheffield Study revealed tht 63 (45%) authorities said that they
had an authority wide procedure for handling complaints with 48 (34%)
claiming to have a committee or sub-committee as the final link in the
grievance chain. The Sheffield Study fieldwork and follow up work
revealed that the claims to have a procedure were an overestimate.
What many authorities meant by claiming to have a procedure was that,
given sufficient fuss by a complainant, there would be a "corporate
response". The claim to have a committee or sub-committee as a final
link was in many cases an admission of the right of a member to raise
an issue at committee level if s/he wished. The local councillors'
role in dispute settlement has already been discussed at some length
in chapter 4. However, it must be borne in mind that councillors, at
the end of the day, are responsible for the running of the authority.
It is therefore surprising that the Sheffield Study survey revealed
that they had only a small role to play in grievance resolution.
While acknowledging that it is always possible for a councillor to
raise a grievance at committee, any formal role they play appears to
be restricted, as evidenced by the fact that, of those authorities
with a grievance procedure, only one-third uses a member-only
committee or sub-committee as a final link in the grievance chain.
Sometimes chief officers did not realise that the authority had a
complaints procedure. For example in one authority's returns, chief
officers had all answered "No" to the question whether the authority
had a complaints procedure, but the chief executive's assistant had
changed all these to "Yes" and referred to page 31 of the Rates
Booklet.	 This "procedure" was an invitation to anyone	 with a
complaint to speak or write to the department or official concerned;
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to write to the Chief Officer of the department, if this fails; to
write to the Chief Executive if still not satisfied; finally, to use
the local councillor, and then, if the complainant feels s/he has
suffered injustice through maladministration, approach the Local
Ombudsman. Indeed, a number of authorities claiming to have such
procedures were little more than this, that is, a suggestion that
complainants pursue their complaints up the managerial hierarchy, and
in the last resort, write to the chief executive.
Some authorities rejected the need for a more formalised system than
this, on the grounds that they did not believe in having "elaborate
procedures for dealing with matters which only occasionally arise".
Some were concerned about the amount of resources allocated to
complaints as opposed to the amount allocated to the services
themselves. One authority with this particular concern was in the
process of devising a complaints procedure, with the novel idea of
having the chief environmental health officer as the supervisor of the
system. This was thought to be in keeping with his responsibility for
trading standards and consumer protection.
Another example of the mismatch between questionnaire response and the
system on the ground was the chief executive (albeit recently
appointed) who said that he was surprised to see that a complaints
procedure existed, and that he was not aware of the existence of a
complaints officer even though this had been mentioned in the
questionnaire returns from his authority. Nor had he ever seen a
complaints form, although a copy was submitted with the questionnaire
return. The chair of the housing committee in one local authority had
no idea that a new centralised system for handling complaints had been
introduced. In another authority, a procedure document, which
Incorporated many aspects of the 1978 Code of Practice (CLA 1978),
including a demand that chief officers issue a written procedure for
complaint handling in their respective departments, was found to have
been inoperative since 1980. The borough solicitor knew nothing of
the procedure, and there were no written departmental complaints
procedures.
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However, despite the limited existence of complaints procedures, some
good practices were found in authorities visited during the Sheffield
Study. Before examining these I will compare the experiences of some
of the service departments in relation to complaints procedures. This
is because it was found, when analysing the departmental returns
during the Sheffield Study, that departments had quite different views
on this subject. The variety of experiences within the different
service areas emphasises, once more, the need for a central,
authority-wide procedure, so that, irrespective of departmental
provision, there is some consistency of provision, and in the last
resort a more neutral approach to the problem. The purpose of the next
section is to indicate the diversity of views.
Departmental Complaints Procedures 
The majority of chief executives (61%) thought that complaints
procedures were desirable, and, indeed, the Sheffield Study research
itself played some part in alerting authorities to the need for, and
advantages of, such procedures. Chief officers in the service
departments had widely differing opinions about the desirability of
formal written complaints procedures within departments.	 Social
services departments were strongly in favour of such procedures, with
70% (29) responding favourably to the question. Altogether 63 (54%)
housing departments were in favour, but only 49 <37%) planning and 11
(33%) education departments thought they were desirable.
This view of desirability is reflected in the existence of such
procedures across the service departments. 65% (24) of social
services departments had formal written procedures for resolving
complaints, but only 45% (52) of housing departments, 31% (41) of
planning departments and 39% (13) of education departments had them.
There were definite departmental responses, which were independent of
the "central" view. So, for example, many housing officers saw the
main problem being that of scarce resources. They did not like too
much discretion, and saw complaints procedures sometimes as a method
of "jumping the queue". Indeed, one chair of the housing committee in
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a large urban authority was anxious to create technically good
administrative machinery and reluctant to make allowances for an
aggrieved individual. Planning officers saw complainants as mainly
third-parties to planning decisions, who would try anything to prevent
unwelcome development, and whose main concern was to protect their
property values.
Few education departments had formalised procedures, and education
officers appeared unconcerned about this. Many seemed to think that
problems or complaints were best sorted out at school level, on an
informal basis, and the Sheffield Study found nothing to contradict
Hannon's (1983b) finding of "a definite professional hostility in
education towards legal norms and forms" (p212). Thus she found that
the educational press regularly lament new instances of the incursions
of the law, especially litigation (p212). During the course of the
Sheffield Study, education officers appeared to feel that appeals
panels, for example, for education matters in general would not be
useful, believing that departments operated on the whole fairly and
efficiently, without the necessity for them. 	 One officer remarked
that "legislation in this area would take away flexility - including
the flexibility to prevent some matters going to appeal". Hannon
(1983a) has also observed that many professionals within education
departments believed that to think in terms of legal rights encouraged
a disputatiousness not in the best interests of the child (p275). I
would agree with her conclusion that "to emphasise legal rights
encourages a more assertive defence of, and demands for improvement
in, the delivery of services" (p275).
Mua is evident from the comparison between the service areas, is the
importance of professional ideology which can be at variance with the
corporate view of the authority. This tendency was observed by Leach
and Stewart (1986) who noted that "the present reality of local
authorities is less the variety of local choice, than the uniformity
of shared assumptions", including "reliance on professional expertise
and a departmental way of working" (p3.4).
	 Stewart and Greenwood
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(1985) also noted the tendency for local authority departments to be
professionalised:
"The main source of recruitment is professional, in that within
each department there is a dominant profession from which the
chief officer and most of the senior staff are likely to be
recruited 	  professional careers involve mobility between
authorities with the professional providing the common link and
the loyalty. The professional basis encourages shared standards
of behaviour, common (standardised) skills and expertise, and the
development of common problems of working in local authorities".
What all this means is that staffing, training, and development is
outside the control of individual authorities, and that rather than
there being local choice, there are uniformities of accepted practice.
Hannon (1983b) observed this in particular in education departments
where, at one time, "it was considered commonplace that for the
education system to work well (or at all) it must be based on trust,
shared values, and the competent management of benign professionals
utilising informed discretion" (p211).
In this context, the idea of rights and appeals is even more
important, to challenge these assumed values. Hannon (1983a) noted
that education officials found the concept of rights, and fair
hearings, "anathema" or "inappropriate" (p283), an observation
endorsed by the Sheffield Study. Other service areas were not so
hostile and the fact that social services departments favour more
formalised procedures may be a reflection of the concern, expressed by
social services officers, for adequate information channels for
consumers.
	 Issues relating to social services and planning will be
taken up in later chapters.
As was mentioned before, the majority of chief executives saw the
desirability of formal procedures, and saw the need for improvement.
The most popular form of improvement supported by chief executives
was, not surprisingly, the introduction of a formal published
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complaints procedure, with 61% (86) advocating this. In addition 43%
(60) would like to see a committee or sub-committee as the final link
in a grievance chain. However, there was a marked reluctance to have
such improvements implemented by a change in the law, with only 3% (4)
agreeing that legislation had a role to play here.
The service departments too revealed an overwhelming dislike of
implementing reforms by legislation. Only 407. (15) of social
services, 10% (7) of planning, 12% (4) of education and 23% (27) of
housing departments thought it was desirable to have legislation
requiring a general authority wide procedure.	 Even less (167. (6)
social services; 2% (3) planning; 9% (3) education and 12% (14)
housing] wanted to see legislation to establish independent tribunals.
This resistance to the imposition of complaints procedures by
legislation came out strongly during Sheffield Study fieldwork, where
it was viewed with resentment and as just another example of central
government interference. 	 It was thought that a system imposed by
legislation would be too inflexible, and would not allow for the
widely different needs of the various local authorities. Very few
departments viewed formal complaints procedures positively, as an aid
to management efficiency, a point which has been discussed earlier in
this chapter.
Even consumers of local authority services recognise the advantages of
formal complaints procedures. During the course of the Sheffield
Study, a survey of consumers was conducted in a London borough. The
desirability of formal complaints procedures was expressed by the
overwhelming majority of respondents
	 (89%)	 to this survey,
irrespective of their class or method of housing tenure. The main
reason (66%) given for this was that it would enable complainants to
know how to complain, and this reflects an acknowledgement that part
of the frustration encountered in dealing with council departments
stems from ignorance of departmental procedure. About a quarter of
the respondents felt that knowledge of the correct procedure would
ease the way for them, speeding up the whole process, and maybe even
producing a more satisfactory outcome.
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As many of these consumers had expressed dissatisfaction because of
delays, a quicker response and a better response may be one and the
same thing. Some consumers even acknowledged that council officers
would find it easier to handle complaints if the public had a better
idea how to make them. Others recognised the accountability role of
such a procedure, mentioning that it would give them a democratic
avenue of access, a way of being heard, and an element of protection
against being "fobbed off". Procedures were thus perceived as a mark
of open government, and as facilitating communication, rather than
adding another undesirable layer of red tape, which was an argument
often advanced by officers against the use of complaints procedures.
Of the authorities with formal complaints procedures, only 18
publicised the procedure, mainly in the form of posters in council
offices, or some information in the rates booklet. The rest admitted
that the procedures were for internal consumption only. This confirms
the view that such procedures serve managerial functions, rather than
being seen as participatory and democratic (see Birkinshaw 1985, p61).
It is also a reflection of how the public are not kept informed of
local authority matters in general. For example, a research study
conducted for the Audit Commission by MORI in 1986 (Audit Commission
1986) found that only one third of the public in England and Wales
said they were kept very or fairly well informed about the services
and benefits their local council provided. 	 60% of respondents said
that they were given only a limited amount of information or not told
much at all (p24). Not surprisingly, the Audit Commission concludes
that there is much scope for improvement by local authorities. While
recognising that most members of the public would not want to interest
themselves in the intricacies of local government finance,
nevertheless the Commission believes that local accountability cannot
be fully effective "without voters having at least a basic
appreciation of the way local services are managed and funded" (Audit
Commission 1984, p50).
To return to the findings of the Sheffield Study, in relation to
publicity for complaints procedures, one London borough which
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considered itself very consumer oriented, produced an A-Z Guide to its
services for the general public. In this well-produced booklet
"complaints" had been added, by hand, as an after-thought, between
"Community Centres" and "Consumer Protection", but it merely said:
"COMPLAINTS: see Neighbourhood Office". However, under "Neighbourhood
Office" there was no specific reference to complaints or the methods
of dealing with them, only that "staff are on hand to help with"
certain matters, such as council house transfer, lettings and repairs,
street cleaning, home helps etc.
Publicity for departmental procedures was Just as poor: 35% (13) of
social services departments, 9% (6) of planning departments, 30% (10)
of education departments and 34% (39) of housing departments claimed
to publicised their procedures. Again, such publicity was in many
cases for internal use only. Even social services, with a relatively
good record on complaints procedures, were mainly concerned to have
internal procedure documents which were seen as a method of allocating
staff responsibility rather than enabling complainants to make their
voice heard. They appeared to be used as protection for social
workers, who seemed all too aware of the necessity of making their
decisions accountable in an increasingly critical environment.
Publicity can also be seen as another aspect of communications, which,
as INLOGOV (1985) points out is not only good for public relations
"but should reduce unnecessary opposition and resentment" (p88).
To conclude this section, it must be said that in general the
Sheffield Study found unpatterned, informal methods of complaints
handling, which owed more to the persistence of some complainants than
to a commitment to open government and natural Justice. However,
since the conclusion of the Sheffield Study, there is evidence that
local government is becoming more responsive in this area, and the
Local Ombudsman is prepared to say that the absence of a complaints
procedure is, of itself, evidence of maladministration (see Chapter
5).
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Mua this section has indicated is the variety of views and practices
within departments, and this lends support to the argument for an
authority-wide system, so that all users of local authority services
have the right to have their grievances heard. Such a system would
also mean that particular professional views and ideologies would not
be so able to subvert any initiatives which an authority, as a
corporate entity, developed in this area. Particular aspects of two
service areas, social services and planning, will be examined in later
chapters, but I want to return now to authority-wide procedures, and
outline some good practices which were noted during the course of the
Sheffield Study in these centralised systems.
Good Practices 
A number of authorities had systems and procedures which were worthy
of note, and which could be used as a model for other authorities.
One example is the authority which introduced a complaints system in
1968, as a result of a Conservative party manifesto commitment to run
the borough along "industrial lines", like a corporation with a "Board
of Managers", cost effective methods and an emphasis on consumer
interests and market forces. Consequently a complaints procedure was
established, which was retained by subsequent Labour administrations,
as, by then, the Local Ombudsman system was about to begin.
The feature of this procedure is that there is a named individual,
sometimes called an "executive ombudsman" who is in charge of
complaints. The authority now plays down the title "executive
ombudsman" as it causes confusion with the Local Ombudsman and his
actual title is Complaints Executive Officer. 	 He is empowered to
receive and investigate complaints about any matters over which the
council has jurisdiction. If a matter is beyond his jurisdiction he
will pass on the name of the relevant body to whom the complaint
should be made. His remit is to find, through administrative means,
and in consultation with chief officers, a solution to the
individual's grievance, so that where possible the complaint should be
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resolved either by explaining why a decision has been made or by
getting that decision altered.
Sometimes complaints reveal faults in the system, which he will
discuss with the chief officer concerned with a view to making
improvements. He can be particularly useful where more than one
department is involved, and his inside knowledge enables him to go
directly to the person responsible for a particular decision, not
simply the departmental head. As he has established working
relationships with officers in the various departments, he is able to
achieve solutions to grievances through negotiation on a more informal
level, and in some circumstances he can overcome the intransigence of
bureaucratic decision making.
As far as publicity is concerned, this borough funds its own advice
centres, which are obviously aware of the complaints officer's role,
as are ward councillors, but there is no direct publicity. Sometimes
members refer a complaint to him. One of the advantages of this
system is the fact that there is a named person who will oversee
complaints, but the lack of publicity is a drawback.
Another interesting procedure was found in a district in the south
east of England. This district operates a system of pre-printed
postcards, which was introduced in 1976 as a result of the
Conservative party's manifesto commitment in local elections. The
system operates by means of yellow pre-paid postcards, which are
available for members of the public to give brief details of
complaints or suggestions.	 These postcards are available at council
offices, libraries, post offices, doctors surgeries and citizens
advice bureaux.	 Councillors, parish councils, ratepayers and
residents associations have supplies.
When the postcard is received in the Administrative Service Department
it is passed to the relevant department and an acknowledgement card is
sent to the complainant saying which officer is dealing with it, and
quoting a reference number.	 Hoax, frivolous or anonymous cards are
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destroyed, but these are only a tiny minority of the cards received.
If the complaint refers to a matter which is outside the authority's
Jurisdiction (e.g. police, water authority or county matter) the
complainant is referred to the relevant authority.
The smallest number of cards received in any one day was three, and
the largest was 358, although this was as a result of an experiment,
when the council delivered two cards to every household with the
three-monthly supply of plastic refuse sacks. This experiment was the
members' idea, and was obviously resented by the officers, who spoke
disparagingly of a "brainwave" by the members. As a result of this
experiment, 110,000 cards were delivered, which resulted in 2,600
cards being returned, of which 700 were complaints about the quality
of the refuse sacks. Apart from this experiment, most of the
complaints are about refuse collection, holes in the road, street
lights or stray dogs, and many of the matters complained of have
already been noted by inspectors and are being dealt with.
The Administrative Services Department registers all complaints and
files them according to wards for ward councillors to inspect. They
have a Complaints Sub-Committee of eight members which meets seven
times a year, in line with the regular committee cycle. The
committee's task is to monitor complaints, and they look at the
progress, type and number of complaints in relation to wards. Each
ward councillor in the 20 wards receives a copy of the list of
complaints for his/her ward.
In terms of the resource implications of such a scheme, although it is
time consuming, no extra staff or resources are allocated to the
scheme, not even when the refuse sack experiment was conducted. The
post-card scheme work is supposed to take priority over other work,
and there is a time limit for responses. Staff are thus expected to
fit the work into their normal work load.
The authority rarely has any feedback about the complainants'
satisfaction with the council's response, and it may be that
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complainants are still dissatisfied. However, as ward councillors are
provided with complaints lists, they may do their own follow up. It
is certainly the case that members see the scheme as a useful public
relations exercise, and therefore they may be keen to ensure consumer
satisfaction. It would be a relatively easy exercise for the
authority to do a statistical analysis of the complaints received
under this scheme, and they do some monitoring where there are a
number of similar complaints. They also note the wards which produce
the most complaints.
An initial impression was that the postcard scheme was an excellent
one which is worth considering by other local authorities. It is
interesting that even when complaints were actively sought (the refuse
sack experiment) only 2,500 cards were returned from a total of
110,000 and of these, about 1000 related to the refuse sacks
themselves, or were anonymous, abusive or hoax cards. The most
impressive aspect of this system is that it invites the public to
voice their complaints.
However, a reservation about this system is whether it is really
useful for the more serious type of complaint. Mostly, it is used for
matters of a fairly trivial nature, for example, street lamps and
potholes. In the housing, planning and environmental health
departments, the postcard system represented only a tiny minority of
their complaints. In these departments, they already had established
routes for complaints before this system was introduced, and these
routes are still the method used.
The system is certainly viewed in terms of public relations, and the
officers kept stressing the importance of personal contact. However,
in a physical sense, this authority was one of the most unfriendly and
"fortress" like visited, with a system of security passes which was
unique in the fieldwork experience. While not denying that any attempt
to allow consumers to voice their complaints must be welcomed, it must
still be borne in mind that this does not, of itself, make the
authority more open and accessible and ready to listen.
	
As an
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example, at the time the Sheffield Study fieldwork was being
conducted, two tower blocks of flats in good structural orderwere to be
blown up because the Conservative councillors wanted their town "to
look pretty". The aim was to declare the borough a "tower-free zone",
and only seven more blocks needed to be destroyed to complete the
process. Besides making the town look pretty, the effect of this
policy was to double the council house waiting list to five years, but
this did not appear to worry the chairperson of the housing committee,
who planned to tighten eligibility criteria. He did not believe
people should live in council houses, but that "they should buy their
own". One wonders how many postcard complaints were received in
response to this!
Despite the drawbacks, the merits of the postcard system was that it
was easy for a complaint to get into the system. One authority
visited had a good procedure, once a complaint got into the system,
but there were some doubts about the ease of getting into the
complaints procedure and a suspicion that many of them never get
beyond the department.	 This authority has specially printed
complaints forms which are available at enquiry desks and area
offices.	 These forms are only to be used, however, for serious
complaints:
"The purpose of the form is to record complaints of a serious
nature where it is clear that the complainant is aggrieved. It
should not be used for recording complaints for which there is
already a routine system available (e.g. housing maintenance);
or, if it seems likely that the complaint can be dealt with at
once and to the complainant's satisfaction by summoning the
officer concerned directly. However, if in doubt you should
invite the complainant to complete a complaints form" (Guidance
for Staff Receiving Complaints).
The complaint form is acknowledged within seven days, and the
complainant is informed of the name of the officer responsible for
dealing with the complaint. 	 The procedure was administered by the
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Administration Department, but in effect they acted as no more than a
postbox. The Sheffield Study research team felt that they should
adopt a more active role, and follow up the complaint to ensure that
the department responds, and that a satisfactory outcome for the
complainant is achieved. In this respect the Chicago system,
mentioned previously, had features which were an improvement on this
one. For example, there was a computerised system of checking whether
there had been a response, and if none had been received within 10
days, the matter was pursued. When faulty procedures have been
identified, this should be followed up also. So, although there was a
commitment to complaint handling, and a procedure designed to ensure
that results were achieved, it would have been better if the
Administration Department had been involved more actively in
overseeing the system.
One procedure which is worthy of note, in terms of quality of
investigation once the complaint has got into the system, was found in
the north east of England. The drawback to this procedure is that its
existence is not widely publicised, and is largely councillor
stimulated. This lack of publicity was, it appears, because the
officers were afraid of being "swamped" with complaints, an argument
often advanced by officers during the Sheffield Study fieldwork for
the absence of complaints procedures.
Once the complaint is within the system the office of the head of
administration takes it over, and this department has one full time
and one part time complaints officer. Complaints are often settled at
this stage due to the intervention of these officers. If, however,
the complainant is not satisfied the complaint is lodged before the
complaint sub-committee, where the chief legal adviser submits a
report containing the views of the complainant and the chief officer
of the relevant department. The complainant, the relevant chief
officer, and the referring councillor (if there is one) are invited to
attend this meeting, and it is encouraging to note that at only one
time since the system was set up has a complainant failed to attend.
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The sub-committee will adopt one of two courses of action. Either it
will make a decision after considering the evidence, and recommend a
particular course of action, or it will ask for an in-depth
examination of the complaint. This latter course of action is rare,
but it is a valuable feature of the procedure.
Local Ombudsman complaints go through this system, and of course,
there is nothing to prevent a complainant going to the Local Ombudsman
after this stage of the procedure. However, it can also be used for
serious or resistant complaints, and it is worth noting that the
authority has an impressive Local Ombudsman record. In such a
thorough procedure there will inevitably be some delay, and this
feature has been criticised by the Local Ombudsman. However, it is
difficult to see a solution to this problem, if serious complaints are
to be dealth with thoroughly. I would agree with Whitmore (1970) in
this respect:
"I personally can never accept the idea that fair procedures and
high quality judicial review inevitably result in inefficiency.
Perhaps there is some delay; but this seems to me to be a cheap
price to pay for fairness in administration" (1)481).
Of course, many complaints are dealt with expeditiously at
departmental level, as an analysis of complaints received and their
outcome over the past four years revealed. A commendable feature of
the system is the genuinely independent and neutral role adopted by
the administration department and sub-committee, and the complainants
claims have been vindicated on numerous occasions. This feature adds
support to the view that, even with departmental procedures, there is
value in having an authority-wide procedure.
An interesting feature of the procedure was that it was introduced
after consultations with the trade unions, and it was agreed that no
criticism of any individual officer would be made, nor any entry put
on an officer's file, as a result of the investigation. If improper
conduct is suspected, the investigation ceases while the disciplinary
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procedure is invoked. Without these guarantees it would be difficult
to conduct an effective investigation. To say that the Sheffield
Study research team were impressed by this procedure would be an under
statement.	 Certainly, the quality of the investigation matched that
of the Local Ombudsman.
	 This procedure did seem to present the
optimum level of dispute resolution. Of course, only a minority of
cases were dealt with at this level, but the very existence of such a
procedure, and the possibility of a review at this level, can lead to
the exercise of greater care in decision making.
The various good practices described give some indication of the kind
of features which makes for good complaints procedures. Firstly, an
independent element is useful, that is, the opportunity to have
recourse to someone not involved in taking the original decision (see
Birds and Graham 1988, p316).	 In this respect, a centralised system
of handling complaints with the chief executive's department
overseeing an authority-wide system is ideal. While recognising that
chief officers are responsible for running their own departments, it
Is useful to have the chief executive as a neutral party, if
departmental procedures fail to achieve satisfaction. Of course, the
majority of complaints could be settled at departmental level, given
adequate procedures.
Member involvement at a final stage for resistant complaints, in the
form of, for example, a complaints sub-committee, also has advantages.
Despite the fact that most complaints can be handled at officer level,
in the final analysis, members are responsible for the running of the
authority, and they have a duty to control quality. In addition,
their involvement may also mean that a complaint can be examined in
the larger context of policy review.
I would, of course, agree with Birds and Graham (1988), that the
procedures themselves must be fair and effective (p316). This
involves the complainant being given a fair hearing, and the
opportunity to appear in person is an important aspect of this. It is
also useful if the authority attempts to redress the inequality in
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power between the complainant and the authority. Consumer advocates
may be useful in some cases, for example, in social services, but in
many cases the neutrality of the chief executive's departments may be
sufficient.
The central role of the chief executive's office has been emphasised,
but within this, it is worth emphasising the importance of the
existence of a person who is responsible for complaints, which could
be a special "complaints officer" or a specified officer who delegates
responsibility. In Scotland, Watchman (1985) found that none of the
authorities had a formal position of a complaints officer. In England,
the Sheffield Study found that it was possible to identify such a role
in some authorities, although only a small minority had a full-time
complaints officer. Authorities did have officers whose Job
description would encompass this role, but the complaints with which
they were involved were usually those which may result in Local
Ombudsman complaints.	 The Sheffield Study concluded that it was
preferable to have a specialist officer who could co-ordinate and
supervise complaints, and ensure that a solution is found.	 Such a
person could be named in council documents, and in publicity outlets.
An obvious, but frequently overlooked point, is that the more
accessible the procedure, the more use it will be for consumers. The
lack of publicity for complaints procedures has already been
discussed, but the fact that most procedures involve complainants
putting their complaints in writing may act as a deterrent for those
who find it difficult to construct a clear and concise argument. This
point has already been discussed in relation to ombudsman complaints,
and there does seem to be an advantage in allowing oral complaints,
with perhaps specially trained members of staff who could help commit
the complaint into writing.
Sympathetic staff, are of course, very important in the whole process
of complaint handling, and the attitude of staff must not be
overlooked despite the emphasis on procedures. In this respect those
authorities which have a commitment to providing initial and ongoing
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training opportunities for officers at all levels must be
congratulated, as should those which recognise the importance of
involving trade unions. It is probably true to say that the culture of
particular departments may have to change before there is a serious
commitment to complaints handling. Leak's work (1986) has already
been mentioned in previous chapters in this respect and more will be
said about this in the ensuing chapters, but it is worth noting here
that a commitment to giving reasons for decisions is useful in
relation to this. Other developments which may improve matters are
the moves towards decentralisation which may make the authority more
accessible with neighbourhood and community officers helping to
diffuse complaints. The procedures found in some planning departments
for example, where negotiations take place with developers in advance
of planning decisions may also prevent disputes arising, a matter
which will be examined in Chapter 9.
Consumers and Complaints Procedures 
This chapter began by looking at the relationship of the consumer to
public services, and indicated why complaints procedures are a
necessary part of this relationship. However, even with a complaints
procedure which incorporated the good practices discussed, and aside
from any problems of implementation, in order to complain, a person
must perceive a problem. Thus, there must be initially a perceived
entitlement to a service, which may have been refused, or, if granted,
there must be a standard by which to measure the inadequacy of the
service. Rawlings (1986) has pointed out that grievance machinery "is
only one administrative method for ensuring that citizens are
protected from poor levels of services", and that a complaints
procedure "is interdependent with techniques such as codemaking,
monitoring or audit" (p2).
As the Social Security Advisory Committee (1988) points out, the
"measurement of performance in public sector services presents
considerable difficulties" and that while "bare statistics on
performance are one thing; the quality of service is another" (1,39.
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Original emphasis). Thus a low level of Local Ombudsman or
departmental complaints cannot of itself be considered an indication
of consumer satisfaction, as it could be due to ignorance, weakness or
hopelessness. In order to try to unravel some of these issues it may
be appropriate to mention something about consumer complaining
behaviour.
Firstly, it should be noted that "empirical work on the sociology of
complaining in Britain is underdeveloped" (Rawlings 1986, p10).
Friedman (1974) too spoke of "our almost complete lack of knowledge
about complaining" (p55). Friedman's study, carried out in 1969,
found that the "courts of the land apparently are not the place where
the citizen 	  looks for administrative justice" (pp9-10), but
rather citizens appeal up the administrative hierarchy, or turn to
elected representatives. His survey found that 75% of complainants
had complained internally, and that it was the better educated and
higher socio-economic classes which tended to complain more often and
more successfully. He also noted the "squeaky wheel" syndrome, where
the persistent complainers were the ones who obtained redress.
Despite the fact that there must be a complex relationship between the
sense of dissatisfaction with a public service and the triggering of a
grievance mechanism, little work has been done in this country since
Friedman (see Moss 1980). In the U.S., research confirms Friedman's
finding that complaining, along with participation in general, shows
an "over-representation of upper-status groups in the participant
population" (Verba and Nie 1973, p336).
It has been argued that this over-representation of the middle classes
in complaining activity is "irrelevant as far as democratic values are
concerned 	  as long as the opportunity for redress is equal for
all persons and no barriers are erected against or inducements
extended towards particular complainants" (Rosenblaum 1974, p46). The
Study on Federal Regulation (1977) makes the point that, as long as
policymakers and the public realise that complaints are not
necessarily a representative sample of problems and issues, agency
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summaries of complaints can be an important tool in the regulatory
process (p134).
Another study of consumer behaviour was conducted by Best and
Andreasen (1976), again in the U. S. This was not a survey of
behaviour in relation to public services, but was a study of reactions
of urban households to purchases made in 34 common consumption
categories. The study found that households complain in only about
one third of instances in which they perceive purchasing shortcomings,
and that people of low socio-economic status are less likely than
those of higher status to perceive problems with their purchases, and
to complain about problems they do notice (p33). The explanation for
this is that these people "see themselves as abused by the system and
as powerless: they may well expect goods and services to be of poor
quality" (p33). Many also feel that "it is wrong or illegitimate to
be a victim of unsatisfactory purchase transactions" (p37).
The study also found that complaining "is an activity that many
consumers engage in reluctantly" (p102), and that complaining
behaviour "follows a rational pattern" which is related to the
transaction cost (p34). Thus, the cost of the purchases is the
significant determinant of the likelihood that a complaint will be
made about problems that are noticed. Consumers are also more likely
to complain about clear cut issues, rather than those which involve
possible conflicts in Judgement or interpretation (p62), for example,
as to whether there is poor design or poor workmanship. They are also
more likely to complain where the "responsibility is relatively easy
to pinpoint" (p56) and where they have some kind of bargaining
strength, for example, the goods have been bought on credit, so that
they can withold payment.
The conclusion from the study is that complaining, being "a costly and
rational endeavour", is not entered into lightly, and that it "takes
significant additional trouble to increase the rate which perceived
dissatisfaction is transformed into vocal complaining" (p68). Despite
the limitations of this study (that is, that it was conducted in the
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U.S. and dealt with private business organisations) there are lessons
which are useful for local government. Firstly, it explodes the myth
about being "swamped" with complaints; it reveals the rational nature
of complaining; and it may indicate that certain groups of people need
to be encouraged to complain, if they are not to feel that complaining
is somehow illegitimate.
Although the Parliamentary Commissioner is not the best model for
encouraging people to complain, a recent annual report (Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration 1988), found that in 49% of cases, the
complaint against the department was wholly Justified; in 40% of
cases, while the main complaint was not upheld, it was necessary to
criticise at least some aspects of the departments' handling of the
matter; and only in 11% of cases was there no justification for the
complaint (p26). Again, the Health Service Commissioner (1989) found
that 61.4% of cases of complaint were Justified (pare 3).
These figures do not indicate that people pursue trivial and
unjustified cases.	 Indeed, complaining is a stressful business, and
not pursued lightly. Evidence from the Sheffield Study consumer
survey revealed the feeling of despondency and rejection felt by many
consumers who took the trouble to complain.
"It is not worth making a complaint. People making a complaint
Just get sent round in circles"
"We are fed up with making complaints. Nothing ever gets done if
you make a complaint"
"I could not be bothered to keep ringing and complaining"
"The complaint was not followed up at all".
These are Just some examples of the feeling of dissatisfaction in the
way the authority in which the survey was conducted responded to
complaints. These comments were surprising, given this particular
authority's self-perception as an open and accessible one. There is
evidence therefore that there is a submerged body of complaints and
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dissatisfactions, and proper procedures may help to ensure that these
problems are not overlooked.
Certainly, one of the findings from the Sheffield Study fieldwork, was
that authorities had not really addressed themselves to the problem of
what it was like to be a complainant. Of course, the majority of
consumers are never likely to complain, and in the Sheffield Study
consumer survey it was found that less than 30% of the sample said
that they had ever had cause to complain against the council, and only
20% had in fact done so. It must, however, be borne in mind that the
authority in which the consumer survey was conducted had a reputation
for open government, had good procedures, and had good methods of
publicity. Widdicombe (1986 Research Volume III, Table 3.9) found
that 26% of the electorate had made a complaint to the council at some
stage, and that the majority were dissatisfied with the outcome.
The volume of complaints within an authority could also be due, quite
simply, to a lack of information. For example, a traveller on British
Rail has a scheduled arrival time and can therefore judge whether
there has been a shortfall, but a consumer of local authoritiy
services often has no such yardstick. How long is it reasonable for a
student to wait before being informed about a discretionary award?
What standards of care should an elderly person expect in a
residential home? Barclay (1982) has pointed out that the absence of
a common code of practice for social workers makes it difficult for a
complainant "to prove that the 
	  action was unreasonable as he
would not be able to point to any generally accepted standard of
reasonable practice" (p190).
In this respect the use of performance indicators, which have gained
enormous momentum in many public services, could play an important
role in enabling consumers to evaluate the standard of service
delivery. However, it must be pointed out that the main motive for
performance indicators was not consumerism, but they were "top-down"
affairs by which politicians and senior officers could control
expenditure, and the activities of lower level officials, the "street-
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level" service deliverers <see Pollit 1986). The only place for
consumers, therefore, was as the "eventual beneficiaries of the
enhanced efficiency" which performance indicators were supposed to
identify and encourage (Pollit 1988, p3). In fact, one of the most
sophisticated local government performance planning and management
systems has "no way that the dissenting opinions of citizens can enter
the system" (Hobbs 1985, p12).
Point (1988, p4) notes that "consumerism" initiatives have tended to
gravitate towards the cosmetic and "charm school" approaches rather
than towards the idea of improved provision of information, direct
consumer participation and power-sharing. This tendency has been
noted in the NHS context, where consumerism is about '<eustvmer
relations, not patients rights", a model which requires "little
serious change but much public visibility" (Winkler 1987). There is
similar concern in the context of local government (see Stewart and
Clarke 1987, pp169-170; Rhodes 1987), although the privatised
utilities seem to be addressing this problem. For example, the Gas
Consumers Council (1989) recommend that companies publish details of
the minimum standards of service customers can expect, not only to
offer a basis of choice, but "as criteria against which customers can
formulate complaints and seek redress should things go wrong" (p4).
Certainly, the Audit Commission (1986c) has recognised that existing
performance indicators "tend to focus on what is easily quantifiable",
and that "measuring the effectiveness, or quality, of services is much
harder" (p5). The Commission also warns that performance indicators
should not be presented as an end in themselves, but rather "they
should always be used as signals for action, or further enquiry or
both" (p7). They could also be used to empower citizens, if, for
example, a performance indicator of "improving consumer information"
offered consumer data which they could use to make real choices
(Pcalit 1988, p5). Pollit calls for performance measurement
indicators which are "essentially participative and which are
negotiated between service providers, service consumers, and the wider
community", so that the recipients of public services are not just
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"pleased" but "empowered" (Pollit 1988, p22). This is just another
aspect of "effectiveness" which was discussed earlier in the chapter.
The indicators used must measure something which is seen as desirable
by the recipients of the service or citizens in general, otherwise
there is no legitimacy for the policies which are being pursued.
Conclusion 
The Sheffield Study found low levels of formal complaints procedures
In local authorities, and, although in many cases their desirability
and usefulness was acknowledged, there was some resistance to the idea
that legislation should be used to implement them. Even when there
we procedures they were usually perceived as an internal staff
management function, but even on this model, there were deficiencies
in their operation.
Only a small proportion give their procedures adequate publicity, and
a number of authorities had excellent sounding procedures which had,
In fact, never been used. Few authorities used complaints as a
systematic form of quality control, with few departments having
monitoring systems to check efficiency or identify administrative
shortcomings. Although a number of chief officers thought that
complaints procedures had advantages from the point of view of
management efficiency, it is difficult to see how this could operate
without some systematic analysis. The general view, then, was a system
of largely informal complaint handling, which often achieved results
because of sympathetic staff attitudes.
For reasons discussed in the introductory chapters and this one, local
authorities need to have complaints procedures. The emphasis in this
chapter has been in terms of management efficiency and consumer
satisfaction. Indeed, as the Audit Commission (1988) has noted,
councils "must respond to the changing demands of the electorate"
(o), as their customers are more demanding and less grateful; better
informed and more able to articulate their demands; and will "no
longer accept that the council knows best" (p3).
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Alongside a more critical public, councils are also being called upon
to be more efficient and issues relating to this have been discussed.
Complaints procedures are useful in this context, as a device for
management information, but, it should be borne in mind that the
information is needed to see if the system is effective, which
presupposes a set of goals which are to be fulfilled. Thus, it is not
sufficient to equate good administration with cost effectiveness in
purely financial terms, and some consumer input is needed also, to
ensure that the goals themselves are adequate. An advantage of
complaints procedures is that they give an opportunity to consider the
subjective experience of consumers, which is essential in the public
sector because "services, unlike manufactured goods, cannot be sampled
and tested for quality" (LGTB 1988, p5). Complaints procedures are a
method of quality control to ensure that services are up to standard.
Although the view from the various service areas surveyed in the
Sheffield Study, and particularly from chief executives, was that
complaints procedures were desirable, few wanted to see their
introduction implemented by legislation.	 Despite evidence from the
Sheffield Study that complaints procedures would improve performance,
and despite attempts by the Local Ombudsman to make the absence of
procedures for dealing with complaints evidence of maladministration,
the Department of the Environment declined to introduce a statutory
requirement for local authorities to have authority-wide complaints
procedures, although there are specific areas (for example, in the
Children Act 1989; in curriculoum matters in education) where
complaints procedures are required.
The importance of a central procedure, covering the whole authority
must be emphasised, particularly since the Sheffield Study revealed
that few departments had complaints procedures, and that there was a
wide variation in the type of procedures available. Added to this was
the finding that different service areas have very different views on
the matter of complaints. This is a reflection of the growth and
influence of professional groups, the dangers of which were recognised
in the 1970s by Sharpe (1971), who maintained that the growth in the
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power of professional groups was a function of the growth in the
technical complexity of public services and the consequent
specialisation of function (p252). This was seen, by Sharpe (1971),
to present a potential threat to effective democratic government, as
the "service gradually comes to serve objectives set by the
professional group or groups running the service, rather than those of
its recipients or society at large" (p252).
The issue of professional autonomy has been discussed in the chapter,
but it is worth repeating Hannon's (1983a) observation that even an
apparent lack of conflict within a service area "should not
necessarily be attributed to any very high degree of satisfaction with
provision" (p278). She sees it as a reflection of the control
professions have on policy-making and in individual decisions, which
"make the task of challenging or controlling the action of professions
more difficult" (p278). It is for this reason, among others, that an
authority-wide procedure is necessary, because as the Sheffield Study
has indicated, such a procedure can involve a more neutral stance.
Coupled with this is the recognition that the local authority has to
be seen as a corporate whole, and as such, should ultimately have a
corporate response to a problem.
However complaints procedures in themselves are not enough. They must
be implemented, and this involves staff training, and in many cases, a
change in the culture of the department. Complaints procedures are
Just part of the process of an all-embracing service for consumers.
They are the end of the line in protecting consumer rights. In
addition to complaints procedures there should be other mechanisms
which may give consumers a voice, and which may reduce the necessity
for complaining, for example, by the use of consultation processes,
and by in-built appeal mechanisms. In this respect, Crawford's (1988)
warnings of the dangers of examining complaints procedures in
isolation from policy process and consultation devices is noted (p1).
The following chapters examine in more detail two service areas,
social services and planning, where some of these issues will be
explored, and they should be seen in the context of the changes which
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have occured within local government in recent times. In this
respect, it may be worth quoting the Audit Commission and Local
Government Training Board, as they observe that
"the essentially bureaucratic approach which has served local
government well in the past is, in many ways, inadequate for
coping with the upheavals of the 1980s and beyond. It has to be
replaced by a new approach, which will need to be more responsive
and flexible, placing greater emphasis on the value of people,
both as clients and employees" (INLOGOV 1985, p9).
The Local Ombudsman has praised those councils which are responding to
these changes, noting that it is some of the most "value for money"-
conscious councils which have introduced excellent complaints
procedures, and that while customer care may be 'buzz words' this
approach "can only be good for the consumer and a factor likely to
reduce complaints" (CLA Annual Report 1989/90, p30).
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GLUIER 8 SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENTS AND COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES
Introduction 
Some of the concerns relating to the relationship of consumers and the
public services, as expressed in Chapter 7, are particularly relevant
in social services departments. It is not just the case that in many
situations the department is the monopoly supplier, but also that
sometimes a client is compelled to receive a particular service.
Added to this is the fact that much social services work clearly
involves issues of "rights", not just allocation of resources, and the
clients themselves may be particularly weak and vulnerable. These
issues will be taken up in the chapter, but it should be emphasised
that in such situations, it seems absolutely crucial that aggrieved
consumers have an opportunity to express their grievances, quite aside
from any use such procedures may have for monitoring performance.
The last chapter examined the extent of, and justifications for, a
central authority-wide complaints procedure, and concluded that such
procedures were essential. However, this does not obviate the need
for departmental procedures, and although the last chapter did give
some indication of the extent of departmental complaints procedures,
this was not explored in any detail. What was evident, and has been
mentioned, is that few service areas had such procedures, and that
officers in the various service areas displayed distinctive
departmental attitudes, irrespective of the type of authority in which
they were situated.
These issues seemed worthy of further examination, but a detailed
study of all the major service areas was considered too ambitious in a
study of this kind, and therefore just two areas were chosen, social
services and planning, in order to develop these issues. Social
services were chosen because, although serving a minority of the
population, the services they offer can have a vital impact on those
they serve, who are often the most vulnerable members of society, for
example children, the elderly and the physically and mentally
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handicapped.	 Some examination of grievance redress in this area is
therefore appropriate.
Planning departments, too, have a significant impact on the lives of
consumers, although service delivery is usually of a less direct and
less specific nature than in social services. Planning was also
chosen because it is a service area which has consistently accounted
for a large number of complaints at Local Ombudsman level (on average,
over the years, about 30% of complaints to the Local Ombudsman concern
planning matters).
	 The personal social services, by comparison, has
always accounted for much smaller numbers (less than 5%).
Both areas are heavily legislated and regulated, with widespread use
of codes of guidance and central government regulation. For both
areas there are elaborate appeal mechanisms built into the statutory
controls, with the courts, tribunals and government departments
playing a role. Planning departments are subject to fairly extensive
formal mechanisms of appeal, yet the number of complaints to the
ombudsman remains high. Social services departments are also subject
to numerous protective mechanisms for the consumers of social
services, but, by contrast, the number of complaints remains low.
Does the difference in complaining behaviour reflect a different
clientele; a different approach by the officers in the two areas; more
satisfaction with the services offered; more member involvement in the
complaining process? Given the significant impact on the lives of
consumers played by both services, some explanation for their
different complaint record will be sought. It will be interesting to
see what role complaints procedures play and whether there are other
mechanisms which reduce the necessity for complaining.
By concentrating on Just two areas it enabled another theme to be
explored, that is, the view that, although complaints procedures are
vital, they are not enough in themselves, but they must be
supplemented by good practice and procedures in all areas of work. By
restricting the study to two areas, these could be explored in some
Wail, so that as well as looking at the extent of complaints
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procedures, other mechanisms which reduce the necessity for
complaining can be examined.
This chapter will look at social services departments, and it must be
said at this stage that these departments proved to be a difficult
area for research, partly because of the wide and varied services and
client groups which they serve. The full range of functions covered
by these departments can be found in Schedule I of the Local Authority
Social Services Act 1970. The following gives a brief outline of these
functions, which, now include the establishment and administration of
residential homes for the elderly, adult training centres, community
homes for children, day care centres and homes for the physically and
mentally handicapped.
They also provide support services, such as home helps, which can be
provided where a sick or expectant mother or disabled person cannot be
adquately looked after, or where help is needed with housework,
although they are now mainly involved with the elderly. Meals on
wheels are also provided with the help of volunteers (WRVS), although
the bulk of the catering staff and kitchen facilities are provided by
local authorities.	 Other support services include attendance
facilities for those living alone and laundry services.
Local authorities also provide social workers in their various roles,
who are, to some extent, the link between the community and the
department. It is they who have to exercise crucial statutory
responsibilities and assess individual cases, in many cases acting as
"gatekeepers" deciding on the allocation of scarce resources. Their
role can be that of caseworker, exercising statutory duties in
relation to children (for example deciding on suitable foster
parents), the sick and disabled, or the elderly. They may also work in
residential establishments, including hospitals. Their role and
relationship with their clients and the local authority is not always
clearly defined and there will be some discussion of this later in the
chapter.
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Social services also have responsibility for a range of client groups.
Where children are concerned, there is a general responsibility for
the welfare of children within their areas, and an appropriate branch
of the department should be responsible for the general organisation
of child care services. The various statutory duties in relation to
children include help for children in difficulties, for example, those
who have been orphaned or abandoned, neglected or abused, or those who
are delinquent or lack proper parental supervision. In these cases
the department has powers to take out care orders, or supervision
orders, or arrange for children to be adopted or fostered. They can
also provide community homes, and play a preventative role by
arranging family support and financial help. They can provide day
nurseries for children under 5, and are responsible for the
registration of private day nurseries and child-minders.
Services for the elderly include the various domiciliary services
previously mentioned, and the provision of residential accommodation.
They have responsibilities for the registration and inspection of
private residential homes, and can also provide day centres and clubs
for the elderly.
Local authorities also provide services for the handicapped and
disabled. Seebohm (1968) found that, although some disabled groups
were adequately catered for, there were large groups for whom very
little was done. The recommendation of the Seebohm report resulted in
the Chronically Sick and Disabled Person's Act 1970, which required
local authority social services departments to establish the numbers
of disabled people within their areas and to make provision for them
as necessary. Local authorities now have to provide help, where
necessary, to adapt a persons home to hie/her disability, and such
aids as telephones and free or subsidised travel. They also provide
centres where the disabled can be rehabilitated, for example,
sheltered workshops, residential accommodation, daycare centres and
domiciliary services and family support.
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The Mental Health Act 1959 places duties on local authorities in
relation to the mentally ill. A great deal of the treatment of mental
patients is initiated by referrals from social workers, and the
services provided by local authorities are based on the premise that
the patient should, as far as possible, be cared for in the community
and if possible, by the community. Severely sub-normal patients can
be made the subject of guardianship orders, and local authorities can
act as guardians. Social services departments are required to provide
mental welfare officers and psychiatric social workers, and
establishments such as day centres and clubs for the sub-normal, as
well as residential training centres, where the need for them is shown
to exist.
Because of the range of work undertaken by departments, it was decided
to highlight only certain specific areas as illustrations of the
issues concerning complaints procedures and good practices.
Another problem with researching this area is that the potential for
conflict is not just in relation to resource allocation, but it also
relates to the issue of clients' rights, a point which will be
elaborated upon later in the chapter. There was also the added
difficulty about confidentiality in this area which was compounded by
mlea appeared to be a culture of closeted conduct, and a feeling of
defensiveness among staff. This kind of attitude was also found by
Berry (1988a), who noted that staff were concerned about their own
protection, and often felt isolated "under pressure and under edge"
(p16). Berry's research was conducted in 1986, but she notes the
progress made in staff attitudes, so that in 1988 staff were more
ready to acknowledge that clients may have legitimate grievances
(p16). These issues, relating to the culture of professionalism among
staff, will be discussed later in the chapter.
Despite these problems, it was felt that the Sheffield Study
questionnaire responses (and there was a response rate of 68%),
together with the interviews of officers, members, social workers and
representatives of client groups, gave a fairly comprehensive picture
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of complaints and complaining within these departments. Before
examining these issues, I will discuss, briefly, the context in which
these departments operate.
The Organisation of Social Services Departments 
The Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 is responsible for the
present organisation of social services departments, which was passed
as a result of the Seebohm report (1968). A discussion of the history
of British social services, and their development from the poor law,
is not considered appropriate in a study of this kind. Historical
accounts can be found in, for example, Fraser (1973), Packman (1975)
and Parker (1965). The Seebohm committee, set up jointly by the Home
Secretary, the Secretary of State for Education and Science, the
Minister of Housing and Local Government and the Minister of Health,
was to "review the organisation and responsibilities of the local
authority personal social services in England and Wales, and to
consider what changes are desirable to secure an effective family
service" (Seebohm 1968, p11 para 1).
The committee found not only lack of resources and inadequately
trained social workers,	 but also divided responsibility and
organisational fragmentation. 	 They illustrated the problem by the
following example:
"The home help service, a day nursery, nursery school or
residential nursery might all provide means whereby a motherless
child could be cared for, providing in the first three instances
the father was able to take charge at night. But these services
are the responsibilities of three different committees and
departments, which look at the problems from somewhat different
points of view, have rather different methods of trying to solve
it, and different orders of priority in deciding how much of
their total resources should be devoted to the particular service
required" (Seebohm 1968, p34 para 98).
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Seebohm (1968) therefore argued the case for organisational change,
recommending that all major local authorities should have a social
services department to administer the various welfare services,
including services for children and the elderly, as well as the
handicapped and mentally ill, who were living as part of the family.
There should be one central government department responsible for
these new social services departments, and for overall planning and
resources in social services.
The 1970 Act thus brought together a number of functions previously
carried out by different authorities under various pieces of
legislation. As a result they took over the work previously done by
children's departments; welfare departments which had provided
services for the elderly, the physically handicapped and the homeless;
and local health departments, which had been concerned with the care
of the mentally ill and mentally handicapped in the community and with
the provision of the home help service. A new administrative
framework WEIS required, and a duty was placed on a local authority to
set up a social services committee and appoint a director of social
services to administer the statute and ensure that services were
available to the public.
The act also made provision, nationally, for the training of social
workers, with responsibility vested in the Central Council for
Education and Training in Social Work, which was set up in 1971.
Within the (then) DHSS, a local authorities social services division
was formed under the Secretary of State for Social Services, and an
independent, non-statutory body, the Personal Social Services Council,
was appointed in 1973 to advise the Secretary of State. The Council
was wound up in 1980, as a result of the government's public
expenditure cuts, and part of its work, that relating to children, was
transferred to other voluntary bodies. Incidentally, Seebohm (1968)
had recommended a member to represent the consumer interest on this
council (p145 para 641), but such a person was never appointed.
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The revision of the local authority boundaries in 1974, as a result of
the Local Government Act 1972, affected the organisation of the
personal social services. The present position is that metropolitan
districts, London boroughs and non-metropolitan counties have
responsibilities for social services functions in England, making a
total of 107 social services departments.	 These departments have
adopted a variety of internal structural arrangements (for a fuller
discussion of this see Hallett 1982, pp33-43). The Local Authority
Social Services Act only stipulated that a committee and director
should be appointed, and thus the internal structure is a matter of
local decision. This has therefore led to a variety of arrangements,
and this, together with a lack of uniformity in the terms used to
describe different posts and units within departments, has complicated
the task of categorising and comparing them.
Hallett (1982, p37) identifies two main models of organisational
structure. Firstly, there is the functional model, where three or
four assistant directors have responsibility for different spheres of
the department's activities, for example fieldwork; residential and
day care; administration; research and development. The second model
involves devolution to defined geographical areas of the authority.
These "divisions" contain all the various functional areas, and they
usually have divisional directors or area directors. Hallett (1982)
believes that potentially this model "raises the problems of
territorial justice within an authority" (p37. Original emphasis), if,
for example, one divisional body favours home helps and meals on
wheels, at the expense of residential care.	 There are variations
within these models. For example, within the functional model, the
area teams are sometimes divided into larger divisions, forming a tier
between senior management and area officers, but without the direct
responsibility for services, as in model two. Although Widdicombe
(1986) discusses the differences in structure and function of local
government as a whole (pp 22-29), there is no discussion about the
internal organisation of social services departments.
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It was not possible to identify the organisational structures of the
departments responding to the Sheffield Study questionnaire, and it is
difficult to assess the most effective type of structure from the
point of view of the consumer. I would therefore agree with the Audit
Commission (1986b) which refers to the "many possible structures" in
social services departments, commenting that:
"There is no consensus as to best practice. What matters is
whether a structure works effectively in the local situation and
that there are arrangements for assessing this" (p17).
This lack of consensus about structure was evident from a recent
conference on complaints procedures in social services departments
(AMA 1988). Some participants to the conference thought that a
decentralised, or patch, system could best serve the needs of clients,
as physical proximity resulted in a greater understanding of clients
in their community. Others, however, thought that structures were
less relevant than the philosophy, practices and processes of the
department, and that physical proximity does not necessarily result in
social workers and clients changing their views (1,25).
iftua is in no doubt is that grievance procedures could be one method
of assessment of the effectiveness of the structure while also
providing a mechanism for raising the problem of "territorial justice"
raised by Hallett (1982, p37). This was the conclusion from a
conference organised by the Association of Metropolitan Authorities
and the National Institute for Social Work (AMA 1988), that complaints
procedures were crucial to protect rights, and that whatever
administrative or territorial structure the department has, it needs
to ensure that the structures "can facilitate an effective complaints
system" (p25). Indeed, one of the advantages Seebohm (1968)
identified with the establishment of a single social service
department and committee was that it should make it easier "for
complaints to be dealt with more effectively and for any abuses or
neglect to be remedied" (p191 pare 625).
	 The reason for this is that
the new structure would enable members to be freed from "the tyranny
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of committee papers and the minutiae of administration" (p191 pare
625), giving them time to devote themselves to personal contact with
their constituents.
Nevertheless, the very size and diverse functions of these departments
can create problems for clients, and there is a danger that the
bureacratic imperatives of the organisation could override the main
function, which is the welfare of those in need. Seebohm (1968) saw
the long term objectives of social services decartmeats as involving
more than work with groups of clients. Rather they should provide a
"community-based and family oriented service available to all,
reaching beyond the discovery and rescue of social casualties and
enabling the greatest possible number of individuals to act
reciprocally, giving and receiving services for the well being of the
whole community" (p11 para 2). I would contend that complaints
procedures are a part of this process.
The Consumer and Social Services Departments 
The justification for complaints procedures has been discussed in the
introductory chapters and in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 explored in more
detail the particular relationship a consumer may have with the public
sector which may make complaints procedures more appropriate there
than in the private sector, although it was argued that monopoly
suppliers in general should have some method of testing consumer
satisfaction, because of the consumers' lack of choice. 	 In this
section I want to argue that these justifications are even more
relevant for social services departments because of the type of
services offered and the kinds of clients who may be served.
As was mentioned in Chapter 7, the "customer" model for public service
consumers is not always appropriate, and, for social services, I would
agree with Jowell (1988) that "market consumerism is .... of modest
relevance to the experience of social service users" (p9). This is
because the model depends on the ability to pay, whereas most social
services users have little choice in the market place because of their
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poverty, and indeed they become social services users often "because 
they cannot exercise the conventional freedom of consumers" (p9.
Original emphasis). This is not to say that consumerism itself is of
no value here, and Sowell argues that "participative consumerism",
which "presupposes a shared commitment to service based on values of
individuality and respect" (p9) should be the model. used for social
services departments.
Doyle (1988), too, argues that "consumerist 'philosophy' and social
services values can converge" (p12), because in order to provide
service for the public (which is the point of local authority
activities), it is necessary to find out what people need, which
involves "seeing the public as customers demanding high quality
service and as citizens who are entitled to receive it (p12). He
recognises that choice is a difficult principle to apply to public
services, and this is particularly true for social services clients,
who often "do not want the service they are receiving" (p13).
However, he argues that there should be some room for negotiation, so
that services can be modified to meet individual needs.
This model of consumerism is a recognition that clients have rights,
an idea that was "promoted by Seebohm, the Personal Social Services
Council 	
 then Barclay, and indeed by BASW" (see Berry 1988a,
p17). For example, Seebohm (1968) speaks about the need for proper
safeguards for the rights of children and parents where compulsory
powers are used (p58 pare 190; p79 para 269), and one of the
conclusions of the Barclay report (1982) was that "steps should be
taken to formalise the rights of clients who should as far as
possible, participate in decisions, be made aware of their rights,
receive information about decisions taken, have a channel of appeal or
complaint and access to a second opinion" (p197). Moreover, "the
person affected should have the right to know the grounds upon which
•decisions have been taken, or present his own case personally or
through a representative, to question any disputed facts, and to
appeal against the decision" (Barclay 1982, p188).
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The Scottish Voluntary Organisation Group has endorsed this view,
recommending that "there must be mechanisms to formalise and
strengthen the rights of social work clients" (NISW 1984, p43). There
was a similar expression of concern about the current state of policy
and practice in relation to clients rights in England (NISW 1984,
p119). In their discussion paper about clients rights in both the
voluntary and statutory sectors, the National Council for Voluntary
Organisations recommended that "particular concern should be shown to
safeguard the residual rights of those who experience some deprivation
of right when they become clients against their will" (NCVO 1984,
p85).
The House of Commons Social Services Committee recommended that the
DHSS should support efforts being made to reach an agreed model for
complaints by clients about social services provision (Short Report
1984, para 365). And the DHSS itself in its Consultative Document
"Review of Child Care Law" (DHSS 1985) stated that they had "no doubt
that some machinery for the resolution of disagreements relating to
children in care should be provided" (p9), adding that "not all local
authorities yet have a satisfactory system for dealing with disputes
and complaints" (p9). One of the recommendations in the document was
that "every local authority should have a procedure for resolving
disputes and complaints" for children in care (p20).
This recommendation has now become law by virtue of the Children Act
1989, which requires local authorities to establish a procedure for
considering any representations (including complaints) made to them by
a child being looked after by them, or by the child's parents, or
someone else whom the authority considers has sufficient interest in
the child's welfare (Section 26[3]). While applauding the
introduction of such a procedure, I would agree with Bainham (1990)
that perhaps the categories of those entitled to make representations
are too restrictive, in that members of the extended family are not
included, except at the discretion of the authority (p86). The
Department of Health's consultation paper on "Representations"
addresses this problem, recommending that local authorities should
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have a clear policy on their discretionary powers, which takes into
account the Act's "emphasis on participation in their decision making
of all those persons who are significant to the child or can make a
positive contribution to planning for the child's future" (DoH 1990a,
pare 11). The department urges a flexible approach so that
"individuals are not overlooked or obliged to use other means to make
their views or complaint known" (para 11).
This procedure will only affect children in care.	 So far as other
clients are concerned, Sainsbury (1982) in his study, concluded that:
"Clients were, in effect, dependent on the limited expertise and
vision of an individual worker, with little access to other help
save on their own initiative and with virtually no appeal against
inefficient service" (Sainsbury et al. -1982, p183).
Hallett (1982) noted the "absence of general, systematic and
collective client participation in social services" which has meant
that most clients, or their representatives, only "intervene
sporadically and individually in relation to a particular perceived
injustice" (p77), and Hill (1976) described the ad hoc methods of
grievance redress in the personal social services, which usually
consisted of complaining to a higher officer in the organisation, or
to an M.P. or councillor (p149).
Many of these conclusions will be supported by evidence from the
Sheffield Study, although, as will be indicated, there have been
improvements since the completion of that study. An indication of
this improvement was the calling of a conference in 1988 to discuss
complaints procedures in social services departments, which was
arranged because "Sheffield University, the National Consumer council,
NISW, the Ombudsman and many others had been finding that there were
things in the personal social services which should be put in order".
(Harris 1988, p7).
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There is no doubt that the very nature of the work undertaken by
social services departments introduces potential for conflict. When
deciding to remove a child from its parents, for example, there will
be opposing views, as there may also be in the case of adoption or
fostering. Similar problems occur in the case of compulsory removal
of the mentally ill, disabled or elderly into hospital.
	 These are
difficult decisions, which by their nature invite conflict. One
deputy director interviewed during the Sheffield Study described it as
a case of "if you don't like the decision, you blame the messenger".
In such situations lack of redress causes particular concern, because
the decisions often affect the most vulnerable members of society.
Another area of potential conflict is in relation to the allocation of
resources, especially in a situation where these resources may be
scarce. For example, if a client is refused a home help or a place in
a residential home, this will give cause for complaint, as will the
refusal of aids and adaptations to handicapped people who consider
themselves entitled to them. Barclay (1982) recognised the problem of
insufficient resources in social services departments saying that
"everywhere there is evidence of unmet need, some of it urgent" (p99).
Seebohm (1968), too, found inadequate provision, both in terms of the
range and quality of provision, due to a lack of resources, including
staff, buildings and training provision. The committee found that
local authories were failing to meet the "needs for which, on the
basis of duties placed on them by statute, they are clearly
responsible" (p30 para 74).
This highlights one of the problems with the social workers' role. On
the one hand they are seen as caring and concerned for the welfare of
their clients, but they also have to protect and ration scarce
resources and decide upon priorities. One deputy director,
Interviewed during the Sheffield Study, speaking of the "rationing of
resources and services", said that it was inevitable that disputes
would arise about the assessments made in allocating resources.
Another officer in an inner London borough believed that most
complaints were about the inadequate provision of services, but that
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in many cases, this dissatisfaction with service provision develops
into a rights issue. The main cause for complaint was a "shortage of
resources amidst great poverty".
Even if resources are scarce, it would also be useful if people knew
Wua level of allocation was appropriate or possible, so that they
knew what to expect. This is also relevant in the context of judicial
review on the basis that legitimate expectations have not been taken
into account, as, in this area, it is difficult to know what
expectations there may be. It is in this context therefore that the
use of performance indicators by local authorities may be helpful (see
Pollitt 1988, p21; Chapter 7 of this study) in giving consumers some
indication of whether there was a cause for complaint. Barclay (1982)
also criticises some local authorities who fail "to make explicit
their Criteria for allocation of resources (for example, in deciding
whether or not an elderly person should have a telephone)" (p189).
Mayer and Timms (1970), in their study of client experiences, found
that clients did not have any precise expectations as to what would,
or should, happen, which is in contrast to the clearer imagery of what
to expect from more conventional services (p65). If clients do not
know what to expect, what standards are they to use in order to
formulate a complaint? Hallett (1982) too makes the point that very
few clients know the criteria for the allocation of resources, or
indeed what resources may be available to help them. This "limits the
opportunity for clients to appeal and thereby increases the power of
"professionals" to give or withold" (p80). The Audit Commission
(1986b), in their manual on performance review, suggests that local
authorities should be asking the following review question:
"Are there agreed criteria for the provision of different forms
of care, and are quality standards laid down by the council for
the various forms of provision?" (p32)
This question is specifically relating to the elderly, but there is no
reason why it should not be asked of other areas too.
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It is interesting that the Labour Party speaks about changing the
culture of local government to orientate it towards quality, and in
particular that local authorities should "set and publicise targets
and standards for each service so users know what to expect" (Labour
Party 1989, p44). Councils should be required to say what standard of
performance residents are to expect for each service, "where to obtain
further information, and how to complain" (p44). This would mean that
people receiving meals-on-wheels or home helps would be given written
statements setting out quality standards, variety and timing of these
services. In addition there is a proposal to establish a Quality
Commission responsible for promoting the quality of local government
services, providing quality assurance standards for different
services, and publishing guidelines and codes of practice covering
matters such as service contracts and model complaints procedures.
Such information would be useful to consumers, and it may even reduce
the numbers of complaints. In this respect,"supply and demand"
charts, found in several of the large authorities' housing departments
visited during the course of the Sheffield Study research, may prove
useful for social services departments. 	 In housing departments they
are used to indicate those council estates which are the most
pressurised in terms of housing waiting lists. Housing managers
spoken to during the course of the Sheffield Study agreed that these
systems had produced savings in management time, as this information
had taken the pressure off the front of house staff in dealing with
queries and complaints.
The Clients of Social Services Departments 
The last section indicated that complaints procedures were essential
in social services departments because of the types of clients served
and the nature of the problems posed within these departments. In
this section, I want to explore this in more detail, particularly in
view of the fact that there is some evidence that few clients make
complaints, which could indicate satisfaction with the service. 	 The
only reliable source of levels of complaints is the Local Ombudsman as
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most authorities do not keep such statistics, and from the Local
Ombudsman annual reports it can be seen that complaints about social
services departments normally account for between 3% and 5% of the
total number of complaints and formal investigations. There was an
increase to 6% for formal investigations in 1987 and 1988, but this is
thought to have been a result of the attention given in the news media
to recent child abuse inquiries (CLA Annual Report 1987/1988, p8).
This does not, of itself, necessarily mean that there is a high level
of satisfaction with social services departments, although the
Sheffield Study consumer survey did find that 30% of respondents
expressed satisfaction with social services departments, compared to
10% who said they were dissatisfied. This compared well to the other
service areas, and is supported, to some extent, by Widdicombe's
(1986) findings, where 37% of respondents said they were satisfied
with "home helps for the elderly" (Research Volume III pp44-45). As
this was the only service mentioned which related to social services
work, it has limited application in testing satisfaction with the
service as a whole. In Widdicombe's survey, 39% had no view at all,
presumably because they had had no experience of this particular
service. It may, therefore, be that the small number of complaints is
a result of the relatively small number of people who are users of the
service, compared to, say, housing and planning departments. This
explanation is supported by the Sheffield Study consumer study, where
only 19% of those surveyed had dealt with the social services
department.
This explanation is not sufficient in itself, as other evidence
suggests that there may also be a disturbingly high number of unvoiced
complaints. The Sheffield Study questionnaire sent to social services
departments, asked officers their view on why so few of the cases
investigated by the ombudsman were about social services. Only one
respondent gave the small number of users as a reason. The most
popular view, which was held by 49% of the sample (17 respondents),
was that the lack of complaints was due to the nature of clients who
tended to be inarticulate, vulnerable and fearful. On the other hand,
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24% (9 respondents) gave as the reason that social services
departments are sympathetic, 	 constructive and offer adequate
safeguards. A further 14% thought the reason was because social
services departments have more statutory protections than other
departments, and 5% thought it was because there is consumer
participation in decision making in social services departments.
However, during the Sheffield Study fieldwork, the view which came
across the most strongly, was the vulnerable and fearful nature of
clients, which made it most unlikely that they would complain. The
feeling was that not only did clients tend to be "inarticulate and
ignorant", but, that with the exception of elderly clients, few had
even voted at elections or participated in the political process
generally. This was echoed by some of the responses to the Sheffield
Study consumer survey. Ten respondents claimed to have had cause to
complain to the social services department, but only half of these
actually made a complaint. The reasons for not complaining included:
"It was not worth it"
"I did not know you could complain"
"I did not think it was worth it as they never come to see you"
Only two of those who did complain thought that their complaint was
satisfactorily resolved. The others complained that, for example:
"The buck was passed from one department to another. 	 We just
didn't get any help at all from them".
Or:
"I was not informed of my right to appeal on this problem"
During the Sheffield Study fieldwork, when exploring the types of
complaints received, it was discovered that the majority were by
relatives of old people, complaining about standards of care, or lack
of resources, or by relatives of the physically handicapped, in
connection with aids and adaptations for their homes or by relatives
of deceased clients in relation to their property.
	 Few complaints
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came directly from the aggrieved consumers themselves. This lends
support to the use of citizens' defenders or advocates, and the Local
Ombudsman's initiative in encouraging voluntary organisations to make
complaints on behalf of consumers, which will be discussed later.
Some of the responses to the Sheffield Study consumer survey indicated
that there was confusion by consumers in relation to the limits of the
responsibilities of social services departments, with a number of
problems clearly within the province of the (then) DHSS, or even the
housing department. A previous study (Glastonbury et al 1973) has
also demonstrated the extent of public confusion or misunderstanding
about social services departments and their activities. However,
looked at from another perspective, many problems which should be
attributed to social services departments are not perceived as such.
Thus the complaints officer in one London borough said that they
received very few complaints about social services specifically, but
that social services tended to be involved in most cases when the case
was investigated. In this respect it can be misleading to divide up
the service functions too discretely.
The lack of complaints may be due, therefore, more to factors in
relation to the type of consumer, rather than a lack of grounds for
complaint. This is supported by a study in the U.S.A. (Best and
Andreason 1976) of complaints in relation to common items of household
expenditure. The study found that the strength with which households
perceive problems relates to problem type. Problems that are simple
to state, such as a breakage, or loss of property, are often perceived
more strongly than are problems which may seem ambiguous, such as poor
design or difficulty of use (p14). As a consequence, there was a low
level of voicing complaints for medical, dental and legal services
(02), which probably reflects the reluctance of people to antagonise
doctors and lawyers (see Soskis 1975).
As it was found that topics with the lowest voicing rates were the
ones that involved differences of judgement or opinion, or an
ambiguous situation, this could be an explanation for the low level of
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complaints in social services, where many problems are created because
of differences of opinion or judgement. The distinction between
making a professional assessment and administrative actions can be
equivocal, especially in social services departments, and this makes
the intervention of the Local Ombudsman more problematic in this area
than in other forms of local authority work (see Hallett 1982, p78).
There is also confusion and ambiguity about the standard of service or
help which might be expected, making it difficult to complain about an
alleged shortfall. Although Barclay (1982) referred to research
findings where, according to one survey, 66% of clients confessed to
be satisfied with the service compared to 20% who professed themselves
dissatisfied (p67), with another survey finding 60% satisfaction and
22% dissatisfaction (p169), this may be due to low expectations.
Surveys in 1972 and 1975 found that the majority of consumers said
they had received some help, and almost two-thirds felt that they had
received what they had hoped for. 	 However, half of the clients who
were over 65 said that they did not know what to expect from the
department (Goldberg and Warburton 1979). Any "satisfaction"
expressed by such clients therefore could be a reflection both of "low
expectations on the part of the clients", together with "the kind of
'gratitude' which has also contributed to low levels of complaint
against the health service, for example, about inconvenient hospital
routines" (Hallett 1982, p77). Social services departments are
therefore unlikely to have a high number of voiced complaints, as this
depends upon "the degree to which a given topic can be considered
manifest and not open to questions of judgement" (Best and Andreason
1976, p102). Best and Andreason (1976) also found that problem
perception is lowest for households with low socio-economic status
"Clearly, disadvantated status, defined as membership in the
lowest socio-economic status category is closely related to
voicing behaviour. Those in disadvantaged status are less likely
to voice complaints than are other members of the population".
(p72).
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The study therefore concludes that there is "significant under-
representation of households with disadvantaged status among the total
population of participants in the consumer complaint process" (p84).
Similar conclusions have been reached by Friedman (1974) who found a
tendency for the better educated and higher socio-economic classes to
complain. Justice (1980) also found a strong middle class bias among
complainants to the Local Ombudsman with over 70% being made by non-
manual households (p60). Lewis and Gateshill (1978) also found that
the Local Ombudsman was used more by the middle-class, mainly being
yaw occupiers bringing complaints against planning departments. The
Sheffield Study Local Ombudsman complainants' survey endorses this
finding, with 77% of respondents being owner-occupiers.
The Sheffield Study consumer survey found, not surprisingly, that of
the 60 respondents who claimed to have dealt with the council's social
services department, two thirds were council tenants and in social
classes C2, D & E. Since the work of social services departments is
to provide help and services to those in need in society, it is safe
to assume that the clients will, in the main, be those of low socio-
economic status, and this factor in itself could account for the low
number of articulated complaints.
An interesting finding of Widdicombe's consumer survey was that
"maker-occupiers had a considerably more positive evaluation of local
government" than did those living in council accommodation, and there
W88 "a fairly marked propensity for people in the higher social class
groupings to be more satisfied with local government" (Widdicombe
1986, Research Volume III p39). MORI'ssurvey for the Audit
Commission (Audit Commission 1986a) had a similar finding, with higher
satisfaction levels with local government in the higher social
classes. Thus 697. of social classes A, B were satisfied, compared to
53% in Cl, 51% in C2, and 53% in D, E (p4). Given, therefore, a lower
level of satisfaction by the lower social classes, and given the
reluctance of these people to complain, it appears that there is a
high level of unvoiced complaints within social services.
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The Best and Andreason study (1976) also found that consumers are more
likely to complain when they have bargaining power (p40), for example,
when they had not paid in full for an article. Consumers of social
services, in many cases, could not be further removed from the concept
of bargaining power. This is illustrated by an observation from an
officer in a social services department, who was particularly
concerned about children in care:
"If a child (in care) complains, he is sent out of the county; if
the parents complain they have their access restricted; and if
the social workers complain, they are sent on a CQSW".
During the Sheffield Study fieldwork, a case was quoted by a voluntary
body dealing with mental health matters of a woman dropping a case
against a local authority because, as a single parent with young
children, she was completely dependent on the social services
department. She was too frightened of pursuing a complaint which
might Jeopardise her income and other benefits.
This voluntary body claimed that the organisation was inundated with
telephone calls in relation to mental health issues, a great number of
which involved social services departments. Many of these calls
involved allegations of serious breaches of procedure, but most were
not pursued by the complainants. Many complaints were dropped once
the complainant realised the difficulty and sheer effort involved in
bringing a complaint. This factor alone deterred all but the most
determined and resourceful complainants. Another case was cited where
there was clear evidence of bad practice by a social worker, but the
complainant felt reluctant to pursue the complaint because she was
afraid of upsetting the department upon which she was so dependent,
and which had so much influence over her life.
The U.S.A. study (Best and Andreason 1976) also found that there was a
feeling that consumers did not want to get anyone into trouble (p44).
During the Sheffield Study fieldwork this point was raised in relation
to complaints in social services departments, where clients were
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reluctant to get their social worker into trouble. The very fact that
they had built up a relationship with their social worker made it
difficult to complain. This point was made time and again: the
relationship with the social worker prevented complaints, or, as one
officer put it, "CQSW trained staff are good at diffusing potentially
difficult situations".
One officer also thought that the use of the voluntary sector (e. g.
WRVS for meals on wheels) made it difficult to complain because people
think "it's a bit off to complain about a volunteer". Those in
residential care are even more vulnerable. People are often worried
about their relatives in private or voluntary residential care, but
they tend not to complain because they do not want to jeopardise the
position of someone in such a vulnerable situation.
For the reasons outlined in this section, clients of social services
departments need to have clear procedures for the redress of
grievances. Before looking at the extent of such procedures, I want
to look at alternative, or additional avenues of redress in this area.
Additional Avenues for the Redress of Grievances 
I have already examined in some detail the role that could be played
by the Local Ombudsman, the courts and councillors in grievance
redress (see Chapters 4, 5, 6). In this section, I want to look at
these methods in relation to social services departments, to see if
they pose particular problems for social services consumers, or, on
the other hand, render departmental complaints procedures unnecessary.
Some decisions in social services departments are subject to appeal to
the courts. The main area of judicial involvement is in child-care
cases, where the decision to place a child in care is taken as a
result of the judicial process, as are decisions about adoption. The
Children Act 1989 gives new powers to the courts about access by
parents to children in care. Section 34 raises a presumption of
reasonable access for parents, and can only be refused with a court
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order. The majority of respondents to the Sheffield Study
questionnaire (75% 28) saw the advantages of statutory procedures
which had an appeal mechanism to the courts, especially in the area of
the assumption of parental rights and adoption orders.	 The main
reason given for this was the independent element:
"There is a need for appeal to a body not directly involved in
decision making".
"An appeal to an impartial body and the involvement of people
outside the department reduces the likelihood of mistakes being
covered up".
"Courts can be impartial, avoid 'cover-ups' and be seen to be
just".
"The courts have the reputation of objective assessment of
problems and are usually seen to be outside the system and as
impartial as any organisation can be".
There was also a feeling that decisions by the courts could clarify
ambiguous situations in a public forum:
"Appeals to Courts enables the establishment of a body of case
law and precedent which may be used to guide subsequent decisions
by authorities".
"They enable 'test cases' to clarify ambiguous legislation".
"Appeals to the courts enables case law to be established which
can guide future practice".
Some also saw that it was important to check local authority power:
"The right of appeal to the courts is useful in certain limited
circumstances concerning fundamental persona/ rights and
liberties where the Authority should not have unfettered power".
The value of using the courts was also emphasised during the Sheffield
Study fieldwork. In one authority the director maintained that most
child-care cases are taken to court by the department because they are
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looking for another judgement in the case. Although the procedure was
time consuming and costly, it was a form of protection for the
department. An officer in the court section of this department said
that social workers liked to obtain court orders especially for older
children, as it helped to alleviate any feelings of resentment that a
child may have against its parents.
Although there was this favourable response to the intervention by the
nuts, only 8 (22%) respondents wanted to see the extension of the
powers of the courts, preferring these being restricted to the
situation where "individual rights are at riskTM.
The courts were thus seen as more useful than authority, or
departmental, tribunals, because they are more authoritative, and to
some extent, they relieved the authority of the burden of
responsibility, as the decision was taken out of their hands.
However, there is evidence that the courts are not exercising a
judicial function in this area, and that in many cases they are merely
"rubber stamping" decisions taken elsewhere. Harris and Timms (1988),
in their study of procedures in relation to secure accommodation
conclude that "the watchdog role intended for the juvenile courts had
not proved effective" (p191), and that "court hearings frequently
rubber stamp applications" for secure accommodation (p193). They
observed that "the grounds for an authorisation being made are often
the subject of only cursory consideration by the court" (p178), and
that once the department decided to go for secure accommodation "there
is a very good chance that authorisation will be granted" (p178).
There was also concern about the "specially cursory attention given to
renewal applications", which were "processed in a casual, even
desultory manner" (p197). They compared this to the "entirely
different situation of an application in the adult magistrates court
for a remand in custody" (p197).
Similar concerns were expressed by the Butler-Sloss Inquiry (1988)
into child abuse in Cleveland in 1987, that the magistrates were not
exercising a judicial function (pp172-4) and that there was an
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"acceptance of an automatic response by way of place of safety order
to certain sets of facts" (p228). The Children Act 1989 will improve
this situation. Legislation on place of safety orders is repealed,
and a new Emergency Protection Order is introduced (sections 44-45).
Under this order the court has to be satisfied that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the child is likely to suffer
"significant harm" before it can be removed from home.
The Department of Health, in their consultation paper (DoH 1990b),
remind authorities that the emergency protection order is "an
extremely serious step", and that it "must not be regarded - as
sometimes was the case with place of safety orders - as a routine
response to allegations of child abuse or as a first step to
initiating care proceedings" (pars 25). It is also recommended that
the emergency protection order should name the child, or, if this is
not possible, describe the child as closely as possible (pars 27). It
is also a matter for the court to decide on contact between the child
and any named person (Children Act 1989, section 44[6][al), and,
subject to the courts directions, there is a general duty on the
applicant for the emergency protection order to allow the child
reasonable contact with a range of persons, including the parents (DoH
1990, para 45).
Stevens (1989) believes that these new provisions will do away with
"at home" hearings which were criticised in Butler-Sloss (p252). In
addition, Robertson (1989) believes that the Children Act will mean
that social services departments "will face the scrutiny of the courts
in a much more rigorous way than previously" (p225), and that the Act
"fundamentally, shifts the onus for review and decision making from
closed, 'inaccessible case conference planning, review or briefing
meetings held by social services departments to a much more open
arena" (p225), and represents "the most radical shift towards
reviewing the exercise of local authority power by the courts" (p225).
This seems to be a move in the right direction, and must surely result
in an improvement in practice within social services departments.
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The Children Act 1989 does not allow decisions about children L-1 . care
to be challenged in the courts, except in relation to contact with
parents, and in this respect the government "has taken the review of
Child Care Law's approach, which was that only certain decisions can
be made by courts" (Haggett 1989, p217). Harris and Timms (1988) also
sound a note of caution about overstating "the capacity of the
juvenile court to safeguard the child's rights" (p196), maintaining
that to "place undue emphasis on the court's capacity to do so is to
do the child a disservice by neglecting the more central role of
bureaucratic and professional decision-making" (p196). Any reforms in
the court process, for example longer hearings, better legal
representation, greater involvement of the child, "however
Intrinsically desirable, would make little difference to the outcome
of hearings" (p196). They advocate the greater use of independent
social workers (p196), reasons to be given for decisions (p181) and
better training for social workers (p189).
Again this problem is addressed in the Children Act 1989, with the
emphasis on the provision of services to families with children in
need being carefully planned and reviewed (DoH 1990c, pare 1). Draft
regulations made as a result of the Act place a new duty on
authorities, in making arrangements to place a child, to draw up "an
individual plan for the child", which is to be "reviewed (and amended
as necessary) on a regular basis" (DoH 1990c, p2). The purpose of
these planning arrangements is to "safeguard and promote the child's
welfare" and "to prevent 'drift' and help to focus work with the
family and child" (DoH 1990c, pare 12). It is also suggested that
"decisions and the reasons for them should be recorded and
notifications sent to the appropriate people" (DoH 1990c, pare 13).
This approach recognises that it is within the departments themselves
that changes have to be made.
Even though the courts will have a greater role to play in the future
in relation to the child care functions of local authorities as a
result of the Children Act 1989, this, in itself, may not be
sufficient to safeguard the rights of children and their families.
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However, the fact that such decisions will be subjected to independent
scrutiny must improve the quality of decision making. Complaints
procedures will still be needed for those areas not subject to appeal
to the court, both in relation to childcare, and the other clients of
social services departments.
The role of elected members in relation to social services departments
will now be examined. Where decision making is concerned Maud (1967)
recommended a clearer division of functions and responsibilities
between councillors and officers and the adoption of "the guiding
principle that issues are dealt with at the lowest level consistent
with the nature of the problem" (p xiii, and pares 150-2). Most
officers interviewed during the Sheffield Study fieldwork saw the
member's role as deciding policy, and that they should leave the day
to day matters to the officers. Seebohm (1968) noted the "delicate
balance of the relationship between members and officers", observing
that it must not be upset "by unnecessary interference on the part of
the member with day to day administration and case work" (p192 para
625).
The delicacy of this balance was observed during the Sheffield Study
fieldwork, where there was some resentment by officers if they thought
that members were becoming too involved in what they considered to be
their preserve. One assistant director thought that there were
situations where members could add nothing to the decision making
process, quoting the example of foster parenting, which he said should
be a professional decision, and any appeal should be to an assistant
director, or director.
"Members should establish policies and procedures and leave the rest
to officers" was often said. While there was a feeling that members
could have a role, in, for example, bus pass appeal panels, there was
a feeling in some authorities that members "interfered a lot" and that
this was "unfair and unhelpful".
	 Members should agree the criteria
for allocations etc, and only deal with exceptional cases.
	
They
should not be routinely involved, as their individualistic approach
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could lead to unfairness. While it was conceded that sometimes
members could act as a safeguard, it was the officials who made the
"consistent professional judgments".
Even in a policy making situation, there has been criticism that
councillors are out of touch with their clients, and with the
situation on the ground. For example Jowell (1979) claims that "for
most social workers engaged day-to-day in the direct effects of
poverty, human distress, disability and insufficient public resources,
the social services committee is a remote, little considered and
normally uninstructive entity" (p23). Self (1971), feeling that most
councillors have little in common with the clients of social services,
says that "the ability of local councillors effectively to represent
the views of consumers of particular services is now regarded with a
good deal of justified scepticism" (p276). Moreover he questions
whether councillors can make a reasoned contribution to policy making,
feeling that they are not very influential, because each particular
service "is itself a 'policy sub-system' operating within a complex
framework of central government regulation and guidance, professional
practice and opinion, specialised pressure groups and a specialised
press" (Self 1971, p272).
In one outer London borough visited during the Sheffield Study the
officers interviewed had a particularly cynical attitude to case work
by members, believing it came in three-yearly cycles: when
councillors were not canvassing, they took up casework. However, the
members in this authority adopted the attitude that "officers are
employed to get it right in the first place". This was considered by
the officers to be a more healthy attitude than that of some inner
London borough councillors "who wanted to appoint the cleaners". This
impression was borne out during the Sheffield Study fieldwork in one
such authority, where the officer complained of too much member
involvement in the minutia of administration, quoting as an example
the fact that there was a member panel for the review of adoption
cases.
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This belief in the professionalism of social workers, which translates
to "social workers know best", can be contrasted with the widespread
belief, expressed by directors and assistant directors, that social
workers were not adequately trained, and that there should be more
government funding for continuing education and training. Harris and
Timms (1988), in their concern about decision making in relation to
secure accommodation recommend that the "DHSS initiates training
opportunities for secure accommodation decision-makers, normally at
Principal Officer/Assistant Director level" (p189). And in 1986, the
Association of Directors of Social Services called for £30 million to
be spent over 5 years to improve in-service training of social workers
and managers (Guardian 10-4-86). Butler-Sloss (1988) also called for
more training in the area of child sexual abuse (p225).
There was also some resentment expressed by officers during the
Sheffield Study about the role of members in bringing individual
complaints. Although members do not become involved in social
services cases in anything like the way they do in housing, the
resentment stems from a feeling that people were trying to by-pass
agreed procedures by using elected members. A similar resentment was
found by the DHSS Study (1978) when intervention was seen as special
pleading, or an attempt to circumvent council policy. This may also
be a reflection of the way social workers see their lines of
accountability, as this study also found that social workers saw
themselves as accountable either as professionals, directly to their
clients, or to their team leaders and their area officers. No mention
was made of elected members (DHSS 1978, pp217-8).
The role which members can play within a departmental complaints
procedure will be looked at later in the chapter, but it was observed
during the Sheffield Study fieldwork that a number of authorities did
have special procedures for complaints by councillors or M.P.s. In
some cases this was no more than copies of the correspondence going to
the director or chair of social services, although in others this
triggered a more formal procedure, and there was a time limit for
responding to the letter. Not one authority visited used the social
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services committee for individual cases, seeing them as concerned with
policy matters, although there were sub-committees which dealt with
particular complaints, for example, bus passes.
Despite the resentment felt by officers for what was considered to be
Interference by the members, it should be remembered that councillors
are responsible for the delivery of services, and that therefore
member involvement is necessary. I would endorse the view of the
Short Report (1984) that:
"It is no good pretending that real policy is possible, unless at
least the Chairman and lay councillors are able to assure
themselves that all is well in individual cases, and that
policies are being carried out".
Social workers could also play a part in informing clients of their
rights when they have a grievance against the local authority. This
can be seen as part of their role of bringing "a humanising face, a
caring component into the increasingly large-scale welfare setting ...
which ... can so easily slide into heartlessness and become alienated
from the compassionate thought that fired its origination" (Davies
1985, p234). Indeed a number of officers in social services
departments interviewed during the Sheffield Study accounted for the
lack of complaints at Local Ombudsman level by the fact that clients
had their own complaints officer - their social worker. However, this
may only be the case if the client is in agreement with the social
worker. Greater difficulties will arise when it is the actions of the
social worker which gives rise to the sense of grievance. The Audit
Commission (1986b) has recognised the possibility of conflict here,
when it suggests that authorities should be asking what arrangements
are made for the review of cases and for supervising social workers
(p13).
Social workers can have conflicting roles; on the one hand, they want
to provide help to their clients but they are also the gatekeepers to
what are, in many cases, scarce resources. Social workers are often
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in an impossible situation because of this dual relationship with
local authority and client. Despite this difficult situation, the
majority of respondents to the Sheffield Study survey (62%, 23) did
not think there should be any provision for an aggrieved client to
have access to an independent professional opinion. In this respect
they are out of line with Barclay (1982) who considered that an
aggrieved client must have access to either an independent
professional opinion or to some objective yardstick as to what
constitutes acceptable practice (091).
Harris and Timms (1988) would also like to see the introduction of
independent social workers in secure accommodation cases (p192). They
found "considerable confusion as to the notion of independence", with
my respondents to their survey acknowledging "the potential for role
conflict in local authorities acting both as counsellor for the
youngster and petitioner for secure accommodation" (p191). They
believe that social workers, who "act both as employees and experts",
seldom have any "undue difficulty in getting the decision they seek"
(p177), and that is why an independent, professional opinion is
essential.
There is the additional problem that the complaint may actually be
about the social worker. When respondents to the Sheffield Study
survey were asked whether there should be a separate procedure for
complaints about the substance of a decision, and complaint about a
social worker, the majority (57%, 21) said "no", although in most
authorities a complaint about a social worker had to be in writing.
There seemed to be a marked reluctance by officers to allow clients to
change social workers seeing this as a problem that the social worker
and the client had to work out themselves.
Despite the fact that much was made, during the Sheffield Study, of
the social workers ability to diffuse potentially conflicting
situations, Barclay (1982) found that some client groups "have come
increasingly to regard social workers' with fear and suspicion
believing that they now have excessive powers which they may use in
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an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion" (p169). Although this view
was far from universal among client groups, the fact that it exists at
all is disturbing, and it lends even more support to the argument for
complaints procedures.
Because of the relationship between the client and the social worker,
there is a particular need for some method of resolving grievances
against social workers. Of course, such a procedure should try to
balance the rights of staff and complainants, and it is necessary,
therefore, for such a procedure to fit in with staff grievance and
disciplinary procedures. Adequate staff discussion must take place
before such a procedure is introduced, a factor emphasised by the
National Consumer Council, in their report on complaints procedures in
social services departments (NCC 1985, p47). Without staff
involvement, any procedure could suffer the same fate as the system
set up in Northern Ireland to deal with children in residential care,
where parents faced difficulties because of staff reluctance to
implement it (see NCC 1985, p43). It is therefore heartening to note
that at a national level the National Association of Local Government
Officres has made clear its support for the introduction of complaints
procedures (see AMA 1988, p19).
The final additional avenue of redress for complaints, which I want to
look at in this section is the Local Ombudsman. The Local Ombudsman
is concerned about maladministration, and so far as social services
are concerned, the distinction between administrative matters and
professional judgment is even more problematic than for the other
service areas. Hallett (1982) summarises the problem as follows:
"Within social services departments, the distinction between
professional Judgement and administration can, at times, be
equivocal. The consideration of an application from people
wishing to act as foster or adoptive parent is but one instance
when the work involves both making a professional assessment and
also completing certain inquiries, and forms, which are
essentially administrative matters" (p78).
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Although at a recent conference on complaints procedures the Local
Ombudsman made it clear that his interpretation of maladministration
was broad enough to include professional decision making when
appropriate (see AMA 1988, p21), evidence suggests that the ombudsman
is reluctant to intervene in such cases. Indeed, one of the present
ombudsman's reactions to complaints from parents or guardians about
actions by social services which they consider excessive or
overbearing, is that "there would need to be clear evidence before I
would find maladministration where the officers genuinely and
reasonably believed that their action was taken in the child's
interest" (CLA Annual Report 1986, p10). In a report, concerning a
complaint about compulsory admission into hospital (87/B/1308) the
Local Ombudsman repeated this view:
"As Local Ombudsman I cannot substitute my judgement for that of
a professional officer of the Council unless it was so
unreasonable that no competent officer could reach such a
decision. My concern, is whether the ASWs (Approved Social
Workers) on each occassion followed the procedural requirements
of both the law and good practice " (p23 para50).
There are, however, situations where the Local Ombudsman should be
used, but is unable to intervene because the system has to be
triggered by a formal complaint. The 1987/88 Annual Report cites the
report of the Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
the death of Kimberley Carlile (A Child in Mind). The Commission
considered what form child abuse inquiries might take in future, and
suggested that, in certain cases, investigations might be conducted by
the Local Ombudsman (CLA Annual Report 1987/88, p5). This could only
be done by an amendment to Part III of the Local Government Act 1974.
Widdicombe (1986) too has recommended that the Local Ombudsman should
be given new powers to investigate individual cases on their own
initiative (p233 pare 9.83), subject to the provisos that the Local
Ombudsman would not pursue a case except where there were good grounds
for concern, nor conduct an investigation into the general procedures
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of an authority rather than an individual case where there was reason
to suppose that injustice had occurred (p221 pare 9.76). Widdicombe
believed that this would go some way to redressing the present
imbalance, whereby the majority of complainants are middle-class.
It may also help in the situation highlighted by Pat Thomas in the CLA
Annual Report 1987/88, referring to the publicity about the number of
children in the Cleveland area suspected of being subject to sexual
abuse. She noted that although "Cleveland County Council is one of
the local authorities within my jurisdiction, no complaints were made
to me about a matter on which there was much attention in the press
and on radio and television" (p29, pare 4.12). The power to
investigate on her own initiative would have allowed intervention in
this case. The publicity surrounding the case was, she believes,
"responsible for a rise in the number of complaints made .... from
elsewhere about the way social services departments had carried out
their responsibilities toward the younger, older and disadvantaged
members of the community" (p29 pare 4.12).
As has been mentioned in Chapter 5, discussions with relevent bodies
during the course of the Sheffield Study supported Widdicombe's
proposals. This would be a useful protection, given the vulnerability
of children, especially young children who cannot complain on their
own behalf, and has for some time been the view of the CLA (quoted
here in response to the DHSS Consultation paper on Child Abuse
Enquiries):
"the Local Ombudsmen would be better able to help in this
sensitive field if they had the power (as the Commission had
recommended) to investigate on their own initiative, without
receiving a complaint, or at the request of a local authority"
(CLA Annual Report 1986, p34).
Despite Widdicombe's (1986) arguments, the government has not been
pursuaded to support the recommendation that the Local Ombudsman be
allowed to investigate on their own initiative, believing that the
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Local Ombudsman "would lose goodwill and co-operation by acting, or
appearing to act, as a general purpose watchdog" (Government Response
to Widdicombe 1988, p30 pare 6.31).It also seems unlikely that there
will be the establishment of a Children's Ombudsman, as there is in
Sweden, and Norway, with duties which include furthering the interests
of children, and assessing the potential effect on children of
government policies (see NCC 1985, p51).
One development which has taken place, and which would serve as a
model for other authorities, is the establishment by Leicestershire
County Council of a Children's Rights Officer, with duties to examine
how council policies will effect children. This development will be
examined later in the chapter. The Labour Party proposes the
establishment of a Children's Commissioner along the Norwegian model,
who would be independent, and whose role would be to "promote the
interests of children in the private and public sector" (Labour Party
1989, p64). It is unlikely however, that there would be such an
institution in the near future, and it would appear to be more useful
at present to extend the powers of the existing Local Ombudsman.
The recent abolition of the member filter, al/owing people to complain
directly to the Local Ombudsman is one reform which will make the
Local Ombudsman more accessible to those in need. Before this reform,
any complaint by a young person would have had to be sponsored by an
adult. The Local Ombudsman has now made it clear, as there was some
confusion before, [confusion which still appears to exist as the
Labour Party (1969) speaks about strengthening "the position of young
people by giving them the same rights of access as adults to existing
Ombudsmen" (p64)] that complaints received directly from a young
person will be considered. Despite any practical problems they may
face, there is no longer a requirement that a complaint has to be
sponsored by an adult, and the Local Ombudsman "will consider a
complaint from any young person provided he is satisfied that it is
genuine" (letter from Secretary of the CLA to Editor "Social Work
Today", 13 April 1988).
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Time will tell whether the removal of the member filter has made it
easier for clients in social services departments to complain,
although there has been a rise in the number of cases referred to the
Local Ombudsman concerning social services matters. The 1989/90 Annual
Report of the Local Ombudsman shows a 31% increase in such complaints
au Annual Report 1989/90, 01). This increase is welcomed by the
ombudsman, seeing it as evidence that "the door to remedies for
alleged injustice is opening that bit wider", and that "the protective
arm of the Local Ombudsman is reaching people ... who are powerless to
do anything" about acts of maladministration (CLA Annual Report
1989/90, p5).
In addition, the Local Ombudsman has recently written to voluntary
organisations (see CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p58), urging them to
make complaints on behalf of their clients, who may be unable to make,
or have difficulty in making, complaints. The Local Ombudsman is
empowered to investigate such complaints by virtue of section 27(2) of
the Local Government Act 1974. This could have the effect of
highlighting previously "unvoiced" complaints, although the recent
increase in complaints received concerning social services matters was
not due to voluntary organisations referring complaints. The Local
Ombudsman believes, however, that the letter to these organisations
may have "encouraged them to recommend the Local Ombudsman service to
their clients, who have then made complaints direct" (CLA Annual
Report 1989/90, p12).
Wale serving useful purposes in many cases, these additional avenues
of redress have some drawbacks, and, as far as the courts and Local
Ombudsman are concerned, few would argue that these should be used
only when internal methods have been exhausted. I want to turn now to
an examination of complaints procedures in social services
departments.
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The Extent of Complaints Procedures 
There can be little doubt of the value of complaints procedures in
social services departments, and, indeed, the prevailing view seems to
be "not only embarrassment at a lack of procedures, but also a
determination to introduce procedures, and a readiness to acknowledge
that clients may well have legitimate criticisms to make of services"
(Berry 1988a, p6). Such a view has evolved since the conclusion of
the Sheffield Study, although there have been calls for such
procedures for a number of years. For example, the Short Report
concluded that the "crucial nature of the decisions made every day by
social workers has led to a widely perceived need for a system to
provide for the possibility of complaint or appeal against decisions"
(Short Report 1984, pars 360).
The booklet issued by A Voice for the Child in Care points to the use
of complaints procedures as "fail-safe" mechanisms, which balance the
power of the social worker and the rights of clients (Wadcock and
Tames 1984, p14). One of the respondents in the National Consumer
Council survey on complaints procedures (NCC 1985) remarked that
"complaints are an important way in which social services departments
are accountable" (p5), a point which was made in the DHSS consultative
paper on a complaints procedure for children in residential care and
their parents:
"The basis of a complaints procedure within the public services
is the recognition that users or potential users of the services
may be justifiably concerned about the effectiveness of those
services and the manner in which they are provided. They have
the right and should be afforded an opportunity to make known
their views to those who are in a position to take remedial
action if appropriate" (N.1. DHSS 1983, p9 pare 2.1).
The National Council for Voluntary Organisations believes that a
complaints procedure would enhance the service because:
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"for every client who pursues a complaint there will be many who
recognise the value and the right to make a complaint if they
ever felt they needed to, and that fact in itself adds to the
dignity of the client" (NCVO 1984, p70).
As well as enhancing the service from a management point of view,
complaints systems can be used as a method of quality control. Jervis
(1989a) bemoans the fact that "random grumbles may be commonplace but
complaints systems have had a sluggish history in social services
departments", pointing out that commercial enterprises "see rumbling
dissatisfaction as the most dangerous form of negative advertising",
but a good complaints procedure is "a smart way of quality control,
harnessing the goodwill and future custom" (p16). The Audit
Commission (1986b) have also emphasised the management role of
complaints procedures, suggesting that complaints "can be used as a
key indicator in the process of supervision of decisions or referrals,
to minimise the risk of incorrect rejection or unncessary acceptance
of referred cases" (p17).
This section will examine the extent of such procedures, and is based
on questionnaire responses from the Sheffield Study survey,
supplemented by interviews of officers, social workers and members
during the course of the Sheffield research. It is also based on a
number of developments which have occurred since the completion of
that research, and further fieldwork experience. The Sheffield Study
survey questionnaire was fairly wide ranging in its scope, not only
asking questions about internal complaints procedures, but also about
specific aspects of social work practice, for example the conduct of
case conferences, and about issues raised in the Barclay Report
(1982).
In the Sheffield Study questionnaire, "complaint" was defined using
the definition in the 1978 Code of Practice on Complaints Procedures
issued by the Local Authority Associations in co-operation with the
Commission for Local Administration in England (CLA 1978, pare 1-2).
During the Sheffield Study fieldwork some officers did raise the issue
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of definition, maintaining that it was difficult to differentiate
between something which is a complaint and something which is a part
of a complicated social work process. This point was appreciated, but
it was assumed that most respondents appreciated that the concern was
to discover the procedures used for solving disputed issues and it was
assumed that few people have real problems recognising a complaint,
although they may wish to distinguish "serious" ones from the rest.
It must be recognised, however, that this can be a problematic area,
and that a lawyer's view of a situation does not always coincide with
a social workers. For example, the director of the social services
department in a large metropolitan authority seemed reluctant to
accept that a request from a client for a change of social worker,
because the client did not like the action the social worker was
taking, was a complaint. Nor did he think that a letter from a couple
objecting to their child being placed on the Non-Accidental Injuries
register was a complaint. I do not believe that too restrictive a
definition of "complaint" is helpful, and I would agree with Doyle
(1988) that if "you really want to listen to the voice of the consumer
you have to be careful not to exclude representations which may seem
trivial to your staff but which may indicate a real problem for the
client or be a sign of a serious malfunction of the service" (p14).
Like the National Consumer Council research (NCC 1985), formal, as
opposed to informal, procedures were not defined in the Sheffield
Study questionnaire, but by formal was meant one which was written in
a document and available to staff. The Sheffield Study fieldwork
confirmed that this was how the question was interpreted. Of the 37
respondents to the questionnaire 49% (18) claimed to have formal
complaints procedures which applied to all areas of work in the social
services department. This compares with 56% of the 59 respondents in
the National Consumer Council survey (NCC 1985). Another 16% (6) had
formal procedures covering some areas of work: 4 related to children
in care; one related to residential accommodation; one said that their
procedure related to serious complaints only, which they defined in
their procedure, the reason given for such differentiation being that
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it "would be impractical to insist that all 	  complaints had to go
through a formal procedure".
This section of the questionnaire was specifically about procedures
used within the department for handling complaints and it may be that
departments without formal complaints procedures do have an authority-
wide procedure which can be used by dissatisfied consumers of the
social services, as was the case in one of the authorities visited
during the Sheffield Study fieldwork.
Altogether 79% (29) of respondents believed it was desirable to have
formal written procedures for the resolution of complaints and 92%
(34) agreed that it was preferable to try to resolve complaints within
the authority, rather than relying on external agencies. The most
common reasons for this view was that it made for better public
relations and was quicker and more efficient.
The existence of formal complaints procedures does not however ensure
that they are used, or even known about. Of the 24 authorities in the
sample who had formal procedures, just over half (13) said they were
publicised, but four of these can be discounted, because when asked to
"specify in what ways it is publicised" they admitted that it was only
publicised internally.	 (One of these four did add that staff were
expected to tell clients!).
	 How effective the publicity is in the
other authorities is difficult to assess, but respondents did refer to
posters and leaflets in council offices. In one authority, visited
during fieldwork, the departmental complaints procedure was not widely
known among the staff.
The National Consumer Council (NCC 1985) found from their survey that
clients were informed of the procedure once they made a complaint
(pp . This is borne out by the fieldwork for the Sheffield Study,
where it became apparent that the persistent usually managed to find
the information. Certainly the Sheffield Study found nothing to
disagree with the Local Ombudsman's study, undertaken to see how local
authorities had responded to the 1978 Code of Practice, which found
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that "relatively few procedures were well publicised"
	
(CLA Annual
Report 1980, p15).
A minority of authorities publish booklets, usually for selected
clients, informing them, inter alia, of their right to complain. For
example, those entering residential care may receive such a booklet,
with information about the procedure for complaints, as may children
in care. One authority produces a social services handbook, which is
a general guide to the services provided by the department, and which
explains the procedure to be followed for complaints.
Of the 24 authorities with formal procedures, 5 said that the
procedure specified that complaints were to be dealt with by officers
only, one by members only and 18 by both officers and members. It is
difficult to assess the extent of member involvement. There were
authorities which had a right of appeal from the director of social
services to a complaints/appeal panel, which consisted of members of
the social services committee. Another authority had member
involvement in cases about access to children in care, where decisions
about termination and refusal of access were to be made by the
director in consultation with the chair and vice-chair of the social
services committee.
	 This authority also had a parental rights sub-
committee to monitor such cases. When the Children Act 1989 comes
into force the courts can decide on issues of refusal or termination
of access (Section 34). Local authorities will only be able to refuse
parents reasonable contact with their child after obtaining a court
order, or in an emergency for not more than seven days (section
34[6l[b]).
It was also interesting to know how much member involvement there was
in the informal procedures of local authorities. 68% (25) said that
it was possible for complainants to appeal from the decisions of
officers to the elected members of the council. Seven of these
allowed appeals to the full social services committee and 17 were
appeals to a special sub-committee.
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The impression gained from the Sheffield Study fieldwork was that the
replies to questions about member involvement reflected the view that
It is always open to members to raise a matter at committee if they
wish, but that such involvement rarely occurs and is not part of the
institutional culture. The impression was that members on the whole
do not become involved in individual cases like, for example, in
housing matters. It seems that committee members are mainly involved
in policy matters and not with individual cases, and this is
considered to be their proper role (although for certain exceptional
matters, for example, the allocation of bus passes, member involvement
is welcomed). One director said "what do members know about
schizophrenia?" a view which was endorsed by other officers who
believed that their decisions were a matter of professional judgement,
which should not be challenged by members:
"The members should establish the policies and procedures and
leave the rest to the officers".
This view was also endorsed in the Leeways Inquiry Report, an
independent inquiry set-up to look into the case of an officer-in-
charge of a children's home in Lewisham who was convicted of various
offences involving indecent photography of young children:
"In our view they (the elected members) should decide policy and
how they want their objectives carried out.
	 They should leave
the carrying out of those policies to their officers. If those
officers refuse or fail to do so then they have the power to
discipline and ultimately to dismiss them" (Lewisham Social
Services 1985, p114)
One officer was very outspoken on member involvement:
"The members interfere quite a lot ... but such case work can be
unfair and unhelpful. Member's policy can vary from one extreme
to another, whereas officers make the consistent professional
judgement. They should agree the criteria for allocations etc.
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and ONLY deal with exceptions.
involved".
They should not be routinely
The Social Services Teams study (DHSS 1978) also found resentment by
social workers of councillor intervention, when it was seen as special
pleading, or an attempt to circumvent council policy. It is not only
social workers and officers who think this way. One chair of a large
authority's housing committee thought that the "role of councillors
was to frame policy and to check upon its day to day implementation by
officers". She disliked too much discretion, and she was not just
thinking in terms of housing departments when she said: "In a well run
authority casework would be unnecessary".
However, the organisation "A Voice for the Child in Care" calls for
more councillor involvement in decision making.
"You share responsibility for your authorities services to the
public and therefore you are in a key position to change policies
and influence decisions" (Wadcock and James 1984, p5).
Hill (1974) notes that there is "little evidence that most councillors
wish to spend all their time on policy" (p85). Indeed Self (1971)
suggests that few councillors have "the time, energy or perhaps
ability" to make a reasoned contribution to policy-making (p272).
There is, too, evidence of an increase in councillor involvement, in,
for example, child abuse cases. In East Sussex, decisions about
returning children for whom the authority has assumed parental rights
to parents is taken by councillors (see Community Care - January 1980
"Social Workers lose rights to councillors").
For the formal complaints procedure itself, 10 of the respondents had
a tribunal-type hearing as the final stage of appeal. In 8 of these
cases the final appeal was to elected members. Only one authority in
the sample had an independent element, as well as elected members, on
this final complaints body. This is surprising, as 57% (21) thought
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that it was desirable to have an independent element in the final
stage of a complaints procedure.
When asked about informal procedures, the majority (60%) allowed for
the complaint to be dealt with by the director ultimately. However, a
further five said that there was always a possibility that the
director would hear a complaint, depending on the circumstances and
seriousness of the problem. In other words, although not the standard
response, it is always possible for the persistent to go to the
director.
Again respondents admitted to the possibility of appealing to members
in their informal procedures. 68% said that this was possible, but it
is difficult to see if this is anything more than the recognised right
of members to raise an issue in committee if they wish. Of the 25 who
spoke of this possibility, 7 said there was the possibility to appeal
to the full social services committee and 17 to a special sub-
committee.
The conclusions from the survey and fieldwork was that few authorities
had really applied their minds to the possibility of having procedures
which were accessible, and that they were mainly defensive in nature,
a view endorsed by Berry (1988a, p16) in her work on social services
complaints procedures. Indeed, 70% of the respondents to the
Sheffield Study survey said that they agreed with Barclay that
"current channels for making a complaint or for lodging an appeal were
at best inadequate" (Barclay 1982, p190 pars 12.49). It is therefore,
good to note the change in attitude since the Sheffield Study (see
Berry 1988a, p16) and a renewed interest in complaints procedures,
which was partly a result of the Sheffield research (see Harris 1988
p7).
As for using complaints for management information 70% of the sample
(26 respondents) said that they had a system for the monitoring and
logging of complaints, 19 of these keeping a special register, rather
than recording them on particular case files.	 Of these 26, all of
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them included in their system complaints made in writing, 25 included
complaints made by an elected member and 24 included complaints made
by telephone and in person. 	 The National Consumer Council Survey
found a variety of practice in relation to verbal complaints, with
some complaints procedures making no reference to them, others
stressing the importance of settling verbal complaints locally and
others stating that verbal complaints should be processed in the same
way as written ones (NCC 1985, p32).
It is important, especially in an area like social services, not to
insist that complaints are put in writing. 	 These figures therefore,
show an encouraging response to verbal complaints. This positive
approach was also revealed in some of the information received about
particular complaints procedures, with some specifically mentioning
verbal complaints:
"On receipt of any complaint, written, by telephone or in person,
an entry will be made in the register"
Or, by implication verbal complaints are included:
"These procedures apply to all complaints arising from any source
about the service"
"The Department will continue to receive complaints through any
channel which the client feels is appropriate"
Some authorities make it clear to the public that it is not necessary
to complain in writing:
"If you are still not satisfied, you should write to, or
telephone ...."
"Write to the Director of Social Services or telephone for an
appointment".
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Despite the extensive logging of complaints, few departments make use
of this by producing a statistical analysis of complaints. Only 19%
(7) admitted to doing so, and one wonders how effective such a
monitoring process is. The National Consumer Council survey produced
a telling example of one authority with a complicated procedure for
recording complaints which stipulated that quarterly statistics should
be produced for the information of the directorate. Their reply to
the NCC enquiry about the extent of use was "information unavailable"
(NMC 1985, p.34).
When those authorities who said they did a statistical analysis were
contacted at the time of the Sheffield Study, two said that they did
not do this; in one the person spoken to could not understand why she
had answered "Yes" to this question, although she said it was a good
idea, and perhaps they ought to do it; another said that the analysis
was a bit crude, revealing only numbers and client groups, but not
types of complaints.	 Two actually did produce statistics, but in
neither case was this a high priority in the department. One
respondent said they were supposed to produce them every year, but in
practice it was not as often as this. They admitted that collection
of the statistics was difficult, because a lot of complaints were
handled at local level, and therefore the statistics themselves were a
bit patchy.	 One authority was trying to improve its method of
analysis.	 The analysis revealed particular areas or services in
trouble, and it was presented to management.	 In this authority the
report was supposed to be every six months, but was more likely to be
once a year. The officer in this authority also admitted that the
task of collection was difficult as information from a number of local
offices had to be collated.
Even without such statistical analysis, a surprisingly high number of
respondents (28, 76%) said that they used complaints as a method of
reviewing their administrative procedures. This is clearly not done
in a systematic way and must depend on particular complaints coming to
the attention of key officers. However, the majority of respondents
(24, 65%) saw the advantages of complaints procedures from the point
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of view of management efficiency. Of these, 7 mentioned that such
procedures helped to ensure a standardised uniform approach from the
staff, while others spoke of such procedures creating staff awareness
of their responsibility; clarifying boundaries and resulting in a
definite conclusion; being useful monitoring devices for types of
complaint and staff performance. This is a recognition of the
positive role of complaints procedures, and their use as a resource by
revealing weaknesses in the system. It is hoped that the Audit
Commission's emphasis on the use of complaints as key indicators for
some areas of work in social services departments will encourage local
authorities to see the positive aspects of complaints procedures (See
Audit Commission 1986b). Indeed, participants at a recent conference
on complaints procedures in social services departments agreed that
"systems and structures for the recording, processing, monitoring and
resolving of complaints were crucial" (AMA 1988, p25).
Some of the bodies calling for complaints procedures set out models or
checklists for the elements which should be embodied into a good
complaints procedure (see, for example, NCVO 1984, pp68-9; Wadcock and
Tames 1984, p3). I would agree with Doyle (1988) that it is best not
to produce a single model procedure, but rather it is better to help
authorities to develop their own policies, by raising important issues
and generating suggestions which would be adapted to local needs and
circumstances (p14). On any checklist of good practice, most of the
authorities who responded to the Sheffield Study survey were
deficient, especially in relation to publicity and the possibility of
an independent element in the procedure.
This section has looked at departmental procedures, and while I would
agree with Berry (1988a) that a departmental-wide procedure is
necessary because "ultimately for such policies to be effective ....
they should be available to every user to any local authority service"
(p19), there were departments which had complaints procedures for
particular areas of work. In the next section I will examine some of
these to see how useful they are.
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Complaints Procedures in Specific Areas 
Social services departments have a number of powers and duties in
relation to the chronically sick and disabled. This often involves
the exercise of discretionary powers in relation to resource
allocation, which may and often does give rise to complaints. In a
number of authorities visited during the Sheffield Study research,
officers claimed that most of their complaints were about the
inadequate provision of these services. It was admitted that
departments were often unable to provide people with what they need,
and that complaints arise because of the shortage of resources coupled
with the poverty of the consumers. Some officers said that they were
in the business of rationing resources and services, and that most of
their disputes were about assessment of need.
The Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 places a duty on
social services departments to inform themselves of the number of
people with physical handicaps in their locality, and requires them to
make help available when it is satisfied that such help is necessary
in order to meet the needs of such people. "Need" is not defined in
the act, and local authorities are left to set their own criteria for
allocation of such "help".
The Sheffield Study fieldwork revealed that most of the complaints
which departments receive are about aids and adaptations under the
Act, the reason being that the consumers are "middle class and
articulate". The National Consumer Council study (NCC 1985) found
that 36 authorities (61%) have a complaints procedure for complaints
under this Act (p30), and the Sheffield Study fieldwork revealed more
general support for member involvement in this area, where the problem
was one of resource allocation rather than professional Judgement.
The Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation conducted a
survey in 1980 of disabled people, asking for information about
difficulty in obtaining services under the Act. They found that some
authorities were failing to fufil their clients requirements, and
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complaints were concerned with the way need was assessed or the time
it took to provide the assessment. This was a problem noted in some
of the authorities visited during the Sheffield Study where the
nationwide shortage of occupational therapists had led to problems of
delay concerning adaptations of houses for the disabled. Those who
received help complained about the cost of the service, or that the
services were inadequate or unsuitable. The conclusion of the survey
was that there was a pressing need for an appeal procedure for
disabled persons dissatisfied with the assessment of need or service
provided.
The Audit Commission (1986b) suggested that authorities should be
finding ways of assessing what clients, carers and parents think about
the services provided for the handicapped, and that complaints were
one method of discovering this (p43). They also suggested that
"disabled people may choose not to use unsatisfactory services and
reasons should be sought for low take-up rates" (p56). Again, it is
suggested that complaints can be used to monitor service delivery.
Residential care is another area where a specific complaint procedure
mad be useful, and in the Sheffield Study, it was decided to
concentrate on questions and problems surrounding residential care for
the elderly. The Residential Care Report (NISW 1988a) emphasised that
people in residential care should be able to exercise "a positive
choice over the combination of accommodation and personal services
which they require", and in order to do this they need, among other
things, "ways to appeal against inadequate, inappropriate or enforced
services" so that they can be guarded against "being overwhelmed by
the power of the service providers" (p26).
The National Consumer Council (NCC 1985), in their survey, found that
37 authorities (63%) had complaints procedures for residential homes
for the elderly and handicapped (p27). They also cited examples of
local authorities issuing booklets to residents with information about
the home and references to complaints and queries (p28). During the
Sheffield Study fieldwork such practices became evident. For example,
- 253 -
one authority issued a booklet which encourages residents to write
directly to the director in a letter marked "personal" in the case of
an unresolved complaint, or ask to see the official visitor from the
committee, who visits the home each month.
Despite such booklets, and procedures, it became evident that
complaints do not usually come from the elderly residents themselves,
but rather from relatives or someone within the authority. Even so,
there remains many submerged grievances since, however caring
relatives might be, they are conscious that residents remain
vulnerable, and that complaining might increase that vulnerability.
Hallett (1982) also recognises that it is unlikely that externally
imposed checks and controls can offer more than a slender hope of
protection to some vulnerable residents in residential homes (00).
Because of this vulnerability, it has been recommended that all
residents in residential homes should have a "citizen advocate or
friend" (NCVO 1984, p75). The Residential Care Report makes a similar
to independent advocatesrecommendation, suggesting that access
assist the elderly to overcome the fear of
victimisation (NISW 1988a, p187).
may
recrimination and
One authority visited during the Sheffield Study fieldwork had no
procedure for complaints for the elderly in residential care, but said
that councillors and officers regularly visited the homes and would
receive complaints from residents. However, it was interesting to
note that experience convinced them that this outlet was no longer
satisfactory and they decided that a more formalised procedure for
these types of complaints was needed. 	 A study by the Centre for
Policy on Ageing found that some of the authorities which had adopted
the code of practice for residential homes, including the
recommendations on complaints, seemed to have the best record in
resolving disputes at the level of the home itself (Centre for Policy
on Ageing 1984, p60).
It is interesting that staff in residential homes recognise the
benefits of a simple, well publicised complaints procedure (NISW 1988a
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p156). What they wanted was a procedure which would deal with the
residents' fear of retribution, but would not contribute to the
staffs' feeling of being subjected to constant criticism by "self-
appointed vigilantes". There was a feeling that complaints may not be
as frequent if there was more efficient monitoring of homes and
tighter restrictions on who could run them (p157). The report itself
recommends that there should be national guidelines for the inspection
of residential homes, which "should give equal attention to standards
of accommodation, quality of life and the qualifications of management
end staff" (NISW 1988a, p59).
The Audit Commission (1986b) is also concerned about the standards of
care given to the elderly, suggesting that councils should have
"agreed criteria for the provision of different forms of care", and
"quality standards laid down by the council for the various forms of
provision" (p32). The key indicators, which the council should use to
monitor service delivery in this area, are statements of standards and
complaints.
The child-care aspect of local authority work is arguably the most
contentious area, and this is an area where a complaints procedure
mild be useful. The contentious aspects of the admittance of a child
Into care are handled by the courts, and such intervention was seen as
desirable by officers and social workers interviewed during the course
of the Sheffield Study. The Children Act 1989 puts more onus on the
courts in care cases, and local authorities will no longer be able to
assume parental rights through council resolution (section 31). Only
the court can make an order putting a child in the care of the local
authority or under the supervision of the local authority. The
Children Act 1989 also repeals the legislation on place of safety
orders (which allows children in danger to be removed from their homes
for up to 28 days), and replaces it with a new Emergency Protection
Order, which the court will grant only if satisfied that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the child is likely to suffer
"significant harm".	 Such orders can initially be granted for eight
days, but are extendable for seven days. Parents who are not present
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when the order is made will be able to challenge it in court after 72
hours (sections 44, 45).
Once in care, the question of access to the child by parents and
others having an interest becomes important. The DHSS issued a code
of practice "Access to Children in Care" in 1983, which recommended,
inter alia, that local authorities should have clear procedures to
enable parents and other relatives to pursue complaints about access
and to be able to ask for decisions to be reviewed (DHSS 1983a, para
28). The code recommends that directors of social services should
consider cases involving termination or refusal of access (pare 29)
and that arrangements should be made for members to consider cases
where the director cannot satisfy the complainant. Individual
authorities are left to decide on the extent of member involvement
(pare 30).
The National Consumer Council (NCC 1985) found that 14 out of 59
respondents had no procedure for access to children in care (p24).
The Sheffield Study survey results were more favourable, with all but
one authority claiming to have adopted the DHSS code of practice. The
fieldwork and additional documentation revealed a wide variety of good
practice. One authority set up a parental rights sub-committee which
monitors cases where access is terminated, refused, or substantially
restricted. Some authorities have a right of appeal to the social
services committee or a sub-committee, and others have the final
appeal to the chair or vice-chair of the committee. Some authorities
stress that the child's wishes should always be ascertained in access
cases.
Despite these claims, the Local Ombudsman has recently criticised two
authorities concerning their procedures about access to children in
care (CLA Annual Report 1989/90, pp21-22). In one (88/A/1026), where
the complainant was concerned about access to her grandchildren, the
council did not have adequate arrangements for complaints, and the
complainant was denied the opportunity to appeal to members, as was
suggested by the DHSS code of practice (DHSS 1983a). The other council
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(88/A/1235) was criticised because, although it had a formal
complaints procedure, it did not provide for recourse to elected
members.
The Children Act 1989 places greater emphasis on children in care
maintaining contact with their parents, which may go some way to
allaying the criticism by the European Court of Human Rights that
English Law does not allow parents sufficient juridicial rights to
have access to their children (see Stevens 1989). Section 34 provides
for children in care to have reasonable contact with their parents or
guardians, and only the court can restrict access, except in the case
of short term emergencies, where the local authority can restrict
access, but only for 7 days. Even in the case of Emergency Protection
Orders, the Act provides that reasonable contact with parents should
be allowed (Section 44[13]).
The Act also places a duty on local authorities to promote contact
between a child and parents (Schedule 2, para 15[1]), and the
Department of Health consultation paper reminds authorities that
parental participation "is one of the key provisions of the Children
Act 1989" and a non-custodial parent should be kept informed about
changes in their child's placement (DoH 1990d, p23).
The Children Act 1989 also requires every local authority to establish
a complaints procedure for children in care, their parents and foster
parents (section 26[3]). The procedure must ensure that at least one
person who is not a member or officer of the authority takes part in
the procedure, and that complainants should be notified in Qriting of
the decision reached and their reason for taking that decision and of
any action which they have taken, or propose to take. The draft
regulations (see DoH 1990e) provide for a two stage procedure, with an
independent element at each stage (Annex B), and it is suggested that
an independent element "will inspire confidence in the procedure" (DoH
1990a, pare 9). The consultation paper also recognises that the
benefit of such a complaints procedure is that it will illustrate "how
policies translate into practice and highlight areas where authorities
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should be more aware of the needs of individual clients and the
community" (DoH 1990e, pars 8).
Local authorities are also required to publicise their procedures
(section 26[8]). The Department of Health recommends that the
authority should "publicly announce the setting up of the procedure
and invite the participation of service users, community groups and
others", and that information should be available in the form of
leaflets and posters. It is also suggested that the publicity material
should present a positive view of the procedure (DoH 1990a, pare 12).
Jervis (1989a) concludes that the inclusion of a complaints procedure
for children in care in the Children Act is "the first step to
consumer accountability" (p16), but warns that "without carefully
thought out structures, complaints procedures can merely be a nominal
gesture acting as a smokescreen" (p16). Robertson (1989) also warns
that authorities may use the rule of sub-judice "an all-enveloping
concept used readily by some authorities to stifle investigation of
complaint" (p225). Nothing found in the fieldwork during the Sheffield
Study would detract from such warnings, and certainly the procedures
which were effective were those which were "woven into consumer
oriented services" (Jervis 1989a, p16). Certainly the Department of
Health is anxious to see a commitment to the representations
procedure, and recommend an "unequivocal policy statement" on the
scope and benefit of the procedure, together with staff training. The
Department hopes that the procedure will be "viewed as another aspect
of service provision to meet the needs of service users" (pare 13).
Nevertheless, I would agree with Robertson (1989) that the various
reforms introduced by the Children Act will raise expectations, and
that this "will have enormous implications for social services
departments who, for a long time have hidden behind self-protective
veils of confusion, due, by and large, to widespread ignorance of
their powers and responsibilities in the wider professional public"
(p225). Hopefully, the end result will be that social services
departments will become more accountable in all areas of their work.
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This section has examined some areas where complaints procedures cover
specific areas of social services work, and it can be concluded that
they have a valuable role to play. However, all consumers should have
some avenue of redress, and that is why there should also be a
departmental procedure which will cover any type of complaint. Also,
during the course of the Sheffield research it became obvious that,
vital though internal complaints procedures may be, they are not
enough in themselves unless they are supplemented by good practices
and procedures in all areas of work. In the next section I will
examine other procedures which need developing or improving in order
to safeguard the interests of consumers of the social services.
Clients Rights in Social Services Departments 
One of the conclusions from the recent conference on complaints
procedures in social services departments was that "complaints
procedures are important, but that they are insufficient in
themselves" (AMA 1988, p26). This is especially true of the social
services, where both clients and workers "are often in vulnerable
'private' situations which demand more than administrative appeal or
complaint" (Timms and Timns 1982, pp34-35). Evidence suggests that
these are the very clients who are reluctant to complain, but their
interests must be protected, particularly as they "may also by virtue
of disadvantage or handicap be in a poor position to fight for their
rights, and in many instances they may be receiving attention from the
agency against their wishes" (Barclay 1982, p187). In this section I
want to look at particular areas of work where improvements could be
made, or where good practices were observed during the Sheffield
Study, which should go some way to protecting clients.
One area of concern is the conduct of case conferences, particularly
in relation to children, and a number of problems with case
conferences were identified during the course of the Sheffield Study.
During that study it also became apparent that "case conference" was
an extremely elastic concept, covering statutory reviews for children
in care, cases of child abuse and even informal discussions among
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social workers. Harris and Timms (1988) also noted that "consistently
with the findings of other studies, the use of case conferences was
variable" (p193). The Children's Legal Centre conducted a survey in
1983 on statutory six monthly reviews for children in care. They too
discovered that the concept of "case conference" was nebulous and that
there was no consensus among authorities about the distinction between
case conferences and reviews.
	
The only real distinction is that
holding reviews is a statutory duty, while case conferences are
discretionary (Children's Legal Centre 1983, p10).
In the Sheffield Study survey only three respondents claimed to allow
child clients to attend case conferences as a matter of course, with
92% (34) allowing attendance sometimes, depending on the age and
understanding of the child. As for representation, 21% (8) said that
they always allowed it, and 60% (22) only allowed it in certain cases.
A further 19% (7) did not allow representation in any circumstances.
What was more surprising was that where case conferences involved
witat clients only 13% (5) of authorities allowed attendance in all
cases, the rest allowing it at the discretion of the authority, often
exercising this discretion according to what was considered the
client's best interests.
There is also evidence to suggest that case conferences and reviews
are not central to the decision making process (see DHSS 1985b,
p14,p32). This view was confirmed by remarks made by officers during
the Sheffield Study that the important decisions are made elsewhere,
social workers often using ad hoc case conferences as a means of
providing support for a particular decision or action which they have
already taken. It has been suggested that the nature and function of
case conferences should be clarified, and that if they are intended to
serve a decision making function, that decision should not be made
elsewhere. I would endorse the recommendation of the National Council
for Voluntary Organisations that:
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"Agendas should be used at a case conference to clarify the
purpose of the conference, individual roles, especially that of
the client, and how information is to be shared" (NCVO 1984,
p88).
The Children Act 1989 makes no explicit reference to families
attending case conferences, despite the fact that the Family Rights
Group put forward an amendment to ensure that parents had the right in
principle to attend and to be kept fully in the picture (see Jervis
1989, p24). There is also no provision for the challenging in court
of decisions about children once they are in care, and it is therefore
important that there are procedures within the authority to challenge
these decisions and there is "a desperate need for an advocacy system
for children in care, independent of the authority" (Robertson 1989,
p225).
This is also one of the recommendations from a Voice for the Child in
Care, particularly in relation to secure accommodation (James 1987),
and Harris and Timms (1988), who believe that an independent person at
case conferences is a "minimum requirement of good child care
practice" (p194). Harris and Timms (1988) also found that, in secure
accommodation decisions, the courts frequently rubber-stamp
applications, making "the role of case conferences in many cases a de
facto decision-making body, whatever its formal status" (p193.
Original emphasis).	 They maintain that a "strong interpretation of
this by the European Court of Human Rights could lead to further
difficulty for the British Government" (p193). These comments could
also apply to the use of case-conferences in other areas of child-
care, and there has been a call for a review of the - "guidelines to
local authorities in such a way as to reduce the secrecy of the
hearings", and for "a study of the policy and practice of case studies
in child care generally" (Harris and Timms 1988, p194). Such a study
is long overdue.
Social services departments in effect admitted that their own
procedures were not good enough, during the Sheffield Study research.
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84% of respondents to the survey thought that case conferences could
be improved, the majority calling for better information for clients,
and client participation. Others said there should be more staff
training and simplification of the procedure.
Another effective method of protecting clients rights is to give the
necessary information, and this is especially so in social services
departments.
"The client must be given an essential minimum of information,
including information from records, as to what decisions have
been taken about him, by whom and why" (Barclay 1982, p191).
The DHSS, in their circular on social services records, set out
general principles governing the disclosure of information contained
in social services files. Local authorities are asked to review their
policy on access, and to formulate a procedure for handling requests
for access to information. Although there is recognition that there
will need to be restrictions on access in some cases, the circular
stresses that this should be kept to a minimum: "the need to refuse
requests from clients to know what is said about them in case records
will arise only exceptionally" (DHSS 1983b, para 4).
The National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO 1984)
recommends that clients should be encouraged to participate in the
construction of their records. Clients should have the opportunity to
read the record of an interview and to comment upon it; there should
be clear and simple procedures for clients to gain access to their
records; there should be independent bodies to arbitrate in the case
of disagreement (pp86-87). The Short Report (1984) believes that
children are entitled to as much information as adults, and to know
details of their past and families (pars 357).
The National Consumer Council (NCC 1985) found that 59% of the
respondents to their survey claimed to have complaints procedures
covering access to records (p29). The impression gained on fieldwork
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during the Sheffield Study indicates that this is an optimistic
figure. Authorities visited either had no policy on access, or were
wrestling with the problem of a procedure and policy. One officer
interviewed confessed to there being a fundamental disagreement about
access to files within the department. An officer in another
authority said that all his staff agreed that people should see what
was written about them, but the department was in a state of chaos
about what sort of information could be disclosed. I would contend
that access to information is vital, if clients rights are to be taken
seriously.
An independent element in an appeals procedure is an effective way of
protecting clients' rights. Barclay (1982) says that aggrieved
clients "must have access either to an independent professional
opinion or to some other objective yardstick as to what constitutes
acceptable practice" (p91).	 The NCVO (1984) has also stressed the
importance of an independent assessor or appeal body (p88).
In reply to a question on the Sheffield Study questionnaire about
access to independent professional opinions for aggrieved clients, it
was found that only one authority had provision for this in all cases.
A further 11 (30%) had provision for this in some cases, at the
discretion of the director, and the rest did not provide for it at
all. Opinion was divided about whether complainants should have a
right of appeal to an independent body, which would be able to review
all aspects of the case.
The Children Act 1989 introduces the requirement for an independent
element in the complaints procedure set up to hear complaints about
children in care (section 26(4)) and this seems to be a step in the
right direction. Also the use of an authority-wide complaints
procedure, where departmental procedures had been exhausted, could
introduce a semi-independent element into the complaints investigation
(see Berry 1988a, p19). Another interesting idea suggested by Berry
(1988a) was for authorities to collaborate in introducing complaints
procedures, which may enable the creation of linked posts of
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investigating officers who could provide some additional element of
independence in any investigation" (p19).
I have already mentioned the problems relating to case conferences.
Another area of concern is the practice in relation to child-
protection registers. There are no statutory provisions about such a
register, which is described in a memorandum from the DHSS to Local
Authorities in August 1980 as:
"a central register of children who have been or may be the
victims of abuse and who are the subject of serious professional
concern" (DHSS 1980).
The register is described as an administrative aid to professional
workers in the field of child abuse, and it is to be treated as
confidential. The memorandum states that:
"a decision to place a child's name on the register should only
be taken at a case conference. Registration is essentially an
agreement between agencies to co-ordinate their efforts in
respect of a particular family, and it is therefore considered
appropriate that the decision to register should be a joint one".
(DHSS 1980).
There are around 40,000 children who have their names on child
protection registers (see Jervis 1989b, p24), and although set up as a
means of "co-ordinating services for vulnerable and seriously ill-
treated children", registration is seen by the families concerned as
"a shameful and stigmatising indictment of their conduct as parents",
and the register has become "a bureaucratic repository of defensive
social work" (Jervis 1989b, p24).
An entry is made on the register only after a case conference, and, as
has previously been mentioned, there is no right for parents to attend
such a conference, or even have their views represented. The
Cleveland Inquiry found, not surprisingly, that "parents felt a strong
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sense of grievance that conferences were making recommendations and
decisions about them and their children without, as they saw it, their
views being heard" (Butler-Sloss 1988, p58 para 4.32). One of the
recommendations of the inquiry was that parents should be informed of
case conferences and invited to attend for all or part of it, unless
"In the view of the Chairman of the conference, their presence will
preclude a full and proper consideration of the child's interests"
(Butler-Sloss 1988, p246).
In situations where a case conference results in an application for a
care order there is, at least, an opportunity for parents to raise
their objections before the court. There is no such right of appeal
in situations where the result is an entry on the "at risk" register.
Indeed, in a recent case of judicial review, it was held that where
children had been entered on the "at risk" register after a case
conference at which the parents had not been permitted to attend, the
parent had not lost a right nor been denied a legitimate expectation,
and the barring from the meeting was not reviewable (R v Harrow London 
B.C. ex parte D(1988) LGR 41).
However, in another case the court held that local authorities are not
free to exercise arbitrary control over the entry of names of alleged
abusers on a child abuse register with total immunity from supervision
by the court. This case (R v Norfolk County Council. ex parte M 
(1989) 2 All ER 359) was brought by a person who had been named as a
suspected abuser by a case conference about which he had no prior
warning, and to which he had no opportunity to present his case or
object. But this was treated as a special situation, and the court
accepted that a case conference which was deciding whether or not to
place a name on the register as an abuser was not acting judicially,
and therefore the rules of natural justice were not automatically
applicable.
Because of the particular exceptional facts of this case certiorari
was used to quash the case conference decision insofar as Mr M. was
identified as a suspected abuser.
	 Although the court did say that
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there was a duty to act fairly, this was seen as a flexible concept,
and cases involving a parent or other custodian may require different
treatment to those involving a stranger. Whilst applauding the result
in this case, it seems more concerned with the rights of third parties
and strangers, and there does seem to be a case for appeal against
registration.
Jervis (1989b) notes that other countries recognise the civil
liberties aspect of registers and have them governed by legislation
(1)24). For example, in Canada an appeal against registration can be
made by application to a court, whereas here the only route is through
judicial review. Such a review can only order the decision to be made
again, but cannot overturn it. This is an area of concern not
addressed in the Children Act 1989, nor does the Act include an
explicit reference to parents attending case conferences, despite the
fact that there appears to be an "inarguable case for families to have
general access" to them (Jervis 1989b, p24). This is an area where
some external review is necessary, in order to safeguard clients
rights, and, as was discussed in Chapter 6, the possibility of review
by the court can effect the quality of decision making.
This section has explained some areas of social services departments
work where improvements in procedures are needed in order that
clients' rights may be protected. With such improvements there may,
indeed, be fewer complaints. The point has been well made previously
that one cannot impose a complaints procedure and expect the whole
culture of the department to change, and that is why improvements in
the areas just discussed should indicate a commitment to the clients
interests. In this respect the Children's Rights Service, introduced
recently by Leicestershire County Council social services department,
is to be applauded. This is an attempt to change the culture within
the department and change staff attitudes. It is not just a
complaints procedure, but a whole rights service, headed by a
children's rights officer (CRO), which is available for staff as well
as children and their carers. It was introduced only after extensive
consultations with trade unions and professional bodies, and with the
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help of the National Children's Bureau, which is giving it publicity
and support.
Part of the job description of the CRO is to "promote and develop the
rights and interests of children in care in all aspects of child care
policy, planning and practice", and it is expected therefore that
officers and elected members acknowledge and support the discretionary
aspects of the job. It is thus seen as inappropriate to restrict his
access to information, reports, key meetings and key personnel when he
is attempting to investigate or resolve a complaint.
The CRO is not just available to children and young people in care.
Staff too can seek advice on aspects of child care law, the existing
policies of the authority and the practice guidelines of government
departments. This part of the service is intended to provide a
framework to enable staff to be familiar with the "rights"
implications, so that they can bear this in mind when they make their
decisions.
The CRO is located in the social services department, and he has
direct accountability to one of the deputy directors, but is
independent from the rest of the structure. He sees that his ultimate
responsibility "through the authority of the elected members .... is
to children in care", and he would therefore be unable to support
policies, planning or practices not considered to be in the interests
of children in care. He therefore has a wide discretion for
determining the matters and policies which raise children's rights
issues.
The complaints procedure itself is a three-stage process. The first
stage (notification) requires the CRO to make "all reasonable attempts
to secure an informal resolution", which will normally involve
negotiating with the parties concerned and ensuring that they are
aware of the young person's rights. An attempt is made to explore the
potential for settling the grievance, within existing procedures, and
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there have already been a number of cases where this first stage has
been implemented to good effect.
The second stage (registration) is used if the first stage fails to
resolve the difficulty, when the complaint is "registered" with the
director of social services by means of a complaints form, if
required. This is a more formal process, which can involve written
submissions from interested parties and discussion by the director
with those people identified as the principals involved. He can also
appoint someone, who is independent of any case or management
responsibilities for these principals, to carry out further
investigation and report their findings and recommendations to him. It
is for the director to determine the outcome of the complaint, and
this is to be done within eight weeks of the complaint first being
registered.
If the child or young person in care remains dissatisfied, the third
stage (review) comes into operation. The review will be carried out by
a panel of three elected members from the personal services sub-
committee and one independent representative, not an employee of the
local authority, who will be chosen by the chief executive and
director of social services. The hearing is to take place within one
month of its being lodged, and the complainant, director and their
advisors will be allowed to attend. This right of review is only
available in cases where there has been no previous referral to a
panel or committee of elected members, for example, a complaint about
access, parental rights resolutions, adoption. For the purpose of this
procedure, its decision is final.
The procedure is being implemented by a series of training courses,
and there is a commitment to mutual and ongoing training, with the
department organising a number of one-day training courses for staff
at all levels, so that they will be familiar with the aims and
objectives of the service. In the area of recruitment, when a child
care related post is advertised, prospective candidates are informed
of the child care service. The success of this approach is evidenced
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by the fact that the procedure is being used by staff, is viewed in a
positive way, and is seen as seeking to protect legitimate rights.
This approach should be a model for other authorities.
An important feature of the scheme is that the CRO is not part of the
departmental hierarchy, so he can be detached and independent. He
believes that it is important that the decision to set up the service
came from elected members, as part of their concern for the welfare of
children in their care, and not from officers who were "suddenly
getting into consumerism". Because of this commitment from the
members, if there were a problem, the CRO would go to them for
support. He believes that they have provided invaluable support, in
particular in relation to any attempts there may have been by officers
to sabotage the procedure.
The outcome of the Leicestershire development is being watched with
interest, and although it has not yet been evaluated, the experience
so far adds support to the view adopted in this study, that in order
to be effective there has to be a commitment to changing departmental
culture, so that the procedure is seen in a positive way, and the
rights it seeks to protect are seen as legitimate.
Conclusions 
The Sheffield Study found a disturbing lack of complaints procedures
In social services departments, and a concern that even when
procedures did exist they were probably not used by dissatisfied
clients. As well as a lack of complaints procedures, the Sheffield
Study also highlighted some areas of work where procedures needed to
be introduced, in order to safeguard clients' rights.
Mua was even more disturbing about social services departments was
the culture that the professionals know best, and that to suggest that
they may be failing their clients by not having complaints procedures
was somehow undermining their work. As an example, the Local
Ombudsman, concerned about the lack of complaints to the ombudsman,
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and as a result of the findings of the Sheffield Study, circulated all
social services departments, urging them to review their arrangements.
The response from social services departments was not only defensive,
but attacked the findings of the study, and claimed that social
services were far better than the other service areas.
Such a response misses the point that, even if there are procedures,
the nature of the clients in social services departments may mean that
there are dissatisfactions and grievances which never come to the
surface. It is precisely because of this that the secretary to the
Local Ombudsman has recently written to voluntary organisations
concerning complaints about social services departments, urging them
to make complaints on behalf of clients (see CLA Annual Report
1988/89, p58), and why the Local Ombudsmen have always maintained that
they ought to be able to investigate on their own initiative, without
a complaint being referred to them.
Happily, there are signs that the defensive attitudes within social
services departments are changing, one such sign being the conference
organised by the National Institute for Social Work and the
Association of Metropolitan Authorities about complaints procedures in
the social services (see AMA 1988). This was organised as a direct
response to the Sheffield Study findings, and it was acknowleged that
there was no room for complacency, and that departments had to
"recognise inadequacy and deal with it" (p7). The whole tenor of the
proceedings from the conference is an emphasis on clients' rights and
a move away from a paternalistic attitude, so that contributors spoke
about "rights of citizenship natural justice and ... rights to
access to services" (Harris 1988, p8). Berry (1988b) too speaks about
the need for "commitment to creating respect and dignity for the
rights and responsibilities of those who receive and those who provide
social services" (p28).
The general view was that there must be a change in staff attitudes,
an acknowledgement that social workers do not always know best and a
need for managers "to make an unambiguous commitment to complaints
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policies" (Berry 1988a, p18). Time will tell whether these views are
translated into action, but that there is a commitment to change seems
evident, and I can only endorse the views expressed. It is also worth
pointing out that, while "consumerism" may not be so easily
incorporated into the work of social services departments, one
advantage of this new approach within local authorities is that the
emphasis is on customer care, which must improve the rights of users
of these services.
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CHAPTER 9 PLANNING DEPARTMENTS AND COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES
Introduction 
Having looked, in some detail, at the use of complaints procedures in
social services departments, I will now turn to an examination of
planning departments. As has already been mentioned, these two areas
of local authority activity were chosen for more detailed study,
because, although both areas have a significant impact on the lives of
consumers, and both areas are heavily legislated and regulated and
have a number of appeal mechanisms built into the statutory controls,
they have very different experiences in relation to complaints.
Social services account for only a small percentage of the Local
Ombudsman's workload, whereas planning complaints account for about
one third of ombudsman complaints (see CLA Annual Reports), a
proportion which has remained fairly consistent over the last few
years. Such a discrepancy between the two areas cannot be a function
of the degree of regulatory framework, so other explanations will be
explored, for example, the types of complaints and complainants. It
may indeed be a reflection of the context in which the two areas
operate, and the internal avenues of complaint available to those
aggrieved.
The work undertaken during the Sheffield Study pointed to the
advantages of other procedures, which are outside the regulatory
framework, as a means of reducing conflict, in particular, the
commitment to negotiation by some authorities. Details will be given
of this in this chapter.	 There are also the procedures used for
consultation and participation. However, it is difficult to make
strong recommendations about these practices, as, in a project of this
kind, the resources were not available to develop this area in as much
detail as for social services. Despite this, by looking at the
questionnaire returns, interviewing planning officers and members,
looking at files in planning departments and in the Local Ombudsman's
office, it was possible to obtain an overview of the nature of
complaints in planning departments. What did become evident was that
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there were some persistent complainants, and that the opportunity to
have another look at the problem, perhaps through the mechanism of a
complaints procedure would have helped.
The Context of Planning Departments 
I do not propose to discuss the historical context of town and country
planning (for a discussion of this, see Ashworth 1954), but it should
be noted that the present law on planning originated in the 1947 Town
and County Planning Act, which came into force on the let July 1948,
and which contained "some of the most drastic and far reaching
provisions ever enacted affecting the ownership of land 	  and the
liberty of an owner to develop and use his land as he thinks fit"
(Heap 1987, p12). This act was amended by subsequent acts in 1951,
1953, 1954 and 1959, which were later consolidated in the Town and
County Planning Act 1962. The principal act now relating to town and
county planning in England and Wales is the Town and County Planning
Act 1971, which in turn has been amended, most recently by the Housing
and Planning Act 1986.	 (For a detailed discussion of planning law,
see Heap 1987).
These acts are administered by the local planning authority for each
local government area, and the effect of the Local Government Act 1972
was to make every county council and every district council a planning
authority in its own right. When the Greater London Council and the
metropolitan counties were abolished on the 1st April 1986, powers
were transferred to the London boroughs (in Greater London) and the
metropolitan districts.
It is now only in shire counties where there are two local planning
authorities (county planning authority and district planning
authority) for every piece of land, although shire counties have
limited responsibilities in the area of development control. Since
1980, all planning applications except those relating to mineral
extraction and operations and waste disposal matters are to be decided
by the district planning authority (Local Government Planning and Land
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Act 1980, section 86E2]). The district authority will only consult
the county on certain applications relating to the following: land the
county intends to develop; matters which conflict with the policies or
general proposals in an approved, submitted or proposed structure
plan; a universal extraction area (section 86(41). In these cases,
applications are submitted to the district council who then forward
the relevant applications to the county. Even in these applications a
county authority may waive the requirement for consultation (section
86[3]). These changes were introduced in an attempt to reduce the
confusion about responsibilities for certain planning applications, as
there were areas of overlapping responsibilities, which were often a
source of conflict.
Parish councils are not local planning authorities, but they are
entitled to be consulted about certain applications for planning
permission to carry out development of land in their areas (Local
Government Act 1972, Schedule 16, pare 20, and Town and County
Planning General Development Order 1977 Article 17).
Under the old Town and County Planning Act 1947, the Minister of Town
and County Planning was the central authority for the administration
of land planning throughout England and Wales, having a duty to secure
"consistency and continuity in the framing and execution of a national
policy with respect to the use and development of land throughout
England and Wales" (Minister of Town and County Planning Act 1943,
section 1). Now all matters relating to town and county planning in
England and Wales are handled by the Secretary of State for the
Environment.
I have already mentioned the fact that planning has a significant
impact on the lives of consumers, a view which is endorsed by the
Audit Commission which speaks about the impact of planning on the
public being "profound", and "far greater than its expenditure might
suggest", observing that the "total planning process is fundamental to
the overall vision of the local authority and the council's strategy
for the future" (Audit Commission 1986c, p23).
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An important aspect of the planning authorities' work is the drawing
up of development plans, which indicate the planning proposals for
particular areas. The counties are responsible for drawing up
structure plans which consist of statements of broad policy, the
object of which is to "sketch out the trends and tendencies, to lay
down general lines and to show broadly and without detail how
development could shape up within the area of the structure plan"
(Heap 1987, p 73). Districts draw up Local Plans (Town and County
Planning Act 1971, sections 11-15B), which are prepared in line with
the general objectives of the structure plan.
With the abolition of the metropolitan county councils, a new unitary
development plan was introduced for metropolitan districts (Local
Government Act 1985, section 4 and Schedule 1 Part I) which contains
elements of the structure plan and local plan. There are proposals to
introduce a similar system for the shire counties. The White Paper
"The Future of Development Plans" (Government White Paper 1989)
outlines the government's proposals to introduce legislation to
"simplify and improve" the development plan system in England and
Wales. The proposals include the introduction of a single tier of
district development plan to replace the present two tier system, and
the provision of regional planning guidance to assist in the
preparation of new statements of county planning policies and district
development plans (Government White Paper 1989, pi).
Despite the obvious importance of development plans, this chapter will
concentrate on the development control aspect of a local planning
department's work because, not only is this "from the point of view
of the property-owner 	  the sharp end of the planning system"
(MkAuslan 1980, p147), but it is this area which precipitates
complaints to the Local Ombudsman. Hammersley (1984) estimates that
development control matters account for over 90% of the total of
planning complaints (0), a finding endorsed by the Sheffield Study
fieldwork interviews, where planning officers often noted that
virtually all their complaints related to development control, a
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handful were concerned with enforcement, and none were about forward
planning.
A cursory glance at the examples of findings of maladministration in
each Local Ombudsman annual report almost unanimously refers to the
development control aspect of planning. Indeed, because of the high
numbers of planning complaints, the Local Ombudsman proposes to give
more detailed information about them, and in future years planning
complaints will be categorised as neighbour notification/consultation;
enforcement; miscellaneous (see CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p11). This
gives some indication where the bulk of complaints arise and recent
figures indicate that over one third of planning complaints related to
neighbour notification/consultation problems (see CLA Annual Report
1989/90, p54). Hammersely (1984) found only one maladministration
report directly concerned with development plan procedures in his
examination of five years of Local Ombudsman reports (p2), presumably
because, where development plans are concerned, there are often other
mechanisms for participation in the decision-making process, which may
not be available in development control.
Not only does this area of work precipate a large number of
complaints, but, it could be argued that it is a fundamentally
important aspect of the planning authorities work. I would agree
therefore, with the sentiments expressed in one authority's Annual
Report, which spoke about the control of development being "a
statutory responsibility which lies at the heart of the planning
system". Given its crucial role, and the fact that it is concerned
with the allocation of scarce resources so that "each decision ....
even on a minor matter of development control, represents a value
judgement about the way a particular resource - usually land - should
be used" (McAuslan 1975, p xxvi), it is hardly surprising that
development control is an obvious area for conflict.
Before looking at the scale of the problem it is perhaps useful at
this point to look at the meaning of development control. Under the
1971 Act "development" is "the carrying out of building, engineering,
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mining or other operations, in, on, over or under land, or the making
of any material change in the use of any building or other land"
(section 22). Development is controlled by the grant or refusal of
planning permission, as development should only be undertaken with
planning permission granted by the local planning authority (Town and
Country Planning Act 1971, section 23[1]). Development without the
necessary planning permission is not, of itself, a criminal office:
this is only committed by a failure to comply with an enforcement
notice served under Part V of the 1971 Act. Local planning
authorities are not obliged to serve such a notice: it is a matter of
discretion, which allows the serving of an enforcement notice "if they
consider it expedient to do so" (section 87 (11).
In order to keep a sense of proportion, it is worth noting that,
despite the large numbers of complaints relating to development
control, the vast proportion of decisions are not problematic. For
example, in the six months from January to June 1989 there were
355,000 applications for planning permission to local planning
authorities and 270,5000 decisions given (See Journal of Planning and
Environment Law 1990, ppl and 245). In the year 1988/89 there were
2,889 complaints received about planning, 118 of which were the
subject of formal investigation (see CLA Annual Report 1988/89, pp48
and 51). Hammersley (1984) also notes that from 1974 to 1983 there
were 3% million planning applications made, but only 423 reports of
maladministration in planning departments.
It is also worth noting that the public at large do not appear to be
dissatisfied with planning departments. For example, Widdicombe
(1986) found that only 9% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction
with the way their local authority dealt with planning applications,
which was a much lower percentage than for other services. However,
this was not because they were in general "satisfied", as only 32%
expressed satisfaction. This again was in contrast to other services,
where a higher percentage expressed satisfaction. The majority had no
view, with 43% saying "don't know", and 16% saying that they were
neither satisfied or dissatisfied, presumably because they had had no
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direct dealings with planning departments (Widdicombe 1986, Research
Volume II p39).
This finding was endorsed by the Sheffield Study consumer survey,
which did not reveal a higher level of dissatisfaction with planning
than with other departments. Apart from, predictably, housing, which
had a 25% dissatisfaction rate, the other departments had 10% of
respondents expressing dissatisfaction. The numbers expressing
satisfaction with planning was lower (17%) than for other departments,
which ranged from 28% to 30%, but again, this may be a reflection of
the fact that few respondents had any dealings with this department,
so that they had no firm opinions. From the Sheffield Study
therefore, it appears that the majority of the public approve of or
accept the work of the planning department, with only a minority
appearing unhappy about the service they received.
However, despite the fact that obviously many development control
decisions are unproblematic, the large number of complaints is a cause
for concern, although it must be admitted that officers in planning
departments did not appear unduly concerned about it, and, as shall be
shown later in the chapter, few departments had complaints procedures.
It may be useful, at this point, to look at why there is such a high
level of complaints in planning departments.
Planning Complaints and Complainants 
The Town and County Planning Association note that the "usual reason
for a complaint is a contentious proposal, the handling of which
causes grievance either to the applicant, who feels he is being
unfairly treated or obstructed, or a neighbour, who objects to the
proposal" (TCPA 1980, p133). Experience from the Sheffield Study
indicates that it is more likely to be the neighbour who has a
complaint. Indeed, the recent categorisation of planning complaints
by the Local Ombudsman reveals that of the 2,562 planning complaints,
758 were in relation to neighbour notification and consultation, and
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284 were about enforcement (CLA Annual Report 1989/90, p54). A
cursory look at the Local Ombudsman reports indicates that these, in
the main, come from dissatisfied third parties rather than applicants
for planning permission.
The majority of respondents to the Sheffield Study survey of local
authority planning departments (62%, 81) thought that complaints arose
because dissatisfied third parties or neighbours were using the Local
Ombudsman as a means of appeal. This was endorsed during fieldwork,
when a number of officers mentioned that planning was essentially
"conflict prone" and that it was almost inevitable that interest
groups and amenity groups would complain if they did not agree with
the council. While acknowledging that this may be the case, and that
this in turn may be a function of the recognition of the value and
right of public participation, which was introduced by the Skeffington
Report (1969), good authorities have introduced procedures to try to
reduce complaints from third parties. These will be discussed later
in the chapter. 40% (53) of the Sheffield Study survey respondents
also thought that complaints were inevitable because of the complex
and discretionary nature of planning decision-making, and a lack of
public awareness about the role of planning.
During fieldwork officers spoke of the public's "misunderstanding the
extent of the ombudsmans power", and trying to use the Local Ombudsman
as a threat. One officer complained that public participation in the
planning process had "been encouraged to an extent where it is now
reducing the quality of decisions", and that because there is no
appeal against an unsuccessful objection, the Local Ombudsman is used
out of a sense of frustration and misunderstanding of his powers.
This gives some insight into the planners perceptions of their role,
which is that of professionals exercising their judgement in an
impartial way for the benefit of the whole community, and which is
summarised by one respondent, who thought that complaints arose
because of:
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"the misunderstanding of town and county planning as an
administrative/bureaucratic process of interference with private
rights rather than a technical task serving the public interest.
Unlike more obviously specialist fields where one hesitates to
dabble, everyone can be 'an amateur planner'".
This attitude, of planners seeing themselves as neutral, skilled
advisers, has been observed by Goldsmith (1986), who notes that the
view that planning is a political activity in the broadest sense "has
only recently and grudgingly been accepted by the plannIng proiesslon
itself" (p126). This is a result of the professional ideology, which
claimed that planning was "objective, technical and ... non-
political", and a belief that there was no disagreement in society
about goals, and that the means for achieving them "could be decided
by the technical methods available to the planner" (p126).
Such attitudes are not universal, and there were authorities which
were concerned to see planning decisions as involving a wider
constituency. As an example, one London borough, in its "Statement of
Current Policies" for planning, lists as the objectives which the
development control process must satisfy as follows:
"The first is to ensure that the Council's intentions with
respect to development in the Borough .... are carried out, and
the second is to ensure that applications are dealt with
efficiently and speedily .... Lastly the process must ensure that
both developers and other interested parties have reasonable
information and access to the Council. so that fair and 
reasonable decisions are taken" (emphasis added).
Burton (1986), the head of planning in a London borough, also makes
the point that his council "recognises that in order to have a healthy
planning system, it must have the support of the public" and that
"planning decisions should be reached openly and clearly seen to be
fair and consistent" (p1).
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The Sheffield Study survey also revealed that half (51%, 67) of the
respondents from planning departments thought that complaints were a
reflection of the fact that there was much public interest in
planning, and that there was a major concern about private property
values. Again, during fieldwork, this point was taken up, with
officers saying that people complained because of the impact of
planning on people's lives, and that the public were "more involved
with the political processes these days". It was also thought to be a
function of the increase in home ownership. Before the 1947 Act, few
people owned their own homes, so there was less concern about
protecting private property values in the past. 12 (9%) respondents
also thought that people used the Local Ombudsman and planning
departments, to attempt to settle neighbour and nuisance disputes, a
reason that was mentioned during fieldwork, and about which there was
evidence on some of the local authority files.
From reading Local Ombudsman reports, the ombudsman seems to identify
third party problems as a major cause of complaint. Laws (CLA Annual
Report 1985) urges local authorities to keep their procedures
regarding neighbour notification under review because "if notification
of applications is restricted, or even omitted altogether, the sense
of grievance is heightened" (p12). He criticises those authorities
which "still maintain a policy of simply carrying out such
notifications as are required by statute", maintaining that, if they
do not have a discretionary notification procedure they should have a
system "for considering in each case whether amenity considerations
require that neighbours should be notified" (p12). More details about
consultations and neighbour notification will be given later in the
chapter, but it is useful to note here the use of the ombudsman as a
quality control mechanism for improving practices and procedures.
Hammersley (1984) in his study of five years of Local Ombudsman
decisions in planning reports found, that of the 269 cases of
maladministration during this period, 23% were concerned with failures
to consult third parties, and 18% were about a failure to obtain other
appropriate information. 	 These cases referred "almost entirely to
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'neighbour consultation' - where there is no statutory obligation to
do so" (p3). Other major areas where maladministration was found
referred to failures to enforce planning controls (18%), failure to
convey information to decision making bodies (13%) and giving wrong
information to the public (11%). In this latter category, two thirds
of cases concerned applicants or developers, who, for example, were
told that planning permission was not required, but this was later
found to be untrue and an application was refused or amended after
work had begun, or they were asked to produce expensive plans which
were subsequently found to be unnecessary. The other third concerned
third party misinformation, where, for example, a neighbour is told by
an officer that an application is bound to be refused, as a result of
which the neighbour does not _submit a formal objection, but this
application is subsequently approved (p6). In the main, then, he
found that the complaints were from neighbours who were unhappy about
the grant of planning permission, and the effect it would have on
their property.
Only a minority of respondents (11, 8%) to the Sheffield Study survey
thought that the sheer volume of work led to complaints, and only 12
(9%) mentioned staff shortages and staff fallibility causing
complaints. However, there can be no doubt that mistakes will occur,
and unlike the clients of social services departments, those who have
dealings with planning departments are unlikely to accept the
consequences. Friedman (1974) has noted that the "better educated and
higher-economic classes" have a tendency to complain, a view endorsed
by Justice (1980) and Lewis and Gateshill (1978) which found a strong
middle-class bias among complainants to the Local Ombudsman. The
Sheffield Study Ombudsmen Complainants survey also endorses this
finding, with 77% of the respondents being owner-occupiers.
The clients of planning departments tend to be owner occupiers and
from the higher socio-economic classes. The Sheffield Study consumer
survey found that, of the 33 respondents who had dealt with the
planning department, 23 were private sector residents, and 22 were in
social classes ABC1, which was in marked contrast to those respondents
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who had dealt with the housing and social services departments. So,
unlike social services clients, they are more likely to complain when
they feel dissatisfied with a decision.
In most cases complainants have little to lose by complaining, and a
great deal to gain by a successful complaint. Time and again, during
the Sheffield Study fieldwork, officers noted that ombudsman
complaints were a form of third party appeal against planning
permission, for those who had no other form of redress. Does this,
then, indicate that there should be some method of appeal by third
parties when there is a grant of planning permission? Harlow and
Rawlings (1984) point out that it is important "to bear in mind how
limited are the rights of 'objectors' to participate in development
control procedures" (p247), as only the applicant can appeal to the
Minister.
Despite the obvious frustration felt by third parties, not one
planning officer interviewed wanted the introduction of a statutory
right of third party appeal to the minister. They saw that the
problem was best tackled by consultation at an early stage.
The evidence from the Royal Town Planning Institute to the Widdicombe
Inquiry (RIP! 1985) came out strongly against introducing a right of
appeal for third party objectors against the grant of planning
permission, believing it "would further weaken the role of elected
members and make the planning application process unreasonably
protracted and uncertain" (p5). The introduction of such an appeal
would entail a large number of practical and procedural problems, and
although public consultation is very important "an applicant for
planning permission is entitled to permission unless there are strong
and overwhelming reasons for refusal and the balance should not be
disturbed by strengthening the forces against change" (p5).
This presumption in favour of planning permiesion is not new. In 1953
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government was saying that
development "should always be encouraged unless it would cause
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demonstrable harm to an interest of acknowledged importance"
(Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1953, pare 2f a]). Recent
guidance from the Department of the Environment has endorsed this
principle:
"The planning system fails in its function where its prevents,
inhibits or delays development which can reasonably be permitted.
There is always a presumption in favour of allowing applications
for development, having regard to all material considerations,
unless that development would cause demonstrable harm to
interests of acknowledged importance" (DoE 1988, pare 15).
Of course, this begs the question of what is meant by "demonstrable
harm", and what "interests" should be taken into account. Elsewhere
in the Circular (DoE 1988), the purpose of planning is acknowledged to
be the regulation of the "development and the use of land in the
public interest" (pare 17). Again, who defines "the public interest",
and what about the many conflicting interests that may arise in
development control situations? Moreoever, the Minister has admitted
that the presumption in favour of development does not override
established policies, but is rather a statement of the basis of the
whole system, "that good reasons must be given to justify any refusal
of permission" (Minister's speech at the AGM of the Planning
Inspectorate, quoted in the Journal of Planning and Environment Law
1990, p178).
Thie is a recognition that an application for planning permission is
not solely a matter between an applicant and the local planning
authority. On the one hand the authority will devise its policies
according to the needs of the locality. In other words, decisions on
planning applications "are based on wider policies and proposals in
which the public also need to be involved" (Burton 1986, p1).
Moreover individual third parties or neighbours may have legitimate
Interests which have to be taken into account. It does, however, seem
unlikely that a form of appeal by aggrieved third parties will be
introduced, and that fact in itself indicates a need for some
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complaints procedures within the authority where aggrieved third
parties can seek redress. Before exploring the extent of such
procedures, I want to look at the other avenues of redress which can
be used for grievances in planning departments.
Additional Avenues for the Redress of Grievances 
The courts, traditionally, are the institutions to which aggrieved
citizens will turn, but their use in development control is limited.
Applications to the High Court for the review of planning decisions
are "governed by preclusive procedural provisions which are desisned
to restrict the means by which a challenge may be brought, the class
of person who may bring it, the time within which they may do so, and
the grounds on which they may rely" (Boydell and Lewis 1989, p146).
Even when cases are brought, less than 50% are successful, and even
for those which are successful there is "an even chance that the
quashed decision will be redetermined to its original effect" (p146).
One method of challenge is by virtue of section 245 of the Town and
Country Planning Act 1971, which allows an appeal concerning the
validity of a decision by the Secretary of State in certain limited
circumstances, by a person "aggrieved" by the decision, that is by any
person who had a right to have his/her representations considered on
the appeal and who feels a genuine grievance at the way the decision
has gone, but not someone who is a "mere busybody" (Boyden and Lewis
1989, p146). Should the Secretary of State's decision be quashed, it
has to be redetermined and a fresh decision must be reached in
accordance with the court's judgement. The court cannot substitute
its own decision for that of the Secretary of State (p154). As this
particular procedure relates only to decisions of the Secretary of
State, and not local authorities it is not a method of challenging
planning departments decisions, and will therefore not be discussed.
The procedure which can be used against a local planning authority is
that of challenging, by way of Judicial review under Order 53 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court, decisions of local authorities.
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This remedy is limited, because it will not be granted where there is
an effective redress at the applicant's disposal. For example, in R
v. London Borough of Hillingdon. ex p. Royco Homes Limited (1974) 2
WLR 805, conditions were attached to an outline planning permission,
for residential development, that the houses built should be occupied
by people on the council's waiting list for council housing, with
security of tenure for 10 years. These conditions were unanimously
held to be unreasonable and ultra vires because the conditions were
not directed to furthering a town planning purpose. However, the
court did say that this remedy would not be available where there was
an effective means of redress, where almost invariably there would be
in planning cases, because of the appeal system under the Town and
Country Planning Act. This case indicates therefore that "an
applicant who is refused planning permission should follow the
statutory appeal procedures unless the excess of power alleged against
the local authority is something quite out of the ordinary" (Boyden.
and Lewis 1989, p153).
In the normal course of events, the aggrieved applicant will appeal to
the Secretary of State, and such conditions will be removed if, for
example, they do not serve a planning purpose or do not fairly relate
to the development permitted. Where judicial review is more likely to
be used is where allegations are made against a local authority of
improper motive or bad faith in reaching a planning decision, that is,
in cases where it is the process of decision-making, not the merits of
the decision itself which is to be examined.
In view of this, it will not usually be applicants for planning
permission who use Order 53, but rather those who cannot make use of
the appeal procedures provided by the Town and Country Planning Act.
In other words, it will be aggrieved third parties who use the courts
in an attempt to quash the decision of a local authority to grant
planning permission.
For example, in R v. Torfaen B.C. ex parte Jones (1986) SPL 686,
owners of kennels applied for planning permission to rebuild kennels
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which had caused a nuisance in the past. Despite objections from
neighbours the planning committee supported the application. One of
the objectors (Jones) had requested a site meeting because the plans
he had seen appeared to be inaccurate, but this was rejected by the
committee and planning permission was eventually granted. Judicial
review was granted on the grounds (inter alia) that the local planning
authority should consider planning applications fairly, and that this
required both the views of the applicants and objectors to be
considered. To fulfil the "fairness" requirement the committee should
have allowed representations from the objectors in respect of the
amended plans.
	 The objectors were prejudiced because they were not
dealt with fairly, and were therefore entitled to relief.
This requirement to act fairly was also the basis of the decision in R
v. Great Yarmouth B. C. ex parte Botton Bros. Arcades Ltd (1988) JPL
18, which concerned an application for change of use from a hotel to
an amusement arcade. Although the non-statutory seafront plan of 1980
indicated a preference in favour of commercial entertainment, since
1984 permission for further arcades had been refused on the grounds of
proliferation. The initial response therefore was to refuse this
change of use, but after taking expert advice that the building was
non-viable as a hotel, the application was supported. Existing arcade
owners were aware of the application but they did not object because
they were aware of the policy on arcades and assumed it would be
refused. When they became aware that it could be approved they asked
the council to defer the decision so that they could make objections,
but this was not done, and permission was granted.
On an application for judicial review it was held that although there
was no duty to give notice, nor to hear objectors before deciding
applications, and although the objectors did not have a "legitimate
expectation" in that no actual rights were affected by the decision,
the objectors submissions would have been "material" in planning
terms. The unusual circumstances of this case led to a duty to act
fairly, and this meant that objectors should be given an opportunity
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to make their objections which may have influenced the committee.
Therefore the council were in breach of their duty.
Walsh (1988) concludes that the courts may intervene if the process is
seen to be unfair, but they do not seem to recognise a "legitimate
expectation" to consultation outside the statutory requirements,
except where, as in the Great Yarmouth case, there has been a
departure from the norm (p19). However, Hinds (1988) maintains that
where an authority's practice has created an expectation that a
decision will not be taken until neighbours or others have been
notified and/or given an opportunity to object, and that such
objections will be duly considered, it will be a breach of natural
justice to frustrate these expectations (p744). He cites the Torfaen 
case to support this proposition and also says that the courts are
developing a concept of fairness in this area, believing that the
standard of fairness required by the Town and Country Planning Acts
could lead to greater procedural rights for objectors generally
(p748).
Despite these developments, the courts have only a limited application
in redressing grievances in relation to planning matters, and the
respondents to the Sheffield Study survey appear to be content that
this should remain so. Only one respondent believed it was desirable
to reform the complaint handling process by extending the powers of
the courts. Most respondents also believed that the decisions of the
courts have limited effect on their internal procedures, with only 29%
(38) of respondents claiming that their internal procedures had been
affected by court cases, compared to 67% (88) who said that the Local
Ombudsman's decisions had affected their procedures.
The courts still adhere to the underlying principle that "the
controlling process of town and country planning over the development
of land is an Administrative (and not a Justiciable) process" (Heap
1987, p222. Original emphasis). A challenge in the High Court must be
on a point of law. The courts cannot look at the merits of the
decision:
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"We are not a Court of Appeal from the Planning Committee. We
cannot substitute our views for that of the Planning Committee"
(per O'Connor L.J. in R v. London Borough of Haringey. ex parte 
Barrs and Faherty [1983] IPL 54).
This does limit the usefulness of the remedy.
The right of appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment is
limited to an aggrieved applicant for planning permission. Section
36(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 allows such an appeal
within six months, if planning permission is refused, or is granted
subject to conditions which are unacceptable to the applicant.
Section 37 allows a similar right of appeal if the local planning
authority fails to give a decision at all within eight weeks. The
Secretary of State may allow or dismiss the appeal, may vary any part
of the decision, and can deal with the application as if it had been
made to him in the first instance (section 36[3]). He can, thus, add
more onerous conditions than those originally imposed by the local
authority, or refuse planning permission where the local authority
originally granted it (see Heap 1987, p220).
Some authorities visited during the Sheffield Study fieldwork
expressed dissatisfaction with the way the appeals system was
operating, believing that in recent times the Secretary of State has
tended to approve large commercial developments even when the
authority believed it was against the public interest. Some wanted
the right of appeal removed in cases where the planning authority had
a publicly declared policy which had been through the consultation
process and obtained the approval of central government, and the
application was contrary to this policy. 	 Appeals on questions of
interpretation of the development plan would be in order, but not
where there was a clear dispute of the policy. Where such appeals
were allowed, it would "drive a coach and horses through the policy".
One officer complained that not only are inspectors remote figures
from central government "but they are all too willing to follow DoE
circulars which may conflict with local and structure plans".
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Although central government wanted to encourage small businesses and
enterprise, officers thought that this policy should not be enforced
at the expense of development plans, which identified matters of local
importance, and which were drawn up after consultation with the local
population.
Some officers thought that there had been an increase in the number of
appeals in recent years, and thought that this was because, as
applicants now had to pay for their applications, they were more
reluctant to accept a refusal. Some thought that a system of payment
for appeals would prevent obviously frivolous ones, but there was
little support generally for the introduction of a system of payment,
or for the award of costs against the unsuccessful party.
However, the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI 1985) believes that
costs in appeal decisions should be more widely awarded "both against
local authorities in wasting time and money in reaching thoroughly
unjustifiable decisions and appellants who likewise make cavalier
appeals contrary to publicly agreed and up-to-date plans and policies"
(p6 pars 25). Costs can be awarded in planning appeals where there is
"unreasonable" behaviour which causes the other side to incur costs
unnecessarily (see DoE 1987 Circular 2/87), and in the twelve months
up to the 31st May 1990, costs were awarded to the local authority in
53 cases (see Journal of Planning and Environment Law 1990, p564).
There are also proposals to introduce fees for planning appeals which
are proving "perhaps surprisingly, relatively uncontroversial" (Howard
1989, pi). The government is, apparently, worried by the increase in
the number of appeals (in the year 1988/89 planning appeals increased
by 14% to over 21,000. See Journal of Planning and Environment Law
1990, pl), not only because of the resource implications, but because
some see "this 'planning by appeal' as a centralisation of decision-
making" (Howard 1989, pl). Howard (1989) states that the government
believes that decisions that have local implications should be taken
at the local level against the background of locally agreed policies
and proposals (p1), and there are proposals to legislate to prevent
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repetitive or substantially similar applications being made within two
years of an unsuccessful appeal where there has been no national
change in circumstances (p5).
These proposals will have implications for some authorities visited
during the Sheffield Study fieldwork which relied on the fact that it
was a relatively easy matter for applicants to appeal, and therefore
rejected applications if they were unsure. One officer said that a
newly elected administration tended to reject up to 40% of
applications because at first they are unsure and realise that people
can appeal to the DoE, which then bears the responsibility and blame.
Once the administration is established only 15-20% of applications are
rejected as members gain confidence in their ability to make
decisions. Another officer thought that the ease with which people
could appeal meant that councillors were more happy to go against
officer advice.
This technique was also used in cases where the planning committee had
not yet formed a policy. In such cases the practice would be to
refuse the application, even if officers had recommended approval,
until they had established their policy. This kind of tactic had been
used in the area of conversions of dwellings into private residential
homes for the elderly.
Such practices are questionable, and, indeed, as long ago as 1949, the
Minister of Town and Country Planning criticised them:
"The Minister deprecates the practice of some authorities who had
admitted that, in order to avoid the responsibility of deciding
an application in favour of an applicant in a borderline case,
they preferred to refuse permission and place the responsibility
of deciding the application on the Minister. The Minister
advises that, in cases where no serious issue is involved and
where the authority can produce no sufficient reason for refusal,
the presumption should be in favour of granting the application"
(Minister of Town and Country Planning 1949, pare 5).
- 291 -
This approach is in contrast to some other authorities which reject
only about 10% of planning applications, because they have consciously
adopted a "negotiating style" when dealing with planning applications,
rather than placing a premium on arriving at a decision within the
statutory 8 weeks, as in some authorities. Rather than taking the
application as it stands, and, if it is refused leaving the matter to
the DoE appeal mechanisms, or a further application, the "negotiating
style" involves discussion with the applicant which may take longer,
but which ultimately results in an application which is acceptable to
all parties. This practice will be discussed in more detail later in
the chapter.
This system of appeal, does not help aggrieved third parties, such as
neighbours or local residents, who are opposed to the grant of
planning permission.	 They have no right of appeal to the DoE if
permission is granted. As already indicated, there was no support
among planning officers for the introduction of a statutory right of
third party appeal to the Secretary of State, because it was thought
to be open to abuse, wasteful of officers' time, and "would mean that
virtually all decision making is taken out of the local authority's
hands". Apart from the limited use of the courts, the most useful
remedy, and in many cases the only remedy, is to turn to the Local
Ombudsman.
The high number of complaints at Local Ombudsman level has already
been noted, and some of the reasons for this have already been
discussed. Most planning officers were very supportive of the work of
the ombudsman, and said that they had learnt a lot from them. The
majority of respondents to the Sheffield Study survey (67%, 88)
recognised that Local Ombudsman decisions had affected their internal
procedures and were quite content that internal departmental
procedures, backed up by the use of the ombudsman, were the best
method of dealing with complaints. Comments were made about the Local
Ombudsman being a valuable system which imposed discipline on the
planning committee, and which provided an impartial and neutral
judgement free from the influence of local and national government.
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There can be no doubt of the value of the Local Ombudsman in this
area, and the numerous examples observed during the Sheffield Study
fieldwork, where procedures had been improved as a result of ombudsman
investigations, can only lead to endorsement of the Royal Town
Planning Institute's view that in "recent years the Local Ombudsman
has been a force for consistency and open decision making" (RTPI 1985,
p6 pare 22). The Institute's practice has been to work closely with
the ombudsman, and "to guide its members on how to meet the standards
sought by the Ombudsman" (p6 pare 22) with a view to improving
performance.
Certainly, the ombudsman is working for consistency in decision
making, and has found maladministration where neighbours were treated
by two officers in "markedly different ways in similar circumstances"
(88/B/826); where planning permission was inconsistent with earlier
decisions of the council in relation to the land (88/C/1872 and
881C/1853); and where a failure to consult was contrary to normal
practice (88/Al2323). There are also cases of maladministration
because the authority had not followed their own procedures and
policies (see for example, 88/B/2059; 88/C/0510; 891C/0511).
One case (87/8/0493) illustrates the advantages of the ombudsman's
methods, over the courts. In this case the council had made
inadequate inquiries into the planning history of a site beside the
complainant's home, and the ombudsman found maladministration because
the council had not made sufficient enquiries. This case is a good
example of the use of the ombudsman when a complicated issue of mixed
law and fact presents itself. The courts could have made a ruling of
the law, had the facts been clear, but "it was only during the course
of the Local Ombudsman's investigation, that the facts actually
emerged" (Editors Note, Sournal of Planning and Environment Law 1990,
p295).
	
In this case, therefore, the courts would not have been
appropriate.
However, despite the obvious benefits of the ombudsman system in
improving procedures generally, and despite the fact that Crawford
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(1982) concludes that "not only does the Ombudsman provide a different
remedy but may indeed go beyond the remedies provided by the courts"
(p627), the limitations of the Local Ombudsman cannot be overlooked.
Firstly, the Local Ombudsman can only make a finding of
maladministration, and cannot look at the merits of the decision.
This is by virtue of the Local Government Act 1974, which states that
the ombudsman shall not "question the merits of a decision taken
without maladministration by an authority in the exercise of a
discretion vested in that authority" (section 34[3]). So, the
ombudsman will not substitute his view "for that of a professionally
qualified officer, if the officer has considered the matter properly
and observed the Council's appropriate procedures" (88/13/1836). In
another case where there was no obligation on the council to notify
neighbours and there were no guidelines to officers the ombudsman said
"I do not question the merits of the decision" (891C/0312).
Indeed during the Sheffield Study fieldwork, some officers mentioned
the fact that some complainants are "just lucky" that the
investigation finds some technical fault, however minor, upon which to
pin a finding of maladministration and there was a view that if the
ombudsman felt there was some injustice, there would be an effort to
find some administrative error. On the other hand, one officer had
doubts about the "narrow administrative" approach, taken by the
ombudsman in some cases, and thought that the ombudsman was "too
gentle" with local authorities on occasion.
This view, however, is not the complete story, and an examination of
local authority files indicates examples where some fault was found
but the ombudsman concluded that it would not necessarily have led to
a different decision by the committee. For example, there was one
case concerning a London borough where the complainant was a
commercial concern complaining that he had not been notified
personally of a planning application, involving neighbouring property.
The council's response was that it had never normally been the
council's practice to individually consult commercial concerns. The
CLA decided not to investigate, for the following reasons:
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“it would have been better for the council to have consulted you
at the time of the planning application 	  I do not believe
that any injustice has been caused to you as a result of their
failure to do so. If they had consulted you there is no
suggestion that any objections you might have made would have
resulted in the application not being approved" (CLA letter to
complainant).
No matter how serious the finding of maladministration and injustice
by the ombudsman, the planning approval cannot be set aside, and the
complainant is left with, in some cases, monetary compensation, or
just an apology. Councils are usually prepared tc. compensate tbe
complainant, and one Local Commissioner finds no difficulty in
obtaining satisfactory action from councils in complaints about
development control, as "increasingly, councils are recognising that
mistakes are sometimes made in the process of giving planning
permission and are prepared to take appropriate action (very often the
payment of financial compensation) to those adversely affected by the
mistake" (Mrs P. Thomas in CLA Annual Report 1988/89, p35).
During the Sheffield Study one case was noted, where an exceptional
remedy was agreed to by the council, which could not fail to satisfy
the complainants. In this case petrol storage tanks were erected
following planning permission, where the council admitted error on
their part. The council agreed to resite the tanks at great expense
which resulted in the Local Ombudsman discontinuing the investigation,
and writing to the council as follows;
"I would like to place on record my appreciation for the way that
this complaint has been handled by your council and for the
action which has now been agreed in spite of the high cost
involved. It is likely that I will cite this settlement in my
next annual report as an example of a council who not only
admitted that they had made a mistake, but took effective steps
to mitigate the effect of it".
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There is no doubt that the Local Ombudsman has been a force for the
good in the area of development control, in particular, in encouraging
departments to look at their procedures, and consult as widely as
possible before a decision is made. A number of authorities observed
during the Sheffield Study had a clear ombudsman record or very few
cases each year, which they all ascribed to "doing things properly",
taking time over applications, consulting widely, making site visits,
and adopting a "negotiated settlement" approach rather than a "formal
disputation" approach. All recognised that if public pressure or
neighbour objections were disregarded, the council could be open to a
charge of maladministration. They were therefore careful to take all
views into account and to be prepared to defer matters if there were
late objections. However, despite the improvements in planning
practice brought about by the Local Ombudsman, the large number of
complaints to the ombudsman indicates a need for some method of
dispute resolution within planning departments themselves. The extent
to which such procedures exist will be examined in the next section.
The Extent of Formal Complaints Procedures 
The Justifications for the use of complaints procedures in general
have been discussed at length in Chapter 7, and I have already looked
at the special needs of social services departments, but are there
reasons for planning departments to have complaints procedures?
Although it is probably true that those aggrieved by a decision of a
planning authority are more likely to complain whether there is a
procedure not, a formal grievance procedure may actually aid
management, as well as the complainant. If the procedure incorporates
a system of participation and monitoring, it will indicate trends for
complaints, which may then enable the department to amend existing
policies and practices. Good authorities recognise the usefulness of
complaints. For example, the procedure documents of one county
council noted that:
"Complaints are often helpful in that they can identify a
weakness in procedures and help improve our service for the
- 296 -
future. Even complaints without substance may be useful as
showing a need for a better understanding of what we do, why we
do it and how we go about it".
The Audit Commission (1986c) suggests that complaints can be used as a
system of monitoring in relation to development control (p30), and
suggests that good management "will recognise that tensions are likely
to occur between different interests in the planning process and will
have mechanisms for resolving conflict between one aspect of planning
and another" (p25).
Although it was argued by a few officers that grievance procedures add
another unnecessary layer of procedures to those already existing,
some of the larger authorities visited during the Sheffield Study
fieldwork which had the best and most advanced procedures, did not
share this view believing that good procedures reduce the number of
complaints going to the ombudsman, and that although making a thorough
departmental investigation could be a nuisance and time-consuming, it
was worthwhile because, either the complainant was satisfied, or, if
not, when a formal complaint was made to the ombudsman, they had all
the information available. When a correlation was made between
departmental ombudsman records and departments with developed
procedures, it was found that the six large authorities with excellent
Local Ombudsman records all had developed departmental or authority-
wide procedures. Five randomly selected authorities with neither
formal departmental procedures nor authority-wide procedures had below
average ombudsman records.
Another argument for the use of complaints procedures in the public
sector, which has already been discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, is that
the consumer of public services has a lack of choice. Although the
problem is not quite the same for planning as it is for social
services, where goods and services are allocated and rationed on an
individual basis, planners do make choices about the allocation or
removal of resources. It is therefore important that consumers,
especially involuntary ones, like third parties affected by a planning
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decision, can register their dissatisfaction. The large number of
complaints which come from third parties indicate the size of the
problem. There are obviously a large number of people who feel that
the formal planning system does not take their interests into account,
even though they are directly affected by it. A formal complaints
procedure would provide a channel for such grievances, in particular
from those who have little input into the planning process.
Such a procedure may also allow more participation from those people
who have traditionally been excluded from the planning process, which
has been dominated, according to McAuslan (1980) by lawyers on the one
hand, and the professional planners on the other (p2). Thus, he says
that the "law and lawyers have played a more significant role in
development control than in any other part of the planning system
since its creation in its modern form in 1947" (p147). The lawyer's
approach is private property rights orientated, which has found favour
in the courts (p180).
On the other hand according to McAuslan (1980) there is the planners'
ideology of public interest "as defined and administered by the
planners", which "sees individual cases as less important than the
furthering of the public interest as a whole" (p181). The conflict
has traditionally been played out by these two ideologies, and the
general public have traditionally been excluded from direct
participation. McAuslan (1980) concludes that "the ideology of public
interest is dominant over the ideology of public participation and
without significant changes in institutional structures and processes
in government, is likely to remain so" (p237). Within this context,
complaints procedures are a way of attempting to tilt the balance a
little, to involve otherwise excluded members of the public in the
planning process. As well as allowing members of the public to
contest the decision of planners, complaints procedures could also
provide additional information to planners to inform their decision.
As in social services, knowledge about the extent of procedures in
planning departments,. is based on the work conducted for the Sheffield
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Study, supplemented by recent developments in this area. 	 For the
Sheffield Study, postal questionnaires were sent to half the local
authorities in England with planning responsibilities (205
authorities) and the response rate was 64%. The questionnaire asked
not only about internal complaints procedures, but also about specific
aspects of planning practice, for example, publicity and consultation
practices in development control, and these returns were supplemented
by fieldwork in selected authorities.
The definition for complaints used throughout the Sheffield Study was
that contained in the 1978 Code of Practice (CLA 1978, para 1-2), but
this seemed to raise more problems in the planning area than in any
other service area within the local authority. This is partly
explained by the fact that some questions asked about internal appeal
mechanisms for complainants and appeals, but as the word "appeal" to
planners refers specifically to appeals to the Secretary of State
about the refusal of planning permission, some respondents wanted to
take issue with the definitions. Nevertheless, it became clear that
departments do have procedures for dealing with complaints which are
completely separate from the statutory appeals procedures.
This problem of definition was recognised by authorities in their own
internal procedure documents. For example, one authority specifically
stated:
"complaint should not be defined too narrowly. It will include
all those matters which from their context are obviously intended
to be complaints and also criticisms of the council, committees,
members, the departments, officers, procedures, letters and
documents etc."
This document also recognised that planning, by its very nature, can
give rise to disagreements, but that these are not necessarily
complaints against the council:
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"Objections received in response to normal public participation
processes are not to be regarded generally as complaints although
members of staff in doubt should seek the views of the Deputy
County Planning Officer".
Only 31% (41) of planning departments had formal written procedures
for dealing with complaints, the majority of these (36) being
applicable to all areas of the departments work. In the 5 departments
where the complaints procedure did not apply to all areas of work, the
procedure related to complaints about enforcement actions.
Such a low level of formal procedures did not appear to be a matter of
concern for the questionnaire respondents, as only 37% (49) though it
was even desirable for departments to have formal written procedures
for the resolution of complaints, which is in contrast to social
services departments where the over-whelming majority (79%) of
respondents thought that they were desirable. What is interesting
about this response is that, although 19 of the 89 respondents who did
not have a written procedure said that to have one would be a good
idea, 10 of the 41 respondents who did have a complaints procedure did
not think it was desirable, expressing a preference for a more
flexible, discretionary approach to complaints. This view was
endorsed by the fieldwork where most planning officers appeared to
believe that complaints are satisfactorily dealt with by informal
mechanisms.
Hammersley (1984) found similar attitudes when looking at procedures
in planning departments designed to obviate Local Ombudsman
involvement. Most authorities made no attempt to resolve complaints,
and believed that a special complaints committee, for example, would
usurp the powers of the ordinary committee, or would be an admission
of defeat.
Of the departments which had formal complaints procedures only 12
claimed to give these procedures publicity. However, this was found
to be an over estimate, as the majority tended to be internal
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documents for the benefit of officers and members. In only six cases
could it be said that publicity was given in "public" documents, three
of these being in the rates booklet, leaflets and notices in council
offices, and a further three making details available in the council
minutes only, which must have limited public circulation.
It should be noted that this section of the questionnaire was
specifically about procedures within the department for handling
complaints. Some departments without formal complaints procedures do
have authority-wide procedures, and therefore, although there appear
to be few departments with procedures, complaints may find expression
in the authority-wide procedure, a fact which was confirmed by the
fieldwork. Thus, although a number of planning officers wanted
informality and flexibility at the departmental stage, they saw the
value of a formal authority-wide procedure for complaints which were
not resolved at departmental level.
Of the minority of authorities which had formal procedures eight said
that complaints were dealt with by officers only, two by members only,
and the majority (28) had both officer and member involvement. From
the fieldwork, it became clear that senior planning officers treat
complaints as management problems rather than problems of
accountability, and the aim seemed to be to retain control over the
dispute. This was endorsed by the fact that only 167. (21) of
respondents thought it was desirable for there to be an independent
element in the final stage of a complaints procedure operated within
the planning department.
Certainly, during the Sheffield Study fieldwork, it became clear that
member involvement in individual cases was not welcomed or encouraged,
the view being that complaints are "Just another part of the general
business of a responsive, planning department". The members' role was
seen to be one of policy making, while officers were to administer
such policy, using their trained professional Judgement. Some
officers even thought that member involvement would lead to injustice
since decisions were technically correct and accorded with policy or
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not (a matter which was capable of being decided by planning officers)
and that member involvement usually meant that members were trying to
reinterpret, or even change, their own policy, which led to
inconsistencies. The clear impressions gleaned from these interviews
was that planners disapproved of member involvement in "administrative
matters" which, according to the officers, included complaints.
This is a further example of the "corporate management" approach in
local government which has been discussed in previous chapters, where
"the average councillor is squeezed between policy formulation at the
top, which is for chief officers and chief councillors, and
implementation at the bottom which is for the other officers"
(McAuslan 1980, p241). Most officers believed that members should be
discouraged from becoming involved in the daily running of planning
departments. This was especially the case when officers were
"negotiating" with applicants or developers, as "the applications
often change and members might pre-empt the committee's decision".
Although in some authorities complaints referred through a member were
given special treatment, and had a time limit for the response,
generally speaking members were discouraged from becoming involved in
individual cases, and there was nothing like the member involvement as
was found in, for example, housing departments. During the Sheffield
Study fieldwork it became apparent that in many cases members were not
even informed of ombudsman investigations, let alone other types of
complaints.
Planning officers certainly saw themselves as the experts, the
professionals, who could exercise impartial judgement, and who, in
many cases, doubted whether members could be as objective as they
were. This view is endorsed by Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI
1985), which spoke of the professions as "a force for impartiality and
standards" (p11) and their concern that "the ability of officers to
give impartial and independent advice .... should not be fettered"
(p9). This view has been discussed earlier in the chapter, and its
dangers have been recognised by McAuslan (1980), who noted that policy
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choices "have too often been blurred by implying that technological
scientific or social scientific research and factors have really left
only one choice open to the local authority" (1)244).
Despite the fact that members do not routinely become involved in
complaints against planning departments, and that officers are content
with this state of affairs, believing complaints are a management
problem and therefore best left to the officers, only a minority (37%,
48) thought that formal complaints procedures had advantages from the
point of view of management efficiency, which was, again, in contrast
to social services respondents, where the majority recognised the
positive role of complaints procedures and their use as a resource by
revealing weaknesses in the system. Most of those (17) who said there
were advantages for management efficiency said that they helped staff
to approach complaints in a standard and uniform way. Others thought
that procedures clarified the boundaries of a dispute and ensured a
resolution one way or another. Only 11 respondents saw the value of a
more systematic approach for monitoring purposes, so that operational
defects could be highlighted.
This view is not shared by the Audit Commission (1986c) which, while
recognising that there "is no single output for the Service which can
be sensibly looked at in isolation", nevertheless, "the level of
appeals and complaints" is one useful indicator to be taken into
account when assessing performance in relation to development control
(pH).
The majority (58%, 76) of planning departments claimed to have a
system for monitoring or logging complaints from members, or those
which were put in writing; 51 departments also included complaints
made in person, and 49 included telephone complaints. These figures
should be viewed with some caution, as the use of "complaints and
appeals" together may lead some respondents to include appeals to the
Minister, which they are required to log and monitor.
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The majority of respondents (73%, 96) claimed to use complaints and
appeals as a method of reviewing their administrative procedures, but,
as only 14% (18) claimed to produce a statistical analysis of such
complaints, this is probably done in an unsystematic way. Again,
during fieldwork, senior planning officers claimed that they could
spot trends in complaints, as there were so few complaints anyway, and
that statistical analysis was not necessary.
Only 17% (22) of respondents thought that there were advantages in
having statutory procedures for resolving complaints by members of the
public, the majority mentioning "natural justice", and "justice seen
to be done" as reasons for this preference. The majority (77%, 101)
preferred resolution within the authority, because it was less
complicated, cheaper and quicker, and a large number thought that the
ombudsman was perfectly adequate in keeping watch over the various
complaints mechanisms employed by planning departments. Some thought
that internal procedures were preferable because statutory procedures
may encourage complaints and harden attitudes.
The overwhelming majority were opposed to any change at all being
implemented by legislation. Thus 84% (110) did not want legislation
requiring a general authority-wide appeals procedure, 93% (122) were
opposed to the establishment of independent tribunals by legislation,
and 92% (121) were opposed to an extension of the powers of the
courts. Again, this view was endorsed by the fieldwork experience,
which revealed satisfaction with informal, internal methods, based
largely on discretion, with the Local Ombudsman as a last resort. Few
(31%, 41) even thought that it was necessary for local authorities
themselves to introduce reforms to the complaint handling process.
Most of these mentioned the introduction of written procedures, or
codes of practice. The majority of respondents (74, 56%) appeared
satisfied with the status quo, and some even pointed out (although the
Sheffield Study questionnaire did not specifically ask them to do so)
that complaint handling was a matter for local discretion and local
democracy:
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"it is for each authority to deal with as they judge appropriate
for the priorities and attitudes of their area".
This emphasis on local democracy was endorsed by the Royal Town
Planning Institute submission of evidence to the Widdicombe committee
(RTPI 1985), which, although recognising the importance of having some
method of challenging decisions "which must be capable of revealing
any abuse of power or discretion by a local authority", said that it
was "vital not to undermine representative local democracy by
providing excessive opportunities to seek to overturn properly made
decisions arrived at after public consultation and due consideration
by councillors advised by their officers and acting within national
legislation" (01).
Such a view ignores the particularly limited role the councillors play
in many development control decisions. McAuslan (1975) notes that
approximately 70% of planning applications are of a simple nature, and
that a large proportion are decided without discussion, on the
recommendation of officers. The vast majority (60%-70%) of all
development control applications are effectively delegated to the
staff for decision, and McAuslan thinks this is probably an
underestimate <060). He concludes that the general public have,
therefore, very little input in the decisions, as planners share a
common ideology, which is not influenced by their employing authority.
Only in rare cases is respect shown for the grassroots knowledge of
the councillors, the more common view being that councillors lack
professional understanding (p360). It must be rare, therefore, for
councillors to come to committee with independent views, and it should
not be forgotten, as Evans (1985) points out, that "the basic decision
on an application may be reached long before it gets anywhere near a
committee" (03).
Added to this is the greatly increased delegated powers in relation to
development control. The Local Government Act 1972 allows local
planning authorities to discharge their planning functions under the
1971 Act by a committee, and allows them to appoint such sub-
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committees as they may determine for the discharge of any of their
functions (sections 101, 102). The authority can also delegate their
planning functions to an officer of the authority (section 101), in
which case the decision of the officer becomes automatically the
decision of the authority, but they cannot delegate to a single
member, even if that member is chair of the planning committee (see R
v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte London Borough of 
Hillingdon (1986] W.L.R. 192).
During the course of the Sheffield Study research a variety of
practices in relation to delegation was discovered. For example, in
one authority officers make decisions for approval on less important
applications, so long as these are not against the policy of the
authority and there are no objections. In this authority almost all
applications which go to the committee will have officer
recommendations which are usually followed by the members, and members
are "encouraged to defer a decision if they are unsure", rather than
refuse or approve.
In most authorities the pattern was that officers had delegated powers
to grant permission in minor matters, for example extensions, where
there were no objections, and where the development was in line with
the council's policy. In most authorities these delegated matters
accounted for between 50%-55% of the applications. Where there were
objections these were referred to committee. In most cases all
matters would have an officer recommendation, although, of course,
members were entitled to disagree with the recommendation. However,
in some authorities, the officer recommendation was available to the
public, and therefore officers warned members that this information
may be used by a dissatisfied applicant in an appeal to the Secretary
of State, or by a dissatisfied objector in an appeal to the ombudsman.
Most authorities did not delegate the power of refusal to officers,
but one London borough did allow officers to refuse on minor matters.
It is not suggested that there should be no delegation, nor that
officers should not make recommendations, as this would clearly make
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the process unworkable, and impossible to adhere to the statutory time
limits. However, having recognised the limitation of member
involvement, both before and at committee, there can be little
argument of the "undermining representative democracy" - type against
the introduction of mechanisms for complaint by aggrieved parties.
There is also a need for procedures for obtaining as much information
as possible in relation to a planning application, and for
opportunities for objectors and applicants to make their views known.
It is to these aspects of the development control process to which I
will now turn.
Although the numbers of planning departments with complaints
procedures was disappointingly low, some good practices were
discovered which indicated that some authorities were concerned, not
just with processing complaints, but with. ensuring that people knew
when and how to complain; that complaints were taken seriously, and
that officers believed that consumers should be given an opportunity
to challenge decisions. What was important in these authorities was
that the culture of the planning department was orientated towards
taking complaints seriously.
One of the major requirements of a complaints procedure is that it
should be accessible to all, including the inarticulate and poorly
educated, whom evidence has shown, are often reluctant to complain.
The Sheffield Study consumer survey endorsed the findings of other
surveys which showed that it is the higher socio-economic classes who
complain, and that this is especially true of planning cases.
Part of accessibility is good publicity, and indeed, many officers saw
publicity as they key to dealing with complaints. Evidence from the
Sheffield Study survey and fieldwork revealed a depressingly low level
of publicity for the complaints procedures which existed. This calls
into question the value of procedures, when only the extremely
determined or persistent complainer who is sufficiently knowledgeable
will use them. Authorities with good practices in this area were the
ones which encouraged the idea of partnership between people and
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planners, which stressed negotiation and bargaining. This point will
be taken up later, but complaints procedures were seen as a natural
part of this kind of approach, which encourages officers to be less
defensive and less hostile, seeing complaints as a natural part of the
administrative workload.
These authorities with good procedures were the ones which took
account of the differing seriousness of complaints and had procedures
for dealing quickly and efficiently with those that could easily be
handled by an explanation or an apology. There was however provision
for a more formal stage for those who are not satisfied at this stage,
where a more thorough examination of evidence was required, and a
decision taken at a more senior level. The best practices observed
were the ones where the complainants had at least one opportunity to
put their cases orally.
The members' role in the procedure needs a great deal of care and
thought. In most cases, officers, some at a very senior level, were
the most appropriate persons to deal with complaints. However,
members are ultimately responsible for the running of the authority,
and there should be some recognition of this in the complaints
procedure. The planning officers' views of themselves as the
professional, impartial decision-makers came across most strongly
during fieldwork, and whereas some division of labour and officer
delegation is obviously necessary because of the sheer volume of work
(for example, one authority had fortnightly planning meetings where
there were often 500 sheets of paper to get through; another had
weekly meetings, consisting of 45 applications) some officers seemed
to be tipping the balance too much towards administrative efficiency,
at the expense of public accountability and decision-making.
As well as complaints procedures, there is a need for procedures for
obtaining as much information as possible in relation to a planning
application, and for opportunities for objectors and applicants to
make their views known. It is to these aspects of the development
control process to which I will now turn.
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Consultation Practices and Procedures 
As we have seen, there is little a third party can do to overturn a
planning decision once the local planning authority has granted
planning permission. We have also seen that the applicant is entitled
to planning permission unless there are good reasons why this should
not be granted, but there has arisen "a customary right of
consultation", which is looked for by the ombudsman (TCPA 1980, p133),
and the better authorities, examined during the Sheffield Study, had
well developed consultation practices, which, in many cases, prevented
complaints arising because the public became involved at the decision-
making stage.
However, even though the Skeffington Report (1969) recognised the
right of the public to become involved in the planning process, the
legal rights of objectors are fairly limited. The planning acts
provide for only limited consultation and notification of proposed
development. Section 27 of the 1971 Town and County Planning Act
provides that an applicant for planning permission must notify the
owner or certain persons having other interests in the land which is
the subject of the application, unless, of course, the applicant is
the "owner" (as defined by section 27 (7]) in fee simple of all the
land comprised in the planning application. When the decision is
reached, the planning authority must give notice of the decision to
any such person (section 29[3][6]), as well as to the applicant.
Section 26 of the 1971 Act provides that certain classes of
development must be advertised in the local press, and have a site
notice displayed on the land affected by the development.
Representations can then be sent to the authority within 21 days, and
any representations must be taken into account by the local planning
authority when it is determining the application (section 29(21).
This procedure is only to be used for certain limited types of
development, usually referred to as "bad neighbour" development, and
it relates to the following: construction of buildings for use as
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public conveniences; construction of buildings or use of land for
waste disposal, or as a scrapyard; construction of buildings which are
higher than 20 metres; use of land or buildings for use as a
slaughter-house; construction or use of buildings for such purposes as
casinos, funfairs, cinemas, gymnasia, swimming pools; construction or
use of buildings or land for use as a zoo, or for the business of
boarding or breeding cats or dogs; construction of buildings or use of
land for motor car or motor cycle racing; use of land as a cemetery
(General Development Order 1977, article 8, S. I. 1977 No 289).
These statutory requirements give only a limited right to consultation
but DoE Circular 71/73 "Publicity for Planning Applications, Appeals
and other Proposals for Development" (DoE 1973) has suggested
improvements to the system. The declared principle of this circular
is that "opinion should be enabled to declare itself before any
approval is given to proposals of wide concern or substantial impact
on the environment" (pare 2). The circular suggests that local
authorities should ask applicants to display a site notice where
permission is sought which "in the authority's opinion, is likely to
have a substantial impact on the neighbourhood" (pare 7), and that
other forms of publicity, for example, press and local radio handouts,
and notices in public libraries, should be used as appropriate (pare
11).
Despite these improvements, the emphasis is still on the "public
interest" ideology, as paragraph 3 of the circular indicates:
"Planning is concerned to ensure that in the development of land
the public interest is taken fully into account. Its objective
is not the safeguarding of private property rights as such; nor
in particular, to protect the value of individual properties or
views to be had from them. Those who argue for a right for
neighbours to be notified individually of all prospective
developments do not give sufficient weight to this" (DoE 1973,
pare 3).
- 310-
This sentiment has been endorsed more recently by Nicholas Ridley, the
then Secretary of State for the Environment, who commented at the
National Housing and Town Planning Conference in 1987:
"Planning is seen as the mechanism by which change can be
resisted and established interests are protected - the view from
my window, the fields down the road, the value of my property
.... it is not the function of the system to resist change as
such, nor to act as a sort of costless restrictive covenant for
those who are already sitting pretty and want to control their
neighbours activities" (Quoted in Walsh 1988).
Despite these views, the Sheffield Study survey found much more
neighbour consultation than that recommended by the circular, and few
officers had the same doubts about citizen participation, expressed by
Heap (1973) that such a principle seemed to strike at the very roots
of elective democracy. He believed that the elected representatives
should be left to "get on with the Job" and that the principle of
citizen participation leads to town planning control by angry
neighbours" (pp201-215).
87% (114) of the respondents to the Sheffield Study survey said that
they had sought to comply with the non-statutory publicity
recommendations of the circular. An earlier study of London
authorities found that 68% (14 out of 22) complied (Evans 1985). It
was not clear from the Sheffield Study responses whether departments
complied with it all or just part, but what was clear was that many
authorities are doing much more than the circular suggests. The
circular emphasises site notices and press adverts, and explicitly
opposes notification of adjoining neighbours on all applications.
However, 62% (81) of authorities had adopted formal resolutions about
consultations with third parties, and all but four of these revealed
that they notified neighbours extensively.
For example, 12 authorities consulted all neighbours of the proposed
development.
	 Forty four authorities consulted those "affected", and
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eight required site notices or press advertisements for all
development. 52% (68) required site notices for some types of
applications, and 55% (72) thought it was a good idea to have site
notices displayed by applicants for planning permission.
Fieldwork confirmed this favourable attitude to neighbour
notification, and in some cases site notices, and officers were
convinced that extensive consultation prevented complaints to the
Local Ombudsman and findings of maladministration when complaints were
investigated. One authority had even been criticised by the Audit
Commission for doing too much consultation, but they balanced this by
the fact that there had been no formal complaint to the ombudsman in
the previous 5 years. Another officer remarked that "even though
consultation is expensive, it is cheaper than dealing with ombudsman
complaints", a view endorsed by officers in other authorities.
Not surprisingly the information gleaned from third parties was used
in the decision-making process. 39% (122) of respondents said that
the views of third parties were taken into account in deciding an
application, and 96% (126) brought to the attention of the planning
committee public petitions on proposed development.
Even within the framework of policy statements, there is still much
room for officer discretion in deciding which third parties to
consult.	 Words like "adjoining neighbour", "substantially affected"
and "significant alteration" are all capable of differing
interpretations. Nevertheless, 73% (95) thought that a national code
of practice in relation to publicity would be desirable, the majority
(76) believing that this would give greater uniformity across the
various planning authorities, and help to clarify the position for
applicants and objectors who may often be confused by the different
practices.
Of the 34 (26%) who disliked the idea of a code of practice, the
majority (17) preferred to have local discretionary policies which
could cater for local needs, and they believed that Circular 71/73
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(DoE 1973) was sufficient. Others said that a code would be too much
of an imposition on local democracy. Two respondents were opposed to
codes of practice because of their ambiguous legal status, and wanted
more statutory requirements in relation to publicity.
In Scotland, there is a legal requirement for neighbours to be
notified, by the applicant, who has a general duty to notify those
having a "notifiable, interest in neighbouring land" about the making
of the application (Town and Country Planning (General Development)
(Scotland) Order 1981, Article 7). Commentators have noted the
increased administrative burden that this places on both the planning
authority and the applicant (see Journal of Planning and Environment
Law 1985, pp289-290; Rae 1985; Berry et al 1988), and there are mixed
feelings about the usefulness of the requirement. One advantage is
that it may lead developers and neighbours to seek some kind of
compromise before any application for development is made, but
problems can include delay and extra costs, and also planning
officials can be led into "unpleasant domestic and civil disputes
which have nothing whatsoever to do with planning" (Rae 1985, p19).
Berry et al (1988) conclude that it is questionable whether neighbour
notification improves decision making, but that it has distinct
advantages over the site notice system in England and Wales, and that
"some system of formal notifications should be an integral part of
development control procedure" (p807). It seems then, that although a
statutory procedure may present problems, few would deny the
importance of consultation, and the problem is really one of informing
the decision-makers "of public opinion or specific issues without
weakening their responsibility to look more widely at the implications
for the area and community as a whole" (RTPI 1985, pare 17).
There is certainly an expectation of consultation and as has been
mentioned before, the ombudsman reports are dominated by complaints
from neighbours as the Local Ombudsman is often the only avenue of
appeal. These people often feel excluded from the decision-making
process, and, although the ombudsman cannot look at the merits of the
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decision they are frequently sympathetic, and occasionally find a
"technical" maladministration, for example, a minor alteration to a
plan, on which to hang a finding of injustice felt by a neighbour.
This feeling of sympathy for individual third parties is seen in some
of the reports, where maladministration has been found in cases where
not only was a policy to consult not adhered to, but also where there
was no policy, consultation being left to officer discretion, and no
consultation had taken place. Maladministration has also been found
where the judgement of officers had been based on inaccurate facts
about third party interest, and where a neighbour had been given the
wrong information.
Maladministration has also been found where the Circular 71/73 (DoE
1973) was not followed. Although the Association of District Councils
have recommended that planning authorities should avoid adverse
ombudsman findings by deliberately not adopting a formal policy about
third party consultations, the ombudsman can still find
maladministration for failure to consult. There was a case where the
council had considered the ADC advice in deciding whether or not to
consult, taking into account the possibility of a future ombudsman
investigation.	 The Local Ombudsman held this to be an irrelevant
factor when making that decision, and, found maladministration
(510/3782). Indeed, even without a policy on neighbour notification
there is "no less a duty upon the planning officer to be fair and
consistent in his approach" (TCPA 1980, p5).
The Sheffield Study survey revealed that four authorities had passed
resolutions to have no guidelines, to evade the ombudsman's findings,
in accordance with the ADC's advice. The Local Ombudsman, not
surprisingly, dislikes such action, and is very much in favour of
giving people "an opportunity to make their own views known about
neighbouring developments if they wish" (CLA Annual Report 1980, pare
41). They suggest that planning authorities should be responsible for
notifying interested neighbours and supplying lists of applications to
the local press and community organisations, while ensuring that
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applicants display suitable site notices (pars 44). 	 The ombudsman
also believes that it is not good administration for a local authority
have a policy of doing no more than statute law requires. "The
planning officers' motto should be 'when in doubt, notify'" (CLA
Annual Report 1986, p15 pare 44)
He also suggested that neighbours should be contacted directly by
postcard if there is any "significant" development or adverse change
of use on adjoining land, where development might entail overlooking
or overshadowing, or if there is a "substantial amendment" to a
proposal already notified (CLA Annual Reort 1986, p15 pare 44).
The Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA 1980) also believe
that it would be helpful "if the planning authority had a definite
policy for such local consultation, governing the types of application
to be advertised locally, the means and extent of such and procedures
for impartial consultation" (p5). Some planning authorities not only
had a definite policy, but also produced guidance notes and
information sheets for neighbours and other interested parties in
planning applications.
A number of other good practices in relation to consultation were
noted from the Sheffield Study survey response and from fieldwork.
When deciding whom to consult, many officers stressed the importance
of site visits, believing that it was not always possible to rely on
ordinance survey maps, especially for houses in multiple occupation.
Proforma letters were found to be better than postcards, and in order
to encourage a response, some authorities issued pre-paid reply
envelopes.	 An increasing practice was that of notifying in ethnic
minority languages where this was relevant. The ombudsman, in a
recent report (87/B/441) has suggested that councils should evolve a
procedure for making development proposals known to people who were in
the process of buying property likely to be adversely affected, and
that in order to do this, the letter of notification should be
addressed to "the occupier".
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The best authorities reconsulted where there were alterations to the
original application "where it was reasonable" to do so, and there
were some authorities who not only consulted neighbours whose property
physically adjoined that of the proposed development, but also a whole
street or neighbourhood where it concerned a large development, or the
development might have a dramatic impact on the community by, for
example, increasing the traffic or noise in an area. Another good
practice, in one of the London boroughs, was to inform objectors of
the council's decision, and the reasons why permission was granted or
refused.	 This can go some way towards allaying the fears of many
objectors that their views are not taken into account.
Site notices were also used where a development was likely to have
dramatic or widespread impact. Many officers preferred site notices
rather than direct consultation, but their use was not universally
acclaimed.	 Many officers expressed a dislike for site notices, an
officer of one large metropolitan borough believing them to be an
inefficient method of communication.	 Indeed, this authority had
passed a formal resolution not to use them, unless legally required to
do so. In response to the Sheffield Study survey, 47% (62) of
authorities admitted that they did not use site notices except where
they were statutorily required to do so. 42 of these respondents were
opposed to site notices in principle, saying that they were often
overlooked by the public and sometimes vandalised.
In order to aid the planning process, 89% (115) of respondents to the
survey supplied lists of planning applications to the local press.
Although 25% of respondents expressed some reservations about their
use, 73% thought that they were a valuable and cheap method of public
notification. Lists were also provided to parish councils. With the
aid of computers, several authorities found that they were able to
compile and supply lists of applications relatively cheaply, and many
have substantial mailing lists. Authorities had different policies
for charging for these lists, and costs could be a deterrent to some
groups and organisation.
	
Some authorities only charged commercial
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concerns, and community groups had a concessionary rate, or were not
charged at all.
Another developing practice which needs commending is the willingness
of some authorities to make further information and advice easily
accessible to possible objectors. Many would-be complainants were
satisfied once the planning officer had explained the extent and
impact of a proposal. There is still room for improvement. The
London Planning Aid's survey included a "public involvement charter"
(Evans 1985, p27), suggesting that interested parties should be
informed whether, for example, something is to be dealt with by
delegated powers, and that there should be access to the reports of
committees.
Few would deny the right of the public to become involved in the
planning process, and neighbours and other third parties now have an
expectation that they will be consulted over proposals which may
affect them. Consultation may reduce the number of planning
complaints, but it may also cause complaints, when, for example, the
correct procedures have not been complied with. There is also the view
that "public expectation exceeds the limit of planning custom,
practice and law", and that neighbours "very often find it difficult
to appreciate that the planning authority may not agree with their
views" (Rae 1985, p19). Given the inevitability of conflict
situations in the planning process, the authorities which seem to deal
best with problems are those that have deliberately sought to make the
process more accessible and have adopted a "negotiation" style. These
practices will be discussed in the next section
Negotiation and Accessibility 
McAuslan (1975) notes that planning is a problematic area because
there has to be a process of decision making which ensures that the
relevant information is gathered together, but that decisions have to
be taken without due delay and those people likely to be affected by
the decision have to be given an adequate opportunity to make their
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views known (0), and he concludes that the types of decisions taken
in planning are so disparate "that no one solution to the problems
outlined above has so far emerged" (p6).
Given these problems, and given the fact that people do not take
naturally to restrictions upon the development of their own private
property, those authorities visited during the Sheffield Study which
seemed to have the best approach were the ones which adopted a
"negotiation" style rather than a conflict one. They believed that
the way to overcome problems was to educate and persuade people about
the necessity for planning and then to spend considerable time
explaining what alterations might be necessary to an application in
order for it to succeed. These authorities also displayed a
willingness to hold site meetings and round table discussions and
conferences.
This informal approach is vindicated by the Department of the
Environment which believes that:
"Before a disappointed applicant for planning permission lodges a
planning appeal ... there should be consultation and negotiation
between the parties and other bodies or individuals affected.
Discussions of this kind can often resolve difficulties more
quickly and cheaply than appealing. An appeal is intended to be,
and should remain, a last resort" (DoE 1981)
The Department also believes that early informal discussions with
applicants and their agents is to be encouraged, so that applicants
can consider the scope for adjusting the scheme prior to formal
submission (DoE 1983, para 8Eiiiifl. Samuels (1986) also concludes
that in relation to the applicants challenging a decision "negotiation
or renegotiation with the local planning authority, probably with a
fresh application, is likely in practical terms to be the most
promising line to pursue" (p818).
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Some authorities visited during the Sheffield Study were convinced of
the need for this type of approach, and, paradoxically at first, these
were the authorities which rejected very few applications. For
example, only 5% to 107. of applications were rejected in these
authorities, which compares to a national average of 20%, which
involves a "northern" average of 14% (see Journal of Planning and
Environment Law 1990, pl). Officers in one authority spoke of the
importance which the city gave to promoting development, and "the
importance which development control staff give to advising and
negotiating with applicants to produce acceptable schemes". This
authority was obviously concerned about the environment and did not
want development at any cost, but the authority was committed to
"persuading, cajoling and educating the general public into a belief
that planning was a collective concern" and that each of them had a
part to play in creating a better community. 	 The high number of
successful applications was explained by painstaking liaison and
negotiation, and this approach was more likely to achieve development
which would benefit the city, while at the same time protecting the
community from development which would damage the quality of the
environment.
In another authority, there had been a conscious decision to adopt a
"negotiating style" rather than placing a premium on arriving at a
decision within the statutory eight weeks. They preferred to
negotiate rather than reject and leave the matter to the statutory
appeal mechanism.
	
Such approaches are to be commended, and these
authorities believed this was part of the procedures of a good
planning department. However, in a recent case, an authority was
making a charge of £25 for dealing with enquiries relating to
speculative redevelopment
purchasers of land or prope
or development proposals by prospective
rty. The case (R v. Richmond upon Thames 
LBC ex parte McCarthy and Stone (Developments) Ltd (QBD) IPL 1989,
p41) concerned judicial review, as the applicant contended that the
respondent had no statutory authority to levy charges in respect of
matters arising prior to the making of a planning application. It was
decided that there was power to make the charge, and there was
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Judicial approval for pre-application consultations with the council's
planning officers:
"It was quite clear that it was in everybody's interest that
there should be discussions before parties submit their full
application, between the developer and local authority, so
everybody knows whether the scheme is likely to be succesful or
not" (p44).
It was thought that £25 is a reasonable charge to make, but it was
hoped that, should such "consultation" fees become widespread, it
would not deter applicants from entering negotiations.
Authorities must also take care that these negotiations do not lead
objectors to believe that the council are, as a result, biased in the
applicants favour (see Local Ombudsman Report 87/B/001). The
authorities visited during the Sheffield Study were unlikely to have
such a charge levelled against them, as their approach involved
negotiation and accessibility for objectors and the general public, as
well as the applicant.
One London borough had an active consultation process and encouraged
public participation, trying to create an environment and procedures
for "frank and open liaison and consultation". Most authorities had a
general tolerance of the public at meetings, and good authorities
allowed the practice of objectors speaking at meetings. This appeared
to be a growing practice, whereby objectors could briefly present
their case, and a practice which was supported by the Town and Country
Planning Association, which believes than individuals and groups "with
a legitimate interest in a planning application must have the right to
speak, if desired, at the meeting deciding that application" (Evans
1985, p27). However, even the best authorities had to admit that the
demands of clear, efficient and effective administration necessitated
some limit on public involvement of this kind, and sometimes written
summaries of objections, or representatives to speak on behalf of a
number of objectors, was the best that could be offered.
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One authority did allow neighbouring landowners or occupiers to
personally present their objections if they wished. Both the
applicant and objectors are allowed five minutes to present their
case, and they are allowed lawyers or other representatives. The
planning committee usually make their decision straight away, and
reeons are given. Details of the hearing procedure are sent out with
the neighbour notifications, and officers spoken to believed that the
procedure filtered out a great deal of potential complaints.
Authorities have other procedures for bringing objections to the
attention of the committee, where personal attendance is not
available. Most summarise and present them as part of the general
report, but one had a special proforma report with a space for
objections.	 The members attention was thus drawn to the issue,
whether or not there were any objections. Other authorities had
special procedures to check that all objections were reported, and
this was especially useful for those which were submitted between the
preparation of the report and the committee meeting. Sometimes, all
the letters of objection were readily available for members, as well
as the written summaries.
The Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 has given
increased rights to the public in relation to knowledge about local
government decision-making, and planning is no exception. The public
are thus allowed access to committee meetings of the planning
authority (Local Government Act 1972, section 100A); to have access to
agendas (section 100B), minutes (section 100C) and background papers
(section 100D). These new enactments "greatly strengthen the hands of
any seeker after planning and development information when he
approaches the appropriate local planning authority in his search for
knowledge" (Heap 1987, p188).
Such wider public access to information, "should result in more
informed decisions and reduce the risk of decisions justifying
challenge" (RTPI 1985, p7 pare 29). The Royal Town Planning Institute
believes that total public access to council and committee meetings is
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essential and that "more open decision-making is less likely to be
partisan, and subject to challenge and in the long term may prove more
cost effective" (p7 pare 31). Such views were held by planning
officers in some of the better authorities visited during fieldwork.
All this confirms the view that planning is a "highly complex
decision-taking process which exhibits many of the characteristics
associated with bargaining" (Lichfield 1989, p43). Those authorities
with the best practices seem to have recognised this fact.
Conclusion 
Planning, and in particular development control, exhibits a basic
tension. There is a need to provide speedy decisions on planning
applications, but there is also a need to reconcile this with the
extensive consultation adopted by some authorities. This consultation
process itself raises awareness and expectation, and people often feel
a sense of grievance when the decision goes against them. The high
number of complaints about planning to the Local Ombudsman is just one
indication of the problematic nature of this area of local government
work, a problem exacerbated by the fact that it is the middle classes
who often feel aggrieved by planning decisions, and these are the very
people who are more likely to complain.
Few would now deny the right of the public to become involved in the
planning process, and the views of the public need to be sought to
inform the decision makers. However, the Sheffield Study research
found a disturbingly high level of "officers know best" attitudes
within planning departments, and an emphasis on the "professional,
impartial" approach, which appeared to spurn the members as mere
amateurs. Such an approach "reduces the democratic and representative
nature of government" (McAuslan 1980, p261), and allows little hope of
public participation. These authorities seemed unconcerned about the
level of complaints, and the low level of complaints procedures within
planning departments seemed to be a reflection of this attitude.
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However, there were good authorities which saw the necessity for
participation and consultation, and those authorities with the best
ombudsman records were the ones which had consciously adopted a
"negotiating style" with applicants, along with widespread public
participation. Not only did this result in fewer ombudsman complaints
but it also meant that more applications were successful and therefore
it was less likely that there would be appeals to the Secretary of
State. This approach did not result in developers pursuing their
proposals irrespective of objections from third parties, but rather
enables objections to be overcome by negotiation and modification.
These authorities recognised that planning is not merely a technical
exercise. In order to discover the likely impact of a proposal on the
environment it is necessary, in most cases, to take the views of those
affected by a proposal. This approach, therefore, feeds more
information into the decision-making process, and is less likely to
arouse a sense of grievance in those affected.
Of course, there are no easy solutions in this area, and an approach
which involved third parties in the planning process "has to be
balanced .... with practical consequences" <Crawford 1988, p254). The
applicant does, at least, have the right to appeal to the Secretary of
State. The public, too, need some imput before permission is granted,
as it is practically impossible to overturn permission once granted.
While it is difficult to suggest blanket policies for all authorities,
I can do no better than endorse the views of the London Planning Aid
Service, which suggest that such policies be based on basic principles
which "focus around informing people in ample time, about planning
applications affecting them, providing people with opportunities to
state their views on those applications and enabling people to
participate in decisions on those applications" (Evans 1985, p26).
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study was ambitious in its aims; to provide an overview of the
use of complaints procedures in local authorities in England; to
examine in more detail procedures in service areas within authorities;
and to drew some conclusions about the advantages of such procedures
and their effectiveness. It was also an attempt to set complaints
procedures in a theoretical context, both within a democratic culture,
and also in relation to the managerial imperatives of organisations.
The evidence revealed that only a small number of local authorities
had complaints procedures which were applicable across the whole range
of the authorites' work. Where there were procedures, some were in
disuse; sometimes officers and members had no knowledge of them; and
publicity for consumers was non-existent or patchy. Few authorities
actually encouraged complaints or comments from consumers. The
procedures themselves, in many cases, were little more than a
suggestion that a dissatisfied consumer could pursue his or her
complaint through the organisation's hierarchy until it finally
reached the chief executive, or appropriate member, or committee.
Despite this, there were authorities with very good procedures, and
with a level of investigation of complaints which were certainly of
the same standard of that of the Local Ombudsman, but these were so
few as to be remarkable.
As far as the service departments were concerned, experience varied
considerably, both in terms of the extent of such procedures, and the
perceived necessity and desirability for them. There was very much a
departmental view, which had little to do with the central, authority
view of complaints. Social services and planning departments were
examined in more detail to illustrate the use of complaints procedures
and to try to uncover some of the reasons for the divergence of views
across departments.
The evidence revealed that most officers wanted matters to be settled
internally, and there was little support for the extension of the use
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of appeals to ministers, the courts or independent tribunals. It was
found, however, that when there were such external appeal mechanisms,
there was more emphasis on attempts to settle matters within the
authority, with internal systems being instituted to achieve this.
There was also little support for the introduction of a statutory
obligation to provide complaints procedures, with many officers
feeling that this was, in some way, an attack on the idea of local
democracy. Set against this was the finding that the public saw the
advantages of, and would like, such procedures. From the study, it
appears that there has been little progress on the voluntary side, and
therefore, I believe that there should be a broad statutory obligation
for the introduction of complaints procedures. The increase in the
volume of complaints to the Local Ombudsman, since the abolition of
the member filter, indicates some problems within local authorities
themselves, as dissatisfied consumers are turning to the ombudsman.
The introduction of a complaints procedure would, at least, provide
some mechanism within the authority for complainants, and hopefully
reduce the number of Local Ombudsman complaints.
It was found that most disputes could be, and were, handled
effectively at officer level, but the role and impact of the member on
this process varied considerably, and there was differential
involvement in the different service departments. There was some
dispute and discussion about the role of members in complaint
handling, and a number of officers were critical of their
intervention. Although members do have an important role to play here,
it was found that they have neither the time nor the expertise to deal
satisfactorily with every type of complaint. Their effectivenes may
also be diminished by the very tension which may exist between them
and officers. This is said without prejudice to their important
function on appeal committees for extreme cases, which is mentioned
later.
There is also some member distrust by the general public, and some
cynicism about the way that complaints appear to be taken up with more
- 325 -
vigour by opposition members than by members of the ruling party.
Because of this, their role in dispute handling is limited, but, on
the other hand, members have the ultimate legal responsibility for the
running of the authority, and therefore an interest in complaints.
Part of the way around this dilemma is to recognise the important role
which members have, but to emphasise that the more appropriate role
is, perhaps, in the creation of policies within which a complaints
procedure can flourish, to allocate funds for its implementation, and
to monitor the results (see NCC 1988, p23). Also, given the fact that
ultimately members have the legal responsibility for the running of
the authority, they have an important role to play as a tribunal of
last resort within a formal complaints procedure.
Few officers saw the advantages of the use of complaints procedures
for managerial purposes, that is, for monitoring and information
gathering on policies and practices. There was little statistical
analysis of complaints, mainly because few authorities kept statistics
on a systematic basis, and also because few officers recognised the
value of such analyses. This is in marked contrast to some of the
newly privatised industries. For example, the gas industry has
sophisticated methods of using complaints for quality control
purposes. Some officers admitted that procedures had been changed as a
result of complaints, but this was invariably done in an unsystematic
way, as it relied on particular problems coming to the attention of
officers of sufficient seniority to implement such a change. In this
respect, the evidence from the U.S. indicates a more advanced use of
complaints.
Despite the fact that this study, and others, found that the majority
of the public seemed satisfied with local government, this does not
prevent there being concern about those who are dissatisfied,
particularly in areas like social services, where this dissatisfaction
may never come to the surface. Complaints procedures would be useful
in testing true satisfaction, particularly if people were encouraged
to complain, and the process was not seen as somehow illegitimate.
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It was found that complaints were mostly resolved at officer level,
and invariably within the service department concerned. As this is the
site of decision making, this is the proper place for the complaint to
be resolved, but where a satisfactory result is not obtained at this
level, the ability to take a complaint to an authority-wide procedure
is desirable. The value of such procedures is that usually the chief
executive's department oversees them, ensuring a more neutral stance,
and, besides providing a fail-safe mechanism, providing a kind of
administrative review of the complaint. The best procedures were found
to be those which allowed for a personal appearance by the
complainant, and such procedures emphasised the importance of giving
clear reasons for decisions at all stages of the process. It was also
evident that the few complaints which proved to be resistant were best
handled by a sub-committee of members. Given the fact that the best
procedures involved chief executives at some level, and given the fact
that members are ultimately legally responsible, some work must be
done by local authorities to establish the optimum relationship
between chief executives and members in this area.
Despite the fact that individual service areas should have internal
complaints procedures, authority-wide procedures are essential. In
some areas of local authority work, departments are legally obliged to
have complaints procedures, and I would agree with the National
Consumer Council that in view of this, it "makes sense....to move
towards a single coherent system" (NCC 1988, p19), because it creates
consistency across departments; it ensures that all consumers have
access to a procedure; and it clarifies and eases access for
consumers. In addition, such a procedure could indicate that the
authority, as a corporate body, was prepared to respond to consumer
dissatisfaction. An ad hoc approach, which responds to specific
regulations, does not necessarily encourage staff to think in terms of
the consumer interest, but "could reinforce a grudging attitude
towards legal requirements" (NCC 1988, p19). An authority-wide
complaints procedure shows a commitment which runs throughout the
whole authority.
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This then leads to another important aspect of such procedures. It was
found that some authorities had excellent sounding procedures, but
they were never used. Procedures in themselves are not enough. Those
procedures which worked well were where there were other good
practices in the department, and where there was an attempt to change
attitudes and change the culture. The authorities with a commitment to
staff training in this area were the successful ones, so that the
practice became an institutional response, rather than an individual
response. A corporate change of attitude to complaints is also
important, so that staff feel supported, and therefore less
defensive.Those few authorities with complaints officers are to be
commended, and it was found that where they are outside the management
structure they can be more effective, as they can bring an independent
element into the procedure.
What did become evident during the research was that different
problems require different responses, so, for example, in social
services departments the kinds of procedures needed to resolve a
complaint about the allocation of resources may be different to that
concerning the outcome of a professional decision. Procedures should
take these matters into account, and what is needed is a broad
commitment and general set of obligations and duties in relation to
complaints, with specific procedures to fit particular needs.
Since the completion of the Sheffield Study, there are signs that
gradually local authorities may be changing, and this change may be
due, in part, to the Sheffield Study itself, as, on a number of
occasions during the fieldwork, officers remarked that the research
had alerted them to the need for a complaints procedure. The change is
also due to the rise in consumerism, and the focus on the consumer has
not only been relevant in the private sector. The European Commission
speaks about the "third partner - the consumer", and the Consumer
Affairs Division of the European Community is currently attempting to
encourage consumerism in public authorities, as well as in the private
sector. The fact that there is discussion about the setting up of a
European Ombudsman Institute is also a recognition of the value of
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dispute solving agencies outside the courts. The Next Steps Initiative
(1990), too, emphasises the needs of consumers of organisations, and
the aim of improving customer service. Much of this is about
efficiency' and economy, but, as has been argued in the thesis,
efficiency is not Just about money-saving, but about giving value for
money, which calls for some measure of effectiveness.
The dangers and problems of the private sector model of the consumer,
with its emphasis on competitiveness, has been discussed. Indeed the
Next Steps initiatve itself recognises the problems of using
competitive language when it is inappropriate, as this creates "a gap
between the rhetoric and the reality" (Next Steps Initiatve 1990,
p87). There are situations where private sector approaches are
relevant, but the analogy cannot be strained too far, and the
constraints placed on public sector managers, which are different to
market forces, must be taken into account.
It is admitted therefore that the place of consumerism in the public
sector is problematic, and has to be developed. However, despite being
wary of the attempt to translate too readily the practice of the
market to public sector bodies, the emphasis on the consumer has
resulted in improvements in the public sector. In the recent annual
report, the Local Ombudsman has recognised that the ides of customer
care can only be good for the consumer, and a factor likely to reduce
complaints. He notes that it is some of the most 'value for money'-
conscious councils which have introduced excellent complaints
procedures, and which are looking at complaints and consumer
satisfaction from the angle of performance review (CLA Annual Report
1989/90, p30).
This emphasis on internal complaints procedures does not ignore the
necessity for the Local Ombudsman. No matter how good the internal
procedures, there is still a need for an outside body, an external
check on the authority. All the evidence points to the fact that the
Local Ombudsman has been a force for the good in local government, and
that officers within authorities show a great deal of respect for the
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ombudsman. Not only do authorities welcome the intervention of the
Local Ombudsman when there are particularly resistant cases, but there
is increasing evidence of enquiries from local authorities about good
practice, which are not prompted by particular complaints or findings
of maladministration (see CLA Annual Report 1989/90, p30).
Section 23 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 provides for
the Commission to give advice and guidance about good administrative
practice, but a recent communication with the Local Ombudsman's office
revealed that nothing concrete has happened concerning the
implementation of this section. The position as at October 1990 is
that the Commission has not yet published any guidelines or
information for local authorities on good administrative practice in
general. The Local Ombudsman is asking for resources to implement the
section, but as yet, no-one has been appointed to oversee this area of
work. Discussions are taking place within the office, and there is an
intention to publish good practice guides for authorities in the
future.
The Local Ombudsman's methods may, in many cases, be an ideal way of
resolving a problem, as, on the one hand, an authority's investigation
held in private may not command public confidence. On the other hand,
a formal public enquiry can be costly and have adverse effects on
staff morale. The Local Ombudsman, having "flexible investigative
procedures", has an advantage over these two methods (see CLA Annual
Report 1989/90, p5).
There is no doubt that many authorities respond in a positive way to
the Local Ombudsman, and that the Local Ombudsman has been responsible
for improving procedures generally within authorities. But, despite
this, the emphasis should still be on resolving complaints within the
authority, and the most effective way of doing this is by the use of a
complaints procedure.
The role of the courts should also not be ignored, but the aim should
be, as with the Local Ombudsman, to keep matters out of the courts as
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far as possible, and only to use them as a last resort. An advantage
of having statutory appeals mechanisms involving the courts is the way
that this encourages authorities to use negotiation and other internal
procedures to resolve problems, in an attempt to keep matters out of
the courts. This is one of the advantages of an external check.
Although there is evidence of change, and that authorities are seeing
the necessity for complaints procedures, there is much work to be done
in this area. The role of the consumer has to be established, and
connections have to be made between the public and the private
provision of services. The role of the member, the courts and the
Local Ombudsman also need further discussion in relation to the part
they play in access to justice for individuals. The argument for clear
and accessible complaints procedures seems to have been won, and now
few would deny that good procedures and well trained staff are "the
best safeguard for clients" and in the interests of "professionals and
the wider public" (NCO 1988, p6). What is now needed, and what the
debate is focussing on, is how this can be translated into practice.
This debate will, no doubt, continue for some time in The future, and
this thesis is, hopefully, a contribution towards it.
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